Research Alerts: Home

Atlantic Council. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Post updated as the story develops).
“On Wednesday, US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced a new defense partnership among their nations that will furnish Australia with new nuclear-powered submarines. The pact, known as AUKUS, is a clear challenge to China in the Indo-Pacific and a deepening of military ties among close allies of more than a century. But it could ruffle the feathers of other allies. Our Atlantic Council experts break down the implications.”

Niblett, Robin. (London, UK: Chatham House, September 18, 2021).

Chatham House. (London, UK: Chatham House, September 16, 2021).
“Chatham House experts examine the potential implications of the new defence and security partnership between the UK, US, and Australia known as ‘AUKUS’.”

Kapetas, Anastasia. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 21, 2021).

Jennings, Peter. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2021).

Barker, Geoffrey. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2021).

Nicholson, Brendan. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 16, 2021).

Stoltz, William A. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2021).

Schaus, John, and Michael Shoebridge. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 15, 2021).
“This memo comes out of cooperative work between two think tanks—the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)—and is intended to support President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Scott Morrison in setting directions and making decisions for the U.S.-Australia alliance for the purpose of advancing joint prosperity and security.”

Dortmans, Peter, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The Royal Australian Navy has embarked on an ambitious plan to modernise its maritime capabilities to support Australia's defence strategy. The ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’ calls for Australia to be ready to shape the strategic environment, deter actions against its interests and respond with military force when required. Maritime capabilities feature heavily in the update, including those related to robotics, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (RAS-AI). The Navy recently established the RAS-AI Directorate, giving it the responsibility of developing a maritime RAS-AI strategic roadmap to provide a path for developing and employing RAS-AI out to 2040. In this report, the authors provide an evidence base to inform the Navy's thinking as it develops its RAS-AI Strategy 2040. Analysing a range of information captured through a literature review, environmental scan, interviews and workshops, the authors make observations that should shape the evolution of the strategy. A framework for the strategy, consisting of the future operational context, potential RAS-AI effects and a high-level technology roadmap, is developed and populated, and objectives for RAS-AI and implementation lines of effort are identified and discussed. For the Navy's RAS-AI strategy to succeed, its implementation needs to be planned in a manner that recognises the evolving environment that the service will contend with over the next two decades.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated September 15, 2021).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress on three potential new shipbased self-defense weapons for the Navy - solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), also known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP).”

Posard, Marek N., Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Laura L. Miller. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The vast majority of military personnel and their families are not extremists. But even a small number of people engaged in extremist activities could damage the U.S. military's reputation, its force, its members, and the larger community. Extremist activities can also be harmful to the individuals who are radicalized and their friends and family. To address the problem of U.S. military service members' exposure to and potential involvement in extremist movements, the authors present a framework for understanding and reducing the risk of extremism in the U.S. military. The framework calls for recognizing and scoping the problem, preventing future extremist views and activities, detecting and intervening when observing extremism, measuring extremist trends, and evaluating intervention measures. The U.S. Department of Defense has existing programs that support personnel and their families, promote diversity and inclusion, and prevent violence. The authors recommend a community-based approach that leverages existing military programs to better support commanders with their responsibilities for combating extremism. Such an approach would not only help prevent service members and their families from associating with extremist groups but also assist the military in responding sooner - and more effectively - if members do engage in extremist activities.”

Connolly, Richard. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).
“This Emerging Insights paper analyses Moscow's ambitions for its 'pivot to the East', assesses its progress and evaluates the impact of the Indo-Pacific concept on Russian strategy.”

Quiggin, Daniel, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The risks are compounding, and without immediate action the impacts will be devastating.”
“At COP26, the governments of highly emitting countries will have a critical opportunity to accelerate emissions reductions through ambitious revisions of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
If emissions follow the trajectory set by current NDCs, there is a less than 5 per cent chance of keeping temperatures well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and less than 1 per cent chance of reaching the 1.5°C target set by the 2015 Paris Agreement. Unless NDCs are dramatically increased, and policy and delivery mechanisms are revised accordingly, many of the climate change impacts described in this research paper are likely to be locked in by 2040, and become so severe they go beyond the limits of what nations can adapt to. As well as the immediate physical and socio-economic consequences of changes in climate, the paper captures the systemic cascading risks likely to arise as these direct risks and impacts compound to affect whole systems, including people, infrastructure, the economy, societal systems and ecosystems.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 15, 2021).
“The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The PSC program has received a total of $1,754.6 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement funding through FY2021, including $300 million that was provided through the Navy’s shipbuilding account in FY2017 and FY2018. With the funding the program has received through FY2021, the first two PSCs are now fully funded… The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, ‘Polar Star,’ and one medium polar icebreaker, ‘Healy.’ In addition to ‘Polar Star,’ the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, ‘Polar Sea.’ ‘Polar Sea,’ however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. ‘Polar Star’ and ‘Polar Sea’ entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of ‘Polar Star’ until the delivery of at least the second PSC. The Coast Guard is using ‘Polar Sea’ as a source of spare parts for keeping ‘Polar Star’ operational.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: September 9, 2021).
“The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the following, all of which relate to China and/or Russia:
• grand strategy and the geopolitics of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
• organizational changes within DOD;
• nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
• the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments;
• U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
• new U.S. military service operational concepts;
• capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
• maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
• innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
• mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
• supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
• capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to renewed great power competition with China and Russia, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2021).
“In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 8, 2021).
“The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years… The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s force-level goal, its proposed FY2022 shipbuilding program, and its longer-term shipbuilding plans. Key questions for Congress include the following: Is the Navy’s emerging force-level goal appropriate for supporting U.S. national security strategy and U.S. national defense strategy? Is the more distributed fleet architecture envisioned by the Navy the most cost effective fleet architecture for meeting future mission needs? Is the Navy’s proposed FY2022 shipbuilding program consistent with the Navy’s emerging force-level goal? Given finite defense resources and competing demands for defense funds, what is the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans? Does the U.S. shipbuilding industry, including both shipyards and supplier firms, have adequate capacity for executing the Navy’s shipbuilding plans?”

Brown, Ryan Andrew, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Terrorism and ideologically inspired violence represent persistent and serious threats to U.S. national security. The January 6, 2021, attack at the U.S. Capitol and other recent events emphasize the need for more research to inform prevention and deradicalization strategies. In this report, the authors aim to characterize why and how individuals joined extremist organizations, as well as how some of them exited these groups. Semistructured interviews were conducted with former extremists and their family members, representing 32 unique stories of 24 white supremacists and eight Islamic extremists.”

Huguet, Alice, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Media literacy (ML) education has emerged as a promising approach to slowing the spread of Truth Decay, described as the diminishing role that facts, data, and analysis play in political and civil discourse. Several factors contribute to Truth Decay, including a rapidly evolving information ecosystem and overburdened educational institutions. Many teachers believe their students lack the complex skills that are necessary to navigate today's information-saturated world. This gap—between students' existing competencies and those required to engage responsibly in a fast-paced media environment—could lead to negative consequences for individuals and society writ large.
However, teachers report a lack of guidance around promoting ML education in their practice, and rigorous research about what kinds of ML education work best, and in what conditions, remains limited. This report presents a framework for implementing and evaluating ML educational efforts. Following an introduction to the framework, the authors discuss six steps of ML implementation and evaluation: setting ML learning expectations; identifying conditions that can influence ML instructional efforts; exploring instructional resources; identifying measures of ML competencies; monitoring progress; and finally, measuring the summative impacts of ML education on student learning. By bringing this information together for implementors—such as district decisionmakers and teachers—as well as evaluators, the authors emphasize the important connections between these too often separate groups.”

Cohen, Raphael S., et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“How are state adversaries using disinformation on social media to advance their interests? What does the Joint Force—and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in particular—need to be prepared to do in response? Drawing on a host of different primary and secondary sources and more than 150 original interviews from across the U.S. government, the joint force, industry, civil society, and subject-matter experts from nine countries around the world, researchers examined how China, Russia, and North Korea have used disinformation on social media and what the United States and its allies and partners are doing in response. The authors found that disinformation campaigns on social media may be more nuanced than they are commonly portrayed. Still, much of the response to disinformation remains ad hoc and uncoordinated. Disinformation campaigns on social media will likely increase over the coming decade, but it remains unclear who has the competitive edge in this race; disinformation techniques and countermeasures are evolving at the same time. This overview of a multi-volume series presents recommendations to better prepare for this new age of communications warfare.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Past NATO enlargement helped create a Europe whole, free, and at peace, but future enlargement, should it occur, faces a hostile and militarily revitalized Russia. This report examines the military requirements and resulting budget costs of extending NATO’s Article 5 commitment to countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are actively seeking NATO membership, and Sweden and Finland, about which there has been analysis and speculation about membership. Costs to the United States range from $11 billion per year to defend Ukraine to half a billion dollars or less to defend Sweden. The project recommends that NATO incorporate force requirements and cost considerations into its future decisionmaking.”

Faustman, Joshua M. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2021).
“In this paper, the author argues for establishing a separate and complete organizational identity for the United States Space Force. Leaders must manage and incorporate new cultural artifacts to foster the desired identity of the Space Force through heraldry and other historical items. Through the use of organizational identity theory, the author proposes a methodology to help establish corporate-level cultural guidance to develop this identity now and in the future.”

Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2021).
“The conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region has fueled a large-scale humanitarian crisis and attracted international concern, amid reports of starvation and atrocities. The war has taken a heavy human and economic toll, and it is spreading beyond Tigray.”

McInnis, Kathleen J., and Andrew Feickert. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2021).
“After a rapid Taliban campaign to capture cities and territories formerly controlled by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), on August 15, 2021, the Taliban took Kabul and the President of GIRoA, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country. Information regarding the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and U.S. troop numbers is fluid and should be treated with caution. This Insight, which may be updated as circumstances warrant, is intended to assist Congress as it considers the military and defense implications of the withdrawal while events unfold.”

Thomas, Clayton. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2021).
“Afghanistan’s geography, complex ethnic composition, and history of conflict and instability have created space for numerous armed Islamist groups, some of which have engaged in transnational terrorist activity. This product outlines major terrorist groups active in Afghanistan that are affiliated and allied with Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym Da’esh), and relations between these groups and other state and non-state actors, most notably the Taliban. The Taliban are not a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). These dynamics may inform assessments of U.S. policy in Afghanistan in light of the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country.”

Thomas, Clayton, and Sarah R. Collins. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 18, 2021).
“The status of Afghan women and girls is increasingly precarious in light of the Taliban’s takeover of the country in mid-August 2021.”

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2021).
“The year 2020 dawned with the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) that the world has yet to contain successfully. What are the security environment implications of this pandemic, which changed our life? Grappling squarely with this question, Chapter 1 discusses ‘pluralization’ in international politics even under the divisive pressure of U.S.-China competition. Focusing on the roles of non-U.S. and Chinese major powers as well as small and mediumsized countries in the Pacific and Europe, it presents the struggle for agency and autonomy of those countries. Chapters 2 to 6 are country and region-based analyses of major developments during January to December 2020, including each country/region’s responses to U.S.-China competition as well as the impact of COVID-19 on domestic politics and foreign policy. This edition of ‘EASR’ [East Asian Strategic Review] examines the increasingly assertive diplomatic and military positions of the Xi Jinping government, South Korea’s search for reconciliation with the increasingly coercive North Korea, ASEAN member states’ responses to the pandemic and the South China Sea dispute, the Putin administration’s constitutional amendments, and the U.S. policy toward China and outlook for the Biden administration. Chapter 7 presents relevant policy reviews, including Japan Self-Defense Forces’ response to COVID-19 as well as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that marked its 60th anniversary.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 30, 2021, streaming video, 1:30:26.
“The CSIS Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative are pleased to present the Eleventh Annual South China Sea Conference: Session One on Friday, July 30, 2021. This monthly webinar series will provide opportunities for detailed discussion and analysis of key developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. Panelists will address the strategic balance in the region and U.S. policy under the Biden administration. This session will feature a keynote address by Representative Elaine Luria, Vice-Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, followed by a panel discussion on the state of affairs in the South China Sea with Bonny Lin, Director of the China Power Project at CSIS, Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Nguyen Nam Duong, Deputy Director-General of the East Sea Institute at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.”

Matthews, Miriam, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The increasing frequency and intensity of information aggression targeting the United States and its European allies demands more thorough consideration of concepts and practices for protecting against, resisting, and mitigating the effects of psychological manipulation and influence. Russia in particular appears to use messaging and intimidation as part of its efforts to influence multiple actors and countries, including the United States and its European allies. Unfortunately, concepts and practices for understanding and resisting the potential effects of efforts conducted by Russia and its agents are few. To address this, United States European Command (USEUCOM) asked the RAND Corporation to identify strategies for defending against the effects of Russia's efforts to manipulate and inappropriately influence troops, government decisionmaking, and civilians. The authors describe apparent efforts conducted by Russia and its agents involving the use of information to shape Russia's operating environment, focusing on the European context; review and apply existing research on influence and manipulation to these efforts; and draw from existing practice to describe possible defensive approaches for USEUCOM and its various partners to consider using when defending against these actions. The framework the authors apply offers a way to conceptualize the objectives, tactics, and tools of Russian information efforts in Europe.”

Huxtable, Luke, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Despite the growing policy emphasis on understanding the value of UK defence, assessing the primary benefits of defence remains a challenge. Defence is inherently complex, and it remains difficult to prove that the non-occurrence of an event (e.g. a conflict) is directly related to the existence of defence capabilities and activities. Linked to these challenges, connecting defence activity and output to defence outcomes and benefits remains elusive. This study has explored the potential of five methodologies (lines of enquiry — LOEs) to measure the contribution of defence to UK prosperity in terms of its primary benefits (i.e. protection from external threats). These are:
LOE1 — defence analogue to Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
LOE2 — Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) measures;
LOE3 — insurance policy techniques;
LOE4 — logic models and proxy indicators; and
LOE5 — discrete choice experiments (DCEs).
This study has identified a range of insights for the Ministry of Defence on how to apply and further develop these methodologies towards measuring the primary benefits of defence. This study has been exploratory, and it was expected that not all approaches would be viable.”

Lim, Nelson, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The U.S. Coast Guard seeks to attract, recruit, and retain a workforce that represents all segments of U.S. society. However, in the current active-duty Coast Guard, representation of women and of members of racial and ethnic minority groups declines as rank increases, ultimately resulting in a less diverse senior leadership. These demographics are largely the cumulative effect of the service's personnel system in which the pool of potential senior leaders narrows at each stage of the career life cycle, along with the number of candidates from underrepresented groups. To identify the root causes of the underrepresentation of women and of members of racial and ethnic minority groups in the Coast Guard, researchers used a mixed-method approach involving literature reviews, analysis of personnel data, interviews with subject-matter experts, focus groups, and a survey of active-duty personnel. The team examined the factors that shape representation at each phase of the military career life cycle — recruiting, career development, promotion and advancement, and retention — and identified facilitators of and barriers to improving diversity in the Coast Guard. The report includes recommendations to help the Coast Guard achieve its ultimate goal of a workforce that looks like the nation it serves.”

U.S. Department of State. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021).
“The U.S. Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements provide country-specific information on the business climates of more than 170 countries and economies. They are prepared by economic officers stationed in embassies and posts around the world and analyze a variety of economies that are or could be markets for U.S. businesses of all sizes.”

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2021).
“The Working Group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report addresses the most up-to-date physical understanding of the climate system and climate change, bringing together the latest advances in climate science, and combining multiple lines of evidence from paleoclimate, observations, process understanding, and global and regional climate simulations.”

Pfaff, C. Anthony, and Keith R. Beurskens (eds). (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021).
Volume 10 of the Large-Scale Combat Operations Book Set.
“Volume 10, ‘Maintaining the High Ground: The Profession and Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations’ combines discussions and historical case studies from the past seventy-five years to address ethical challenges for the Army Profession. Healthy and functioning professions facilitate the employment of expert knowledge to serve a social good. In doing so, trust develops among professionals, as well as with the client, creating an acknowledged autonomy over its jurisdiction that allows the profession to maintain its effectiveness. For the Army, that jurisdiction is the application of land power and its client is the US government and the American public it serves. With today’s all-volunteer Army, maintaining public trust is critical, and large-scale combat operations require a professional class of leaders and soldiers with strong ethics and the ability to adapt and even shape their own future.”

Sayler, Kelley M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 9, 2021).
“The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons— maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable 'responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.' Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 27, 2021).
“The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective on the modern battlefield. Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV may be subject to a high degree of congressional interest.”

Kamphausen, Roy. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2021).
“The 27th annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference - ‘The People in the PLA’ 2.0 - revisited a theme first explored at the 2006 conference but understudied since. This volume examines how the structure, education, training, and recruitment of PLA personnel have changed in the last decade and in the Xi Jinping era. Structural changes in the PLA have centered around two poles: improving the warfighting readiness of the PLA and strengthening Communist Party of China (CPC) control of the PLA. Reforms to the political work system, the evolution of the Second Artillery into the Rocket Force, and expansion of the PLA’s foreign-based force posture all indicate that the PLA is accelerating its drive to become a world-class military. To succeed in future ‘informatized’ wars, the PLA recognizes it must improve its members’ education level. It seeks to leverage better China’s civilian education system while also addressing legacy issues that frustrate professional military education and the care of its veterans. The PLA is also reforming joint education and seeking insight from its exchanges and interactions with other nations’ militaries. The revamping of its academic institutions to support better its most technical and advanced entities for network warfare and other operations is indicative of the PLA’s fast-paced evolution.”

Langeland, Krista, and Derek Grossman. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The space-based capabilities of the United States have become integral to economic prosperity, to the defense of both the United States and its allies across all domains, and to facilitating cross-domain joint military operations. The U.S. government thus views the protection of these capabilities and the deterrence of any activity that could degrade them as vital to national security. Concurrently, China regards space capabilities as both a key enabler in terrestrial conflict and a means of bolstering its overall strength, and views United States activity in space as an obstacle to these goals. Accordingly, China may be motivated to exploit any evident U.S. vulnerabilities in the space domain to further its own objectives. Deterring China in space is therefore a priority for the United States Department of Defense and its allies and partners. The authors of this report consider deterrence concepts and examine how a deterrence strategy could be tailored to recognize the unique characteristics of the space domain and the particular objectives of China in space. To accomplish this, they review literature on classical deterrence theory and identify some key features that are particularly relevant to deterrence in the space domain. They then build a foundation for tailoring deterrence for China in space by examining Beijing's goals and approach to space deterrence as stated in openly available Chinese primary-source materials and identifying the implications of these findings for the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.”

Chubb, Andrew. (Newport, RI: U.S Naval War College, 2021).
“This volume examines the role of popular nationalism in China’s maritime conduct. Analysis of nine case studies of assertive but ostensibly nonmilitary actions by which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has advanced its position in the South and East China Seas in recent years reveals little compelling evidence of popular sentiment driving decision-making. While some regard for public opinion demonstrably shapes Beijing’s propaganda strategies on maritime issues, and sometimes its diplomatic practices as well, the imperative for Chinese leaders to satisfy popular nationalism is at most a contributing factor to policy choices they undertake largely on the basis of other considerations of power and interest. Where surges of popular nationalism have been evident, they have tended to follow after the PRC maritime actions in question, suggesting instead that Chinese authorities channeled public opinion to support existing policy.”

Heginbotham, Eric. (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S Naval War College, 2021).
“This report examines Chinese views about the military balance of power between China and the United States in the Western Pacific. It argues that while there is no single ‘Chinese’ view on this topic, Chinese analysts tend to agree that 1) the gap between the two militaries has narrowed significantly in recent years, 2) the Chinese military still lags in important ways, and 3) Chinese military inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S. increases the further away it operates from the Mainland. In terms of specific areas of relative strength, the Chinese military has shown the greatest improvements in military hardware, but has farther to go in the area of jointness, training, and other military ‘software.’ Nevertheless, despite continued criticism from senior civilian leaders, training quality has likely improved due to a greater focus on realism, and recent military reforms have, to a degree, improved the prospects for jointness.”

American Enterprise Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and War on the Rocks.
“The American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and War on the Rocks formed a partnership to address a shared concern: lack of understanding about how defense strategy and security objectives are translated into concrete budget choices. To meet this challenge, the three organizations built the Defense Futures Simulator.”

Anderson, Michael G. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021). “In ‘Mustering for War,’ author Michael G. Anderson provides the ten-year evolution of National Guard mobilization processes in preparation for America’s Global War on Terrorism. Anderson offers a synthesized appraisal of how the United States Army altered its deploying structure to fit a protracted, rotational war that involved the ‘wholesale rotation of units within an all-volunteer force instead of individual replacements supported by conscription.’ Between 2001 and 2011, the Army Guard transitioned from a strategic reserve force into a more operationally responsive component, but not without its growing pains. Anderson’s book details the issues faced by the Army National Guard during mobilization and how they solved problems encountered in manning the force, equipping the force, health readiness, and training the formations for overseas service.”

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
“A podcast channel of the USAWC quarterly journal, ‘Parameters.’”

Kulesa, Łukasz. (New York, NY: Council of Councils, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Although virtually all countries - including the 191 states that are parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) - support the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, many disagree on the best way to achieve it. Two positions have emerged, with the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and their allies on one side and supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, in force as of January 2021) on the other side. The nuclear weapons states and their partners promote a gradual approach to disarmament and emphasize the continued importance of nuclear deterrence for their security, whereas supporters of the TPNW push for the abolition of nuclear weapons and an unconditional rejection of nuclear deterrence.”

Kronstadt, K. Alan, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 19, 2021).
“In recognition of India’s increasingly central role and ability to influence world affairs— and with a widely held assumption that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the United States - the U.S. Congress and three successive U.S. Administrations have acted both to broaden and deepen America’s engagement with New Delhi. Such engagement follows decades of Cold War-era estrangement. Washington and New Delhi launched a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale joint military exercises and significant defense trade. In concert with Japan and Australia, the United States and India in 2020 reinvigorated a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘Quad’) as a flagship initiative in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Biden Administration has strongly embraced the Quad mechanism. In 2021, mutual efforts to address the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have been at the forefront of bilateral engagement. Bilateral trade and investment have increased, while a relatively wealthy Indian-American community is exercising newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals account for a large proportion of foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information technology sector.”

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. (New York, NY: Council of Councils, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Outer space is crowded, with more than eighty countries either owning or operating satellites. The types of actors are also increasingly diversifying. Space is no longer only a realm of states. A growing number of nonstate actors, including the private sector and academic institutions, are also jostling for access. Simultaneously, outer space has become a more contested arena. Fueled by changes in regional and global balances of power, increasing security-driven competition in space has compelled many states to develop counter-space capabilities that can be used to disrupt, deny, or destroy space systems. These activities need to be regulated to ensure safe, secure, and sustainable use of outer space for all.”

Fiertz, Natalie, et al. (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2021).
“The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP), is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states’ capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index - and the social science framework and the data analysis tools upon which it is built - makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.”

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (Copenhagen, Denmark: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Global Data Service, 2021).
“The main focus of this report is the analysis of statistical trends and changes in global forced displacement from January to December 2020 among populations for whom UNHCR has been entrusted with a responsibility by the international community. The data presented are based on information received as of 30 May 2021 unless otherwise indicated. At the end of 2020, the total number of forcibly displaced people was 82.4 million, while the total population of concern to UNHCR stood at 91.9 million people.”

UNAIDS. (Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS, 2021).
“The UNAIDS Global AIDS Update 2021 launched today, highlights evidence that people living with HIV are more vulnerable to COVID-19, but that widening inequalities are preventing them from accessing COVID-19 vaccines and HIV services.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 7, 14, and 21, 2021.
“CSIS, in partnership with the University of the Philippines, is pleased to present ‘Oceans of Opportunity: Southeast Asia’s Shared Maritime Challenges,’ a series of six virtual panels over three sessions on marine conservation, fisheries management, and maritime law. This session will feature expert panel discussions on protecting threatened fisheries and bolstering maritime domain awareness.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2021).
“This is the first in a series of papers that highlight new ways of thinking about global water resources. This Imagine If Water Series aims to inspire, provoke and invite new ideas. The first paper explores circular cities, where the use and reuse of water and wastewater resources are optimized, thereby unlocking the true value and potential of urban areas.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2021).
“Digital technology and business models are driving business disruption. The pandemic has accelerated this trend, making digital transformation critical for business success. However, it takes more than technology alone; leaders need to look at the human side of their organizations. Culture and the way people interact with technology are significant factors in digital success. This interactive guide, created in collaboration with business executives and academia, presents actionable frameworks and tools for executives to improve digital leadership and culture in their organizations.”

Ariga, Taka, and Stephen Sanford. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, June 30, 2021).
“As a nation, we have yet to grasp the full benefits or unwanted effects of artificial intelligence. AI is widely used, but how do we know it's working appropriately? This report identifies key accountability practices—centered around the principles of governance, data, performance, and monitoring—to help federal agencies and others use AI responsibly. For example, the governance principle calls for users to set clear goals and engage with diverse stakeholders. To develop these practices, we held a forum on AI oversight with experts from government, industry, and nonprofits. We also interviewed federal inspector general officials and AI experts…To help managers ensure accountability and responsible use of artificial intelligence (AI) in government programs and processes, GAO developed an AI accountability framework. This framework is organized around four complementary principles, which address governance, data, performance, and monitoring. For each principle, the framework describes key practices for federal agencies and other entities that are considering, selecting, and implementing AI systems. Each practice includes a set of questions for entities, auditors, and third-party assessors to consider, as well as procedures for auditors and third-party assessors.”

Blanchette, Jude, and Seth G. Jones. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“China's evolving perception of the United States' international influence and domestic resiliency has been an important component in how Beijing assesses the international balance of power and its own opportunities to shape—or challenge—the global order. Since the Global Financial Crisis in 2007–2008, Beijing has assessed that the United States is experiencing a slow but steady deterioration of its national power and international influence.
Events of the past 12 months have consolidated this consensus.
But is Beijing's perception of declining U.S. influence and power accurate? And is this narrative setting up the Xi Jinping administration to make strategic miscalculations by overestimating its own relative power? In this open-source analysis, Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies, and Seth G. Jones, director of the International Security Program, explore the implications for the United States from Beijing's growing perception of U.S. decline.”

Lew, Jacob J., et al. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests. Since BRI’s launch in 2013, Chinese banks and companies have financed and built everything from power plants, railways, highways, and ports to telecommunications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables, and smart cities around the world. If implemented sustainably and responsibly, BRI has the potential to meet long-standing developing country needs and spur global economic growth. To date, however, the risks for both the United States and recipient countries raised by BRI’s implementation considerably outweigh its benefits.
BRI was initially designed to connect China’s modern coastal cities to its underdeveloped interior and to its Southeast, Central, and South Asian neighbors, cementing China’s position at the center of a more connected world. The initiative has since outgrown its original regional corridors, expanding to all corners of the globe. Its scope now includes a Digital Silk Road intended to improve recipients’ telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and other high-tech areas, along with a Health Silk Road designed to operationalize China’s vision of global health governance. Hundreds of projects around the world now fall under the BRI umbrella.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2021).
“The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the following, all of which relate to China and/or Russia:
• grand strategy and the geopolitics of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
• organizational changes within DOD;
• nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
• the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments;
• U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
• new U.S. military service operational concepts;
• capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
• maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
• innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
• mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
• supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
• capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to renewed great power competition with China and Russia, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.”

Poling, Gregory B., Simon Tran Hudes, and Andreyka Natalegawa. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 6, 2021).
“The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has been on an upward trajectory defined by common interests since diplomatic relations between the two countries normalized a quarter-century ago. Vietnam was one of two Southeast Asian countries specifically referenced in the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, demonstrating the extent to which it has become an increasingly critical part of U.S. defense planning for the region. Bilateral trade has grown over 200-fold since normalization. People-to-people ties have also grown as Vietnam’s tourism industry has developed. Since normalization, Vietnam has welcomed U.S. tourists, former Vietnam War veterans, and even former refugees and their families. U.S. schools and companies in turn have attracted Vietnamese students and recent graduates, who are among the best educated in the world despite the country’s lower level of economic development.”

Hoehn, John R. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2021).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 7, 2021).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress on three potential new shipbased self-defense weapons for the Navy - solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), also known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP).
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests research and development funding for continued work on SSLs, but proposes suspending further work on the EMRG and GLGP programs and requests no research and development funding for them.
The Navy installed its first prototype SSL capable of countering surface craft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on a Navy ship in 2014. The Navy since then has been developing and installing additional SSL prototypes with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAVs. Higher-power SSLs being developed by the Navy are to have a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Current Navy efforts to develop SSLs include
• the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort;
• the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN);
• the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance (HELIOS); and
• the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).
The first three SSL efforts listed above are included in what the Navy calls the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NFLoS).
The Navy had been developing EMRG since 2005. It was originally conceived as a naval surface fire support (NSFS) weapon for supporting Marines and other friendly forces ashore. Subsequently, it was determined that EMRG could also be used for air and missile defense, which for a time strengthened Navy interest in EMRG development.
As the Navy was developing EMRG, it realized that the guided projectile being developed for EMRG could also be fired from powder guns, including 5-inch guns on Navy cruisers and destroyers and 155 mm artillery guns operated by the Army and Marine Corps. The concept of firing the projectile from powder guns is referred to as GLGP and HVP.”

Berris, Peter G., Michael A. Foster, and Jonathan M. Gaffney. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2021).
“Federal statute defines domestic terrorism to include dangerous criminal acts intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect government policy or conduct within the jurisdiction of the United States. Despite the federal statutory definition, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits ‘domestic terrorism.’ Nevertheless, numerous federal statutes offer prosecutors options in charging violent and destructive conduct consistent with the statutory definition of domestic terrorism. Some of these statutes can be characterized as expressly focused on terrorism, listing criminal offenses to include, among others, providing material support or resources to terrorists and engaging in terrorism transcending domestic boundaries. Other generally applicable federal criminal laws may also be relevant to domestic terrorism prosecutions. For example, depending on the defendant’s motive, target, or means, various federal criminal statutes protecting certain property or persons, prohibiting violence motivated by particular biases, or criminalizing possession or use of specific weapons may apply. Depending on the circumstances, prosecutors may also rely on accomplice liability or inchoate offenses such as attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to charge conduct consistent with the definition of domestic terrorism. Beyond applicable offenses, domestic terrorism may be relevant in federal sentencing, either through specific statutes that authorize additional penalties in the domestic terrorism context or through the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which include an upward adjustment for offenses connected to terrorism.”

European Union Delegation to the United States and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Held June 28 - 29, 2021.
“Please join the European Union Delegation to the United States and CSIS for the tenth annual EU Defense Washington Forum, an annual symposium dedicated to strengthening EU-U.S. cooperation on security and defense.
The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Guidance is clear on the priority Washington places on working with allies and partners. The strategy promises to ‘reinvigorate and modernize’ alliances and partnerships, which the administration considers ‘America’s greatest strategic asset,’ in order to advance our common interests and uphold our shared values. Consistent and pragmatic transatlantic cooperation on security issues is essential to realizing this goal. The EU’s blueprint for cooperation with the new U.S. administration, ‘A New Transatlantic Agenda for Global Change,’ also prominently calls for further strengthening—and leveraging—our joint commitment to transatlantic and international security. This year’s forum will bring together leading stakeholders and experts from the transatlantic security and defense communities to focus on developing a shared analysis of the threat environment and of the capabilities required to improve our collective and individual response.”

Zerk, Jennifer, and Rosie Beacock. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“Political shifts, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the struggle for a shared vision of how to ‘build back better’, have reignited the debate about trade and human rights. Although many trade agreements take human rights impacts into consideration, the monitoring systems that have emerged so far are not comprehensive. Without robust human rights monitoring, trading partners have little chance of ensuring that their counterparts are meeting their commitments. While there are considerable structural, political and resource-related challenges to conducting more systematic and effective human rights monitoring, recent experiences in this field can help policymakers design more effective monitoring mechanisms for the future.”

Sargent, John F., Jr., and Marcy E. Gallo. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2021).
“For more than 70 years, the technological superiority of the United States military has offset the size and geographic advantages of potential adversaries. The Department of Defense (DOD), due in large part to the magnitude of its investments in research and development (R&D), has driven the global R&D and technology landscape. However, DOD and the federal government more broadly are no longer overriding funders of R&D, and this shift in support for R&D has substantial implications for how DOD obtains advanced technology and maintains the battlefield overmatch that technology has historically provided.
In 1960, the United States accounted for 69% of global R&D (measured in share of expenditures), with U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of global R&D (36%). Additionally, the federal government funded approximately twice as much R&D as U.S. business. However, from 1960 to 2019, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 30%, and the federal government’s share of total U.S. R&D fell from 65% to 21%, while business’s share more than doubled from 33% to 71%. As a result of these global, national, and federal trends, federal defense R&D’s share of total global R&D fell to 3.1% in 2019. This decline resulted primarily from more rapid increases in the R&D of other nations (public and private) and partially from increases in U.S. business R&D and federal nondefense R&D.
Some defense experts and policymakers have recognized the shift in the global R&D landscape and the need for DOD to rely increasingly on technologies developed by commercial companies for commercial markets. Among the challenges DOD faces in acquiring new, innovative technologies and maintaining U.S. military technical superiority are
• developing/modifying organizations and business models to access this technology;
• adapting the DOD business culture to seek and embrace technologies developed outside of DOD, the United States, and its traditional contractor base; and
• finding ways to adapt and leverage commercial technologies for defense applications.”

Jones, Seth G., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“This report examines the implications of scientific innovations and emerging technologies on geopolitics in Northeast Asia. It focuses on five areas: (1) data-driven techniques and software-intensive technologies, (2) advanced materials and supply chains, (3) cybersecurity, (4) uncrewed systems and robotics, and (5) space technologies, including satellites and missiles. The applications of today’s emerging technologies are exacerbating regional tensions, bringing new considerations to longstanding security challenges, and propelling new non-state and commercial actors onto the global stage. The report explores the implications of these technologies and recommends policy responses: engaging the private sector; establishing norms and standards; and extending bilateral cooperation to a ‘high-tech’ alliance. The findings are a reflection of expert perspectives and analyses, including from leading experts within the security and foreign policy communities in both the United States and the Republic of Korea.”

Belkin, Paul. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2021).
“The United States has continued to play a key role in advancing NATO’s response to a range of security challenges. In the seven years since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine, the United States has been an architect of NATO’s increased focus on deterring Russian aggression, including through the deployment of an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of about 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States and Poland. NATO also has bolstered its response to terrorist threats and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, primarily through partnerships and training activities. In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to expand NATO’s training mission in Iraq, from its current level of about 500 trainers to potentially as many as 4,000. The allies also are expected to discuss the end of NATO’s ‘train and assist’ in Afghanistan; to address the potential security implications of Chinese investment and engagement in Europe; and to bolster resilience to nonmilitary security threats, ranging from pandemics to climate change.
In response to recent transatlantic tensions and questions about NATO’s longer-term relevance, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to advance proposals to strengthen the alliance, both militarily and politically. At the June 14 summit, the allies are expected to consider Stoltenberg’s recommendations to reinforce alliance unity, broaden NATO’s approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order. Recommendations could include updating NATO’s strategic concept, last updated in 2010, to better reflect today’s security environment, especially with respect to Russia and China; enhancing NATO’s capacity to counter nonmilitary threats; and strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-minded partners across the globe.”

German Marshall Fund of the United States. June 14-28, 2021. 30 videos.
“GMF's Brussels Forum is the preeminent platform for global leaders, policymakers, and experts across sectors to shape the transatlantic agenda and debate the most pressing global challenges. It is designed to encourage transatlantic leaders to work together to directly confront the challenging world we find ourselves in today. Our mission as a conference is to create a platform for debate in an inclusive and intimate atmosphere. We accomplish this by showcasing diverse voices across regional and demographic backgrounds, promoting candidness and openness in our dialogues and forming close bonds between conference participants.”

Kerr, Paul K. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2021).
“Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning ‘possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.’ A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s ‘final assessment on the resolution’ of the outstanding issues.A June 2020 IAEA Board of Governors resolution calls on Iran to satisfy more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. This resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.”

Runde, Daniel F., Conor M. Savoy, and Janina Staguhn. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Covid-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic or health crisis that the world faces, especially as deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change increase the possibility of further spillover of zoonotic diseases. Therefore, this pandemic should serve as an inflection point for the international community to cast aside what the World Health Organization (WHO) has called the ‘panic-then-forget’ cycle, which has been emblematic of previous international responses to global health emergencies. While exclusively strengthening health systems and shoring up health supply chains will not be sufficient to prevent or counter the next public health emergency, stronger and more resilient health systems and supply chains will still be critical to ensuring that future pandemic preparation, detection, and responses can be delivered efficiently, effectively, and equitably. Key takeaways include—but are not limited to—the importance of multisectoral approaches to preparing for in-country delivery (e.g., having an emergency response plan in place), maintaining and expanding geographically diverse manufacturing capabilities, and prioritizing public–private cooperation, as well as establishing or leveraging existing platforms for vaccine administration. Coordination and communication among governments, donors, and private-sector entities (such as third-party logistics firms and manufacturers) is critical. Looking forward, it will be helpful to start by investing in multisectoral approaches that strengthen general health systems and supply chains.”

Devermont, Judd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue:
The U.S. government is grappling with three distinct priorities—violent extremism, democratic backsliding, and strategic competition—in coastal West Africa and the Sahel. The evergreen challenge of tough tradeoffs and limited resources has made policy choices regarding subregion prioritization stunningly difficult.
The emerging tug-of-war between the Sahel and coastal West Africa has in part contributed to a problematic framing of the threat’s source, trajectory, and strategic significance to the United States. Washington should avoid the tendency to cast coastal West Africa as the ‘next Sahel,’ a region on the verge of implosion.
To advance U.S. objectives, the United States will have to play it smarter. It should lean into the reality that there is significant convergence and interdependence between the Sahel and coastal West Africa. The U.S. government should elevate policies and programs that simultaneously tackle these challenges, specifically justice and rule of law programming; anticorruption efforts; and security sector accountability.”

Brown, Oli. and Taylor Dimsdale. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“Most international organizations were not designed to deal with the consequences of climate change. An overhaul of risk management, taking specific account of climate-related risks, is therefore needed to ensure the continued operational effectiveness of UN bodies and other agencies. Climate change is likely to have profound impacts on such organizations in the future: increasing demand for their services, undermining programme implementation, and hindering their ability to fulfil their mandates.
This paper is an attempt to ‘climate stress test’ the international system and provide an early measure of its level of preparedness for climate change. The paper maps the current climate risk approaches of roughly two dozen international organizations, based on a review of official documents as well as on interviews with their staff. The paper offers recommendations for how international organizations can continue to achieve their missions by strengthening their climate risk management frameworks.”

MacColl, Jamie, Jason R. C. Nurse, and James Sullivan. (London, UK: RUSI, 2021).
“Cyber risk poses a complicated and growing challenge for governments, businesses and consumers. This paper explores cyber insurance’s potential contribution to solving this problem.”

Fosher, Kerry B., and Lauren Mackenzie (eds). (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
“Though the priorities of senior military leaders inevitably change over time, the pressing need for American Service personnel to accommodate the human dimension for success in their ongoing military operations has not diminished. That capability now may be even more important than ever. Almost inevitably, the requirement will reach a critical stage in some future crisis. This book compiles the insights and findings of some of the most determined and resourceful scientists, scholars, and practitioners engaged in the programs to inculcate the new capabilities in the early twenty-first century. The authors do not gloss over failures and dead ends. Rather, their expectation is that by presenting the bad with the good, they can help future generations engaged in the same task avoid their pitfalls and build on their work. More importantly, the authors hope that their writing might reach those who are still engaged in building cultural capabilities and that they will find encouragement to continue this essential work.”

U.S. Senate. (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2021).
“On January 6, 2021, the world witnessed a violent and unprecedented attack on the U.S. Capitol, the Vice President, Members of Congress, and the democratic process. Rioters, attempting to disrupt the Joint Session of Congress, broke into the Capitol building, vandalized and stole property, and ransacked offices. They attacked members of law enforcement and threatened the safety and lives of our nation’s elected leaders. Tragically, seven individuals, including three law enforcement officers, ultimately lost their lives. Rioters were intent on disrupting the Joint Session, during which Members of Congress were scheduled to perform their constitutional obligation to count the electoral votes for President and Vice President of the United States and announce the official results of the 2020 election. Due to the heroism of United States Capitol Police (‘USCP’) officers, along with their federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, the rioters failed to prevent Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty. In the early hours of January 7, the President of the Senate, Vice President Pence, announced Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris as the President-elect and Vice President-elect of the United States. This report addresses the security, planning, and response failures of the entities directly responsible for Capitol security—USCP and the Capitol Police Board, which is comprised of the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol as voting members, and the USCP Chief as a non-voting member—along with critical breakdowns involving several federal agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’), Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’), and Department of Defense (‘DOD’). The Committees also made a series of recommendations for the Capitol Police Board, USCP, federal intelligence agencies, DOD, and other Capital region law enforcement agencies to address the intelligence and security failures.”

Schell, Terry L., et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“This report describes analyses designed to identify service member and environmental characteristics that are associated with service members' risk of sexual assault or sexual harassment. The researchers find that experiencing pre-service sexual assault, being younger, and being single were all strong predictors of experiencing sexual assault and sexual harassment. Service history and unit environment characteristics were also associated with risk, although these effects were smaller. Risk factors for men and women and for sexual assault and sexual harassment were strongly correlated, suggesting that a common set of risk factors underlie these experiences for men and women. The authors conclude the report with recommendations for how the Department of Defense (DoD) can use the findings to modify programs and training that address sexual assault and sexual harassment. Data for these analyses were drawn from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study, an independent assessment of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the U.S. military.”

Morral, Andrew R., and Terry L. Schell. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Much of the focus of research on sexual assault in the military has been on the risk faced by women. However, in civilian populations, individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) are known to be at especially high risk for sexual assault. In this report, RAND researchers examine evidence from the 2016 and 2018 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA) survey to estimate the proportion of military sexual assaults that are against LGB service members and others who do not describe themselves as identifying as heterosexual. They find that assaults on the minority of service members who do not describe themselves as heterosexual constitute almost half of the military's sexual assault numbers. The authors discuss sexual assault risks for these individuals and recommend modifying prevention programs to better address a large and previously unquantified proportion of all military sexual assaults.”

McGarry, Brendan W. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2021).
“The Department of Defense Appropriations Act is one of 12 annual appropriations measures typically reported by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the largest in terms of discretionary funding. The act funds activities of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) except for military construction and family housing programs. The legislation also funds certain activities of the intelligence community…This report compares funding levels for certain defense accounts and programs in the enacted FY2020 appropriations, the Trump Administration’s FY2021 request, and FY2021 legislation.”

Heath, Timothy R., Derek Grossman, and Asha Clark. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Focusing on the international and defense dimensions of U.S.-China competition, the authors of this report make three contributions. First, they intend this report to serve as a planning tool by positing international and defense strategies that could allow China to outcompete the United States. Second, they mean to educate readers on Chinese strategy and policy processes. Third, the authors seek to encourage greater public debate about the nature and stakes of the competition. As presented by the authors, China's international strategy aims to establish the country's primacy in the Asia-Pacific region and leadership of the international order. The international strategy presented seeks to achieve this end state through peaceful methods, although it does not rule out the possibilities of militarized crises or even conflicts of a limited scope, such as proxy wars. The core of the proposed international strategy is a reliance on China's economic prowess and diplomatic maneuver to put Beijing into a position of advantage from which it cannot be dislodged by the United States. A complementary defense strategy would aim to constrain Washington's ability to forestall or prevent its own eclipse by building a superior Chinese military that renders the risks of military conflict intolerably high. A major Chinese military responsibility would be to support diplomatic efforts to shape a favorable international environment by building strong security ties with client states and discrediting or weakening the appeal of the United States as an alternative.”

Campbell, Caitlin. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2021).
“China’s military modernization is a major factor driving some observers’ concerns about China’s rise, China’s intentions toward the United States and its allies and partners, and the role China aspires to play in the world. China’s military progress also informs the widely-held view that the United States and China are engaged in a ‘great power competition.’ Congressional actions on these issues could shape, and be shaped by, U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs; U.S. policy toward China, U.S. partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, and the region more generally; and U.S. defense industrial policies, among other things.”

German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Bertelsmann Foundation. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Bertelsmann Foundation, 2021).
“‘Transatlantic Trends 2021’ includes the results of surveys conducted in 11 countries representing all corners of the transatlantic community: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This research is not just transatlantic in focus—it is a true transatlantic collaboration between several U.S. and European organizations and institutions. The findings in the pages that follow benefit in intellectual richness from the diversity of perspectives that informed everything from framing the questions to interpreting the resulting data. Divided into five chapters, ‘Transatlantic Trends’ provides a detailed picture of transatlantic public opinion on core and contemporary issues: the transatlantic relationship; international security and defense; trade, economic, and technology policies; relations with China; and global challenges.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (May 26-27, 2021). 6 videos available.
“The Conference on Diversity in International Affairs brings together college and graduate students and young professionals from diverse backgrounds for plenaries on foreign policy topics, seminars on professional development, and opportunities to interact virtually with senior foreign policy professionals. The 2021 conference featured a keynote session with President of the Ford Foundation Darren Walker. The 2021 Conference on Diversity in International Affairs is a collaborative effort by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Global Access Pipeline, and the International Career Advancement Program.”
Sessions:
• Race and Policy: America’s Standing in the World
• Keynote Session: A Conversation with Darren Walker
• Nationalism Around the World
• Making the Transition Between the Public and Private Sector
• Building Your Brand
• Pandemics and the New Way of Working

Gavin, Michelle. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Although major power competition is a reality, giving it an outsized role in policymaking would be a mistake. Rather, U.S. policy should be dictated by a farsighted understanding of its goals in regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms in Africa. The United States benefits when African states are able to provide for their own security and address transnational threats emanating from within their borders; when African economic growth provides opportunity to African citizens and to those abroad who trade, invest, and co-create with them; when Africa is a rule-governed region that bolsters respect for universal rights and the rule of law; and when Africa is invested and active in international institutions that mitigate global crises. To help realize this vision, the United States should capitalize on what makes it a compelling partner to African states, work more closely and strategically with like-minded partners, create more space for African agendas in its vision for future global governance, and work to build lasting affinities.”

Hall, Natasha. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• The Syrian government has restricted humanitarian access to opposition-controlled areas of Syria as part of its efforts to regain control of the entire country.
• In 2014, the United Nations (UN) designated four border crossings for delivering aid to those in need without government approval. Russia and China blocked the UN from using all but one border crossing, which serves northwestern Syria, and its mandate is set to expire on July 10, 2021.
• The end of UN cross-border aid would pose severe risks not only to the population of northwestern Syria, but also surrounding states and the broader region, since there is no reliable aid alternative.
• Major donors to the Syria response—five of them UN Security Council members—should seek to reopen closed crossings and lengthen the mandate, making it clear that a Russian veto would obstruct future negotiations on reconstruction, sanctions, and additional aid through Damascus.
• The cross-border issue should prompt more consistent high-level negotiations and coordination among donors to expand access in Syria and ensure that warring parties cannot use aid as leverage.”

Sayler, Kelley M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2021).
“Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological applications. In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications, as well as for congressional oversight, authorizations, and appropriations.”

Kamarck, Kristy N. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 25, 2021).
“Over the past two decades, Congress has taken legislative action to address sexual misconduct in the military and to improve prevention, response, and accountability through the military justice system. Despite legislative changes and Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives, sexual assault reporting and prevalence data indicate continued risk factors and room for improvement across several metrics. A recent independent review at Fort Hood which found ‘ineffective implementation’ of the Army’s sexual harassment and assault prevention program, has raised additional congressional concerns. Bills introduced the 116th and 117th Congress would require certain changes to the military justice system with respect to sexual harassment and assault. One proposed change applies to military commanders’ statutory authority, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ; Chapter 47, Title 10 United States Code), to dispose of certain sex-related cases. Members of Congress, victim advocacy groups, DOD officials, legal scholars, and other stakeholders continue to debate proposals to transfer this authority from commanders to career prosecutors. In a February 26, 2021, memorandum, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III ordered the creation of a 90-day Independent Review Commission (IRC) to address sexual assault in the military. According to DOD reporting, the IRC has four lines of effort: 1) accountability, 2) prevention, 3) climate and culture, and 4) victim care and support. The commission began work on March 24, 2021, and has provided some initial recommendations to Secretary Austin, including those related to the commander’s authority. While some officials have argued against transferring authority from commanders to career prosecutors, a few senior military leaders recently expressed openness to changing military justice processes.”

Harris, Laurie A. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 19, 2021).
“In the past decade or so, increased computing power, the accumulation of big data, and advances in AI techniques have led to rapid growth in AI research and applications. Given these developments and the increasing application of AI technologies across economic sectors, stakeholders from academia, industry, and civil society have called for the federal government to become more knowledgeable about AI technologies and more proactive in considering public policies around their use…AI holds potential benefits and opportunities, but also challenges and pitfalls. For example, AI technologies can accelerate and provide insights into data processing; augment human decisionmaking; optimize performance for complex tasks and systems; and improve safety for people in dangerous occupations. On the other hand, AI systems may perpetuate or amplify bias, may not yet be fully able to explain their decisionmaking, and often depend on vast datasets that are not widely accessible to facilitate research and development (R&D). Further, stakeholders have questioned the adequacy of human capital in both the public and private sectors to develop and work with AI, as well as the adequacy of current laws and regulations for dealing with societal and ethical issues that may arise. Together, such challenges can lead to an inability to fully assess and understand the operations and outputs of AI systems—sometimes referred to as the ‘black box’ problem. Because of these questions and concerns, some stakeholders have advocated for slowing the pace of AI development and use until more research, policymaking, and preparation can occur. Others have countered that AI will make lives safer, healthier, and more productive, so the federal government should not attempt to slow it, but rather should give broad support to AI technologies and increase federal AI funding. In response to this debate, Congress has begun discussing issues such as the trustworthiness, potential bias, and ethical uses of AI; possible disruptive impacts to the U.S. workforce; the adequacy of U.S. expertise and training in AI; domestic and international efforts to set technological standards and testing benchmarks; and the level of U.S. federal investments in AI research and development and how that impacts U.S. international competitiveness. Congress is likely to continue grappling with these issues and working to craft policies that protect American citizens while maximizing U.S. innovation and leadership.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 16, 2021).
“Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements. Some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nuclear weapons: a new low yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile. The Navy had deployed the first of these, in small numbers, on U.S. ballistic missile submarines.”

Hoehn, John R. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 24, 2021).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods.”

Reimer, Stephen, and Matthew Redhead. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).
“Numerous deadly terrorist attacks across Europe – from the 2015 ‘Charlie Hebdo’ attack in Paris and the Manchester Arena bombing of 2016 to the far-right firearms assault in Hanau, Germany in early 2020 – demonstrate that self-activating terrorism (sometimes referred to as lone actor or small cell terrorism) has become a major security concern for the continent. Much of the current ‘conventional wisdom’ around these kinds of actors assumes that terrorist financing and a counterterrorist financing (CTF) response are not relevant to this growing threat. Reports of attacks involving little to no preparation or financial resourcing have shaped a false perception that self-activator activity produces no usable financial intelligence. This has generated a high degree of unease among both CTF professionals in law enforcement, whose role it is to use legal investigatory powers to apprehend terrorists and would-be terrorists, and practitioners in the financial services sector, whose controls and instruments are designed to identify and report abuse of the financial system by terrorists planning attacks. The natural fear is that if the private sector cannot produce the kind of financial intelligence required, then law enforcement cannot do its job as effectively as it might. In light of this, the European Commission commissioned RUSI Europe to carry out this research study as part of Project CRAAFT, which seeks to answer two related research questions:
How do self-activating terrorists operating in Europe conduct their financial attack preparations?
How should the CTF regime be changed to meet this pervasive terrorist threat?”

Rendon, Moises, and Claudia Fernandez. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Venezuela is facing a national crisis like no other. Millions have left the country, fleeing the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro. Millions more are starving and sick, ravaged by deadly surges of Covid-19. One of the few remaining options to bring democracy to the country is through negotiations, but what goes into a successful negotiation? Who needs to be represented in the talks? Who needs to be in the room? Who needs to be at the table to ensure that real and lasting change can be brought to combat an increasingly autocratic state, increasing political censorship, and a pandemic? To prepare for this crucial future moment, CSIS hosted a series of workshops aimed at identifying lessons learned from Venezuela’s long history of failed negotiations, as well as other examples from the region and beyond. These findings informed a roadmap that Venezuelan political leaders and the international community could follow to circumvent obstacles and improve the prospects of using negotiation as a tool to resolve the crisis.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2021).
“The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region…Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. The geopolitical environment for the Arctic has been substantially affected by the renewal of great power competition. Although there continues to be significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the Arctic in their planning and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are devoting sufficient resources to the Arctic and taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region has emerged as a topic of congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and has received funding for the procurement of two of at least three planned new polar icebreakers.”

Cahill, Ben, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Covid-19 recovery window offers a rare opportunity to transform economies and accelerate the green transition. There is renewed openness to large scale public investment as governments seek to restore their economic health, boost long-term growth potential, and accelerate decarbonization. But the inequality exposed by the Covid-19 crisis also demonstrates the need for policies that can advance equity and justice. This paper examines green recovery measures through the lens of a just transition. We use three key dimensions of a just transition—distributional impacts, social inclusion, and transformative intent—to assess green recovery interventions around the world. We highlight promising examples of just and green recovery measures in various countries and suggest policy insights with principles and best practices for future action.”

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies China-Africa Research Initiative and Boston University Global Development Policy Center
“The Chinese Loans to Africa (CLA) Database is an interactive data project started by the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-CARI). Since 2007, SAIS-CARI researchers have collected, cleaned and analyzed publicly-available data to create a database on Chinese lending to Africa. The data sources include official government documents, contractor websites, fieldwork, interviews, and media sources. Between 2000 and 2019, SAIS-CARI estimated Chinese financiers signed 1,141 loan commitments worth US$153 billion with African governments and their state owned enterprises. The figures are not equivalent to African government debt, as the database does not track disbursement or repayment. As of March 29, 2021, the Chinese Loans to Africa Database is managed by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.”

Amendolagine, Vito. (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies China-Africa Research Initiative, 2021).
“Participating in the process of global production fragmentation by connecting to global value chains (GVCs) provides a ‘golden’ opportunity for developing countries to access international markets and boost economies. International institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization have expended great effort to promote proper policies that can help low-income countries take advantage of such opportunities. This work explores the extent to which international development lending can support African countries in trading intermediate goods with foreign partners, with the goal of further specializing in high value-added activities within cross-national production networks. The empirical analysis relies on a dataset that includes both Chinese and World Bank loans to a set of 35 African countries from 2000 to 2018. Based on this research, it appears that Chinese lending increases the involvement of borrowing countries in the international trade of intermediate goods, while World Bank loans contribute to move African countries toward higher valued added activities along GVCs. This first result is explained by the different sectoral composition of Chinese and World Bank loans, with the former focusing more extensively on infrastructure, particularly transport and communications, and the latter on social sectors, such as education and health. The second research question investigates the specific role Chinese lending plays in infrastructure sectors. My research provides evidence that loans to transport and communication sectors significantly improve African countries’ participation in GVCs by reducing trade costs and enhancing connection to foreign partners. Such results become more evident over time, especially with concessional loans.”

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021).
“This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 116-260). This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world. This assessment focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the United States during the next year. The order of the topics presented in this assessment does not necessarily indicate their relative importance or the magnitude of the threats in the view of the IC. All require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near-term focus may help head off greater threats in the future, such as climate change and environmental degradation.”

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. (Alexandria, VA: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2021).
“The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which DoD Components provided access to DoD information technology and communications during the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.”

International Energy Agency. (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2021).
“The number of countries announcing pledges to achieve net-zero emissions over the coming decades continues to grow. But the pledges by governments to date – even if fully achieved – fall well short of what is required to bring global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to net zero by 2050 and give the world an even chance of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C. This special report is the world’s first comprehensive study of how to transition to a net zero energy system by 2050 while ensuring stable and affordable energy supplies, providing universal energy access, and enabling robust economic growth. It sets out a cost-effective and economically productive pathway, resulting in a clean, dynamic and resilient energy economy dominated by renewables like solar and wind instead of fossil fuels. The report also examines key uncertainties, such as the roles of bioenergy, carbon capture and behavioural changes in reaching net zero.”

Tsafos, Nikos, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Clean energy technologies are now big business. Vast sums of money in clean energy supply chains promise to rearrange the geopolitics of industrial competition and energy security. Further, to achieve their increasingly ambitious climate goals, countries are likely to do far more to reshape industrial sectors, compressing in a few years a process that normally takes decades. This report looks at how the United States can strengthen supply chains for clean energy technologies through the lens of industrial competition, cybersecurity and trade policy. It finds that the United States can apply some of the mental models, tools, and institutions used for conventional energy sources to think about supply chains in clean energy—and grow its economy and boost its national security in doing so.”

Lewis, James Andrew. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The term ‘National Security Industrial Base’ (NSIB) appeared in the 2018 National Security Strategy. The NSIB is the ‘network of knowledge, capabilities, and people—including academia, National Laboratories, and the private sector—that turns ideas into innovations [and] transforms discoveries into successful commercial products.’ This report outlines elements of the NSIB and how a commercially driven innovation differs from a defense-centric approach to technology. The U.S. innovation ecosystem is based on a mix of strong research universities, flexible financial systems, a competitive business focus, and risk-taking, entrepreneurial culture that is skilled at commercializing research. Other countries have similar strengths, but not at the same scale.”

Stohl, Rachel, and Shannon Dick. (Washington, DC: Stimson, 2021).
“Reflecting on the ways in which the U.S. drone program has defined and has been defined by the United States’ nearly 20-year-old approach to the use of lethal force in counterterrorism operations around the world, the Stimson Center aims to offer an updated inventory of the challenges and consequences wrought by such an approach. This report serves as the fourth installment of our analyses on the U.S. drone program and seeks to emphasize the need for a thorough review and reconfiguration of the United States’ approach to the use of lethal force in order to ensure U.S. policies and activities are responsible and accountable in the short, medium, and long term.”

Lissner, Rebecca. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“To manage the increasingly stark geopolitical power shifts of the past decade-plus, the United States should pursue arms control strategies that regulate rivalry and introduce a broader array of reciprocal restraints.”

Kulesa, Łukasz. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Although virtually all countries—including the 191 states that are parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—support the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, many disagree on the best way to achieve it. Two positions have emerged, with the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and their allies on one side and supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, in force as of January 2021) on the other side. The nuclear weapons states and their partners promote a gradual approach to disarmament and emphasize the continued importance of nuclear deterrence for their security, whereas supporters of the TPNW push for the abolition of nuclear weapons and an unconditional rejection of nuclear deterrence.”

Afrobarometer. (Accra, Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2021).
“In 2015, all United Nations member states adopted the Sustainable Development Goals as a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. Tracking progress toward these goals is challenging but essential for informing national decision-making. Afrobarometer survey data can make a unique contribution by providing a little-heard perspective – that of the ordinary citizen in Africa. Newly developed Afrobarometer SDG Scorecards highlight citizens' experiences and evaluations of their country's performance on democracy and governance, poverty, health, education, energy supply, water and sanitation, inequality, gender equity, and other SDG priorities that can be compared to official UN tracking indicators.”

Hanks, Matthew S., with Williamson Murray. (Quantico, VA; Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
“Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfighting Exercise (MWX) 1-20 was one of the largest and most comprehensive exercises conducted by the 2d Marine Division (2d MarDiv) throughout the last several decades. The concept was to test how the Marine Corps would fight a future conflict against a peer adversary. The participants divided into two groups: an exercise force built around 2d MarDiv and an adversary force built around 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. Both forces contained multidomain and all-spectrum capabilities from elements across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and encompassed multiple units and personnel from the Joint force and several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-ally coalition partners. The exercise took place 1–9 November 2019 at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. It was facilitated by the Marine Corp Tactics and Operations Group and Tactical Training Exercise Control Group, and was largely free play to facilitate the most realistic conditions and series of events possible. This work is not an analytical discussion of MWX…Instead, ‘Khaos Company’ offers a short story written with the intent to provide Marines with the perspective of what it is like to operate and fight at the company- and small-unit levels in operations of such large scale and scope. All of the events herein are based on the actual sequence of events that occurred during the exercise, and the conversations are generally expressed how they occurred but should not be taken as direct quotes.”

Boston University - Center for Global Policy Development.
“Welcome to China’s Global Power Database, a new interactive created by Boston University's Global Development Policy Center. China’s Global Power Database tracks all the world's power plants financed by Chinese foreign direct investment and/or China's two global policy banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. At the end of 2018, Chinese capital is involved in upwards of 777 power plants overseas, providing a total of 186.5 GW of power generation capacity. Among these power plants, Chinese participation includes foreign direct investment (FDI), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), greenfield investments, and debt finance. The database also tracks and displays the deal types, Chinese investors/financiers, percentage of ownership by investor, amount of capacity (in MW), type of technology, operating status, and the estimated annual CO2 emissions of the power plants.”

Boston University - Center for Global Policy Development.
“This dataset is the first global, harmonized, validated, and geolocated record of Chinese development finance. It covers the years 2008 through 2019, to include equal time before and after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. It includes all loans from the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China to governments, inter-governmental bodies, and state-owned entities.
This interactive database includes 858 loans, detailing each project's lender, year, amount, sector, and length in kilometers, where applicable. Among those 858 projects, 615 have specific geographic footprints, and these 615 projects are shown in the visual map. The remaining 243 projects are included in the full list of projects, below the map.
We aim to give context to China’s development finance by showing projects in relation to several types of socially and ecologically sensitive territories:
Indigenous Peoples’ Lands
National Protected Areas
Critical Habitat”

Medeiros, Evan S. (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Policymakers and analysts need to devote more energy and time to identifying and weighing risks of strategic competition—bilaterally, regionally, and globally—before determining the risks and costs the United States and its allies can and should assume to shape and deter China without provoking armed conflict. In other words, conflict prevention is only becoming more central to U.S.-China relations as competition becomes the defining frame for U.S. policy.”

Bermudez, Joseph, et al. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel – Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2021).
“Key Findings
• Recently acquired LANDSAT 7 and 8 thermal infrared imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center provide strong indications that during March and April 2021, activity involving the heating of buildings and operations of facility support systems had resumed at several locations.
• These indications reveal clear patterns, distinct from the surrounding terrain and daily solar heating patterns, that suggest that the Radiochemistry Laboratory, its associated thermal plant, and the centrifuge plant resumed operations during the early part of March 2021 and have continued into mid-April 2021.
• Thermal patterns alone may not be able to explain the full extent of the operations by themselves, however, they may (and do in this case) provide clear evidence of operations at these locations.
• Likewise, these images provide strong indications that the IRT-DPRK reactor, 5MW(e) reactor, and the Experimental Light Water Reactor are not operating.
• As noted in our March 2021 report, this renewed activity is likely an indicator of a new reprocessing campaign designed to expand North Korea’s inventory of fissile material for nuclear weapons – a strategic political move by Kim Jong-un to continue slowly ratcheting up pressure on both the Biden administration and South Korean president Moon Jae-in, or a combination of both.”

Mix, Derek E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2021).
“Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom(UK) as the United States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; a large and mutually beneficial economic relationship; and extensive cooperation on foreign policy and security issues. The UK’s January 2020 withdrawal from the European Union (EU), often referred to as Brexit, is likely to change its international role and outlook in ways that affect U.S.-UK relations.”

Bouchet, Nicolas, Alexander Kleibrink, and Oana Popescu-Zamfir. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“Resilience is the key angle through which policymakers imagine the next-generation Eastern Partnership (EaP). Achieving it is a tough challenge for the EaP countries. They are exposed to geopolitical risks and some of their internal and border conflicts are escalating. The coronavirus pandemic has put pressure on their societies and state resources. This brief draws from the discussions at a conference organized by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, KfW Development Bank, and GMF.
This yielded recommendations for the new, ambitious, and measurable post-2020 deliverables—centered around building more resilient economies, empowering vibrant civil societies, and ensuring responsive and accountable state institutions.
While no one-size-fits-all solution is readily available, there are general guidelines that the EU could follow to improve the chances of success for the EaP, in line with its own policy of differentiation and ‘more for more.’ In particular, the future EaP could rely on building up the following pillars: strong civil society, conditionality, e-governance and digitalization, and fighting hybrid threats.”

Gallo, Marcy E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2021).
“The results of research and development (R&D) help inform the decisions that policymakers and the public reach on a wide range of issues, including human health and safety, the environment, agriculture, energy, and transportation. For example, scientific information is essential to the review and approval of drugs and medical devices and the setting of air quality standards. There is broad agreement among policymakers and the scientific and engineering community about ensuring the integrity of the conduct, communication, and management of R&D, and its use in policy development and decisionmaking. However, recently, some policymakers and others have alleged that presidential administrations of both parties have violated the principles of scientific integrity. Assertions of such violations include weighting the membership of federal advisory committees toward a particular viewpoint or constituency, targeting individual scientists for harassment or adverse actions, appointing agency officials with significant conflicts of interest or antagonistic views toward an agency’s mission or neutrality to science, improperly editing scientific documents, and using the budget process to impede the implementation or formulation of science-based policies.”

Chatham House. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The Inclusive Governance Initiative, launched in 2020 as Chatham House marked its centenary, is exploring how global governance can be reshaped to meet the challenges of today’s world. The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the urgent need for change in the structures and mechanisms of international cooperation. Greater inclusiveness must be a central ingredient, and must go beyond symbolism: the meaningful inclusion of a wider range of non-state actors and the more equitable participation of states are essential for progress on complex, interconnected global issues. The transformation of multilateral bodies and international governance structures into effective agents of change for today’s world is long overdue.”

Morrison, J. Stephen, Katherine E. Bliss, and Anna McCaffrey. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“It is in the United States’ strategic interests to ensure that the world mobilizes effectively to end the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. A proactive U.S. role is essential to secure the gains underway in the United States and ensure Americans’ health, safety, and prosperity into the future. Helping to secure the future of lower- and middle-income countries is also simply the right thing to do, on humanitarian, economic, and security grounds.”

Townsend, Jim, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2021).
“In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing.”

National Intelligence Council. (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2021).
“Welcome to the 7th edition of the National Intelligence Council’s ‘Global Trends’ report. Published every four years since 1997, ‘Global Trends’ assesses the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment for the United States during the next two decades. ‘Global Trends’ is designed to provide an analytic framework for policymakers early in each administration as they craft national security strategy and navigate an uncertain future. The goal is not to offer a specific prediction of the world in 2040; instead, our intent is to help policymakers and citizens see what may lie beyond the horizon and prepare for an array of possible futures…This edition of ‘Global Trends’ constructs its analysis of the future in several stages. First, we examine structural forces in demographics, environment, economics, and technology that shape the contours of our future world. Second, we analyze how these structural forces and other factors—combined with human responses—affect emerging dynamics in societies, states, and the international system. Third, we envision five plausible scenarios for the distant future in 2040. The key themes discussed above appear across these sections.”

Blinken, Antony J. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021).
“The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – the Human Rights Reports – cover internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements. The U.S. Department of State submits reports on all countries receiving assistance and all United Nations member states to the U.S. Congress in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 1974.”

Wong, Leonard, and Stephen J. Gerras. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2021).
“Previous studies analyzing disability compensation have decried its $76 billion annual budget or warned of its perverse ability to incentivize veterans not to work. This study focuses on the impact of this moral hazard on the US Army profession. If soldiers continue to capitalize on an extremely permissive disability system, the trust between society and the military may be threatened, and future Army readiness may be jeopardized should disability compensation be added to the marginal cost of a soldier. More importantly, many of today’s soldiers are rationalizing disability compensation as something owed to them—not for a debilitating injury, but for the hardships of service to the nation. This study uses US Army and Department of Veterans Affairs personnel files, soldier interviews, and discussions with senior leaders to support its conclusions. The intent of the study is to prompt the Army profession to act before the culture surrounding disability compensation becomes permanent. In the end, the essence of the entitlement—taking care of veterans—must remain sacrosanct. This call for reform is driven not by fiscal considerations, but by a desire for the Army to remain both an institution trusted by society and a profession marked by selfless service.”

Curtice, Scott. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2021).
“Major Curtice applies three theoretical models of nuclear proliferation and argues that they are more accurate when used in conjunction with each other than separately. Nuclear proliferation, Curtice states, occurs when Domestic Politics-Positive and Normative-Positive pressures are greater than their negative counterparts when a state is facing a security threat. By using India as a theoretical model, Major Curtice demonstrates how threats from neighboring countries, as well as internal political perspective shifts, changed the country from championing nuclear disarmament to conducting nuclear tests in just one decade.”

Caudill, Shannon W. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2021).
“This third and final volume in the AU Press monograph series Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency provides concise principles designed to assist Air Force and Space Force commanders in better understanding their role in base defense to better protect their people, resources, and war-fighting assets…This volume provides future wing, group, and squadron commanders and maturing Air Force and Space Force leaders some guiding principles through which they can better lead, protect, and secure their people, and air- and space power assets. Volume III outlines 10 base defense principles for commanders: (1) You Own It! (commander responsibilities for base defense); (2) Get Left of the Boom: Deter, Disrupt, Deceive; (3) Influence the Base Security Zone . . . or Someone Else Will; (4) Unity of Effort: Synchronize the Fight; (5) Everyone Must Have a Role in the Base Defense . . . and Play It!; (6) Intelligence Drives Maneuver: A Joint-Interagency Approach Is Critical; (7) Air-mindedness Includes Using Air Assets for Base Defense; (8) Law Enforcement Skills Are Critical to Base Defense and Irregular Warfare; (9) Manage the Risk: Commit Intellectual Capital to the Fight; and (10) Nowhere to Hide: Anticipate Future Threats and Develop Countermeasures.”

Chanlett-Avery, Emma, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 6. 2021).
“Japan is a significant partner of the United States in a number of foreign policy areas, including addressing regional security concerns, which range from hedging against Chinese military modernization to countering threats from North Korea. The U.S.-Japan military alliance, formed in 1952, grants the U.S. military the right to base U.S. troops—currently around 54,000 strong—and other military assets on Japanese territory, undergirding the ‘forward deployment’ of U.S. troops in East Asia. In return, the United States pledges to help defend Japan. The two countries collaborate through multiple bilateral and multilateral institutions on issues such as science and technology, global health, energy, and agriculture. With new leadership in both capitals since September 2020, the two countries have moved quickly to reaffirm their relationship and to embark on new initiatives, from utilizing the ‘Quad’ framework with Australia and India to expanding climate and energy cooperation.”

Bermudez, Joseph, and Victor Cha. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel – Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Key Findings
• The recent repositioning of the submersible missile test stand barge was not an isolated event, but the latest in a series of small naval movements at the shipyard during the past several weeks.
• It is unclear if these movements portend preparations for a forthcoming submarine launched ballistic missile test (potentially of a Pukkuksong-4 or -5), the need for maintenance, repairs, and/or installation of new equipment, or the launching of North Korea’s long-anticipate first true ballistic missile submarine (SSB).
• North Korea retains the capability and resources to launch the new SSB or conduct additional SLBM tests at any time of its choosing.
• No significant activity is observed at the static test stand and there are no indications of either a recent SLBM ‘pop-up’ test or preparations for an upcoming test. However, small construction activity is noted immediately north of the test stand.
• No significant activity is observed elsewhere at the shipyard.
• The launching of the new SSB or testing of an SLBM (at sea or from the static test stand) would present significant challenges to the new U.S. administration of President Biden.”

Doshi, Rush. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“This report is motivated by China’s growing influence in telecommunications and the growing controversy accompanying that influence. However, China’s telecommunications resources, ambitions, and strategic framing are intertwined with those around IT more broadly. For that reason, this report reviews Chinese government, commercial, and academic discussion of both IT generally and telecommunications specifically. This report also contextualizes its analysis in terms of Beijing’s program to become a ‘cyber great power,’ also translated as ‘network great power,’ the blueprint for China’ ambitions to leapfrog legacy industrial leaders and define the architecture of the digital revolution. A new technological landscape is taking shape. China works to define that landscape. More than ever, it is imperative that China’s ambitions be documented.”

Horrigan, John B., and Jorge Reina Schement. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
"Unequal access to broadband Internet threatens to undermine the ability of Americans to participate in their economy, their communities, and in their democracy. Without change in this regard, the country will have a difficult time rebuilding after the coronavirus pandemic.”

Runde, Daniel F., Linnea Sandin, and Amy Doring. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Since the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)—a cornerstone of U.S.-Caribbean economic engagement—was launched almost four decades ago, the United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to the region, which remains a source of reliable allies with security and economic ties. However, the United States often undervalues its relationship with the Caribbean. The United States–Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 sought to address this, increasing engagement with the governments, private sector, and civil society of the region. Yet it is necessary to further reimagine the U.S. approach to the Caribbean in order to emphasize its promising opportunities and identify diverse focal points for engagement.”

Hoehn, John R. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods.”

Hoehn, John R., Kelley M. Sayler, and Jill C. Gallagher. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
“Communication using the electromagnetic spectrum (‘the spectrum’) enables a number of modern military capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses electromagnetic radiation to enable military communications, navigation, radar, nonintrusive inspection of aircraft, and other equipment. DOD also heavily relies on electromagnetic radiation for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) applications such as missile early warning and signals intelligence. Individual branches of the military (e.g., the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Space Force) currently are allotted significant ranges of frequency bands to enable various equipment and applications that support military operations. Potential adversaries like China and Russia have observed how the United States wages war through conflicts ranging from Desert Storm to Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom over the past 30 years. These potential adversaries have identified the DOD’s use of the spectrum as a critical enabler, and, as a result, have developed weapon systems, particularly electronic warfare (EW) platforms, designed to challenge the DOD’s ability to effectively use the spectrum.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
“China’s actions in the SCS [South China Sea] in recent years—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.”

Marine Corps War College. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
“The vision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for professional military education is clear: the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) needs to help prepare Joint leaders, senior staff officers, and strategists to ‘execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations’ and ‘conduct joint warfighting at the operational to strategic levels.’ To achieve this, MCWAR students must first grapple with the fundamentals of national security strategy and grand strategy formulation before delving into the complexities of military strategy. This is the purpose of ‘The Marine Corps War College Strategy Primer.’ It not only provides students an overview of the elements of strategic logic but also introduces a cognitive model for developing and assessing strategy by leveraging innovative design methodologies and other critical and creative thinking approaches. In short, this primer aids in forging strategically minded warfighters who understand how the military instrument fits within a whole-of-government strategy. Only then can MCWAR’s historical case studies effectively teach the art and science of the ‘strategy bridge,’ nesting military options in support of policy ends in shared pursuit of a better peace.”

Stoltenberg, Jens. (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2021).
“On 16 March 2021, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg released his Annual Report for 2020. It covers NATO’s work and achievements throughout the year, including efforts to ensure the health crisis did not become a security crisis, and preparations under the NATO 2030 initiative to future-proof the Alliance. The Report includes the results of new polls on the public perception of the Alliance. These demonstrate that, in a year of upheaval, overall support for the NATO Alliance, the transatlantic bond and collective defence remains strong.”

Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. (Simi Valley, CA: Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, 2021).
“The Reagan National Defense Survey is a public opinion poll that assists elected officials, policymakers, and key stakeholders with understanding how Americans view a wide array of defense, foreign policy, and national security matters.”

Davies, Andrew. (Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021).
“This report analyses the future impact that hypersonic weaponery will have on global affairs.”

Zhang, Albert, and Jacob Wallis. (Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021).
“As international media and researchers expose human rights abuses in China, including allegations of systematic sexual assault in Xinjiang’s internment camps, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is hitting back with a coordinated information campaign and propaganda targeting the UK public broadcaster, the BBC…The coordinated approach to counter and undermine the BBC highlights several features of the CCP’s increasingly agile propaganda and disinformation apparatus. There’s clear temporal and narrative alignment across diplomatic and state media messaging as well as among pro-CCP influencers and patriotic Twitter accounts, from which we can infer a level of coordination and a willingness to target international audiences.”

Army Talent Management Task Force. (Washington, DC: US Army, 2021).
“The Army Talent Management Task Force was founded in 2016 by then Lt. Gen. James McConville, chief of Army personnel. In 2019, as the 44th Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. McConville announced The Army People Strategy which provides the vision and mission for the Army to ‘acquire, develop, employ and retain the diversity of Soldier and Civilian talent needed to achieve Total Army readiness.’ In 2020, the Army implemented more than a dozen new initiatives that transform the Army from a data-poor personnel system to a datarich 21st Century Talent Management System.”

Hope, Gregory C. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021).
“The American Army’s mobilization for World War I was fraught with difficulties, resulting in a number of failings that produced a capable but flawed expeditionary force. The traditional interpretation of army training during that conflict was lackluster as it produced combat units that lacked critical capabilities. The experience of learning how to train and how to write training doctrine produced positive results that historians have largely overlooked. This study examines the status of training in the pre-war army to include both existing doctrine and institutional management organizations. It then chronicles the wartime experience and traces the evolution of training doctrine and practices during the war. It concludes by looking at the immediate post-war years to determine what lasting impacts the wartime experiences had on training doctrine and management. Overall, this study concludes that the training effort during World War I had significant long-term benefits for the army, producing the foundation of the army’s training practices through World War II.”

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. (Arlington, VA: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021).
“The mandate of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) is to make recommendations to the President and Congress to ‘advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States.’ This Final Report presents the NSCAI’s strategy for winning the artificial intelligence era. The 16 chapters in the Main Report provide topline conclusions and recommendations. The accompanying Blueprints for Action outline more detailed steps that the U.S. Government should take to implement the recommendations.”

Engler, Alex. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“This year is poised to be a highly impactful period for the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). The Trump administration successfully pushed for hundreds of millions of dollars in AI research funding, while also encouraging the formalization of federal AI practices. President Joe Biden will start his new administration with federal agencies already working to comply with executive guidance on how to use and regulate AI. Beyond passing the AI spending increases, Congress also tasked the White House with creating a new National AI Initiative Office to orchestrate these developments. All this comes as the European Commission (EC) has put forth the Digital Services Act, which will create oversight for how internet platforms use AI. The EC is also poised to propose a comprehensive approach to AI safeguards in the spring. Taking all this into account, 2021 promises to be an important inflection point for AI policy.”

Yoshihara, Toshi, and Jack Bianchi. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2021).
“China’s military is going global. In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, beyond the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies and partners, who have enjoyed largely unobstructed access to the world’s oceans for the last three decades, will need to adjust to new military realities as the PLA makes its presence felt in faraway theaters.”

Business Executives for National Security. (Washington, DC: Business Executives for National Security, 2021).
“COVID-19 has exposed critical weaknesses in America’s planning and processes for responding to threats and emergencies. The components of an integrated national response capability are largely in place, but major roadblocks prevent the execution of quick, coordinated, and effective action during a prolonged crisis that simultaneously impacts every corner of the country. Unless these weaknesses are addressed, future pandemics, natural disasters, coordinated cyberattacks, or acts of terror will have enormous potential to imperil our citizens, cripple our infrastructure, threaten our economy, and put our national security at risk.”

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“The global public health and economic devastation caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak dramatically reinforces the urgent imperative to minimize the chances of another zoonotic pandemic. Reducing the likelihood of another viral spillover sweeping the world requires a fundamental change in how we interact with nature. It requires minimizing human interface with wild animals and wild spaces; eliminating transmission points where the likelihood of viral spillover to humans is high, such as unhygienic commercial markets in wild animal meat and live animals; better monitoring of the legal trade in wildlife; diligently suppressing illegal and unsustainable trade in wildlife; and conserving natural habitats. Conserving natural habitats in turn requires profound changes in human food production and human encroachment on remaining natural habitats. Decisionmaking about pandemic prevention and nature conservation must be elevated to the highest levels of governments on a permanent basis. Such changes will not be easy or cheap, but they are necessary.”

Hanchuk, Pavel. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“With the ongoing drastic transformation of the Euro­pean security environment, problems of national resilience against hybrid destructive activity occupy a major place in policymaking at the state and inter­national levels. This paper looks at how to foster the capacities of the security sectors of Eastern European countries to withstand the newly emerged combina­tion of threats emanating from Russia. Its assertive actions that have already led to territorial and human losses represent a serious challenge to state sovereignty and societal well-being. The issue is vital especially for the Eastern European countries that constitute the front line of resistance to Russia’s malign activity. This paper looks at two very close and yet consid­erably different countries—Belarus and Ukraine— to illustrate the challenges of adapting to a volatile geopolitical environment. It presents a comparative overview of transformations in their security sectors in response to Russia’s hybrid activities since 2014. It also reveals the main drawbacks in the security poli­cies of Belarus and Ukraine in response to the changed security landscape.”

Thompson, Jack, Danny Pronk, and Hugo van Manen. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2021).
“The purpose of this report is to analyze why, amidst profound transformations in the international system, the US-Dutch and US-European relationships have changed permanently and to offer recommendations for what the Netherlands and its European partners should do over the next ten years to preserve their interests and values. The report’s principal argument is that the election of Biden offers the European Union an opportunity to boost its nascent status as a global power, and that the Netherlands should play an active role in this effort. The report contends that the Netherlands and European Union should proactively seek a more equal relationship with Washington, one that empowers the Netherlands and Europe to accept more responsibility for their own security and for promoting peace and stability in their region. Among other tasks, this will require cultivating more flexible and adept coalition-building strategies and the development of more effective and robust military capabilities.”

Streamed live on Feb 19, 2021. Streaming video. 3:22:11.
“On February 19, 2021, the MSC Special Edition assembled some of the world’s most senior decision-makers. At the very time and place the MSC 2021 would have kicked-off normally, they discussed in a live broadcast how to rebuild and renew the transatlantic alliance and highlight the areas in which transatlantic and international cooperation are most urgently needed.”

Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The dominant narrative of a global jihadi threat has overshadowed the key role played by military nepotism, prevarication and indiscipline in generating and perpetuating conflict in countries of the Western Sahel. This narrative has pushed the international community to intervene to regulate local conflicts that have little to do with global terrorism or religious indoctrination. Mali offers a clear example of how structural failings that long predate the ‘war on terror’ – evident in poor governance and weak state security mechanisms – have been the main driver of the growth of insurgent groups over the past decade. By contrast, the recent experience of Niger, which shares many of the structural and historical challenges faced by Mali, demonstrates that progress is possible where deliberate steps are taken to achieve more inclusive governance. External actors – national and multilateral – see engagement in the Sahel as critical, but a primary focus on insurgent groups as terrorists limits the policy options available to them to help promote regional stability and limit human suffering. Reframing responses away from ‘hard’ counterterrorism towards a more holistic view of human security, and an emphasis on tackling underlying challenges of governance, impunity and development, may offer a more durable route to peace and stability in the Sahel.”

Institute for Economics and Peace. (Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021).
“This report by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) estimates the economic impact of violence and conflict on the global economy. In 2019, it was estimated to be $14.4 trillion in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This is equivalent to 10.5 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) or $1,895 per person.”

Seah, S. et al. (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Centre ISEAS [Institute of Southeast Asian Studies] -Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021).
“‘The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report’ presents the findings of a region-wide online survey conducted among the policy, research, business, civil society, and media communities. For the first time, three different language options were offered: English, Bahasa Indonesia and Vietnamese. A total of 1,032 respondents from ten ASEAN member states participated in the online survey.”

Mohan, Garima, and Dhruva Jaishankar. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“In this edited series, experts from the United States, Europe, and India provide ideas that can move U.S.-India and Europe-India cooperation forward, setting the agenda for 2021. Focusing on five policy areas—foreign policy toward allies and partners, global trade and economic cooperation, critical technologies, security in the Indo-Pacific, and global health—they recommend areas which the Biden administration, the Modi government, and the EU should prioritize, assess the usefulness of new arrangements like D10, the Summit for Democracy, and technology alliances, and outline the roadblocks and challenges the United States, India and Europe will have to navigate this year. This series is part of the India Trilateral Forum, conducted in partnership with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation, and is edited by Garima Mohan (GMF) and Dhruva Jaishankar (ORF).”

Segal, Stephanie, and Dylan Gerstel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The CSIS Economics Program launched ‘Degrees of Separation’ to establish clearer objectives for U.S. engagement with China and to assess whether disengagement from specific economic activities can help in meeting such objectives. This interim report reviews the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship since President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. It takes stock of the current bilateral economic relationship, with particular focus on trade, investment, and innovation linkages. The report identifies six distinct areas that motivated U.S.-China engagement from 1972 through the end of the Trump administration: (1) geostrategy; (2) economics; (3) human rights and civil society; (4) global rules and norms; (5) global public goods; and (6) technology and innovation. While specific objectives in each area continue to evolve, these six areas remain relevant to guiding bilateral engagement today. A subsequent report, delivered later this year, will present a framework for assessing specific economic activities as candidates for targeted decoupling, along with case studies designed to test the framework.”

Kennedy, Scott, and Yilin Wang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which oversees the world’s largest financial system, struggles to effectively communicate with market actors, domestic and foreign. Yi Gang, the current governor of the PBOC, despite being more reticent than his counterparts around the world, has spoken on more public occasions than his predecessor. As a result of Yi’s personal interest as well as changes in the PBOC’s communications strategy, the bank has gained greater public visibility. However, this recent activism should not be mistaken as a sign of greater autonomy or authority. The PBOC has assumed a more important role in China’s overall financial governance, taking up a ‘dual-pillar’function that included both monetary policymaking and macro-prudential management; but it is still far from an independent central bank whose words convey great authority. U.S. policymakers and the financial community should pay close attention to how the PBOC speaks to markets to understand how Chinese economic policies are implemented, but everyone should recognize that on critical issues, higher authorities within the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still set the agenda and speak most authoritatively for the regime.”

Lehr, Amy K., and Henry C. Wu. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“This report is the fourth in a series that the CSIS Human Rights Initiative has produced identifying strategies for businesses, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral organizations to coordinate and address forced labor linked to China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The XUAR produces around a fifth of the world’s cotton and is its largest exporter of textiles and apparel. Due to repressive government programs transferring hundreds of thousands of members of Muslim minority populations into jobs in the XUAR, production in China may introduce forced labor into global supply chains. To avoid these forced labor-affected inputs, multiple actors must work together to develop new sourcing opportunities. This report argues that to speed the development of alternate sourcing hubs that are free of XUAR-linked forced labor, public and private actors must coordinate to encourage long-term investment in new locations, and international human rights and environmental standards must form a fundamental element of the strategy. Preferential trade policy, infrastructure and development aid, import restrictions and sanctions, public apparel procurement, and investment incentives all offer opportunities to diversify supply chains and protect garment workers’ labor rights. Countries in Asia, Central America, and East and West Africa show potential for expanding their roles in the apparel, textile, and footwear sectors.”

Hill, Steven. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. As part of a project examining NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for members of the NATO Alliance. NATO has long maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the new treaty, meaning that under current circumstances it is unlikely that any NATO member will join the TPNW. But the reality for NATO, its members and partners is that the TPNW is now here to stay. There is a risk that if the Alliance maintains an intense focus on opposing the TPNW, this may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament, and may undermine the potential for NATO and supporters of the TPNW to work together to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament.”

Africa Growth Initiative. (Washington, DC: Brookings 2021).
“With this and every iteration of Foresight Africa, we aim to capture the top priorities for the region in the coming year, offering recommendations for African and global stakeholders for creating and supporting a strong, sustainable, and successful Africa. In doing so, we hope that Foresight Africa 2021 will promote a dialogue on the key issues influencing development policy and practice in Africa during the upcoming year. Such ideas will ultimately provide sound strategies for sustaining and expanding the benefits of economic growth to all people of Africa in the years ahead.”

Meester, Jos. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2021).
“This policy brief provides an examination of China’s rise in relation to its African partners. It takes into account geopolitical concerns, but homes in on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its means of expanding into Africa. It examines the role of the Digital Silk Road in the use of Chinese artificial intelligence and technology transfers on surveillance and the risks of repression. The brief aims to move beyond the politicised narratives surrounding Chinese involvement in Africa by testing them against practical initiatives on the ground. It examines Ethiopia, particularly its burgeoning tech hub known as the ‘Sheba Valley’, in order to understand China’s role in development in African countries. Ethiopia is a critical case because of:
• the country’s strong relations with China, leading Ethiopia to model its developmental state model on the Chinese one and incentivising civil servants to learn from the Chinese experience;
• Ethiopia’s attempt to develop its relatively advanced ICT hub (the Sheba Valley) in collaboration with China’s Shenzhen-based ICT hub;
• Ethiopia’s historically heavy surveillance and repressive practices, in part modelled on China’s practice of prioritising development over democratic reform.”

Schenkkan, Nate, and Isabel Linzer. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2021).
“What Is Transnational Repression? It is governments reaching across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, including through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation. It is a daily assault on civilians everywhere — including in democracies like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Australia.”

Bahar, Dany, and Selen Özdoğan. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“The productivity dynamics of Japan, in particular, are quite intriguing. Most developed nations have seen sharp slowdowns in their productivity growth since 2004, but the Japanese case is puzzling because productivity growth decelerated just as sharply there, even though productivity levels continue to lag well behind countries such as the U.S. and Germany.”

Runde, Dan, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Over the past two decades, the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala have undergone significant change and have faced a multitude of political, environmental, economic, and security challenges. Many of these challenges reinforce each other and include gang violence and insecurity, high levels of public debt, poverty, natural disaster vulnerability, corruption, weakened economic growth, and irregular migration issues. The Covid-19 pandemic has also greatly impacted the Northern Triangle and the larger global economy, for example in global supply chains and infrastructure development. Following the pandemic, there will be many opportunities for the United States to engage with development efforts in the Northern Triangle, including collaborating with allies to address the root causes of migration, bolster institutional capacity, fight corruption, protect human rights issues, and foster an enabling economic environment. The Biden administration has already committed to increasing U.S. foreign policy in the region, not to mention President Biden’s considerable experience working with the Northern Triangle countries. As vice president, he led the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P) initiative and made several trips to the region. An effective strategy in the region from the Biden administration can boost economic resiliency, stem migration to the United States, mitigate the impact of organized crime, and enhance citizen security.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated January 28, 2021).
“China’s actions in the SCS in recent years—including extensive island-building and base construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated January 27, 2021).
“In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. Some U.S. observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, particularly for building larger surface ships, and resulting trend lines regarding the relative sizes China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.”

Anonymous. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2021).
“Key Points
• The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
• US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
• The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.”

Kania, Elsa B., and Lorand Laskai. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“In U.S. policy debates on China, military-civil fusion (MCF) has emerged as a frequent subject of debate and concern. Once a niche topic of study among only avid watchers of Chinese military modernization and defense technological development, Beijing’s drive to break down barriers and create stronger linkages between its civilian economy and defense industrial base has started to draw considerable attention in Washington. During Donald Trump’s administration, Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials across the State Department and Defense Department, and members of Congress all devoted time to MCF in speeches, using it to justify a broad range of policies. These included expanding investigations into intellectual property theft, banning Huawei from U.S. networks and critical infrastructure, urging companies like Microsoft and Google to stop working with Chinese counterparts, and even advocating for ‘decoupling’ from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as in supply chains and by limiting technological collaboration. MCF has emerged as a key analytic driver of the intensifying economic and technological competition between the United States and the PRC in recent years. While Joe Biden’s administration will have an opportunity to reset the tone of the U.S.-China relationship and recalibrate the use of instruments of U.S. policy, China’s model of MCF is likely to remain a major concern for U.S. policymakers.”

Mecklin, John (ed). (Chicago, IL: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021).
“It is 100 seconds to midnight.”
“Founded in 1945 by Albert Einstein and University of Chicago scientists who helped develop the first atomic weapons in the Manhattan Project, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists created the Doomsday Clock two years later, using the imagery of apocalypse (midnight) and the contemporary idiom of nuclear explosion (countdown to zero) to convey threats to humanity and the planet. The Doomsday Clock is set every year by the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board in consultation with its Board of Sponsors, which includes 13 Nobel laureates. The Clock has become a universally recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe from nuclear weapons, climate change, and disruptive technologies in other domains.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, Last Updated January 28, 2021).
“The Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States. The interactive covers nearly thirty conflicts with background information and resources on each conflict.”

Mutschler, Max, and Marius Bales. (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2020).
“Every year, BICC’s Global Militarisation Index (GMI) presents the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The GMI 2020 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2019). The index project is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“‘Global Forecast’ is an annual collection of essays by CSIS experts focused on the critical issues facing the United States and the world in the year ahead.”

ACAPS. (Geneva, Switzerland: ACAPS, 2021).
“Crisis In Sight is the new ACAPS analysis portfolio which enables you to compare the severity of crises globally as well as the level of humanitarian access, while providing trends analysis and a forward-looking scan for risks. In order to measure the severity of a crisis, we use the INFORM Severity Index which brings together 31 core indicators, organised in three dimensions: impact, conditions of affected people, and complexity.”

Shahbaz, Adrian, and Allie Funk. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020).
“The coronavirus pandemic is accelerating a dramatic decline in global internet freedom. For the 10th consecutive year, users have experienced an overall deterioration in their rights, and the phenomenon is contributing to a broader crisis for democracy worldwide.”

Bunde, Tobias, et al. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2020).
“30 years after German unification, the Federal Republic is confronted with enormous challenges. Europe's security is threatened, Europe's democracies are on the defensive. The special edition of the Munich Security Report ‘Zeitenwende | Wendezeiten’ provides an overview of the state of German foreign and security policy six years after the ‘Munich consensus’.”

Eisentraut, Sophie, et al. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2020).
“In just a few short months, the coronavirus pandemic has become a polypandemic – a health crisis that is accompanied by various other pandemics, among them the pandemics of poverty and hunger, of nationalism and authoritarianism.”

Cancian, Mark F., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“With the shift of U.S. strategic focus to great power competition, interest in industrial mobilization for a long-term, high-intensity conflict has returned. However, the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not designed to meet this challenge. To gain insight into the ability of the defense industrial base to meet the demands of great power conflict, this project reviewed the history and literature on industrial mobilization and then analyzed the time needed to replace contemporary weapon systems’ inventory at peacetime and surge production rates. This analysis was based on an original database developed using production data found in the P-21 and P-40 exhibits in the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement justification books from 1999, 2008, and 2020. The study found that it would take many years to replace weapon inventories in the event of a long, high-intensity conflict, even at surge production rates. Further, the study found that the industrial base has become more brittle over time, as it takes longer to replace inventories at FY 2020 production rates than at FY 1999 production rates.”

Watling, Jack, and Sean MacFarland. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).
“The diminished expectation of large-scale warfighting in the wake of the Cold War, combined with the liberation from a rigid echelon system enabled by modern communications technology, has reduced the emphasis on the corps in Western militaries. The return of great power competition, however, has seen a renewed interest in corps-level command. But the corps’ tasks have evolved since 1991. The expanded range and precision of fires makes divisional headquarters and enablers increasingly vulnerable, requiring them to be lean tactical formations. This pushes a greater planning, sustainment and force protection burden on the corps, which is likely to also be the echelon at which tactical multi-domain deep effects are coordinated. This paper considers the capabilities that the future corps will require and the challenges in rationalising the corps echelon within NATO. It argues that overcoming interoperability challenges requires extensive exercising with subordinate formations, which necessitates a shift in NATO from ‘rapid reaction’ to being ‘long prepared’.”

German Transatlanticists Group. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“A new consensus must confirm shared goals and necessary implementing measures. Germany and the United States will need to accept their responsibility for the cohesion and creative power of the community of liberal democracies. In particular, they must agree that a new consensus must be reached, especially regarding the United States role and presence in Europe and Germany, aiming to fortify the alliance well beyond the new president’s term in office. Common solutions are urgently needed to combat the scourges on humanity caused by the coronavirus pandemic and global warming. This collaboration on the challenges of our time should attract a new generation and new civil society actors to the transatlantic relationship.”

Hersman, Rebecca, Eric Brewer, and Maxwell Simon. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Arctic is growing in geostrategic importance and potentially becoming yet another zone for strategic competition, as this previously impenetrable territory becomes increasingly accessible to navigation and exploitation. The region is resource rich: it is estimated to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of its natural gas reserves. Diminishing sea ice coverage is opening travel routes that can significantly shorten travel times between Europe and Asia. Traditionally, the Arctic states have relied on cooperative governance to manage competing interests in the region. However, as Arctic temperatures increase, new economic, scientific, maritime, and political opportunities are raising the question of whether the region will become more militarized and further engage competitive dynamics between the United States, China, and Russia.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. Beyond the traditional military services, military forces include the new Space Force as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF, which functions as a quasi-service), Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (which perform many functions that military personnel perform in other countries), and contractors (which form a permanent element of the national security establishment, not only in the United States proper but also on overseas battlefields).”

Katz, Brian. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) stands at the dawn of a new era of technological innovation and transformation unprecedented in its history. In this final report, the CSIS Technology and Intelligence Task Force set out to understand the emerging technology landscape, identify the opportunities and challenges to applying technology to intelligence missions, and generate recommendations that will enable the IC to adapt, integrate technology, and maintain an advantage over sophisticated rivals.”

U.S. Naval War College YouTube page. Posted December 10, 2020. 3 videos.
“Join the USNWC and Stockton Center for the 'Disruptive Technologies and International Law' conference where experts in the field will explore international law and multi-domain warfare.”

McCurdy, Daphne, and Frances Z. Brown. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• For the United States, civilian stabilization assistance in fragile states represents a potentially significant tool in the context of geopolitical competition because supporting locally legitimate political actors helps them stand up against external meddling.
• In eastern Syria, U.S. policymakers have sought to leverage stabilization efforts to counter Iranian and Russian influence, which resulted in limited success and moral dilemmas.
• In order for stabilization aid to be an effective means of advancing U.S. interests amid geopolitical competition, the United States needs to develop a stabilization strategy tied to a viable political end state and commit to more reliable, longer-term engagement.”

Hundt, Reed. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“The United States can create jobs, better compete against China, and at the same time address major social challenges if it leverages the emerging combination of technologies that will constitute ‘distributed computing’ to enable new, democracy-enhancing 21st century infrastructure. Three technologies—the Internet of Things, 5G, and artificial intelligence (AI)—will increasingly come together to compose a new digital revolution. The resulting distributed computing will function as a hugely enhanced combination of the smartphone and the cloud, or as a computer network in a box. It can unlock massive opportunities if the United States invests at home and works with allies to protect democratic values. Distributed computing can solve some of the country’s long-term challenges in climate, healthcare, transportation, and energy.”

Livingston, Scott. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the ‘Party’) is currently strengthening the presence and powers of internal Party organizations located within Chinese companies to ensure greater oversight and influence over China’s commercial sector.
• In addition, as part of what it calls the ‘modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics,’ the CCP is requiring that companies codify a role for these Party organizations in their corporate charters.
• These new developments challenge traditional understandings of corporate autonomy, and by extension, how Chinese companies should be treated under existing international trade agreements and by the regulatory and investment review bodies of foreign governments. Because the CCP might well attempt to extend this push into foreign private companies operating in China, these new actions pose a very real threat to the operational independence of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).
• To formulate an effective response, companies and governments in market economies should increase their understanding of how the CCP operates at the grassroots level and work to ensure greater transparency and understanding of the overall level of Party influence within specific firms. To further this transparency, U.S. policymakers could consider requiring securities issuers in the United States provide enhanced disclosures relating to CCP activities within their firms. The U.S. government should also consider reviving open-source data collection initiatives to publish and translate key CCP regulations and Party documents in order to increase understanding and spur further analysis of the Party system.”

Huguet, Alice, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“‘Truth Decay’—the diminishing role that facts, data, and analysis play in political and civic discourse—has in part been fueled by a complex and rapidly evolving media and technology ecosystem. For those interested in countering Truth Decay, media literacy (ML)—the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act using all forms of communication—has emerged as a potentially powerful tool. But the lack of specificity regarding ML competencies can challenge teachers, policymakers, curriculum developers, advocates, and researchers hoping to understand what kinds of ML education work best and how ML education can be implemented effectively. There is also no shortage of ML-relevant standards. The large number of existing standards can be an additional challenge for stakeholders trying to understand how to define ML for themselves and to determine what competencies are most important to their work. This report, part of the Countering Truth Decay initiative, describes how the authors synthesized myriad existing standards using the lens of Truth Decay—drawing from standards in ML, digital literacy, information literacy, news literacy, social and emotional learning, and other areas—to identify a single, concise set of ML standards.”

Stares, Paul B. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“A crisis stemming from North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing is the top-ranked conflict concern for 2021, according to the Council on Foreign Relations’ (CFR) thirteenth annual Preventive Priorities Survey. The survey identifies potential violent overseas conflicts where U.S. troops might be deployed in the year ahead. Conducted by CFR’s Center for Preventive Action (CPA) last November, the survey asks foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring or escalating in the next year and their potential impact on U.S. national interests.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2021).
“The 16th edition of the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Risks Report’ analyses the risks from societal fractures—manifested through persistent and emerging risks to human health, rising unemployment, widening digital divides, youth disillusionment, and geopolitical fragmentation. Businesses risk a disorderly shakeout which can exclude large cohorts of workers and companies from the markets of the future. Environmental degradation—still an existential threat to humanity—risks intersecting with societal fractures to bring about severe consequences. Yet, with the world more attuned to risk, lessons can be drawn to strengthen response and resilience. In 2020, the risk of a pandemic became reality. As governments, businesses, and societies grapple with COVID-19, societal cohesion is more important than ever.”

U.S. Naval War College. January 8, 2021. Streaming video. 6 videos. Conference videos and handouts available at the bottom of the website linked to.
“This conference explores the national security and economic implications of climate change on the current and future security landscape. Strategically and operationally, this affects both our ally’s and adversary’s behavior leading to the open-ended question—what does it mean if the Department of Defense (DoD) adopts a posture that focuses on the strategic implications of climate change? Not only does this impact where, when, and why the United States gets involved around the world, the economic implications are cross-cutting at home. This includes the increased use of military forces for domestic response, building resilience of defense infrastructure, and the corresponding impacts on training and readiness. The changing climate also affects national security and economic interests in the oceans. Advancing U.S. economic, technological, environmental, security and defense interests in this internationally competitive environment requires a deeper understanding of the blue' or ocean economy and how that connects to the U.S. naval and national security concerns. Our defense, and the defense of countries around the world, is built within the context of a stable climate. From now on a stable climate is no longer a valid planning consideration. In fact, the changing climate can be seen as a high-probability, high-impact security threat presenting new risks around the world. We are proud to be the first DoD academic institution to host an open event exploring the national security significance of a changing climate. Videos from this event include:
NSSCC: Risk and Resilience - Introduction
NSSCC: SECNAV, Hon. Alice Hill, & Panel 1 - How a Changing Climate Affects Global Power Competition
NSSCC: Panel 2 - The Impacts of the Changing Climate on Fragile States Around the World
NSSCC: Panel 3 - Domestic Security Implications: Operations within the Homeland
NSSCC: Panel 4 - Department of Defense Budget and Infrastructure Considerations
NSSCC: Panel 5 - Blue Competition: U.S. & International Efforts to Develop a Blue Economy”

Department of the Navy. (Washington, DC: Department of Navy, 2021).
“America’s interests, stretching from Maine in the North Atlantic across the Arctic Ocean through the Bering Strait and Alaska in the North Pacific to the southern tip of the Aleutian Island chain, are best served by fostering compliance with existing rules to assure a peaceful and prosperous Arctic Region.This forward looking regional blueprint describes how the Department will apply naval power as we continue to prepare for a more navigable Arctic Region over the next two decades. It stresses an approach that integrates American naval power with our joint forces, interagency teammates, allies, and partners to preserve peace and protect this northern maritime crossroads and gateway to our shores. This regional blueprint focuses on coop-eration, but ensures America is prepared to compete effectively and efficiently to maintain favorable regional balances of power.Our Department Team—Sailors, Marines, and Civilians—has taken steps throughout our history to protect American interests in our northern waters. We will build upon these efforts to maintain enhanced presence, strengthen cooperative partnerships, and build more capable naval forces for the Arctic Region. The time has come to write the next great chapter in the history of our Department, to prepare for an Alaskan Arctic and a Blue Arctic where America’s Navy-Marine Corps team, alongside our allies and partners, will be called to protect our interests and people and ensure this region remains peaceful and prosperous for future generations.”

United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. (Washington, DC: United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, 2020).
“‘Advantage at Sea’ is a Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that focuses on China and Russia, the two most significant threats to this era of global peace and prosperity. We prioritize competition with China due to its growing economic and military strength, increasing aggressiveness, and demonstrated intent to dominate its regional waters and remake the international order in its favor. Until China chooses to act as a responsible stakeholder rather than brandish its power to further its authoritarian interests, it represents the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations supporting a free and open system.
Other rivals, including Iran, North Korea, violent extremist organizations, and transnational criminal organizations, also continue to subvert the international rules-based order. We will address these challengers in a coordinated, multinational manner with forces developed to address more significant military threats.
The stakes of this competition are high. China’s aggressive actions are undermining the international rules-based order, while its growing military capacity and capabilities are eroding U.S. military advantages at an alarming rate. The Naval Service must act with urgency, clarity, and vision to take the bold steps required to reverse these trends.
‘Advantage at Sea’ provides guidance to the Naval Service for the next decade to prevail across a continuum of competition—composed of interactions with other nations from cooperation to conflict. This strategy emphasizes the following five themes. We must fully leverage the complementary authorities and capabilities of the Naval Service to generate Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. We must strengthen our alliances and partnerships— our key strategic advantage in this long-term strategic competition—and achieve unity of effort. We must operate more assertively to prevail in day-to-day competition as we uphold the rules-based order and deter our competitors from pursuing armed aggression. If our rivals escalate into conflict, becoming our adversaries, we must control the seas to deny their objectives, defeat their forces, protect our homeland, and defend our allies. And, we must boldly modernize the future naval force to maintain credible deterrence and preserve our advantage at sea.”

Boswell, Alan, et al. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2021).
“From the COVID-19 pandemic to popular protests, civil unrest, and democratic backsliding, 2020 was quite the year! This year’s ‘Africa: Year in Review 2020’ is a special edition, marking the fifth year since the launch of the series. The Wilson Center Africa Program continued its annual tradition of asking policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and stakeholders to examine the top developments in Africa and in U.S.-Africa relations for 2020. Our contributors responded with the brief and insightful essays in this volume. We thank them for their contributions, which provide analysis on topics including the 2020 U.S. election results; COVID-19 diplomacy and mitigation; popular protests and the rise of African youth activists; Niger’s peaceful transfer of power; the military coup in Mali; the role of sovereign wealth funds in promoting sustainable development; and the importance of utilizing African knowledge and traditional medicine to combat COVID-19 and address the continent’s health needs, among other topics.”

Niblett, Robin. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“In this paper, Chatham House Director Robin Niblett sets out a proposed blueprint for Britain’s future foreign policy. Rather than reincarnate itself as a miniature great power, he argues that the country has the chance to remain internationally influential if it serves as the broker of solutions to global challenges. The paper lays out six international goals for the UK that offer the best points of connection between its interests, resources and credibility. These are: protecting liberal democracy; promoting international peace and security; tackling climate change; enabling greater global health resilience; championing global tax transparency and equitable economic growth; and defending cyberspace. In pursuit of these goals, the UK will need to invest in and leverage its unique combination of diplomatic reach, diverse security capabilities and prominence in international development. It should use these assets to link together liberal democracies and, where possible, engage alongside them with other countries that are willing to address shared international challenges constructively.”

Ellehuus, Rachel, and Donatienne Ruy. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Mediterranean basin sits strategically at the intersection of three continents, where events on one shore often shape those on the other. In recent years, geopolitical tensions have risen in this narrow region, along with instability caused by conflict, governance failures, and economic strife. The United States’ goal of maintaining favorable regional balances of power in Europe and the Middle East depends on developments around the Mediterranean. Traditionally a theater of U.S. and European activity, the Greater Mediterranean has seen a rise in Russian and Chinese influence. This risks jeopardizing the space for U.S. and NATO action. In addition to the recent influence activities, an increasing number of transnational threats emanate from NATO’s Southern Flank. Yet the U.S. government still lacks a comprehensive approach to the region that can overcome organizational silos and account for both influence and instability drivers. These silos create blind spots in which adversaries can grow their influence. This in turn blunts the United States’ ability to project power and influence in the Mediterranean.”

Devermont, Judd, and Marielle Harris. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The situation in the Sahel has never been more dire. As the crisis enters its tenth year, extremist violence is spreading, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is growing, and food insecurity is affecting more people than ever before.
• There are growing doubts about how the current diplomatic, development, and security approaches will facilitate a new peace. Indeed, there are several—not entirely congruent—working hypotheses underpinning foreign and regional government strategies.
• It is imperative to reassess and reset the strategy toward the Sahel, casting aside faulty assumptions. Specifically, the international community and its Sahelian partners should prioritize governance, press for an expanded peace process, cautiously dialogue with militants, and rework the division of labor between foreign and regional actors.”

Ellis, Evan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“As U.S. election challenges proceed toward resolution and President-elect Joseph Biden puts his transition team into place, Latin America and the Caribbean will demand his attention. The region—which most directly affects U.S. security and prosperity through ties of geography, commerce, and family—is in the early stages of potentially transformational economic, social, and political convulsions. They will affect the United States through heightened immigration, transnational criminal threats, and newly energized social movements and governments hostile to the United States. In addition, U.S. rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran will leverage the new dynamics to pursue their interests and expand their strategic position in the hemisphere at the expense of that of the United States. Compounding those challenges, the region’s expectations of the Biden administration, both good and bad, will affect each of these actors’ behaviors. In recent weeks, numerous articles have focused on what the region can expect from a Biden administration. The present work examines how perceptions and expectations in the region about a Biden presidency could interact with important dynamics in the region to create significant challenges and opportunities for the new administration.”

Goldenberg, Ilan, Michael Koplow, and Tamara Cofman Wittes. (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2020).
“Today’s realities demand that the United States change its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its current focus is on high-profile diplomatic initiatives that aim for a permanent agreement in which the United States is the central mediator. Instead, the United States must focus on taking tangible steps, both on the ground and diplomatically, that will improve the freedom, prosperity, and security of all people living between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, while also cultivating the conditions for a future two-state agreement negotiated between the parties.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2020).
“Topics this year include China's view of strategic competition with the United States; China's promotion of alternative global norms and standards; China's strategic aims in Africa; vulnerabilities in China's financial system and risks for the United States; U.S.-China links in healthcare and biotechnology; China's growing power projection and expeditionary capabilities; Taiwan; Hong Kong; and a review of economics, trade, security, political, and foreign affairs developments in 2020.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2020).
“On December 9, 2020, President Trump issued a National Space Policy directive providing direction for all United States space activities.
The National Space Policy sets out the nation’s commitment to leading in the responsible and constructive use of space, promoting a robust commercial space industry, returning Americans to the Moon and preparing for Mars, leading in exploration, and defending United States and allied interests in space.
The National Space Policy recognizes that a robust, innovative, and competitive commercial space sector is foundational to economic development, continued progress, and sustained American leadership in space. It commits the United States to facilitating growth of an American commercial space sector that supports the nation’s interests, is globally competitive, and advances American leadership in the generation of new markets and innovation-driven entrepreneurship.
The 2020 National Space Policy replaces the 2010 National Space Policy while retaining the other national level policies listed on our Space Policies page.”

Bates, Emma, Samuel J. Brannen, and Alexander Kaplan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The U.S.-led system of alliances is more important than ever. Global cooperation with U.S. leadership has long undertaken responsibility for economic stability, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and prevention of large-scale violent conflict. In 2020, as the country prepares to transition from the Trump presidency to a new Joseph R. Biden, Jr. administration, that list of responsibilities now includes managing a global pandemic while reinvigorating the power of American values in competition with an increasingly coercive China. The United States will need allies, partners, and friends as it wrestles with a changing international order; more capable and numerous rivals; and mounting challenges to human security at home and abroad.
The 2020 Global Security Forum workshop convened a bipartisan group of 60 leading national security experts to examine how best to adapt the U.S.-led alliance system to meet this new era of complex challenges. Experts considered three distinct, difficult scenarios set in hypothetical futures between 2024 and 2030. They examined the relative alignment of U.S. and allied interests in these plausible ‘worlds’ and recommended steps that could be taken today to strengthen future alliance cohesion, capability, and capacity.”

Schwab, Klaus, and Saadia Zahidi. (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2020).
“The ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ series has since its first edition aimed to prompt policy-makers beyond short term growth and to aim for long-run prosperity. The 2020 special edition is dedicated to elaborating on the priorities for recovery and revival, and considering the building blocks of a transformation towards new economic systems that combine ‘productivity’, ‘people’ and ‘planet’ targets.”

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2021).
“The ‘NIDS China Security Report’ published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) was first released in March 2011. It is not difficult to find differences between this report—the 11th in this series—and the inaugural issue. Unlike the ‘East Asian Strategic Review’ which takes an annual, fixed-point observation style, the ‘NIDS China Security Report’ sets a particular theme each time and provides a detailed analysis related to China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. Initially, the report was written by several researchers studying China and Taiwan, and analyses focused on China’s diplomacy, maritime policy, and the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Beginning with the seventh issue, the report gradually broadened the scope of analysis, and has dealt with relations between China and countries/regions such as Taiwan, the United States, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, Russia, and Central Asia. Accordingly, the writing team was expanded to include not only members of the China Division but also experts on other regions as well as researchers of specific issues. Thus, the ‘NIDS China Security Report’ has evolved into a platform for analyzing China by many NIDS researchers, and has become one of the flagship publications of NIDS that attracts significant interest from research institutes and the media in various countries and regions.”

Armitage, Richard L., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“At this time of great uncertainty and rapid change, the United States and Japan face extraordinary challenges. These include an unrelenting pandemic, rising nationalism and populism, global economic turmoil, multiple technological revolutions, and renewed geopolitical competition. The U.S.-Japan alliance itself is one of the most important sources of stability and continuity in this period of great uncertainty, but there should be no doubt that together both countries must be prepared for a regional and world order under more stress than at any time in the last 70 years. This is the latest in a series of bipartisan ‘Armitage-Nye’ reports that have assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance and suggested a new agenda for the challenges and opportunities on the horizon. This current iteration has special importance because of shifting power dynamics in Asia and new expectations of Japan. Indeed, for the first time in its history, Japan is taking an equal, if not leading, role in the alliance. Developing a more equal U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to addressing both regional and global challenges. This report has identified issues that both allies should prioritize to advance their relationship as well as global security and prosperity.”

Hornung, Jeffrey W. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
"In the Indo-Pacific region, the alliance the United States has with Japan is arguably its most important. If a high-end contingency erupts in the East China Sea and the United States becomes engaged in major conventional combat operations with China, what roles can and might Japan play? In this report, Jeffrey W. Hornung assesses the strengths and limitations of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), as well as legal issues pertaining to the SDF use of force and U.S. base access in a contingency for combat operations that may not be directly tied to the defense of Japan. Hornung finds that, despite Japan's focus on self-defense, there are significant areas in which the SDF can assist the United States. He identifies strengths and weaknesses of the capabilities of each of the three SDF services — both current and expected over the next decade — and steps that could be taken to enhance these capabilities. Hornung also examines bilateral agreements and Japanese laws that govern how SDF capabilities may be employed and whether U.S. forces can expect to access their bases in Japan for combat operations. Hornung makes specific recommendations on how to ensure more effective and capable Japanese support in an East China Sea contingency involving China, including how Japan could better position itself to respond, both for its own defense and in support of the United States, and how the United States could better support Japan in these efforts.

Devermont, Judd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The national security pitch about why Africa matters to the United States tends to fall on deaf ears. Its recurrent themes—terrorism, migration, infectious diseases, and humanitarian crises—fail to resonate with most Americans. Only 1 percent of respondents believed Africa was the most important region for U.S. national security according to a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in January 2020. Instead of just preaching to beltway insiders, U.S. policymakers need to craft a hometown argument about Africa’s significance. They have to showcase how the continent enriches Americans’ daily lives, along with the vibrant economic, political, social, and cultural ties that bind U.S. cities and Africa together. In the past year, the CSIS Africa Program researched the links between African countries and 15 U.S. cities. The resounding conclusion is that a U.S. city’s ties to the continent contribute to its local industries, foster political leadership, enrich cultural life, advance academic scholarship, and promote faith-based and philanthropic endeavors.”

McKillop, Matt, et al. (Washington, DC: Trust for America’s Health / Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Blooming School of Public Health, 2020).
“Given the size and diversity of the country, each state and its communities will experience climate change differently. State leaders must understand their particular risks and vulnerabilities in order to plan effectively. In areas of a state where vulnerability is higher, state leaders should invest more in adaptation and preparedness. Likewise, states that are more vulnerable overall should go to greater lengths to adapt to climate-related hazards. This report examines states’ readiness to protect residents from the health impacts of climate change in light of the nature and level of risks that they face. Researchers at Trust for America’s Health and the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health developed a set of quantitative indicators to assess each state and the District of Columbia, drawing from three domains of inquiry: (1) vulnerability; (2) public health preparedness; and (3) climate-related adaptation. American Indian and Alaska Native tribal nations and U.S. territories were not included in the assessment, owing to a lack of comparable data, a serious gap that this country must work to fill, given the acute threat that climate change poses to many of their residents.
The results provide a portrait of state-level preparedness for the health impacts of climate change in the United States. While researchers found that every state had engaged in at least some level of planning and preparation—the extent or effectiveness of plan implementation, critical to preventing adverse outcomes, was not part of the assessment—there was significant variation, and, in many places, a great deal of room for improvement. Of greatest concern, researchers found that states with the highest levels of vulnerability—predominantly located in the Southeast—tended to be among the least prepared.”

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (Silver Spring, MD: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2020).
“The sustained transformation to a warmer, less frozen and biologically changed Arctic remains clear. Extreme warm air temperatures in the Eurasian Arctic illustrate significant region-wide effects of year-to-year variability and connections across the Arctic environment.”

Blazich, Frank. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2020).
“On the eve of American entry into World War II, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) established the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), an organization of the nation’s private pilots and aviation personnel for national defense purposes. Beginning in February 1942 with tentative Navy Department approval, the Army Air Forces agreed to an experimental use of CAP aircraft and personnel for antisubmarine patrols along the Atlantic Coast. This use of civilian pilots and aircraft developed out of an urgent necessity to stem the tide of German submarine operations inflicting heavy losses on coastal shipping. For the Army, the CAP coastal patrol was essentially a subexperiment for a larger experiment to see if civilian aviation could be semimilitarized for national defense purposes.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Part of ‘U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021.’ The Air Force continues the development and procurement of next-generation aircraft to meet the demands of great power conflict. Fielding of new aircraft has been enough to arrest the increase in fleet age. However, the Air Force is not buying enough new aircraft to sustain its force structure, so it seeks to retire older aircraft.
Key Takeaways
• Air Force military personnel levels, active and reserve component, increase slightly in FY 2021 and over the five-year period but remain essentially level. The largest increases are among civilians.
• Like the other services, the Air Force faces high day-to-day operational tempo while at the same time preparing to meet the demands of great power conflict.
• Aircraft inventories and fleet aging have stabilized in the near term.
• However, the Air Force is not buying enough new aircraft to maintain the inventory over the long term. Increasing procurement to the levels needed to sustain the inventory will require historically high costs.
• Instead, the Air Force plans to close this gap by retiring older aircraft and shrinking the force, possibly substantially. However, Congress has been reluctant to do this in the past.
• Given these circumstances, the Air Force is backing away from its 25 percent expansion goal to reach 386 operational squadrons.
• The FY 2021 budget procures no unmanned aircraft, so the unmanned fleet has plateaued at 6 percent of the force.
• Nuclear forces require a greater share of the Air Force budget as Reagan-era systems reach the end of their service lives, and as a result, nuclear modernization generates some opposition.
• The Space Force continues to take shape, so far entirely from Air Force elements.”

Ibrahimov, Mahir J. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2020).
“The world is changing at an ever-increasing pace. Modern communication with worldwide connectivity has brought together a global community. In this environment, we must be globally astute. We must understand the geopolitical and sociocultural aspects of regional affairs in any region in which we may be called upon to serve. Understanding the operating environment and associated regional cultures of our partners and competitors is essential to making military decisions that directly affect outcomes locally, regionally, and globally. Agile leaders must be able to recognize the cultural and geopolitical realities of operations and be prepared to adjust appropriately to achieve our nation’s broader goals. The US Army’s culture, regional expertise, and language programs provide a mechanism to prep…The articles that make up this work explore the cultural and regional implications of Chinese and Russian power projection in Eurasia, the Americas, and Africa; the rise of sub-state actors in their regions; and military applications of culture, area expertise, and foreign language proficiency in the operational environment. As our Army refocuses to prepare for competition in complex future operating environments, the insights offered in this volume are important for all Army leaders. Future missions may vary, but all will include the need to understand the geopolitical and cultural foundations of regions in which we operate and the people we encounter around the globe.”

Ellehuus, Rachel, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy takes its point of departure in the growing political, economic, and military competition the United States is facing around the world, to include from Russia and China—and aims to prevent any region of the world from becoming dominated by a single power. While the Arctic has been characterized more by cooperation than competition, recent events indicate that the tides may be turning. As attention turns north and the Arctic reenters the strategic calculations of great powers, spaces that have been largely neglected are suddenly assuming a position of significance, forcing countries in the region to consider how to balance competing interests from outside powers.
The essays below illustrate how it looks when three such places—Svalbard, Norway; Greenland; and Iceland—find themselves caught between competing powers. While this attention has taken different forms, there are similarities between the cases. All three, for example, have received economic interest from China and are beginning to feel the pressure of Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic. All three are also part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and anchor their defense policies in that alliance.”
100 Years of Arctic Geopolitics: The Svalbard Headache
Denmark Walks a Tightrope in Greenland
Finding a Niche for Iceland in the Post-Cold War Era

Kornbluh, Karen, and Sam DuPont (eds). (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund for the United States, 2020).
“New technologies will bring enormous new opportunity we must seize to address our existing challenges—and new disruption to which we must respond. Fortunately, good ideas abound for how to ensure these innovations improve lives, increase national security, and strengthen democratic values. #Tech2021 offers strategic, turnkey reforms from experts for how the U.S. government can leverage technology to ensure individuals and society thrive in the midst of rapid change. Despite the diversity of these briefs, some themes emerge:
• Innovation is fundamentally a bottom-up phenomenon, so opportunity to participate must be broadly distributed.
• As Schroeder observes, while many may wish for the government to simply ‘get out of the way,’ governments and other institutions working from the top down are needed to spur physical infrastructure (especially broadband access), education and training, and smart rules of the road that unlock the technological potential of our society and economy.
• Privacy protections and positive corrections to systemic inequities must be built in to ensure democratic values are protected and strengthened.
• Innovation happens in a global context. Democratic allies should work together to ensure that new technologies support and strengthen democratic values.
The ideas offered up are varied and specific.”

Ellis, Evan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Military engagement is an important and officially acknowledged part of the growing interactions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Latin America and the Caribbean. The 2008 and 2016 Chinese policy white papers toward Latin America, as well as the 2015 China Defense Strategy White Paper, all define military and other security activities as an important, if not necessarily leading, component of China’s overall engagement with the region. PRC economic activities in Latin America arguably eclipse military activities, both in terms of the resources and people involved and in terms of the attention given through official government discourse and interaction. This economic focus, along with Chinese leaders’ general avoidance of threatening rhetoric or provocative military actions in Latin America, should not distract from the fact that security sector activities are an integral part of China’s multidimensional engagement in pursuit of its strategic objectives—both in the region and globally.”

Martin, Zachary. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“This paper explores the social climate and circumstances in Mexico that have led to increased cartel activity over the past twenty years. Analysis of these circumstances shows that both Mexico and the United States have failed in their efforts to eradicate cartels and curb violent crime and illicit drug trafficking on both sides of the border. An examination of the Mexican administrations over two decades highlights the efforts and missteps the governments have made that contribute to the rising violent crime rates throughout the country. This paper also discusses potential solutions to those problems and the difficulties both countries face in implementing them.”

Murphy, Kyle. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The humanitarian emergency in the Sahel is causing unprecedented suffering. Approximately 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—the hardest hit countries in the region. The number of people facing acute hunger has tripled over the past year to reach 7.4 million, and the number of children requiring aid has jumped by two-thirds. A lethal combination of climate change, ethnic violence, and governance failures—exacerbated by jihadist attacks and bungled international responses—has caused a record number of people to flee their homes. The region has more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), a twentyfold increase over the past two years. These individuals are in dire need of humanitarian assistance including nutrition and food, health services, water and sanitation, shelter, education, protection, and support to survivors of gender-based violence.”

Bronk, Justin. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“This Whitehall Report examines Russian and Chinese combat air trends, and looks specifically at fast jets and their weapons systems and capabilities.”

Taylor, Trevor. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“The Tempest programme for a new combat aircraft is arguably the most ambitious in the Ministry of Defence’s portfolio, bringing significant risks and sizeable as yet unknown costs, but also extensive potential benefits. Only the Dreadnought programme might be seen as a rival in terms of difficulty. This paper shows how the Tempest programme can bring potential benefits and how its inherent risks are being managed with prudence.”

Kaushal, Sidharth. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“This Occasional Paper examines how the Royal Navy can leverage the potential of its Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers in the context of a strategic environment characterised by persistent competition.”

Wood, Dakota L. (ed.) (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2020).
“Each year, The Heritage Foundation’s ‘Index of U.S. Military Strength’ employs a standardized, consistent set of criteria, accessible both to government officials and to the American public, to gauge the U.S. military’s ability to perform its missions in today’s world. The inaugural 2015 edition established a baseline assessment on which each annual edition builds, assessing the state of affairs for its respective year and measuring how key factors have changed during the preceding year.
The Index is not an assessment of what might be, although the trends that it captures may well imply both concerns and opportunities that can guide decisions that are germane to America’s security. Rather, the Index should be seen as a report card for how well or poorly conditions, countries, and the U.S. military have evolved during the assessed year. The past cannot be changed, but it can inform, just as the future cannot be predicted but can be shaped.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. Unlike the other services, the Navy has sought to significantly expand its force structure. However, its previous plan to reach 355 ships collapsed because of high costs and the need to incorporate new technologies such as unmanned systems. A new plan incorporates smaller ships and large numbers of unmanned systems.
Key Takeaways
• In FY 2021, Navy active-duty personnel would increase by 5,300 to 347,800. Fleet size increases to 306 ships as previously ordered ships arrive, particularly the numerous littoral combat ships (LCS). The Navy continues to plan on significant expansion.
• The 355-ship goal was deemed infeasible because of its high cost. The structure was also criticized for focusing on large and expensive ships, particularly aircraft carriers, and not incorporating unmanned surface and undersea vessels/vehicles.
• When the Navy could not come up with a feasible new plan, Secretary of Defense Esper took over.
• On October 7, Secretary Esper outlined a ‘500+ ship’ future fleet described as 'an ever-present, resilient, and dominant fighting force.'
• Carriers and large surface combatants (LSCs) may be cut to pay for the unmanned vessels, additional submarines and small surface combatants, and a new class of small amphibious ships. However, many details remain unavailable, and to be real, the plan needs to be incorporated into the president’s FY 2022 budget proposal.
• The Navy and the secretary of defense seem to have different interpretations about the future fleet, as has been the case for many years.
• Affordability will be a challenge. The new fleet structure costs about the same as the 355-ship fleet. Esper wants the Navy to find the resources internally and may provide some resources from savings across the Department of Defense (DOD).
• Naval aviation, in contrast to the surface and subsurface fleets, remains focused on manned platforms.
• Ship numbers matter to the Navy because of the high demands for its forces in day-to-day operations for crisis response, allied and partner engagement, and ongoing regional conflicts.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. The Marine Corps begins a major restructuring to develop capabilities for great power conflict after two decades of conducting counterinsurgency ashore. The budget cuts units and personnel to pay for these new capabilities. However, many commentators worry that the restructuring will make the Marine Corps too narrowly focused.
Key Takeaways
• General Berger’s new guidance aims to restore the Marine Corps to its naval roots after two decades of operations ashore, invest in capabilities focused on great power conflict in the Pacific, and divest unneeded forces.
• To pay for this, the Marine Corps’ active-duty end strength begins a decline to about 172,000, the level before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• Despite a continuing high operational tempo, the Marine Corps is pursuing modernization over expanding force structure.
• Ground forces would gain long-range precision fires but give up three infantry battalions, tanks, and some counterinsurgency capabilities. Most artillery would convert from cannon to missile units
• UAVs would increase in number, but the Marine Corps is far behind the Air Force in this regard and the Marine Corps’ UAV development program is in disarray.
• The amphibious fleet will include large numbers of light amphibious warships (LAWs). These will provide more distributed capabilities that can implement the Marine Corps’ intention to be a ‘stand in’ force that can operate inside an adversary’s defensive bubble. The trade-off is that, because of the LAWs small size, they will not be able to support the customary level of global forward deployments, which may decline as a result.
The restructuring has been criticized for focusing too much on a maritime campaign in the Western Pacific, ignoring other global conflicts, and relying on unproven operational concepts.”

Gershaneck, Kerry K. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020).
“This book is a call to arms as well as a valuable study of the history and nature of the PRC political warfare threat. While the United States has recently begun to more seriously engage on the political warfare battlefield, much more work and investment of national resources lie ahead. Professor Gershaneck provides useful strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level recommendations to deter, confront, and defeat PRC political warfare operations, all of which are crucial to development of a coherent, successful national response.”

Scharre, Paul, and Ainikki Riikonen. (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2020).
“Summary
• The Department of Defense’s (DoD) ever-shifting technology priorities jeopardize its ability to win a long-term technology competition.
• The DoD needs a systematic approach—a technology strategy—for how to prioritize technology investments.
• The dominant global tech trend today is the information revolution, which is leading to exponential growth in digital capabilities.
• The top priority of the DoD’s technology strategy should be rapidly spinning in and militarizing digital technologies generated in the private sector.
• The DoD should invest in key military-specific technologies, such as hypersonics or directed energy weapons, when there is clear operational value but should expect advancements to be incremental.”

Office of the Secretary General Human Security Unit. (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020).
“With the adoption of the Policy for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in 2016, NATO has committed military means, including the use of deadly force, to prevent and respond to situations in NATO Operations where civilians suffer harm. At the same time, NATO is renewing its focus on collective defence. As NATO continues to develop when and how military force can be used to protect civilians, the conceptual thinking should consider scenarios relevant to all three of the Alliances core tasks. At the same time, the PoC framework provides NATO with an opportunity for evolving the meaning of ‘security’.”

Salmi, Derek. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2020).
“This study offers a theory of air mobility intended to assist practitioners and policy makers in analyzing the efficacy of air mobility operations. It begins by presenting a model of air mobility utility that incorporates the key airpower and logistical principles of velocity, capacity, attainability, and sustainability to graphically illustrate air mobility’s effects within a campaign. Additionally, the five critical factors of freedom of movement, command and control, integrated logistics, technology, and training emerge as essential elements that must be addressed to determine air mobility success. Next the study applies the theory’s model and factors to eight historical case studies, ranging from combat operations of the Second World War to recent humanitarian disaster relief efforts, which typify the broad air mobility mission set. To garner the greatest analytical insights, each case study examines the air mobility operation within the context of the larger military campaign it served as well as through the lens of the five critical mobility factors. The final chapter offers a summation of the theory’s key points as well as future applications within the air mobility discipline.”

Jones, Seth G, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“White supremacists and other like-minded extremists conducted two-thirds of the terrorist plots and attacks in the United States in 2020, according to new CSIS data. Anarchists, anti-fascists, and other like-minded extremists orchestrated 20 percent of the plots and attacks, though the number of incidents grew from previous years as these extremists targeted law enforcement, military, and government facilities and personnel. Despite these findings, however, the number of fatalities from domestic terrorism is relatively low compared to previous years.”

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020).
“‘The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2020’ (SOCO 2020) aims to discuss policies and mechanisms that promote sustainable outcomes – economic, social and environmental – in agricultural and food markets, both global and domestic. The analysis is organized along the trends and challenges that lie at the heart of global discussions on trade and development. These include the evolution of trade and markets; the emergence of global value chains in food and agriculture; the extent to which smallholder farmers in developing countries participate in value chains and markets; and the transformative impacts of digital technology on markets.”

Yayboke, Erol, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Climate migration is poised to be one of the biggest human development and security challenges of the next several decades, yet policymakers and the research community are just now understanding the myriad impacts of climate change on human mobility. A new framework for addressing these challenges is needed—one defined by the United States taking action to slow the effects of climate change, reforming its own immigration policies, and leading multilateral efforts.”

Schmitt, Gary J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“With the United States facing two major revisionist powers, Russia and China, as well as additional security threats from North Korea, Iran, and jihadist terrorism, a critical advantage for the United States is its global network of alliances and strategic partners. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, ‘Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.’
The advantage of having military allies and partners is enhanced by the core capacity of the American military having remained largely the same over the past decade, though the global security environment grew more complex and difficult during that time. In short, the United States needs allies and security partners. But the United States needs allies and partners that can pull their weight militarily if the country is going to be able to maintain a favorable balance of power in critical regions of the world. The second edition of ‘A Hard Look at Hard Power’ provides an in-depth examination of the overall strategic perspective, defense plans, budgets, and capabilities of seven key European and Asian allies, three frontline strategic partners, and NATO.”

House Armed Services Committee. (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 2020).
“The gravity and complexity of threats emerging to challenge the United States is proliferating as technological advancements in artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and biotechnology transform society and weaponry at an exponential rate. This is occurring as adversarial capability is increasing to the point where the United States may soon lose the competitive military advantage it has enjoyed for decades.
The free world order the U.S. has led for more than 70 years is now in danger of becoming a historical outlier as an alternate form of authoritarianism, one that seeks to emulate capitalism and supplant western-style democracy as the governing standard, is on the rise.
To remain economically and militarily competitive, and to ensure American leadership into the next century, policy makers and the Pentagon must navigate a major course correction in how we invest in national security.
This will require a paradigm shift in our defense posture from heavy, expensive, and antiquated, to lean, adaptive, and integrated. This strategy will require a whole-of-nation approach, one that embraces emerging technologies, aggressively divests of aging and expensive platforms, and more effectively harnesses ingenuity and innovation from the private sector.
The Future of Defense Task Force was established to investigate and assess how to address these challenges. Our findings and recommendations are intended as a roadmap for the greater national security community, and whereas our report should be considered a white paper, it builds upon the extensive work of the House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense, military services, private industry, think tanks, and academia.
This report is neither exhaustive nor conclusive; rather, it is the beginning of a difficult yet necessary conversation. Congress and the American people must recognize that we face a decisive moment as a nation and as the world’s leading democracy, both of which are in peril until we alter the future of our defense to ensure the future of our peace.”

U.S. Department of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
“The Nation has entered an age of warfighting wherein U.S. dominance in air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is challenged by peer and near peer adversaries. These challenges have exposed the cross-cutting reliance of U.S. Forces on the EMS, and are driving a change in how the DoD approaches activities in the EMS to maintain an all-domain advantage.
EMS challenges go well beyond the military battlespace. The EMS is being repurposed for commercial mobile broadband technologies to bolster economic growth and prosperity, which further restricts DoD’s freedom of action. These sophisticated technologies represent new opportunities for the Department and our national economy. However, they also present new challenges across the competition continuum as the electromagnetic operational environment becomes increasingly congested, contested, and constrained (i.e., complex).”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This is part of the CSIS series ‘U.S. Military Forces in FY2021.’ The U.S. Army plans slow expansion through FY 2025, but a constrained budget environment will force it to choose between maintaining the units it has and building new kinds of structures. With modernization, the Army has increased production of proven systems and shifted billions into development of high-priority programs to prepare the Army for great power conflict.
Key Takeaways
• After a dip in personnel strength in FY 2019, both regular and reserve components have recovered. FY 2021 targets include: regular Army, 485,900; Guard, 336,500; and Army Reserve, 189,800.
• The regular Army and Army Guard project small increases through FY 2025; the Army Reserve will stay essentially level. This represents a substantial reduction to earlier growth plans, but probably the most expansion that can be done in the current budget and security environment.
• New air and missile defense units are entering the force. Security Force Advisory Brigades continue despite their focus on stability operations. Other new kinds of units, such as the widely discussed multidomain brigades, remain mostly conceptual.
• The active-reserve mix has stabilized at 52 percent Guard/Reserve, 48 percent active. There is now less tension between regular Army and its reserve components as a result of closer consultations, higher overall budgets, and shared recruitment challenges.
• Army modernization, which forms the basis for future forces, is a mix of good and bad news: the good news is that the Army continues production of proven systems and has a well-modernized force as a result. More good news is a few new systems are coming out of the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) ‘primordial soup.’ The bad news is that the Army is still several years away from having a new generation of systems in production to take it into the 2020s and beyond and set it up for potential combat against great power adversaries.
• In an environment of constrained resources, the Army will need to cut existing Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) if it wants to build new units and procure new systems. So far it has been unwilling to do this.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
CSIS Senior Adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of papers on U.S. military forces, including composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. The first white paper in this year’s series analyzes the strategy and budget context for building forces in FY 2021, criticisms of the strategy, budget and resulting force plans, and risks for sustaining force levels in the future.
Key Takeaways
- From FY 2017 to FY 2020, the administration increased the defense budget to fund its national defense strategy. However, that growth ended in FY 2021, requiring some trade-offs. The FY 2021 budget maintains the readiness gains of the last several years and expands force size modestly but squeezes modernization.
- Active component end strength is projected to increase from 1,346,000 in FY 2020 to 1,351,500 in FY 2021 and 1,361,000 by FY 2025. Congress has been supportive.
- In the long term, force structure faces four challenges and a wild card. The challenges include:
A. The need to respond to heavy day-to-day demands for crisis response, allied engagement, gray zone competition, and ongoing regional conflicts. One observer called this “a bear trap of current commitments,” and it works against reducing force size.
B. The opening of a resources-strategy gap as budgets are flat or reduced, but the strategy does not change. This increases risk as actions may not be able to back words.
C. The desire to move more aggressively toward a structure designed for great power conflict, increasing modernization, and trading off force structure if necessary. A major uncertainty is how the concept of “legacy” systems will be applied—does that means old systems or old types of systems?
D. Disagreements about strategy, as many libertarians and progressives support a foreign policy of “restraint” that would have the United States less involved militarily with nations overseas. Such a strategy would make large segments of existing force structure unnecessary
- The wild card is the long-term effect of the pandemic, and whether this would change the nature or size of the defense effort.
- The public will be the ultimate arbiter. Polling indicates public support for a U.S. role in the world but not increased spending.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Congressional Budget Office regularly provides a touch of reality regarding the trends in the U.S. federal budget and its impact on the U.S. economy. Its September 21st report on the 2020 Long-Term Budget Outlook is no exception.
It provides a clear warning about the problems in civil spending, and it projects a major rise in mandatory spending after the current peak for COVID-19 related spending has passed. These are all critical issues, but so are the trends in discretionary spending, as well as in the areas like defense and foreign affairs.”

Suzuki, Hiroyuki. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“No region will be more important to global peace and prosperity in the coming years than the Indo-Pacific, which has more geopolitical hotspots, emerging powers, overlapping political and economic partnerships, and risks of conflict than any other. Northeast Asia, especially North Korea and the East China Sea, continues to be the region’s epicenter of security risks. While Southeast Asia is an engine of regional and global economic growth, border disputes in the South China Sea likewise threaten regional stability. The expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also increases the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca as a sea lane for natural resources. From a security perspective, the deepening competition between the United States and China has further complicated these geopolitical and geo-economic tensions, a trend that has accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic.
As the U.S.–China strategic rivalry intensifies, there is a growing expectation in the Indo-Pacific region that, in addition to these two major players, middle power countries such as Japan, India, Australia, and Indonesia should play more active roles to ensure stability. This reflects the reality that the Indo-Pacific region is geographically extensive and culturally and politically diverse—and therefore should not be subject to unipolar or a bipolar hegemony. Among the middle power countries, there are high expectations for Japan to assume a comprehensive leadership role in the region, especially as it has multilayered relationships—economic, security, and cultural—with the countries of Southeast Asia. Under the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ vision introduced by former prime minister Shinzo Abe and embraced by the United States and other countries, Japan is well positioned to continue engaging with like-minded states on a range of issues in order to support regional stability and prosperity.”

Glaser, Bonnie S., Richard C. Bush, and Michael J. Green. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established a bipartisan CSIS Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan in January 2020 to prepare recommendations for the coming four years and beyond. The task force includes members who have held senior positions of responsibility on Taiwan policy in previous Democratic and Republic administrations as well as experts on national security, business, technology, law, society, the U.S. Congress, human rights, and Taiwan’s politics and society. The task force met monthly from January to August 2020 to consider U.S. strategic interests, diplomacy, defense, trade, and other issues and to receive background briefings from the governments of the United States and Taiwan.
This task force report explains why Taiwan matters to the United States, the framework for U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and the trends that affect economic, defense, and diplomatic aspects of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The report concludes with a set of specific recommendations to upgrade U.S. policy on Taiwan consistent with long-standing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region while also responding to the new and emerging challenges. The members of the task force participated in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of their respective organizations.”

Small, Andrew. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“The troubles faced by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—are perhaps the most conclusive demonstration that the BRI model that has been in place for the last few years is no longer sustainable. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, CPEC had stalled. Not only are the figures commonly cited for the total package of projects under this framework since its launch in 2015—which run as high as $62 billion—no longer accurate, investments of that magnitude are not under consideration either. The projects that are already underway or that have been completed are far from negligible, however. CPEC represents a marked expansion of China’s economic presence in Pakistan, with approximately $25 billion in investments to date—but this is already pushing close to the framework’s limits rather than the foundations of a more ambitious plan.”

Yayboke, Erol, and Hareem F. Abdullah. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The Covid-19 pandemic is exacerbating conditions for women and girls around the world, especially in conflict and fragile settings. A shadow pandemic of gender-based violence is growing. Women are being excluded and marginalized from all areas of decisionmaking, including Covid-19 response and recovery efforts.
• Despite this, women are showing exemplary strength as they combat Covid-19 within their communities. Women peacebuilders and peacekeepers are educating local communities about containing and preventing the spread of Covid-19 and are providing lifesaving services to men, women, and children.
• Covid-19 further demonstrates and highlights women’s effective leadership in times of crisis. The United States should elevate women’s voices in Covid-19 response and recovery efforts and ensure their meaningful participation in peace processes and politics post-pandemic.
• This year marks the twentieth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action on gender equality and women’s rights. These milestones are the perfect opportunity for the United States to assert its leadership on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“Evidence shows that peace processes overlook a strategy that could reduce conflict and advance stability: the inclusion of women.”
“Women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution can improve outcomes before, during, and after conflict. But women are often excluded from formal peace processes. Between 1992 and 2019, women constituted, on average, 13 percent of negotiators, 6 percent of mediators, and 6 percent of signatories in major peace processes around the world. While there has been some progress in women’s participation, about seven out of every ten peace processes still did not include women mediators or women signatories—the latter indicating that few women participated in leadership roles as negotiators, guarantors, or witnesses.
Peace efforts in 2020 have similarly struggled to include women. For example, women represented only around 10 percent of negotiators in the Afghan talks, just 20 percent of negotiators in Libya’s political discussions, and 0 percent of negotiators in Libya’s military talks and Yemen’s recent process. One current peace process is led by a woman chief mediator (Stephanie Williams, acting head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya)—marking the first time in six years that a woman holds this role.”

Sanders, Gregory, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Researching and manufacturing fighters, ships, and tanks are only part of the picture for defense contracts. Contracting for services accounts for over 41 percent of DoD contract obligations in 2018. Services include maintaining equipment, moving people and things, creating software, providing server space, and construction. Service contracting is challenging as services can be difficult to define and measure. But services are increasingly central to the U.S. economy. The Department of Defense seeks to attract new firms that will increase its speed and agility—many of these firms are service providers, e.g., data analytics or cloud computing. CSIS looked at a million contracts to evaluate how three factors influence performance:
• service complexity
• contract-management capacity
• vendor’s history working with a DoD contracting office.
The existing data fails to explain large differences in contract office performance. More DoD transparency about contracting office capacity could help make a case for further investments.
The report also found that when vendors and contracting offices have a longer history, they tend to have better results. That means DoD needs to think not only about recruiting new partners, but also about helping them succeed.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2020.
“CSIS surveyed the American public and thought leaders in the United States, Asia, and Europe to map perspectives on China policy. The surveys covered a range of issues, including trade, security, human rights, and the trajectory for U.S.-China relations. The United States and U.S. allies generally converge on the need for a tougher stance toward China but not containment. The results point to possible contours of an enduring strategy around international coalition building on the China challenge.”

Smith, Julie, et al. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“Mounting competition between China and liberal democracies will shape the course of the 21st century. The gravity and scope of the challenges that China poses have permeated the transatlantic policy agenda and become a focal point in U.S.-Europe relations. Whereas China has long been a source of disagreement and even tension between the transatlantic partners, in the past two years views have converged. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assertive actions—its ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy, aggressive influence operations, human rights violations at home, and elimination of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong—have increased concerns in both the United States and Europe. There is now fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation on everything from reducing dependency on Chinese trade and investment to setting global norms and standards for the future. Yet, despite this convergence of views and interests, there is still no roadmap for how such cooperation should progress. This report outlines such an approach. It is based on the premise that the time is ripe for greater transatlantic cooperation on China. It also recognizes the comprehensive nature of the task at hand.”

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Strategic Technologies and Advanced Research. (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2020).
“From our nation’s founding moment, innovation has been an essential ingredient of American prosperity and national security. During World War II, the threat of a Nazi atomic bomb prompted a federal commitment to basic research that transformed every element of American life, including establishing American technological pre-eminence. Today, neither that preeminence, nor the commitment that fueled it, are unchallenged. We live in a dramatically changed world. Innovation is happening almost everywhere, including in the laboratories of our adversaries. Threats are dispersed; terrorism, cybercrime, even a radiological or biological attack do not require nation-state sponsorship. And just as nuclear technology emerged to change the world 75 years ago, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biosynthesis and other new technologies promise to reorder the global chessboard and change the lives of everyone on the planet. The question for U.S. policymakers, and the subject of this report, is whether the United States will lead in the development of these technologies or whether we will follow, and instead merely read about their unpredictable effects in the media. Our national security depends on choosing the former path, as does our economic prosperity and our traditional leadership role in the development of the global norms, rules and institutions that disperse technology’s benefits and constrain its destructive potential.”

Artificial Intelligence Working Group. (American Council for Technology and Industry Advisory Council, 2020).
“Artificial Intelligence (AI) is becoming an influential cornerstone of the digital future as we increasingly rely on it to support and inform our world. As organizations become more dependent upon the many technologies which comprise AI, there is a need to determine how much confidence and trust to place in them. To accomplish this ethically, a means to determine its performance and continually monitor for mission veracity or any adverse impacts is needed. This paper addresses the overall ethical framework through an index that evaluates five core parameters underpinning the impact of AI: Bias, Fairness, Transparency, Responsibility, and Interpretability. By addressing and incorporating these five components, the framework can be used to understand the ethical automation of solutions to meet desired mission outcomes.”

Reinsch, William, and Jack Caporal. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership was created in the summer of 2019 to develop a series of recommendations to cement U.S. global leadership in light of a multitude of twenty-first-century challenges, both at home and abroad. In a series of reports, the Commission lays out recommendations for the U.S. workforce, U.S. innovation policy, and U.S. engagement in the international trading system. This report, which is the second of four reports to be released from the commission, focuses on the U.S. workforce. This report recommends nine elements of a new approach to workforce development in the United States. Together, these recommendations would make the U.S. workforce more agile, adaptable, and competitive and put the United States in a position to pursue an am­bitious trade agenda.”

Bollyky, Thomas J., and Stewart M. Patrick. (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“The United States and the world were caught unprepared by the COVID-19 pandemic despite decades of warnings of the threat of global pandemics and years of international planning. The failure to adequately fund and execute these plans has exacted a heavy human and economic price. Hundreds of thousands of lives have already been lost, and the global economy is in the midst of a painful contraction. The crisis—the greatest international public health emergency in more than a century—is not over. It is not too early, however, to begin distilling lessons from this painful experience so that the United States and the world are better positioned to cope with potential future waves of the current pandemic and to avoid disaster when the next one strikes, which it surely will.
This CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report seeks to do just that, framing pandemic disease as a stark threat to global and national security that neither the United States nor the world can afford to ignore again. It argues that future pandemic threats are inevitable and possibly imminent; policymakers should prepare for them and identify what has gone wrong in the U.S. and multilateral response. One of the most important lessons of this pandemic is that preparation and early execution are essential for detecting, containing, and rapidly responding to and mitigating the spread of potentially dangerous emerging infectious diseases. As harmful as this coronavirus has been, a novel influenza could be even worse, transmitting even more easily, killing millions more people, and doing even more damage to societies and economies alike.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Sundar R. Ramanujam. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“At the time of publishing this document, the coronavirus pandemic (or Covid-19) has claimed nearly 900,000 lives and destroyed the livelihoods of several millions of people around the world. Given the contagious nature of this disease, it was not too long before the deadly public health crisis led to a devastating economic turmoil. The impending economic recession can be captured through a recent World Bank memo that forecasts a global economic contraction by 5.2 percent, with some regional markets taking a harder hit than others. As the world battles Covid-19’s challenges and constraints and given the national mandates for border closures and factory shutdowns, global supply chains now face unprecedented stress and its vulnerabilities are now more pronounced, bringing global manufacturing and shipping to a halt and creating vast global shortages and delays.
In large parts, the inherent vulnerabilities in global supply chains stem from a worldwide overreliance on China. China, which joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, began its path toward record economic growth in the early 1990s, with an average growth rate of just over 10 percent. By 2018, China contributed 13.45 percent in global exports and was responsible for 28 percent of global manufacturing output (a three-fold jump from 8 percent in 2004). Unsurprisingly, the world’s second-largest economy was also the top exporter and manufacturer of goods worldwide and the leading global trading partner, making any disruption to its manufacturing hubs tremendously consequential to global supply chains. To put it in perspective, the world’s seven most advanced economies (G7) alone rely heavily on China for imports, bringing in goods and services worth nearly U.S. $ 1 trillion (roughly 2 percent of their GDP). The devastating impacts of Covid-19 have already caused a 3 percent decline in global merchandise trade in the first economic quarter of 2020 while dropping 18.5 percent in the second quarter.”

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2020).
“In the period 2000 to 2019, there were 7,348 major recorded disaster events claiming 1.23 million lives, affecting 4.2 billion people (many on more than one occasion) resulting in approximately US$2.97 trillion in global economic losses.
This is a sharp increase over the previous twenty years. Between 1980 and 1999, 4,212 disasters were linked to natural hazards worldwide claiming approximately 1.19 million lives and affecting 3.25 billion people resulting in approximately US$1.63 trillion in economic losses.
Much of the difference is explained by a rise in climate-related disasters including extreme weather events: from 3,656 climate-related events (1980-1999) to 6,681 climate-related disasters in the period 2000-2019.
The last twenty years has seen the number of major floods more than double, from 1,389 to 3,254, while the incidence of storms grew from 1,457 to 2,034. Floods and storms were the most prevalent events.
The report ‘The Human Cost of Disasters 2000-2019’ also records major increases in other categories including drought, wildfires and extreme temperature events. There has also been a rise in geo-physical events including earthquakes and tsunamis which have killed more people than any of the other natural hazards under review in this report.”

Lohmeier, Matthew L. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“This paper explores space and space culture from two distinct perspectives. The traditional mind of space believes that air and space are indivisible and is limited from the surface of the Earth to geosynchronous Earth orbit. This mind, Maj Lohmeier argues, can limit the effectiveness of the Air Force and the now-formed US Space Force. The emergent mind of space is one that understands the delineation between air and space and views the domain of the military as reaching as far as the moon. This mind, the author says, should be adopted by all space professionals to aid the joint fight and establish the United States’ interests in an ever-expanding military and geopolitical landscape.”

Analysis and Research Team. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The main levers that Army leaders control to apply budget dollars to shape their force are organizational structure, modernization, and readiness. Obviously the size of the force has a major impact on its capabilities, but the greatest challenge for leaders has been to keep the force ready for all current threats while also incorporating new technology for the future. This is an ongoing process, but has become even more complex in the modern era with the increasing scope and impact of technological change. During the last century, the Army has experienced magnified transformational bursts of modernization about every 40 years. The first was during the mobilization for World War II in the1940s, and the second involved the fielding of the Big 5 and associated systems in the 1980s. Both were enabled by a significant amount of innovative thinking in times of tight budgets that could be funded by a later influx of money. These opportunities for mass modernization always put considerable strain on the development of corresponding training, doctrine, and organizations for their application, and in maintaining contemporary combat capability, especially in the 1940s when Army leaders were also trying to massively increase the size of the service.”

Esper, Mark. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020).
“The DoD Data Strategy supports the National Defense Strategy and Digital Modernization by providing the overarching vision, focus areas, guiding principles, essential capabilities, and goals necessary to transform the Department into a data-centric enterprise. Success cannot be taken for granted…it is the responsibility of all DoD leaders to treat data as a weapon system and manage, secure, and use data for operational effect.”

Engstrom, David Freeman, et al. (Washington, DC: Administrative Conference of the United States, 2020).
“Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to transform how government agencies do their work. Rapid developments in AI have the potential to reduce the cost of core governance functions, improve the quality of decisions, and unleash the power of administrative data, thereby making government performance more efficient and effective. Agencies that use AI to realize these gains will also confront important questions about the proper design of algorithms and user interfaces, the respective scope of human and machine decision-making, the boundaries between public actions and private contracting, their own capacity to learn over time using AI, and whether the use of AI is even permitted.
These are important issues for public debate and academic inquiry. Yet little is known about how agencies are currently using AI systems beyond a few headline grabbing examples or surface-level descriptions. Moreover, even amidst growing public and scholarly discussion about how society might regulate government use of AI, little attention has been devoted to how agencies acquire such tools in the first place or oversee their use. In an effort to fill these gaps, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned this report from researchers at Stanford University and New York University. The research team included a diverse set of lawyers, law students, computer scientists, and social scientists with the capacity to analyze these cutting-edge issues from technical, legal, and policy angles. The resulting report offers three cuts at federal agency use of AI:
• a rigorous canvass of AI use at the 142 most significant federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies (Part I)
• a series of in-depth but accessible case studies of specific AI applications at seven leading agencies covering a range of governance tasks (Part II); and
• a set of cross-cutting analyses of the institutional, legal, and policy challenges raised by agency use of AI (Part III).”

Deni, John R. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US War College Press, 2020).
“In 2017, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, none of the capability targets identified in NATO’s quadrennial NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) were left on the negotiating table. Previously, capability targets were identified by the alliance’s secretariat, but they remained unfilled as allies failed to assume responsibility for them. This monograph examines the 2014–18 iteration of the NDPP, which represented a stunning turnaround in transatlantic burden sharing. The analysis reveals a combination of factors—the changed threat environment, political pressure from Washington, and the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ working within NATO—best explain the alliance’s success in achieving more equitable burden sharing.
To reach this conclusion, the monograph relies on an array of primary and secondary sources, including interviews with over two dozen officials directly involved in the 2014–18 NDPP. While incorporating available quantitative data on alliance defense spending, the monograph primarily focuses on process tracing as the most effective qualitative methodology for revealing the story behind the 2014–18 NDPP. Policy makers will find this monograph particularly useful because it draws key lessons from the 2014–18 NDPP to make several forward-leaning policy recommendations to strengthen and build upon NATO’s burden-sharing successes to date.”

Dobbins, James, Gabrielle Tarini, and Ali Wyne. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“The authors trace the decline of U.S. international influence over the past two decades, explore reasons for this decline, and suggest ways in which it might be reversed. They conclude that post–Cold War unipolarity bred hubris that, when provoked by the attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in overreach and consequent setbacks. These, in turn, led to geopolitical retrenchment. The 2008 Great Recession fed U.S. disenchantment with international economic policies that produced national and global growth but failed to raise living standards for many Americans. To regain the willing collaboration of international partners, U.S. leaders will need to once again align American interests with those of the rest of the world, practice competent statecraft, adopt prudent policies, pursue realistically achievable objectives, and demonstrate continuity of policy across successive administrations.”

Smeltz, Dina, et al. (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2020).
“The worldwide spread of COVID-19 has reminded Americans that the United States is not immune to events that take place in other parts of the world. Far from feeding calls to retreat from international engagement, Americans remain supportive of an active US role in the world, with solid majorities supporting US security alliances and free trade as the best ways to maintain safety and prosperity. Most Americans also continue to believe that globalization is largely beneficial for the United States.
But there are profound differences between Democrats and Republicans on which foreign policy issues matter most today. And they are even more sharply divided on how the United States should deal with these issues and engage the rest of the world. Generally speaking, Democrats prefer an internationalist approach: cooperating with other countries, amplifying US participation in international organizations and agreements, and providing aid to other nations. In contrast, Republicans prefer a nationalist approach: putting US interests above those of other countries, creating economic self-sufficiency, and taking a unilateral approach to diplomacy and global engagement.”

CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership. Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 16, 2020.
“The CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership—co-chaired by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Senator William E. Brock, and FedEx Chairman and CEO Frederick W. Smith—was created in the summer of 2019 to develop a series of recommendations to cement U.S. global leadership in light of a multitude of twenty-first-century challenges, both at home and abroad. For the United States to maintain its position as the global champion and chief influencer of the international economic environment and to continue to reap its benefits, it must take bold steps in three critical areas. Domestically, the United States will have to quickly strengthen two economic pillars that undergird its economy and its ability to lead abroad: an agile and better-prepared workforce and enhanced capacity for innovation. Abroad, the United States should embrace and build support for a more flexible, nimble, balanced, and responsive international system, with effective institutions and rule-of-law and market-based principles at its core. The commission’s statement outlines key recommendations from the commission in these three areas to revitalize and affirm U.S. global leadership. More detailed analysis and recommendations in these areas will be provided in three forthcoming reports.”

CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership was created in the summer of 2019 to develop a series of recommendations to cement U.S. global leadership in light of a multitude of twenty-first-century challenges, both at home and abroad. In a series of reports, the Commission lays out recommendations for the U.S. workforce, U.S. innovation policy, and U.S. engagement in the international trading system. This report, which is the first of four reports to be released from the Commission, sets the backdrop for those recommendations. For the U.S. to successfully lead in the next decade, we must first acknowledge the changes that are happening in the global economy and use that information to plan for U.S. leadership in a changing economic environment. This report outlines key trends in the global economy from now until 2030, including the rising importance of services and digital commerce, increased use of automation and AI in the workforce, a shift towards regional supply chains, and an aging workforce.”

Wright, Logan, Lauren Gloudeman, and Daniel H. Rosen. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“A Report of the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics.”
“Analyzing China’s economy can feel like an exercise in futility. The political system presents a certain version of economic reality via official data, while media reports and market prices provide another. A glowing macroeconomic picture of stable and high rates of GDP growth contrasts with micro-level stories of bankruptcy, defaults, and redundancies. Measures of economic performance in China are often not directly comparable to those in other countries. Many aspects of China’s economy look unsustainable in the long term, but it is difficult to identify any particular problem that Beijing authorities cannot manage effectively in the short term. The potential for economic crisis in China is always present, but a crisis is never quite there. That need for better diagnostic tools of meaningful financial stress in China drove the development of the China Economic Risk Matrix, similar to a threat matrix in security parlance. The risk matrix attempts to track developments within the key areas of financial risk in China where changes in Beijing’s credibility can have an outsized impact on financial stability. It is not a predictive tool but a diagnostic one—more like a flood warning system rather than a signal that a particular dam will break.”

“2020 has been a year of reckoning for the global food security community. Covid-19 is front and center: hunger is spiking in vulnerable communities hit hardest by the health and economic crises. But predating the pandemic are long-term trends that paint a bleak picture: we are losing the global fight against hunger and malnutrition.”

United States Coast Guard. (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 2020).
“At-sea enforcement of the Nation’s living marine resource laws is an enduring U.S. Coast Guard mission. Working with our partners in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, our enforcement efforts have upheld the biological and economic sustainability of our Nation’s marine fisheries. The benefits of this mission abound: fishermen’s livelihoods are protected, ports in which catch is distributed remain economically robust, and U.S. seafood consumers are able to support an industry dedicated to the long-term sustainability of U.S. fisheries.
Yet not all maritime nations have the capability to surveil their sovereign waters or the moral conscience to police their fleets; this lack of shared responsibility creates opportunities for exploitation in the form of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. This exploitation erodes both regional and national security, undermines maritime rules-based order, jeopardizes food access and availability, and destroys legitimate economies.
IUU fishing has replaced piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. If IUU fishing continues unchecked, we can expect deterioration of fragile coastal States and increased tension among foreign-fishing Nations, threatening geo-political stability around the world.”

Balboni, Mark, et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
USAWC Integrated Research Project: “This research monograph explores the Army’s emerging concept of multi-domain operations and its implications on the mission command approach. The transition to multi-domain operations changes the traditional view of how Army commanders and staffs conduct operations in the physical environment to include simultaneously operations in the information environment within the competition continuum.
This monograph will utilize the introduction of the aircraft during World War I as a historical case study for the integration of new domains. The Army has integrated new domains in the past and this example provides the historical context for the challenges involving integration of new domains. An overview and analysis of what multi-domain operations are will provide a baseline understanding of how multi-domain operations are changing not only how we fight but also how the Army must change roles and responsibilities to allow the Joint force to compete across the competition continuum, especially below armed conflict.
The transition to multi-domain operations will require new processes. Changes will be required not only to the physical systems employed but also to Joint professional military education, Joint and Army doctrine and headquarters staff structures as leaders and their staffs will require different skills to operate in this new environment.”

Bunker, Robert J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph analyzes and provides policy response options for US national security and Army planners concerning the potential for postterritorial caliphate battlefield migration by the sizable contingent of battle-hardened Islamic State foreign fighters situated within various remaining enclaves that remain in Syria and Iraq.”

Schellenberger, Dominik Josef. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2020).
“The current operational environment is characterized by the emergence of the information age and peer and near peer adversaries. The 2017 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations addresses those paradigm shifts by introducing the multi-domain extended battlefield and four Army strategic roles—shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. FM 3-0 officially implements consolidation of gains and the related consolidation area for the first time into US Army doctrine. The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. An analysis of the historical role the US Army played at the end of World War II for the transition in occupied Germany as well as of current doctrine and future-oriented concepts leads to eighteen suggested doctrinal changes concerning consolidation of gains across US Army operations, leadership, and mission command doctrine. Four of those suggested doctrinal changes are the introduction of a comprehensive multi-domain consolidation area, the emphasis of intent-guided procedural control, the codification of virtual and cognitive consolidation of gains, and the doctrinal recognition of the possible need for temporary military government.”

Brewer, Eric, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The United States has been remarkably successful at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but there are new reasons to question whether this track record will last into the future.
Working with partners, the United States has steadily built a framework of disincentives and barriers to prevent proliferation. These include: (1) international treaties and agreements that have erected legal, political, and normative barriers to the bomb; (2) U.S. security commitments to allies that dampen their own need for nuclear weapons; and (3) a set of tough penalties (e.g., sanctions) for those who get caught trying to build the bomb. In other words, the barriers to entry to the nuclear club are high, and those countries that want the ultimate weapon need to be willing to accept significant risks. This helps explain why, although many countries have explored or pursued nuclear weapons, only nine states have them today.
But several trends are eroding the foundation on which this formidable set of barriers rests. These trends are rooted in, and being shaped by, changes to the nature and structure of the international system: namely, the decline of U.S. influence and its gradual withdrawal from the international order that it helped create and lead for more than 70 years, and the concurrent rise of a more competitive security environment, particularly among great powers. These trends (detailed in the report) will have three broad implications for proliferation and U.S. policy. First, they stand to increase pressures on countries to seek nuclear weapons or related capabilities as a hedge. Second, they will almost certainly challenge the United States’ ability to effectively wield the traditional “carrots and sticks” of nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy and dilute the effectiveness of those tools. Finally, they could increasingly pit U.S. nonproliferation goals against other policy objectives, forcing harder tradeoffs.
U.S. policy must adapt unless the United States wants to be faced with a more nuclear-capable landscape in the future.”

Gerstel, Dylan, and Matthew P. Goodman. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In response to today’s economic challenges—particularly managing the Covid-19 pandemic and the rise of China—prominent U.S. policymakers and political figures on both sides of the aisle, as well as business leaders, have called for more active government efforts to boost domestic production and innovation. However, there is significant disagreement about how to do so.
This report focuses on the role of government in supporting innovation in critical technologies, although there are other challenges—notably Covid-19—where greater federal intervention could be appropriate. To help further the discussion, we reviewed historical approaches to industrial policy in three advanced democracies: Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. Reflecting on those experiences, we present in this report a set of ten ‘first principles’ intended to guide a more active U.S. innovation strategy to reaffirm the country’s leadership in critical technologies.”

Ewing, Aaron R. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“The United States Air Force is struggling to cope with a worldwide pilot shortage that has left the service over 2,000 pilots short of what is needed to man its squadrons fully. With pilot retention declining in a time of unprecedented airline hiring, the service is desperately trying to find ways to increase pilot production. To recover from the current shortage, the Air Force has determined it needs to increase annual production from 1,200 to 1,600 pilots per year. Despite identifying a need for increased production, the service has yet to pinpoint an exact method to accomplish this task. A 33 percent increase of students will necessitate an increase of undergraduate pilot training (UPT) instructors, where the Air Force intends to find additional instructors given the current pilot shortage is unclear. This research paper seeks to fill this gap in knowledge by answering the question, are warrant officers the best solution to increase UPT instructor manning to achieve the overarching goal of producing 1,600 pilots per year?”

Bedard, Alexander F. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“America’s success in space and the continuation of escalating military missions in this security domain necessitates a perpetual and potent medical support apparatus both in space and on land. This research sought to answer the question: How will medical support for manned military space missions need to be organized, trained, and equipped to meet the National Security Strategy (NSS) objective of advancing space as a security domain? The hypothesis was that a dedicated medical support structure specifically for DOD space operations would be necessary.”

Kandrík, Matej. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“In recent years paramilitarism has resurfaced with new vitality in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The appearance of this war-related phenomenon in a predominantly peaceful and stable region might seem paradoxical. Yet a closer look at the historical roots of statehood there (many organizations are building on a heritage of pre-war predecessors), the sociocultural context (insecurity and a lack of alternatives for interested individuals to engage in military and related activities aside from professional service), and major changes in the security environment (the war in Ukraine and the migration crisis) provides some explanations.”

Sheppard, Lindsey, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Encryption is a critical tool to protect sensitive information, prevent cybercrime and digital fraud, and authenticate digital transactions. However, the global encryption policy landscape is fracturing, with different countries pursuing different approaches to encryption through both legal and technical means. With authoritarianism on the rise around the world, encryption policy debates are about more than securing data. How different countries address the question of access to encryption will shape how global companies build their products, which will have significant implications for the tools and choices available to a wide range of users around the world. For vulnerable groups, both recoverable and unrecoverable encryption can be an essential means to protect communications and activities from repressive regimes, criminals, hate groups, and other bad actors. But malicious actors can also utilize encryption to hide their activities from law enforcement and security agencies. While average, everyday users have interests and needs in using encryption, the CSIS research team focused on a subset of user communities that, taken together, illuminate the trade-offs inherent in encryption policy choices. This study explores these issues through the lens of key encryption user groups (independent voices; at-risk groups; businesses and organizations; foreign policy; and terrorists, extremists, and hate groups), their governments, and U.S. values and interests. Its findings illuminate the central trade-offs policymakers face and demonstrate that decisions surrounding when, where, how, and by whom encryption is used should be more nuanced than an all-or-nothing approach.”

Frederick, Kara. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating global trends in digital surveillance. Public health imperatives, combined with opportunism by autocratic regimes and authoritarian-leaning leaders, are expanding personal data collection and surveillance. This tendency toward increased surveillance is taking shape differently in repressive regimes, open societies, and the nation-states in between.
China, run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is leading the world in using technology to enforce social control, monitor populations, and influence behavior. Part of maximizing this control depends on data aggregation and a growing capacity to link the digital and physical world in real time, where online offenses result in brisk repercussions. Further, China is increasing investments in surveillance technology and attempting to influence the patterns of technology’s global use through the export of authoritarian norms, values, and governance practices. For example, China champions its own technology standards to the rest of the world, while simultaneously peddling legislative models abroad that facilitate access to personal data by the state. Today, the COVID-19 pandemic offers China and other authoritarian nations the opportunity to test and expand their existing surveillance powers internally, as well as make these more extensive measures permanent.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
“The PLA’s objective is to become a ‘world-class’military by the end of 2049 - a goal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined what a ‘world-class’ military means, within the context of the PRC’s national strategy it is likely that Beijing will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S. military, or that of any other great power that the PRC views as a threat. As this year’s report details, the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas such as:
Shipbuilding…Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles…Integrated air defense systems…
More striking than the PLA’s staggering amounts of new military hardware are the recent sweeping efforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suited for joint operations, improving the PLA’s overall combat readiness, encouraging the PLA to embrace new operational concepts, and expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“For more than two millennia, monarchs who ruled China proper saw their country as one of the dominant actors in the world. The concept of zhongguo - the Middle Kingdom, as China calls itself - is not simply geographic. It implies that China is the cultural, political, and economic center of the world. This Sino-centrist worldview has in many ways shaped China’s outlook on global governance - the rules, norms, and institutions that regulate international cooperation. The decline and collapse of imperial China in the 1800s and early 1900s, however, diminished Chinese influence on the global stage for more than a century.”

Sayler, Kelley M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2020).
“The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons - maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 - as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable ‘responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.’ Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.”

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 7. February 20, 2020.
“The purpose of this publication is to describe the Marine Corps’ learning philosophy and explain why learning is critically important to the profession of arms. While many of the concepts in this publication have been passed on by Marine leaders throughout our history, this publication seeks to formalize them and provide aspirational goals. Learning is an institutional priority and a professional expectation for all Marines. This mentality is key to the Marine Corps becoming a more effective learning organization.
The most important factor in this philosophy is the importance of continuous learning throughout our careers for warfighting. Continuous learning is essential to maneuver warfare because it enables Marines to quickly recognize changing conditions in the battlespace, adapt, and make timely decisions against a thinking enemy. These skills required in war must be learned, developed, and honed over time—if neglected, they quickly atrophy. Marines leverage the art and science of learning, technologies, and learning environments that reflect the changing operational environment to tailor learning and provide each other with constructive feedback. Leaders hold Marines to high professional standards of performance, conduct, and discipline—to include learning. As Marines rise in rank and position, continuous learning and developing our professional skills are a professional expectation. We must make the most of every learning opportunity, fostering our subordinates’ learning while continuing our own.
Continuous learning is important to Marines because of the fundamental nature of war and its ever-changing character. The nature of war carries a combination of fear, uncertainty, ambiguity, chance, horror and, above all, friction that Marines must prepare to counter. Marines must seek out education and training opportunities that simulate these conditions. We must train how we fight. As Marines, we must understand how important learning is and be committed to the principles laid out in this publication. Our professional responsibility—as Marines— is to engage in continuous learning so that we may best support our fellow Marines, our Corps, and our Nation.”

World Economic Forum. (Cologny, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, June 2020).
“The AI Procurement in a Box project is a series of reports.”
• Project Overview
• AI Government Procurement Guidelines
• Workbook
• Challenges and Opportunities during Implementation
• Pilot Case Studies from the United Kingdom

Rossow, Richard M., Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Kriti Upadhyaya. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The United States has changed rules and created novel programs to strengthen defense ties with India. However, to many Western analysts, India remains largely absent from key conflicts the United States considers globally significant. This report contends that Washington must use a different lens in judging India’s involvement: looking beyond the periphery of the United States and its allies, it should instead consider India’s growing role as a regional security provider in Asia. One region where India’s influence is strongly felt is the Himalayas, where the territorial integrity and security of smaller nations across China’s western border hangs in the balance. Through satellite imagery analysis, this report presents how India is on the front line of China’s expansionist territorial ambitions.”

Patalano, Alessio. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“Chinese activities in the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have undergone a significant change over the past few months. This is a potentially dangerous development for Sino–Japanese relations.”
“Whilst international security analysts continue to focus on the troubled waters of the South China Sea, a storm is gathering in the adjacent and much less reported East China Sea. The eye of this storm is the small group of islands under Japanese administrative control known as Senkaku. The islands are claimed by China under the name Diaoyu, and by Taiwan as Diaoyutai. In July, Japan’s newly released Defence White Paper stressed that Chinese authorities are ‘relentlessly’ pressing their claims to the islands with ever-increasing levels of maritime activities seeking to change the ‘status quo’. In particular, the document sought to draw attention to the possibility of enhanced competition in international security, notably – but not exclusively – between China and the US in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis.”

Jones, Lee, and Shahar Hameiri. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“Critics of the BRI accuse China of pursuing a policy of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: luring poor, developing countries into agreeing unsustainable loans to pursue infrastructure projects so that, when they experience financial difficulty, Beijing can seize the asset, thereby extending its strategic or military reach. This paper demonstrates that the evidence for such views is limited.”

United Nations Environment Programme. (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 2020).
“A Scientific Assessment with Key Messages for Policy-Makers A Special Volume of UNEP’s Frontiers Report Series.”
“This evidence-based scientific assessment has identified the following ten key messages for decision-makers:
• De-Risking Food Systems
• Urgency
• Report Audience
• Scope of the Problem
• Outbreak Frequency and Predictability
• Connectivity and Complexity
• Disease Drivers
• Impact and Cost
• Policy Options
• One Health”

Colwell, Darrin Lee. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2020).
“The United States Army is in the midst of an identity crisis. One of the difficulties that George Washington faced more than 240 years ago is still a challenge today: inspiring young people to aspire to a greater calling. The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) failed to achieve its Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 mission, missing the mark by around 6,500 recruits; the U.S. Navy, Marines and Air Force all reached their FY 2018 goals.1 This prompted Secretary of the Army Mark Esper to make this declaration to current and former members of the U.S. Army: tell your Army Story.2 If USAREC continues to fail to fill the ranks, there will be rippling national security implications. In order to correct this, the Army Marketing Research Group (AMRG) must find the words, images and sense of calling that connect with America’s youth.”

Jackson, Kimberly, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“This report presents findings to assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in understanding what professional experiences and other characteristics the general and flag officers in each of the military services tend to share as a result of each service’s approach to personnel management and other related factors, and how these approaches might influence the ways in which general and flag officers lead, manage, and advise."

Finney, Nathan K. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2020).
“‘On Strategy’ is tailored for mid-career professionals working at the strategic level for the first time, including civilians entering the national security profession and military officers transitioning into strategy from jobs at the tactical level.”

Jurkowsky, Tom. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“Admiral Jurkowsky's distinguished military career culminated in service as the Navy's Chief of Information, and he worked on a variety of events, from the Tailhook Scandal to various incidents at the Naval Academy. His book highlights the importance of honesty, clear messaging, and a positive relationship with the press in order to effectively manage strategic communications. The goal of ‘The Secret Sauce for Organizational Success’ is for both communication practitioners and their leaders to learn from the author’s experiences and motivate both, in tandem, so that they always do the ‘right thing.’”

Bipartisan Policy Center and the Center for a New American Security. (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2020).
“Greater investments in artificial intelligence research and development are essential to maintaining American leadership in AI. Throughout the 20th century, the federal government played a critical role in fueling technological innovation by funding pivotal basic research. Government funding was essential to developing the transistor, GPS, and the internet—inventions that transformed the world economy. Yet over the past several decades, federal government spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP declined from about 1.2% in 1976 to around 0.7% in 2018. This is a worrisome trend as the federal government remains the main funder of basic research. Government support again could be pivotal both in fostering new AI breakthroughs and ensuring that the U.S. government has access to those breakthroughs.
Beyond AI, overall R&D spending trends are troubling. Other countries are outpacing the United States with faster growth of their national R&D budgets. Total U.S. national (public and private) R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have been mostly stagnant since 1996. China quadrupled its R&D expenses as a share of GDP over the same time frame, and countries like Israel and South Korea also significantly ramped up spending.”

Vahle, Mark W. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“This paper examines the implications of a technological convergence of biotechnology and cyber technology and how best to prepare for the exponential change triggered by this emerging field. This convergence, specifically brain-computer interface (BCI) technology, is enabling bidirectional communication between the brain and a computer. Clinical applications are significant, offering treatments for epilepsy, dementia, nervous system disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, as well as advanced prosthetics. In some cases, BCIs may be able to not just restore functionality but also augment it. New noninvasive techniques are now showing benefits to the point where healthy individuals may opt to have BCIs installed to augment their abilities. This paper will explore the opportunities this technology creates for the United States Air Force (USAF) to enhance combat capability, particularly in high-workload career fields, and the policy choices needed to prepare for the next 20 years. It concludes that in order to seize these opportunities, the USAF needs to act now on currently available technologies to foster a culture of increased experimentation and calculated risk-taking.”

Ellehuus, Rachel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The United Kingdom’s 2020 Integrated Security and Defense Review is an opportunity for the country to reposition itself in a post-Brexit world and to restore a sense of coherence to British foreign and security policy. However, the success of the Integrated Review hinges on the ability of the British government to set strategic priorities and manage the economic strains of both Brexit and the Covid-19 crisis.”

Ibrahim, Azeem. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph places events in Libya since 2011 into their historical and social context and argues a form of radical Islamism, linked to long-standing national defiance of outside control, remains a factor even after the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This entrenched radicalism means extremist Islamist groups may still make a renewed bid for power until the current civil war is resolved. At the time of this writing, the military campaign by the Libyan National Army has stalled outside Tripoli. Now is the time for the United States and the wider international community to step up and help Libya transition to a unitary government with conventional elections. If this fails to happen and ISIS is able to exploit the current chaos, the hard-won victory over the group in Libya may yet turn out to have been illusory.”

Devermont, Judd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
- U.S. policy toward Africa is in need of a facelift—in both substance and strategic vision—to keep up with the continent’s shifting demographics and growing influence on the world stage. Africans will be integral to addressing some of the world’s thorniest problems. The continent holds three nonpermanent seats at the UN Security Council, and it represents the largest and most unified bloc at the UN General Assembly.
- A revitalized relationship with African countries must prioritize engagement with African counterparts because there are strategic issues on the table. It has to levy real carrots and sticks, not just deploy moralistic arguments about a policy outcome.
- The United States should expand its diplomatic partners and repertoire, investing in cities, deepening its ties with regional bodies, elevating its private sector, and working alongside other external actors.
- The United States should revamp its public diplomacy and communication with both African and U.S. audiences. By reimagining its soft power, as well as tapping behavioral economists, advertising professionals, and pollsters, the United States has a real opportunity to connect with the next generation of African leaders and advance its objectives in the region and the wider world.”

Howard, Julie, and Emmy Simmons. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“‘Agriculture Under Pressure’ examines the evolving role of agricultural development in today’s U.S. foreign assistance strategy and programming. The numbers of hungry people are rising again, with hunger concentrated in fragile, conflict-, and climate-affected regions where production and trade are disrupted. Concerns are growing that the environmental costs and health impacts associated with the prevailing model of agricultural production are unacceptably high. The spread of the global coronavirus pandemic in 2020 has revealed shocking vulnerabilities in food and agricultural systems at all levels.
Feed the Future, the U.S. Government’s global hunger and food security initiative, which is managed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is mandated to lead U.S. support for the development of food and agricultural systems of low- and middle-income countries. This report:
• summarizes the evolution of Feed the Future;
• reviews the key pressures affecting agriculture today;
• discusses opportunities to strengthen resilience and move toward a more sustainable, inclusive and healthy food and agriculture system; and
• proposes recommendations for U.S. foreign assistance.”

Ellis, Evan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In late June and early July, three separate events highlighted the growing risk that the political, health, economic, and security crisis in Venezuela could come to a head in the coming months, which would have grave consequences for its neighbors in the region. First, two figures affiliated with the regime, Diosdado Cabello and Tarek El-Aissami, tested positive for Covid-19, with the prospect that Nicolás Maduro himself—with whom El-Aissami met—could be next. Second, the Maduro regime excluded three of the four political parties opposing him—Popular Will, Justice First, and Democratic Action—from National Assembly elections to be held in December; it also replaced their leaders with regime loyalists, decisively closing one of the few remaining possibilities for a democratic exit to the political crisis in the country. And finally, a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on illegal mining in Venezuela highlighted the degree to which the national territory is controlled not by Nicolás Maduro or Juan Guaidó, but by criminal organizations. Beyond the greater Caracas area, Venezuela has devolved into a series of criminal fiefdoms bound not by an allegiance to Maduro or Guaidó but rather by a shared interest in the continued absence of effective governance; this enables those with guns to persist in their criminal enterprises, from narcotics and illegal mining to extorting desperate Venezuelans seeking to cross the border or to send remittances to their loved ones.”

Braun, William G., III, et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“The United States faces a hypercompetitive geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, arguably the most consequential theater for US national interests over the coming decades. Although the United States has created exquisite military capabilities to counter insurgencies and fight terrorists, rivals like China have developed a whole-of-government toolkit focused on expanding their span of control and freedom of action, separating the United States from its allies, and deterring US leaders from greater engagement in East Asia.
China is actively transforming its military forces, with an eye toward defeating the United States in the event of armed hostilities. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is also creatively employing its military and paramilitary assets strategically to outmaneuver the United States and partners in meaningful gray zone approaches. The PRC enjoys strategic depth and increasingly operates on internal or heavily protected lines of communication while demonstrating the ability to threaten American interests with a variety of multi-domain capabilities and forces.
Meeting this challenge will require joint transformation to a more hypercompetitive theater design. Army adoption of the four transformational roles of grid, enabler, multi-domain warfighter, and capability and capacity generator will be essential to realizing this more hypercompetitive Joint theater approach.”

Butow, Steven J., et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
“The world stands at the threshold of a new era in space. Much of the foundation of this exciting era is American made, and much of the innovation powering it is born of American creativity and ingenuity. Other nations, however, are challenging the US for leadership of this next space age. Success in this long-term strategic competition requires that the US seamlessly integrate multiple elements of national power. This report provides US policymakers and industry leaders comprehensive recommendations on the path forward to address the growing threats to US space power and how to ensure a strong US space industrial base as a foundation to US space leadership. Going beyond ‘admiring the problem,’ this report documents the next higher level of analysis of the challenge, focusing on specific actions the US must undertake to maintain security in space. The report clearly delineates the state of the space industrial base, its challenges and issues, and provides six overarching recommendations to US policymakers and four overarching recommendations to space industry leaders. It further provides detailed analysis of sub-areas of the space industrial base and areas affecting the base, specifying 39 actions as to what must be done, who must do them, and the timeframe in which they must be accomplished.”

Rasser, Martijn, and Ainikki Riikonen. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The United States has the opportunity to regain momentum by taking a fresh approach to 5G in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition to the broader appreciation for the criticality of reliable communication networks, Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and clunky attempts at soft power have hardened public opinion toward China around the world. The economic fallout of the pandemic will likely slow 5G deployments globally, curtailing the urgency with which many operators approached the issue. At the same time, the first commercial projects centered on technological alternatives to the predominant 5G approach are being deployed. This confluence of events presents the United States and like-minded countries an opening to promote an alternative approach that could lead to a paradigm shift in the industry: wireless infrastructure built on a modular architecture with open interfaces…A restructured industry based on open interfaces would directly address the prevailing concerns over untrusted vendors such as Huawei and the broader inefficiencies of the industry. There are distinct advantages to be gained in security and interoperability, supply chain resiliency, probable cost savings, and the opportunity to stimulate much-needed competition in the sector. Taken together, these advantages do much to blunt Beijing’s industrial policies that have enabled Huawei’s predatory anti-competitive practices.
There are three distinct but related lines of effort the U.S. executive and legislative branches should take to promote open standards for 5G as a viable alternative to the status quo, and as a foundation for a secure 5G future:
• Signal U.S. government (congressional and executive) support for modular 5G equipment with open interfaces.
• Promote development and deployment of modular telecommunications infrastructure based on open interfaces.
• Collaborate with allies and partners.”

Goldenberg, Ilan, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Kaleigh Thomas. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“A U.S. diplomatic strategy should focus on the following key objectives with regard to Iran policy:
1. Prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
2. Contain the impact of Iranian regional policies that are damaging to U.S. interests.
3. De-escalate regional tensions that perpetuate instability and proxy-fueled competition in the Middle East.
Based on these objectives, the United States should pursue the following phased approach starting in early 2021. Critically, from the start such an approach must take into account both regional and nuclear issues and be clear it values and will include both in its diplomatic efforts in a simultaneous, rather than sequential approach.
Phase 1: De-escalation. The United States should move early to de-escalate regional conflict and freeze or roll back Iran’s nuclear program.
Phase 2: Consultation. The United States should engage, simultaneously, in an internal review and consultative process with international partners and Congress on the objectives and strategy on addressing long-term nuclear concerns and regional dynamics with Iran.
Phase 3: Dual Track Negotiation. The United States should implement a strategy that includes activity on two parallel tracks—one focused on a “more for more” deal on the nuclear program and the other on regional de-escalation.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies website.
“The CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security aims to chart a bold vision for the future of U.S. leadership in global health security, at home and abroad. Recent events demonstrate the growing linkages between global health challenges and U.S. national security interests. We see an emerging recognition of the need for a stronger, more coherent, better integrated, and more reliably sustained U.S. approach to health security. The Commission offers the opportunity to build a pragmatic, actionable consensus.”

Association of American Medical Colleges. (Washington, DC: Association of American Medical Colleges, 2020).
“‘The Way Forward on COVID-19: A Road Map to Reset the Nation’s Approach to the Pandemic’ includes 11 evidence-based actions — both immediate and long-term — set forth as a comprehensive, coordinated plan based on AAMC experts’ understanding of the pandemic as doctors, scientists, and medical educators, as well as the work the AAMC has done to help its member medical schools, teaching hospitals, and health systems respond to the pandemic on the front lines.”

United Nations Coordinated Appeal. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2020).
“The pandemic and associated global recession are about to wreak havoc in fragile and low income countries. Unless we act now, we should be prepared for a series of human tragedies more brutal and destructive than any direct health impacts of the virus… We face a massive problem. But it can be addressed with relatively little money and a modicum of imagination. Exceptional circumstances require exceptional measures, discarding some of the previous rules and approaches, just as many rich countries have done in their own countries to protect their own citizens. This crisis – and the prospect of cascading crises down the road – forces us all to think out of our comfort zone. The stakes are high, and what we need to do has fundamentally changed.”

Lehr, Amy. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The forced labor of ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as part of a broader pattern of severe human rights abuses, is a significant and growing concern that demands the attention of governments and private-sector actors across the world. Products entering the United States, Europe, and other democracies are at risk of being affected by these forced labor practices, which often occur several steps away from global brands in supply chains. Companies cannot currently easily ensure that their products are not affected by XUAR-linked forced labor because brands often cannot trace their products to origin, and the XUAR’s important role in a number of sectors may require significant changes in sourcing practices. Moreover, global brands seeking to exert leverage on their Chinese suppliers with regard to XUAR sourcing are reportedly seen to intervene with internal political affairs. This brief explores what the XUAR produces, the sectors that are implicated, the resulting sourcing challenges, and the opportunities for collective action to be explored in further research.”

Note: screen down the page. Episodes are at the bottom.
The Civil Affairs Association
“The One CA podcast aims to broadcast the valuable insights and lessons CA operators learned from challenging assignments. One CA is a way to ensure the regiment continues to be a learning organization. The podcast includes thinkers and leaders from the military, academia, industry, and interagency.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2020).
“The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective on the modern battlefield. Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV may be subject to a high degree of congressional interest.”

de Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra, et al. (Washington, DC: German Marshal Fund of the United States, 2020).
“The 2020 edition of Transatlantic Trends is a comparative study of French, German, and American perspectives on the major issues facing the transatlantic relationship: cooperation in security and defense, China’s influence on the global stage, international trade, and the digital transition. Polling before and after the coronavirus crisis provides, for several questions, a unique tool to better understand the impact of the pandemic on public opinion. The report thus serves as a comprehensive overview of the major trends shaping transatlantic relations, compares public policies with public perceptions in all three countries, and strengthens trilateral French-German-U.S. dialogue on issues where public opinion is in favor of closer cooperation.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2020).
“Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory.”

Bowen, Andrew S. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2020).
“Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia has undertaken extensive efforts to modernize and upgrade its armed forces. In the years ahead, these efforts are expected to continue focusing on modernizing military equipment, as well as improving combat readiness and coordination across service branches. Command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, force structure changes, and logistics also are likely to be priorities for development. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in understanding the extent of Russia’s military modernization and reform efforts as they assess the nature of Russian threats to the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and other regions.”

Afina, Yasmin, Calum Inverarity, and Beyza Unal. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“This paper will identify, raise awareness of, and help reduce risks to NATO’s nuclear weapon systems arising from cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It aims to respond to the need for more public information on cyber risks in NATO’s nuclear mission, and to provide policy-driven research to shape and inform nuclear policy at member-state level.”

Conley, Heather A., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Moscow and Beijing’s toolkit for influencing democratic societies has evolved. Using Germany, the UK, Japan, and Australia as case studies, CSIS explores what traits made these democracies vulnerable to foreign influence as well as the sources of their resiliency.”

Ellehuus, Rachel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report is the United Kingdom case study of an ambitious year-long CSIS initiative to analyze Russian influence activities in the United Kingdom and Germany and Chinese influence activities in Japan and Australia. For the past 15 years, Russia has sought to weaken the United Kingdom internally and diminish its position in the world by exploiting minority grievances, encouraging separatist movements, amplifying anti-EU sentiments, and trying to inflict reputational damage upon the United Kingdom’s role in NATO and the value of its relationship with the United States. Rachel Ellehuus examines what democratic traits have made the UK vulnerable and resilient to these malign influence activities, which Russian efforts have and have not worked, and what the UK policy response has been.”

Jackson, James K., et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 21, 2020).
“Since the COVID-19 outbreak was first diagnosed, it has spread to over 200 countries and all U.S. states. The pandemic is negatively affecting global economic growth beyond anything experienced in nearly a century. Estimates so far indicate the virus could trim global economic growth by 3.0% to 6.0% in 2020, with a partial recovery in 2021, assuming there is not a second wave of infections. The economic fallout from the pandemic raises the risks of a global economic recession with levels of unemployment not experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The human costs in terms of lives lost will permanently affect global economic growth in addition to the cost of rising levels of poverty, lives upended, careers derailed, and increased social unrest. Global trade could also fall by 13% to 32%, depending on the depth and extent of the global economic downturn, exacting an especially heavy economic toll on trade-dependent developing and emerging economies. The full impact will not be known until the effects of the pandemic peak. This report provides an overview of the global economic costs to date and the response by governments and international institutions to address these effects.”

Hillman, Jonathan E. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report examines four dimensions of China-Russia connectivity and reveals a growing partnership that faces structural constraints. Trade is highly concentrated in natural resources, where Chinese and Russian interests most strongly overlap. Investment is constrained by corruption and poor infrastructure in Russia. People-to-people ties have been improving but mistrust remains, as the Covid-19 pandemic has revealed. Even as China and Russia cooperate in building digital infrastructure, each side imposes restrictions that limit data flows. Standing in the way of deeper connections are Russia’s development challenges and both governments’ obsessions with maintaining control. After assessing each of these areas, a final section considers the future trajectory of China-Russia economic relations and its implications for U.S. interests. There is room for growth, but as China and Russia’s economic connections strengthen, their partnership will become even more unequal. Russia’s junior status will become more of a liability, and Russian officials could be incentivized to reduce the risk of greater reliance on China. China’s sheer mass, proximity, and willingness to economically coerce its partners could eventually compel Russia to look again to the West, where most of its trade remains despite its growing ties with China.”

Hayashi, Mitsuko. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Covid-19 pandemic is unlike any other in modern history. It is not just a global health crisis. If the virus continues to disrupt the social environment, it could put a serious strain on international peace and security. On April 9, 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned the world of an ever-increasing number of security risks that have emerged as a result of the virus. They include social unrest, violence, and resurgent terrorism due to rising unemployment and the economic downturn. The situation hinders regional and international efforts to resolve conflict. It provides some actors with incentives to create division as the main players in peace and security focus their efforts on combating the virus… Building up capabilities, maintaining constant awareness of the security situation, and harmonizing regional effort are essential if we are to forge resilience against the pandemic. What kind of contribution can an individual country make for that purpose in the era of Covid-19? Take Japan, for example, which can provide a unique contribution in response to the global health pandemic. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has a track record of upholding regional resilience through its defense diplomacy and capacity building cooperation…Japan seems well equipped to provide a unique and important security contribution to the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s expertise in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/ DR), regional engagement and partnerships, and multilayered defense relationships can be leveraged to bolster the resilience of the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The Defense Production Act emerged from the need to rapidly accelerate industrial mobilization for the Korean War. Over the last 70 years, the DPA's prominence in the national consciousness declined and then only reentered the national dialogue with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, it has remained an important tool for the executive branch and helped to ensure national security, whether it was stockpiling needed metals and minerals, prioritizing the production of weapons systems, developing energy security, or providing emergency relief from natural disasters. In meeting all of these requirements, the DPA has evolved into a flexible piece of legislation that is able to aid in the development and acquisition of military weapons and technology as well as the procurement and distribution of emergency relief materials.”

Clark, J.P., and C. A. Pfaff (Principal Investigators). (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“Within the context of Europe, the US Army must develop a force posture that best navigates the tensions between deterring or defeating armed conflict at an acceptable cost, successfully competing below armed conflict, and maintaining global responsiveness and institutional flexibility through the global operating model and dynamic force employment. While Russia’s economy, and consequently military capability will likely shrink over the next 10 years, which can make them more dangerous as the Kremlin continues to try to punch above its weight. The ideal force posture needs to accomplish a range of on-going and contingency missions and also be adaptive enough to remain viable despite any number of potential swings in resources, military balance, or the domestic politics of allies. This study recommends five possible strategic approaches and specifies what conditions and priorities optimize each. The principal investigators recommend investing in a multidomain alliance. This strategic approach enables the joint force and multinational partners to get the most of their capabilities and makes the best use of the Army’s top modernization priorities, such as long-range fires in a way that alters the strategic balance of a theater to avert a potentially catastrophic, albeit low probability, scenario of armed conflict. More importantly, this strategic approach is far more stable in a crisis, as it does not place policymakers in having to rush this critical, escalatory capability into theater at a moment of high tension. Moreover, invest in a multidomain alliance has the flexibility to allow a later build-up of heavy forces if conditions still warrant.”

Watling, Jack. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“The foremost mission of UK Defence is the protection of the UK’s interests, and few interests are as significant as the avoidance of warfighting at scale. This must be ensured through the maintenance of credible deterrence, which aims to convince potential adversaries that they cannot achieve favourable outcomes through recourse to force. The resurgence of great power rivalry, however, ensures that UK interests will be threatened by state actors around the world, below the threshold of war, meaning that deterrence must also be pursued to constrain adversaries in competition. Russia represents the most serious threat in both conflict and competition. Not only is it willing to use direct military force to advance its interests when it perceives the conditions to be right, but it is also developing global reach, and acts internationally to build up leverage with great powers through coercive issue linkage. Because deterrence is primarily cognitive – aiming to convince an adversary not to do something – any analysis of effective deterrence must be based on an assessment of the target’s policy and outlook.”

Blume, Susanna V., and Molly Parrish. (Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“This report asks whether the 2021 U.S. defense budget request is aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in selecting priority capability investments while taking risk in less urgent areas.1 We conclude that the Department of Defense (DoD) is making progress in NDS implementation in select sectors—for example, in pursuing new command and control and strike architectures. However, we also conclude that DoD continues to underinvest in some critical enablers that will make these emerging command and strike complexes work.”

Green, Michael Jonathan, and Amy K. Lehr. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Indo-Pacific region is emerging as the epicenter of a new debate over how states should be organized. CSIS partnered with the National Endowment for Democracy and the Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands to convene leading thinkers on democracy from across the Indo-Pacific for a discussion of strategies to advance democratic governance and human rights in the region. This report includes a statement of principles endorsed by participants in a dialogue at Sunnylands, as well as a background paper by CSIS scholars examining global trend lines, regional dynamics within the Indo-Pacific, and recommendations for policymakers to consider.”

Farwell, James P. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020).
“A sophisticated, actionable approach to information warfare is vital in carrying out the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations. The NDS adopts the view that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea pose competitive challenges to U.S. prosperity and security in an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield combined across domains, and that they do so with increasing speed and reach. In meeting the new challenges, the U.S. military must build capacity and expertise to conduct information warfare. This book examines how to forge strategies, operations, and tactics using strategic communication as a tool of information warfare to exert influence and gain advantage in this competitive threat environment.”

Paul, Christopher, Yuna Huh Wong, and Elizabeth M. Bartels. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“The U.S. Marine Corps and joint concepts and thinking increasingly emphasize the role of information in military operations—from maintaining situational awareness to influencing adversary decisionmaking and understanding the behaviors of noncombatant populations. At the same time, wargaming is enjoying renewed prominence in the defense community as a tool to explore potential future conflicts and shape strategy. Yet, the information environment (IE) remains underdeveloped and underrepresented in wargames, both in the Marine Corps and across the U.S. Department of Defense. An examination of requirements, principles from military theory, current doctrine, and commercial gaming practices points to solutions and changes to game mechanics to better incorporate information considerations into wargame planning, development, and play in ways that can be customized according to available resources, capabilities, and goals. Recommendations target wargame sponsors, wargame designers, and those who are responsible for procuring new tools and recruiting personnel to support wargaming.”

Braw, Elisabeth (ed). (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“This report emerges from the ‘Revamping Crisis Resilience and Security in the Post-Pandemic World’ conference held on 19 May 2020. Our intention is for it to be used as a resource and source of ideas for resilience and crisis planning officials not just in Sweden but in other countries as well. The report is structured in two sections. The first addresses the major themes of the conference and provides additional context on how these fit into broader debates about resilience. While not presenting new research, this section highlights the key issues that are often absent from the current discussion on the coronavirus pandemic. It further suggests the major lessons that policymakers should take from the pandemic and indicates policy areas that require specific attention so that future crises will be more effectively addressed. The second section delves specifically into some of these policy areas. It features shorter contributions from some of the speakers at the conference. In these, the authors distil the key messages presented at the conference relating to each speaker’s area of expertise. In doing so, many of the authors offer novel ideas that merit further consideration. This work will, it is hoped, generate new discussions among those involved in contingencies planning – both in the public and private sectors – and encourage them to consider solutions that go beyond their traditional remits. In turn, this should lead to more-resilient societies, capable of facing a range of contingencies.”

Williams, Paul D. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“This paper summarizes the US mission in Somalia, analyses how it is being implemented, and assesses whether US policy in Somalia is working. It also outlines three scenarios for future US engagement.”

Wellesley, Laura, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“Malnutrition acts as a brake on the development of individuals, communities and economies around the world. This report is the first of its kind to reveal the hidden costs of malnutrition for business, and the extent to which these costs are recognized and addressed by multinational companies (MNCs).”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“After the 9/11 attacks, Americans yearned for a ‘return to normal.’ The normal they longed for was the world as it was on September 10th, or status quo ante. That was impossible, however, because the events of that day irrevocably changed the world. The new normal, the status quo post, was the world as it was after 9/11. The same must be said for COVID-19. We cannot return to the world before we understood the terms ‘social distance,’ ‘herd immunity,’ or ‘flatten the curve.’ The Army was not prepared for the COVID-19 pandemic, but neither was the nation nor the world. Given the information now known about the virus and the expert predictions that a second wave might occur soon, the Army is better prepared to plan for potentially operating under pandemic conditions. Experts warn that a true second wave arriving in the fall or winter could be much worse than the first. If the coronavirus behaves as the Spanish flu virus did in 1918-1919, then a third wave might be expected as well.
With these events in mind, the Army may expect momentous changes in the coming years. Initially, the Army will be called upon for its vast resources, labor, and specific rapidly deployable capabilities, as has been demonstrated during the initial wave of the pandemic. The Army will also be viewed as an income generator by providing economic support to small contractors that will support both their local economies and the larger defense industry. But the pandemic's long-term effect on the world economy will be devastating and possibly catastrophic. The next administration will face the challenge of using military resources to support communities while reducing defense budgets. Though the defense budget is only a small part of the US budget, it forms a large part of the discretionary spending. The budget cuts, when they come, will fall, as always, disproportionately on the Army. Reducing the Army budget is, and always has been, quicker, easier, and less visibly economically damaging than cutting the budgets of the other services. This is because cuts to the other services’ budgets means cancelling large multiyear contracts that employ thousands of workers while reducing the Army budget inevitably means reducing manpower. This study examines the Army’s necessary steps over the next two years.”

Gentile, Gian, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors show that there is no such thing as a 'traditional' U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. The authors document this in a series of four volumes, collected here in an easily searchable digital tool. Volume I traces the history of U.S. military policy from the colonial era through the Spanish-American War; this period is critical for understanding the genesis of the basic structure of today's Army and the various factors that informed that structure. Volume II focuses on the major laws enacted in the early 20th century that changed the federal government's relationship with the National Guard, established what would become today's Army Reserve, and improved the Army's ability to expand and develop trained specialists. Volume III covers the period from 1940 to 1970 and the development of Total Force Policy. Volume IV covers the period from 1970 to 2015, from changes to U.S. military policy that resulted from the Vietnam War through years of persistent conflict following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 22, 2020).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 23, 2020).
“In an international security environment described as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition…Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative ‘might-makes-right’ approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.”

Green, Michael, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Situated at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia has, in recent years, become the bellwether for the region, including the future of democratic governance. External powers, including the United States and China, have ramped up engagement with Southeast Asia and now compete for influence in the region. Amid these geopolitical shifts, Southeast Asian perspectives on dynamics that will shape the future of the region more than ever before. In late 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a survey of strategic elites in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand as well as Fiji to understand how the region views trends related to power, norms, and institutions. In early 2020, CSIS conducted extensive analysis of the survey data and convened a workshop in Sydney, Australia, to further examine the results with leading experts from the countries surveyed, as well as Australia and the United States. This report presents key findings from the survey and workshop on the strategic landscape in Southeast Asia and the future of power and influence and challenges faced by the region.”

Reynolds, Nick. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“Information has always been critical to warfare. Today, however, changes to the information domain are forcing militaries to adapt how they operate. With the boundary between peace and conflict becoming increasingly blurred, and with the collapse of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs due to connectivity and globalisation, the British Army is now called upon to persistently compete against a diversified array of threats both above and below the threshold of warfighting.”

Baklitskiy, Andrey. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In this new report, former CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program visiting fellow Andrey Baklitskiy examines the future prospects for U.S.-Russia arms control. The report considers the current state of arms control agreements between the two nations; evaluates potential alternatives, including a new trilateral process with China; and examines potential areas that could be on the negotiating table, should the two capitals again choose to pursue arms control agreements.”

Belkin, Paul, and Hibbah Kaileh. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 16, 2020).
“The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is a Department of Defense (DOD) effort to ‘enhance the U.S. deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolster the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners,’ according to the DOD European Deterrence Initiative Fact Sheet…Today, EDI is a key funding source for U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) posture adjustments in response to the evolving European security environment. EDI has enabled the first increase in U.S. military forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This includes the rotational deployment of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT), mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Two BCTs, one Stryker-equipped and one airborne infantry, are permanently stationed in Europe—in Germany and Italy, respectively. A prominent objective of EDI has been to enable rapid military mobilization to Central and Eastern Europe in order to respond quickly to military aggression in the region.”

Bergsen, Pepijn, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“The COVID-19 crisis could lead to a wider rethink of Europe’s political economy. This paper explores what such a model might look like, and what it would mean for the governance of the European Union.”

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“The United States faces a growing terrorism problem that will likely worsen over the next year. Based on a CSIS data set of terrorist incidents, the most significant threat likely comes from white supremacists, though anarchists and religious extremists inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda could present a potential threat as well. Over the rest of 2020, the terrorist threat in the United States will likely rise based on several factors, including the November 2020 presidential election.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2020).
“The Administration’s approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world’s most populous country and second largest national economy. The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems. Through a whole-of-government approach and guided by a return to principled realism, as articulated by the NSS, the United States Government will continue to protect American interests and advance American influence. At the same time, we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2020). “On March 23, 2020, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) announced a major force design initiative planned to occur over the next 10 years. The Marine Corps aims to redesign the force for naval expeditionary warfare and to better align itself with the National Defense Strategy, in particular, its focus on strategically competing with China and Russia. The Marines intend to eliminate or reduce certain types of units and eliminate some military occupational specialties (MOS). The Marines also plan to reorganize higher echelon Marine formations and get smaller—reducing forces by 12,000 personnel by 2030. Congress in its regulatory, oversight, and authorization and appropriations roles could take interest in this major proposed force design initiative.”

Hoehn, John R., and Kelley M. Sayler. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2020). “The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control (C2); and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations.”

Dalton, Melissa, and Hijab Shah. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). "The United States, Canada, and their allies are grappling with how best to build security partner capacity in hybrid warfare environments. In a resurgence of competition between states, actors such as China, Russia, and Iran increasingly use tools ranging from disinformation and cyberattacks to economic coercion and proxy warfare to further their interests. They conduct activities that incur low costs and suffer little reputational or accountability blowback while doing so. In this environment, there is a broad spectrum of threats with which the United States and its allies must contend, often with significant ambiguity. Policy and legal frameworks have not kept pace with the evolving threats. This poses challenges for how allies engage and sustain security partnerships."

Francis, E. Taylor. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2020). “The US armed forces today acknowledge the necessity of air superiority, at a minimum, before operations can begin. The ultimate goal is to achieve air supremacy to facilitate freedom of maneuver for US ground and naval forces. Given the importance of the control of the air, this author’s research goal was to determine the degree to which the history, theory, and doctrine of the US Air Force prepare it to obtain air supremacy against a peer or near-peer adversary in a present or near-future conflict. Research results suggest that air supremacy, in this case, should not be anticipated or expected. The Air Force is highly proficient at the tactical level but lacks the historical, theoretical, and doctrinal foundation on which to construct a campaign that guarantees success.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft Major Revision: June 3, 2020). “The Burke Chair at CSIS has completed a new analysis entitled ‘Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace,’ which provides a comprehensive analysis of the course of the fighting; the role U.S. forces play in Afghanistan’s security; and how developments in Afghan politics, governance, military forces, and economics affect the prospects for a real peace.”

Givens, Austen D. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020). “‘Disaster Labs: How American States Use Partnerships to Manage the Unthinkable’ examines the promise and potential drawbacks of public-private disaster response frameworks during the course of six chapters. After the introduction, the author introduces a series of case studies and then provides a detailed discussion of public-private collaboration in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia. A concluding chapter then comparatively assesses the value of these partnerships. The cases discussed in ‘Disaster Labs’ range from informal, ad hoc collaborations to formalized initiatives with detailed structures defined in contracts and memoranda, setting expectations for performance and accountability for both the government and private actors. Such accountability is desirable as it can limit fraud and corruption. But it is important to emphasize that not all solutions work in all situations, either.”

Stares, Paul B., et al. (New York: NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). “Although the world seems destined to grow more competitive, congested, and contested in the coming years, the logic of major power cooperation remains inescapable. Any effort to shape a new international order that is stable, inclusive, and beneficial to all must be a collaborative undertaking.”

Bernes, Tom, et al. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). “The novel coronavirus has infected millions, killed hundreds of thousands, and affected the well-being of billions more. The COVID-19 pandemic is a transnational threat that requires a global response, but the outbreak has laid bare divergent national approaches to managing global epidemiological interdependence and exposed broader structural weaknesses in the global governance system. Nationalist and inward-looking policies could lead to the loss of millions of lives and global economic disaster. The world needs national governments, regional organizations, and international institutions to act in the same cooperative spirit to effectively mitigate the COVID-19 outbreak. ‘The Challenges of Global Governance Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic’ paper series includes contributions from thirteen Council of Councils institutes. Eight of these papers consider the broader implications of the pandemic for international cooperation and the trajectory of the global system. The remaining five papers examine major gaps in the international management of global public health emergencies and propose reforms to increase the capacity of the multilateral system and national governments to better prevent and anticipate, detect, and respond to future pandemics.”

McCarten-Gibbs, Maggie, and Sara M. Allinder.(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). “This is an important year for the global HIV response. The first milestones toward the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Fast Track goals toward controlling the global epidemic come due at the end of 2020. The world is off-track to meet them. Concerted, well-financed, and targeted action is needed now to sustain progress against HIV, mitigate the threats posed by Covid-19, and get on track to end HIV as a public health threat by 2030.”

“SSI research professors and faculty consider the COVID-19 pandemic and its long-term, strategic implications for the U.S. Army and national security. Each essay provides an independent, specialized view on a particular aspect of the challenges posed by COVID-19 and includes recommendations on how the Army and DoD should address those issues.”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2014).
Note: this product is from 2014, but it is shared in this Library Alert to provide historical context to current challenges relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. “As the Ebola crisis unfolded in 2014, USAHEC-HSD completed a study of how the Army has dealt with epidemics and pandemics. This study examines the Army's efforts to eradicate yellow fever in Central America during the early 20th century during the building of the Panama Canal, and the 1919 flu epidemic which began in the Army and spread worldwide.”

Shrank, Bryan, Scott Emmel, and Jacob Miller. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2020).
“U.S. national strategy documents highlight the increasing significance of the space domain for today’s warfighters and the importance of working with our international allies and partners in that realm. In this issue, we outline and propose an Army course focused on integrating space operations into land warfare. The proposed Combined Space Officer Course (CSOC) will strengthen alliances and partnerships, increase lethality, and build greater deterrence.”
Note: this research is published as part of the May 2020 “Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research.” “‘Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research’ is produced under the purview of the Applied Communication and Learning Lab and the United States Army War College. Each issue reports the findings of a major collaborative student or student-faculty research initiative on a topic of strategic importance to the Army, the Department of Defense, and/or the larger community of strategic leaders. The ideas and viewpoints advanced in Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Applied Communication and Learning Lab, the United States Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other department or agency of the United States Government.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with the assistance of Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Study, 2020).
“The new National Security Strategy (NSS) issued on December 18, 2017, called for the United States to focus on competition with China and Russia in order to focus on the potential military threat they posed to the United States. This call to look beyond the current U.S. emphasis on counterterrorism was all too valid, but its implementation has since focused far too narrowly on the military dimension and on providing each military service all of the U.S. military forces that are needed to fight ‘worst case’ wars… This ‘worst case’ war approach to U.S. strategy also ignores the fact that China and Russia have already found ways to compete effectively using gray area and hybrid operations, which rely on non-military political and economic competition – or that can involve both military and civil forms of ‘warfare.’… China and Russia have not only benefited from the fact that the U.S. has not focused on such forms of competition, they have also benefited from their state-driven systems that allow them to shape their economies to serve their strategic objectives just as well as their military forces. While there are many areas where China and Russia do not directly compete with the United States, there are many other cases where their strategy for such competition now applies to ongoing civil and military competition on a global level.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with the assistance of Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Study, 2020).
“There is no simple or reliable way to define Chinese gray area or hybrid civil and military operations that affect U.S. strategic interests. Many Chinese demonstrative or low-level operations, claims, and political acts can have such an effect, but they are only reported as serving commercial interests, reflecting local claims or interests, or supporting China’s internal security needs. Their impact on China’s strategic competition with the United States may be highly indirect, and the motives behind Chinese actions may be highly uncertain. Many activities are described, in terms of their impact on U.S. strategic partners, other states, and non-state actors, to not have an impact on competition with the United States. Other activities may not be reported in open source literature or may not be described accurately at all. Even when some Chinese actions clearly involve gray area or hybrid operations, the motives behind such actions might actually be very different.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with the assistance of Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Study, 2020).
“There is no simple or reliable way to define Russian gray area or hybrid civil and military operations that affect U.S. strategic interests. Many Russian low-level operations, claims, and political acts can have such an effect, but they are only reported as serving commercial interests, reflecting local claims or interests, or supporting Russia’s broader security needs. The impact of gray zone operations on Russia’s strategic competition with the United States may be highly indirect, and the motives behind Russian actions may be highly uncertain. Many activities are described, in terms of their impact on U.S. strategic partners, other states, and non-state actors, to not have an impact on competition with the United States. Other activities may not be reported in open source literature or may not be described accurately. Even when some Russian actions clearly involve gray area or hybrid operations, the motives behind such actions might be very different.”

Jones, Seth G. (ed). (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"This report examines Russia’s military and diplomatic campaign in Syria, the largest and most significant Russian out-of-area operation since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s experience in Syria will shape its military thinking, influence promotion and personnel decisions, impact research and development for its arms industry, and expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond for the foreseeable future. Yet despite the importance of Russia’s involvement in Syria—especially as the United States competes with countries such as Russia and China—there has been little systematic analysis of Russia’s campaign in Syria. This research aims to help fill the gap and provides some new analysis and data. It conducts a broad assessment of the Russian campaign—including political objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and civilian targeting—which places the military campaign in a wider context. In addition, it compiles a data set of Russia’s civilian targeting and analyzes satellite imagery of Russian activity."

Kurtzer, Jacob. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"Nigeria represents one of the United States’ most important relationships in Africa. Despite U.S. security sector and humanitarian assistance programs, ten years of violent insurgency in northeast Nigeria have led to massive humanitarian needs for more than seven million people, and the crisis shows no signs of abating. Ongoing restrictions by the government of Nigeria on humanitarian action threaten U.S. policy goals of improved humanitarian outcomes and a reduction in the presence of violent terrorist organizations. This report unpacks the challenges for humanitarian actors, the role of the United States and other donor institutions in meeting humanitarian needs, and the effectiveness of the Nigerian government’s response. Jacob Kurtzer provides concrete recommendations for mitigating the civilian impact of the conflict in northeast Nigeria."

Naimoli, Stephen J., and Sarah Ladislaw. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"In 2018, the power sector emitted 13.6 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, 41 percent of total global emissions. To have a chance of holding global temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius relative to its preindustrial level, global emissions from all economic sectors, including the power sector, must be reduced to net-zero around 2050. One of the challenges of decarbonizing the power sector is sufficiently reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while guaranteeing reliability, security, and affordability. Solar and wind power are zero-carbon technologies, but their variability could challenge grid stability if they are not properly balanced by sufficient storage and firm power. Jesse Jenkins, a Princeton professor and one of the speakers at CSIS’s March 30 event on power sector decarbonization, likens the power system to a balanced diet: directly comparing the costs of variable renewable energy to those of firm power sources is like comparing the cost of a banana to the cost of a hamburger. Both can be evaluated on cost alone, but doing so misses the different roles they play in a balanced electric power system."

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Historical Services Division - U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, n.d., ca. 2020).
“Of all the areas of research and writing concerning World War II, there is none filled with more contention and controversy than that concerning the end of the war in the Pacific. This was clearly demonstrated during the intense debate over the content of the Smithsonian’s 1995 Enola Gay exhibit commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. As we move farther away from the atmosphere of 1945 described above, the actions taken by the Allied Powers to force Japanese surrender appear more extreme, and the victors are more easily portrayed as villains by the vanquished or questioned by a newer generation about the motivations leading to the obliteration of enemy cities.”

O’Rourke, Ronald, Michael Moodie, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated May 8, 2020).
“Some observers argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be a world-changing event with potentially profound and long-lasting implications for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world. Other observers are more skeptical that the COVID-19 pandemic will have such effects.
Observers who argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be world-changing for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world have focused on several areas of potential change, including the following, which are listed here separately but overlap in some cases and can interact with one another
• world order, international institutions, and global governance;
• U.S. global leadership and the U.S. role in the world;
• China’s potential role as a global leader;
• U.S. relations and great power competition with China and Russia, including the use of the COVID-19 pandemic as a theme or tool for conducting ideological competition;
• the relative prevalence of democratic and authoritarian or autocratic forms of government;
• societal tension, reform, transformation, and governmental stability in various countries;
• the world economy, globalization, and U.S. trade policy;
• the characteristics and conduct of conflict;
• allied defense budgets and U.S. alliances;
• the cohesion of the European Union;
• the definition of, and budgeting for, U.S. national security;
• U.S. defense strategy, defense budgets, and military operations;
• U.S. foreign assistance programs and international debt relief;
• activities of non-state actors;
• the amount of U.S. attention devoted to ongoing international issues other than the COVID-19 pandemic; and
• the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy.
Issues for Congress may include whether and how the COVID-19 pandemic could change the international security environment, whether the Trump Administration’s actions for responding to such change are appropriate and sufficient, and what implications such change could have for the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy.
Congress’s decisions regarding these issues could have significant and even profound implications for U.S. foreign and defense policy, and for the status of Congress as a co-equal branch relative to the executive branch in setting and overseeing the implementation of U.S. foreign and defense policy.”

Todman, Will. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The Syrian government has restricted international humanitarian access to opposition-controlled areas of Syria as part of its efforts to regain control of the entire country
• In 2014, the United Nations designated four border crossings humanitarians could use to deliver aid to those in need without government approval.
• Russia and China blocked the United Nations from using two border crossings in January, and the mandate for the remaining two crossings will expire on July 10, 2020.
• Cutting off UN humanitarian agencies’ cross-border access to northwest Syria as the country faces the Covid-19 pandemic would be a catastrophe for Syria, the Middle East, the broader international community, and U.S. interests.
• The U.S. government should maximize its leverage in negotiations by focusing on the imperative to maintain UN agencies’ cross-border access to northwest Syria.
• The United States should push for a separate agreement to allow cross-border medical access to northeast Syria through the Yaroubiyah crossing.”

Davis, Lisa, et al. (Alexandria, VA: Office of People Analytics, 2020).
“The ‘2019 Military Service Gender Relations Focus Groups’ (2019 MSGR) report reflects the overall perceptions and findings gleaned from active duty Service members and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)/Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention (SHARP) SAPR/SHARP responders who participated in focus groups in eight locations around the continental United States (CONUS). Participants in these focus groups were asked about the culture of their installation and who influences the culture for Service members, the influence of gender discrimination and sexual harassment on work culture and morale, and how leadership and the SAPR/SHARP responder can better prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment reported by Service members. The goal of this report is to provide an overview and summary of key themes that arose from the discussions with Service members and SAPR/SHARP responders.”

Rosenberg, Elizabeth, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng. (Washington, DC: Center for a New America Century, 2020).
“The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other.”

Chhabra, Tarun, et al. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2020).
“This installment of papers for the Brookings Foreign Policy project ‘Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World’ assesses China’s growing technological reach in the world by focusing on both thematic and technology-specific topics.”
• Chhabra, Tarun, et al. “Executive Summary.”
• Brown, Michael, Eric Chewning, and Pavneet Singh. “Preparing the United States for the Superpower Marathon with China.”
• Wheeler, Tom. “Digital Competition with China Starts with Competition at Home.”
• Kania, Elsa B. “’AI Weapons’ in China’s Military Innovation.”
• Turner Lee, Nicol. “Navigating the US-China 5G Competition.”
• Klein, Aaron. “China’s Digital Payments Revolution.”
• Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. “Dealing with Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports.”
• Zwetsloot, Remco. “China’s Approach to Tech Talent Competition.”
• Imbrie, Andrew, and Ryan Fedasiuk. “Untangling the Web: Why the US Needs Allies to Defend Against Chinese Technology Transfer.”
• Moore, Scott. “China’s Role in the Global Biotechnology Sector and Implications for US Policy.”
• Rose, Frank A. “Managing China’s Rise in Outer Space.”
• Stefanick, Tom. “Secure Power: Gigawatts, Geopolitics, and China’s Energy Internet.”
• Khan, Saif M., and Carrick Flynn. “Maintaining China’s Dependence on Democracies for Advanced Computer Chips.”

Kliman, Daniel, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2018 and 2020 Taiwanese local and presidential elections crystallized that Russia and China are using digital interference to shape the contest between democracies and autocracies. While foreign information operations are time-tested methods of authoritarian influence, the digital space has increased the scope and speed with which these operations can be waged. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Beijing and Moscow explicitly coordinate their information operations, the two countries are increasingly finding common cause as their interests align on a number of issues and in strategic regions.”

Mankoff, Jeffrey (ed.) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“As the U.S. military pivots back to a world shaped by great power competition, it faces the need of coming to grips with the evolving capabilities and doctrines of its principal rivals, China and Russia. The Russian military, in particular, is rapidly updating its tools and techniques in ways that challenge traditional thinking about great power competition. To promote a better understanding of the Russian military’s evolving capabilities and doctrines, the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program (REP), with support from United States European Command (EUCOM) has undertaken to gather this series of papers designed to give planners and executors a clear sense of just where the Russian military is headed.”

Katzman, Kenneth, Clayton Thomas, and Kathleen J. McInnis. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2020).
“The U.S.-Iran tensions still have the potential to escalate into all-out conflict. Iran’s materiel support for armed factions throughout the region, including its provision of short-range ballistic missiles to these factions, and Iran’s network of agents in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, give Iran the potential to expand confrontation into areas where U.S. response options might be limited. Iran has continued all its operations in the region despite wrestling with the COVID-19 pandemic that has affected Iran significantly. United States military has the capability to undertake a range of options against Iran, both against Iran directly and against its regional allies and proxies. A September 14, 2019, attack on critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia demonstrated that Iran and/or its allies have the capability to cause significant damage to U.S. allies and to U.S. regional and global economic and strategic interests, and raised questions about the effectiveness of U.S. defense relations with the Gulf states.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 28, 2020).
“The geopolitical environment for the Arctic has been substantially affected by the renewal of great power competition. Although there continues to be significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China. Russia in recent years has enhanced its military presence and operations in the Arctic. China’s growing activities in the Arctic have become a matter of increasing curiosity or concern among observers. U.S. military forces have begun to pay more attention to the Arctic in their planning and operations. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Navy, and the Coast Guard have all issued Arctic strategy documents in recent years. Whether DOD and the military services are adequately resourcing these strategies and taking appropriate and adequate actions for defending U.S. interests in the Arctic has emerged as a topic of debate and congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and has received funding for the procurement of the first of three planned new polar icebreakers. The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago—though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been recently updated.”

Food Security Information Network. (Rome, Italy: Food Security Information Network, 2020).
“The 2020 edition of ‘The Global Report on Food Crises’ describes the scale of acute hunger in the world. It provides an analysis of the drivers that are contributing to food crises across the globe, and examines how the COVID-19 pandemic might contribute to their perpetuation or deterioration. The report is produced by the Global Network against Food Crises, an international alliance working to address the root causes of extreme hunger.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 14, 2020).
“The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.”

Lawfare. April 8, 2020, streaming audio, 01:25:55.
"March 11 marked the launch of the official report of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. The commission is a bicameral, bipartisan, intergovernmental body created by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, and charged with developing and articulating a comprehensive strategic approach to defending the United States in cyberspace. For the last month, Lawfare has published a series of commentaries on various highlights from the report, some by analysts involved with the commission. In this episode of the Lawfare Podcast, we hear a lively discussion from some of the commission's members, including the co-chair, Representative Mike Gallagher, on a part of that project focusing on China, technology and global supply chains. Special thanks to the Center for New American Security for providing this audio."

Schwarzenberg, Andres B. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2020).
“The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has significantly increased its overseas investments since launching its ‘Go Global Strategy’ in 1999 in an effort to support the overseas expansion of Chinese firms and make them more globally competitive. Since then, these firms— many of which are closely tied to the Chinese government—have acquired foreign assets and capabilities and pledged billions of dollars to develop infrastructure abroad. As a result, many in Congress and the Trump Administration are focusing on the critical implications of China’s growing global economic reach for U.S. economic and geopolitical strategic interests."

Sutter, Karen M., Michael D. Sutherland, and Andres B. Schwarzenberg. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 6, 2020).
“The crisis that has emerged for the U.S. economy is defined, in large part, by a collapse of critical supply, as well as a sharp downturn in demand, first in China and now in the United States and globally. As China’s manufacturing sector recovers, while the United States and other major global markets are grappling with COVID-19, some fear China could overwhelm overseas markets, as it ramps up export-led growth to compensate for the sharp downturn of exports in the first quarter of 2020, secure hard currency, and boost economic growth. China may also seek to make gains in strategic sectors—such as telecommunications, microelectronics, and semiconductors—in which the government undertook extraordinary measures to sustain research and development and manufacturing during the COVID-19 outbreak in China.”

United Nations. (New York, NY: United Nations, 2020).
“We are facing a global health crisis unlike any in the 75-year history of the United Nations — one that is killing people, spreading human suffering, and upending people’s lives. But this is much more than a health crisis. It is a human crisis. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is attacking societies at their core. The IMF has just reassessed the prospect for growth for 2020 and 2021, declaring that we have entered a recession – as bad as or worse than in 2009. The IMF projects recovery in 2021 only if the world succeeds in containing the virus and take the necessary economic measures. In the face of such an unprecedented situation in recent history, the creativity of the response must match the unique nature of the crisis – and the magnitude of the response must match its scale. No country will be able to exit this crisis alone. This report is a call to action, for the immediate health response required to suppress transmission of the virus to end the pandemic; and to tackle the many social and economic dimensions of this crisis. It is, above all, a call to focus on people – women, youth, low-wage workers, small and medium enterprises, the informal sector and on vulnerable groups who are already at risk.”

Kühn, Ulrich (ed.) (Hamburg, Germany: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, 2020).
"With the end of the INF Treaty in 2019, trilateral arms control – meaning arms control between the United States, Russia, and China – has gained center stage. Only shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. President Trump declared that he wants a new nuclear pact to be signed by both Russia and China. Other U.S. administration officials have set the goal of including China in a future follow-on framework to the New START agreement, which expires in February 2021. However, could trilateral arms control be possible at all, and what would be necessary conditions? In this IFSH Research Report, internationally renowned experts Alexey Arbatov (Russia), David Santoro (United States), and Tong Zhao (China) discuss what is possible and what is not. Edited by Ulrich Kühn (IFSH), the report includes a number of very specific proposals, including from China, on how to move forward on trilateral arms control."

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. (Arlington, VA: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2020).
“SUMMARY OF QUARTER 1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1: Recommendations to Increase AI R&D Investments
Recommendation 2: Accelerate AI Application in DoD
Recommendation 3: Strengthen AI Workforce
Recommendation 4: Promote U.S. Leadership in AI Hardware & 5G
Recommendation 5: Improve AI Cooperation among Key Allies and Partners
Recommendation 6: Advance Ethical and Responsible AI
Recommendation 7: Threat Analysis and Recommended Actions”

Wass de Czege, Huba. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2020).
“Countering the aggression of Russian or Chinese ‘hegemonic’ behavior will require a rapid, ready, and appropriate reaction along anticipated lines of operations to deter rather than accelerate crisis escalation, and to defend the status quo when challenged. Do the central ideas in the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, provide logical counters to hegemonic behavior from Russia or China? This monograph offers a critique of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 to avoid the foundational flaws from its predecessor concepts, AirSea Battle and Multi-Domain Battle, and to reinforce the foundation for continued discussion, analysis, and development to evolving Army and Joint doctrine. Today the United States and its Allies must cooperate to keep our advantageous peace. By keeping the peace between the United States, Russia, and China, and by the logic of our theory of victory, we are all more likely to manage other lesser anticipated and unanticipated dangers ahead.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Christopher Metzger. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Corruption plagues governments, economies, and societies around the world. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the amount of money lost to corruption globally is $2 trillion a year. This money could go a long way toward filling the financing gap for the United Nation’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and preparing countries for global pandemics such as Covid-19. The United States should recapture its leadership on global anti-corruption efforts for a number of reasons, but most critically for economic ones. U.S. global competitors, such as China and Russia, offer an alternative development model that largely ignores issues of transparency, rule of law, and good governance. If all companies had to abide by the same anti-corruption legislation and there was more transparency in procurement processes, then U.S. companies would have a better chance of winning contracts. Economic growth in developing countries reduces unemployment, increases stability, and supports U.S. national security interests in the process as well.”

Goldenberg, Ilan, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has become highly proficient in using its surrogates and proxies across the Middle East as a tool to achieve its interests while avoiding direct conflict with the United States. Successive U.S. presidents have sought options for pushing back against this Iranian strategy but have struggled to find approaches that could deter Iran’s actions or degrade its capabilities. In most cases U.S. administrations have been hesitant to respond at all, for fear of starting a larger conflict. The recent killing of Qassim Soleimani represents the opposite problem, in which the United States and Iran came unnecessarily close to a much larger war. In contrast, Israel’s ‘campaign between the wars’ (the Hebrew acronym is mabam) against Iran and Iranian-backed groups in Syria has been one of the most successful military efforts to push back against Iran in the 'gray zone.' Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and especially since early 2017, Israel has conducted more than 200 airstrikes inside Syria against more than 1,000 targets linked to Iran and it’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGCQF), and against IRGC-QF backed groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. This campaign has slowed Iran’s military buildup in Syria while avoiding a broader regional conflagration that would have been damaging to Israel’s interests. This study examines Israel’s mabam campaign and asks what lessons the United States can draw and how they may be applied to future U.S. actions in gray zone conflicts, both against Iran and more broadly.”

Berger, David H. (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2020).
“BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: This report describes the progress of the Marine Corps on my watch in preparing for the sweeping changes needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution: effectively playing our role as the nation’s naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously modernizing the force in accordance with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) – and doing both within the fiscal resources we are provided. A certain degree of institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is hard. As such, I want to be clear up front: our force design effort is a work in progress. Thanks to the dedication and effort of a great many Marines, Sailors, and civilians over the last six months, we have come to a clearer understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that require additional analysis. This reports explains, at length and in some detail, my argument for change, our force design methodology and organization, my personal assessment of the work to date, and the steps we are taking to move the force design effort into the next phase.”

War on the Rocks. April 6, 2020, streaming audio, 36:35.
“As listeners of this podcast know, the Marine Corps is taking a new direction. The latest document to lay out this vision is Force Design 2030. The commandant, Gen. David H. Berger, aims to cut the size of the Marine Corps and let go of some legacy systems (most notably tanks) in order to — in the words of a recent article in the Economist — turn the Corps into ‘a commando-like infantry force with nimbler weapons: drone squadrons will double in number and rocket batteries will triple.’ In Berger’s view, the Marine Corps must make these changes in order to work with the other armed services to deter the People’s Republic of China, if necessary, or win a war against it. Ryan spoke with Berger to get the inside story of these reforms, which he describes as being in their earliest phase. ‘This is not the end of the journey’ he said, ‘but rather the beginning.’ And he calls upon more voices to chime in with criticism to ensure the Marine Corps is ready for the future of war.”

Cook, Chaveso, and Alison Aman. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2020).
“The military needs a common framework across all domains, experiences and personnel structures from which to operate. As values-based organizations, this common language must be derived from core professional attributes. This paper seeks to outline the current state of affairs regarding professional development. As such, this work focuses on principle development as a specific subset of professional development. Principles are fundamental truths that are foundational to the ever-evolving set of characteristics that become the system of beliefs and patterns of behavior that codify our professional persona. The Army’s doctrine—specifically the ‘three Cs’ of character, competence and commitment—is used as a frame for understanding how one component of the armed forces currently codifies professionalism doctrinally and where it falls short. This lens is also used to help show why the key scientific principles of adult personality development, specifically moral/ethical development, should be considered for developmental strategy. Finally, this paper introduces a framework for implementing a strategy for principle development.”

Harrison, Todd, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“Space Threat Assessment 2020 reviews the open-source information available on the counterspace capabilities that can threaten U.S. space systems and which countries are developing such systems. The report is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus their attention. This report focuses on five specific countries that are either avidly pursuing counterspace capabilities or that present the greatest risk to the United States' National Security: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India. A sixth section analyzes the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, including some allies and partners of the United States, and some non-state actors. This report is not a comprehensive assessment of all known threats to U.S. space systems because much of the information on what other countries are doing to advance their counterspace systems is not publicly available. Instead, it serves as an unclassified assessment that aggregates and highlights open-source information on counterspace capabilities for policymakers and the general public.”

Karako, Tom, and Wes Rumbaugh. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The 2021 budget submission represents an inflection point for missile defense programs, the relationship between active defenses and other forms of missile defeat, and the institutional makeup of the missile defense enterprise.
• This is the first Trump administration budget submission to make major programmatic changes to missile defense, but these changes carry uncertainty about the future.
• Despite congressional opposition, the administration’s budget again tries to transfer space sensor development from the Missile Defense Agency to the Space Development Agency.
• Army and Navy investments in air and missile defenses are beginning to transition from research and development to procurement.
• Despite one program cancellation, hypersonic strike development efforts continue to advance.”

Engelke, Peter. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“After decades of largely unfulfilled promises, artificial intelligence (AI) has finally—and only recently—begun to demonstrate its massive power to reshape the marketplace, the public sector, the national security arena, and society more broadly. The technical developments that have occurred over the past decade, including new machine learning breakthroughs based on vast improvements in computational power and enormous increases in the quantity of data that can be used to ‘train’ AI systems, have enabled the application of AI to an ever-wider range of sectors and activities. AI’s increasing range of applications are having real-world consequences, both positive and negative. Those consequences, in turn, have animated spirited and at times emotional debates about how governments can craft policies to come to grips with a world increasingly shaped by AI.”

Wright, Nicholas D. (ed). (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 2019).
“A wide variety of perspectives on the different uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Russia and China and the impact this will have on the Global Order. Essays are from leading defense professionals, academics, think tanks, and policy developers. A comprehensive primer for those concerned with how emerging technologies will influence the west's near-peer competitors.”

Cahill, Jim. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2020).
“The 2018 ‘National Defense Strategy’ (NDS) prioritizes strategic competition with China and Russia. Consequently, defense practitioners have devoted increasing attention to contemplating future conflict with great-power competitors. Underlying issues that require more attention include the impact that future high-intensity warfare will have on civilians, the roles that international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will undertake in conflict settings and the implications to the U.S. joint force’s efforts in pursuing future military objectives. This paper addresses these topics by describing relevant issues in humanitarian affairs. It also identifies useful ways for defense practitioners to think about the relationship between military and humanitarian affairs.”

Kornbluh, Karen, Ellen P. Goodman, and Eli Weiner. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“Even before a global pandemic hit, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists announced that the Doomsday Clock had advanced for the first time ever to 100 seconds before midnight. The Bulletin cited ‘information warfare’ as a ‘threat multiplier’ that is reducing trust and corrupting the information ecosystem needed for democratic debate. Now the World Health Organization is warning of an ‘infodemic’ of widespread conspiracy theories about the coronavirus, and disinformation has already been evident in the lead-up to the 2020 presidential election. Despite a clear and present danger, it is evident that our institutions are not nearly ready—neither for foreign nor domestic disinformation campaigns.”

Conley, Heather A. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In July 2018, CSIS embarked on a major analytical assessment that centered on the following research question: What will be the strategic consequences for the United States by 2050 if America’s two near-peer military competitors, China and Russia, continue to develop their long-term economic and security interests in the Arctic, but the United States does not? Russia’s growing economic and military ambitions in the Arctic, as well as China’s increased physical presence in the region, underscore that both nations have long-term strategic designs for the Arctic region. Data analysis, satellite imagery, and scenario development all demonstrate the continued growth of Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic and heighten the sense of stasis in the U.S. military and economic presence. Unless the United States wishes to lose access to portions of the Arctic and have increasingly diminished capabilities to defend and deter attack against the homeland, the United States must return to the Arctic."

Melino, Matthew, Heather A. Conley, and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"The Kola Peninsula is the crux of Russia’s military establishment in the western Arctic, and its air and maritime capabilities are essential to Russia’s homeland defense, Arctic dominance, and global power projection capabilities. Russia’s modernization and expansion efforts at Severomorsk-1 air base, Gadzhiyevo submarine base, and Okolnaya submarine support base have significantly improved Russia’s operational readiness and its ability to control the surrounding maritime space in the Arctic. The Kola Peninsula is also home to systems such as the RS-24 YARS, located at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, which pose a significant challenge to U.S. and allied defense systems. Russia’s willingness to use its arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles to defend its position in the Arctic was on display during the Grom-2019 exercise. The expansion of Russia’s military presence in the Arctic is far from over—Russia will continue to deepen its military presence in the Arctic to protect Russian strategic interests well into the future."

Hruby, Aubrey. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“Global powers are jockeying for access to opportunities in African markets. In recent years, through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Tokyo International Conference of African Development, the Russia-Africa Summit, and many others, the world’s largest economies have sought to make headway in what are seen as fast-growing and lucrative new markets. In this environment, effective United States (US)-Africa policy requires greater focus on areas of American competitiveness and concerted efforts to educate, mobilize, and support US commercial success in African markets. In this update of her 2017 issue brief ‘Escaping China’s Shadow: Finding America’s Competitive Edge in Africa,’ Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby outlines recommendations for how to best utilize Prosper Africa and leverage American private sector competitiveness by focusing efforts on sectors in which the United States already leads.”

King, Angus, and Mike Gallagher (Co-Chairmen). (Washington, DC: U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 2020).
Note: Contains a brief introductory section by Peter Singer and August Cole entitled "A Warning from Tomorrow."
"After conducting an extensive study including over 300 interviews, a competitive strategy event modeled after the original Project Solarium in the Eisenhower administration, and stress tests by external red teams, the Commission advocates a new strategic approach to cybersecurity: layered cyber deterrence. The desired end state of layered cyber deterrence is a reduced probability and impact of cyberattacks of significant consequence. The strategy outlines three ways to achieve this end state:
• Shape behavior. The United States must work with allies and partners to promote responsible behavior in cyberspace.
• Deny benefits. The United States must deny benefits to adversaries who have long exploited cyberspace to their advantage, to American disadvantage, and at little cost to themselves. This new approach requires securing critical networks in collaboration with the private sector to promote national resilience and increase the security of the cyber ecosystem.
• Impose costs. The United States must maintain the capability, capacity, and credibility needed to retaliate against actors who target America in and through cyberspace.
Each of the three ways described above involves a deterrent layer that increases American public- and private-sector security by altering how adversaries perceive the costs and benefits of using cyberspace to attack American interests. These three deterrent layers are supported by six policy pillars that organize more than 75 recommendations. These pillars represent the means to implement layered cyber deterrence.”

Hersman, Rebecca, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"Informed by research and eight tabletop exercises conducted with nearly 150 participants overall, this two-year study examines implications of the emerging strategic situational awareness ecosystem and its impact on crisis decisionmaking…Improvements to strategic situational awareness (SA)—the ability to characterize the operating environment, detect and respond to threats, and discern actual attacks from false alarms across the spectrum of conflict—have long been assumed to reduce the risk of conflict and help manage crises more successfully when they occur. However, with the development of increasingly capable strategic SA-related technology, growing comingling of conventional and nuclear SA requirements and capabilities, and the increasing risk of conventional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, this may no longer be the case."

Miller, Paul D. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“At the outset of some of the most impactful wars in history, policymakers have assumed that the duration of conflict would be brief. Unfortunately, their assumptions were often wrong, as may wars like those in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan only grew more complicated with the passage of time. However, at least in these three cases, the reality of prolonged stalemate did not stop policymakers from setting withdrawal deadlines to assuage public anxieties and improve military performance. The pressures contributing to these consistent decisions across time are still relevant now. Therefore, as the United States currently seeks to deter great-power rivals and rogue regimes while combating terrorism, it is as important as ever to understand the roles and potential outcomes of withdrawal deadlines in war. In this new Atlantic Council report, ‘Withdrawal Deadlines in War: Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan,’ Dr. Paul D. Miller examines the effect of withdrawal timetables on public opinion, military success, and policymakers’ goals across the three titular case studies. He finds that ‘Withdrawal timelines do not achieve the political benefits that policymakers desire, but they do incur the risks policymakers rightly fear.’ In the face of prolonged and difficult military challenges, withdrawal deadlines can exacerbate outcomes at crucial moments, and thus policymakers must tread carefully.”

Daniels, Seamus P., and Todd Harrison. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report from the CSIS Defense Budget Analysis program seeks to enhance understanding of the formulation and accuracy of Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) projected obligation rates in the defense acquisition sector. These projections are published annually for each appropriation account in the Financial Summary Tables released by the office of the DoD Comptroller. This paper compares the Comptroller projected obligation rates for procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts with actual obligation rates, as well as budget execution benchmarks compiled by the Comptroller’s office. This analysis assesses the reliability of the projections and their consistency with other DoD targets, identifies trends in the accuracy of obligation rates across different accounts, and attempts to isolate factors that may influence the formulation and accuracy of the projections.”

Nakano, Jane. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The nuclear industry of advanced industrialized countries is under significant pressure to remain competitive as the market landscape for new nuclear power opportunities changes. The relative decline of U.S. nuclear export competitiveness comes at a time when Russia is boosting its dominance in new nuclear sales, and China is doubling down on its effort to become a leader in global nuclear commerce. This report illuminates how the changing market competition among the United States, Russia, and China will affect their future relations with nuclear commerce recipient countries, and discusses why Russia and China promote nuclear commerce, as well as which factors may alter their market competitiveness. The report further provides recommendations regarding the U.S. approach to continued commercial competitiveness in nuclear energy.”

Brannen, Samuel J., Christian S. Haig, and Katherine Schmidt. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“We are living in an age of global mass protests that are historically unprecedented in frequency, scope, and size. Our analysis finds that the mass political protests that have captured media attention over the past year, such as those in Hong Kong and Santiago, are in fact part of a decade-long trend line affecting every major populated region of the world, the frequency of which have increased by an annual average of 11.5 percent between 2009 and 2019. The size and frequency of recent protests eclipse historical examples of eras of mass protest, such as the late-1960s, late-1980s, and early-1990s. Viewed in this broader context, the events of the Arab Spring were not an isolated phenomenon but rather an especially acute manifestation of a broadly increasing global trend. Analysis of the root causes of these global protests suggests they will continue and could increase in 2020 and beyond. While each protest has a unique context, common grievances overwhelmingly center on perceptions of ineffective governance and corruption.”

Naimoli, Stephen, and Sarah Ladislaw. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"This brief is the first in a series on achieving net-zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The CSIS Energy Security and Climate Change Program is hosting six events that will be followed by resource briefs related to each event.
Reducing emissions to lessen the long-term impacts of a warming climate has been a shared objective of the international community for decades. To date, progress toward this goal has not kept pace with pathways necessary to deliver a stabilized climate by the end of the century. The result is that the emissions pathways necessary to achieve this target relative to current activity are necessarily steeper and the energy and land-use system changes required are more abrupt. The current scientific consensus indicates that to stabilize the climate and prevent the most catastrophic effects of climate change, we must reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to net-zero by or soon after 2050. In 2010, GHG emissions reached 49 gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO2)-equivalent per year. To reach net-zero, the world must reduce emissions through a combination of replacing GHG-emitting resources with zero-emissions sources and capturing emissions from the remaining sources that cannot be replaced. This resource brief explores how to understand the pathways to net-zero emissions and some of the ways to achieve this goal."

Goldwyn, David L.(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“As Secretary of Energy, I have a strong appreciation for the strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere to US prosperity, energy, and national security. As our closest neighbors and strongest trading partners, the energy and economic security of the hemisphere is critically linked to our own. The Americas are full of potential. With the leadership of the US Department of Energy (DOE) in partnership with our interagency colleagues, the US private sector, and our regional partners, we can galvanize the Western Hemisphere into an energy powerhouse. Achieving the full potential of our hemisphere’s energy resources will boost the economy of the United States and our neighbors while also serving as a counterweight to foreign adversaries. To help achieve this vision, DOE commissioned the Atlantic Council to conduct independent analysis and develop recommendations on how the Department can most effectively catalyze the development and expansion of energy projects across North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.”

Ichikowitz Family Foundation. (Sandton, South Africa: Ichikowitz Family Foundation, 2020).
"The most comprehensive survey of Africa’s youth to date – the African Youth Survey 2020 – reveals a rising Afro-Optimism among the continent’s youth driven by a strong sense of individual responsibility, a post-colonial mindset, entrepreneurialism, and confidence in a shared African identity. Africa’s youth believe they can solve problems collaboratively, and are hopeful of fighting corruption, achieving peace and improving their personal living conditions."

“The Stanford Internet Observatory is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social media. Under the program direction of computer security expert Alex Stamos, the Observatory was created to learn about the abuse of the internet in real time, to develop a novel curriculum on trust and safety that is a first in computer science, and to translate our research discoveries into training and policy innovations for the public good. By providing researchers across Stanford with cutting edge data analytics and machine learning resources we will unlock completely unforeseen fields of research. We envision a world where researchers do not limit themselves to the data that is easy to access, but instead dive into the toughest and most important questions by leveraging the capabilities of the Stanford Internet Observatory.”

Babcock-Lumish, Terry, et al. (eds.) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“‘Senior Conference 55—The Emerging Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers, Directions, and Decisions,’ explores the possibilities and challenges that exist in this critical and dynamic region. This monograph captures three days of panels, keynotes, and discussions among a diverse group of distinguished experts. Focus areas included shifting economic realities, political dynamics, technological trends, and forms of conflict and competition that could shape the region’s future. Senior Conference 55 assembled a range of experts taking a broad approach to the entire Indo-Pacific region to explore complex and varied relationships. This monograph begins by summarizing the consensus recommendations that emerged during the event, followed by the substance of the keynote addresses and panels, all while maintaining a nonattributional approach that allowed conversations to tackle hard questions. This monograph presents those discussions, including disagreements and dissenting viewpoints, and serves as a foundation for future debate on possible policy. The Indo-Pacific region is—and will continue to be—crucial for both the United States and the global community. The United States needs to increase its capacity for decision-making amid risk and uncertainty in the coming decades. This monograph offers key findings for confronting these challenges and broadens the conversation about future US policy in the Indo-Pacific.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
Analysis of the recent deal signed between the United States and the Taliban.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 18, 2020, streaming video, 3:32:38.
"For most of the nuclear age, enhanced strategic situational awareness has been viewed as a benefit for strategic stability. In conventional conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries, the United States has long-enjoyed information dominance in this arena. But can there be too much of a good thing? In today’s increasingly competitive security environment, the risk of conflict between nuclear-armed states is on the rise: capabilities designed to provide situational awareness for conventional conflict are increasingly comingled with nuclear weapons systems and emerging technologies promise to provide enhanced insight into adversary actions and activities. The increased speed and precision of these technologies may have a profound impact on the strategic landscape as miscalculation and unintended escalation risk transforming conventional crises into major conflicts between nuclear powers. Please join the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS on February 18th for a half-day conference, 'Decision-making and Technology Under the Nuclear Shadow,' that will explore how decision-makers think about strategic situational awareness, emerging technologies, and risk in crises between nuclear-armed states. Featured experts will include Dr. Robert Jervis, Dr. Peter W. Singer, Avril Haines, and Dr. Kathleen Hicks and the discussion will cover both the theoretical aspect of decision-making in nuclear crises as well as the policy implications and recommendations for improving international security.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 24, 2020, streaming video, 3:41:37.
"The killing of Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January 2020 sent conflicting signals about the depth of U.S. engagement in the Gulf. The United States seems intent to diminish its presence while keeping an active hand in regional affairs. Meanwhile, Russia and China are exploring ways to reshape their own presence in the region. Please join the CSIS Middle East Program for a conference to examine the Gulf region in the wake of General Qassem Suleimani's death. Two expert panels will explore security threats and new opportunities for diplomacy in the region. General Joseph L. Votel will then deliver a keynote address on Great Power competition in the Gulf, followed by a Q&A moderated by Jon B. Alterman, senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski chair in global security and geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program."
• Panel: New Security Challenges in the Gulf
• Panel: New Openings for Regional Diplomacy
• Keynote Address: Great Power Competition in the Gulf

Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy. February 11, 2020, streaming video, 4:29:36.
“Join us for an event hosted by the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy. The 2020 Conference on Civil-Military Relations will:
• Educate the audience on the history of civil-military relations, particularly the legacies of leadership, cultural change, and policy shifts during wartime;
• Present various dimensions of current civil-military relations debates;
• Engage the audience on questions of who serves, who is expected to serve, and who should serve in U.S. defense and national security, to include debates on the concepts of national service and the ethos of service; and
• Continue to raise questions of leadership, ethics, and morals within military and civilian command, and national service more broadly.”

Dunigan, Molly, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“This report reviews and analyzes assessments of the practices that U.S. federal agencies use to reintegrate civilians following domestic or overseas deployments to high-threat environments. The researchers aim to determine the extent to which such activities vary across the interagency community, and also identify promising practices for such agencies to pursue in the future. The authors leverage interview insights from federal agencies and a review of U.S. military post-deployment reintegration to accomplish these tasks. The authors also draw on U.S. military and Department of Defense civilian policy, programs, and experiences with redeployment to inform future reintegration efforts.”

Government Accountability Office. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, Publicly Released Feb 25, 2020).
"The State Department has expressed a commitment to building a workforce that reflects the diverse composition of the United States. Though State's workforce has grown more diverse, racial or ethnic minorities are still underrepresented, particularly in the senior ranks. Racial or ethnic minorities in State’s Civil Service were 4% to 29% less likely to be promoted than their white coworkers with similar education, occupation, or years of federal service. State should look at the longstanding issues contributing to its diversity problems and do a better job of addressing barriers to equal opportunity in its workforce."

Bliss, Katherine E. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"In June 2020, the United Kingdom will host a pledging conference at which Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, will seek funding to support an ambitious work plan for 2021-2025. Gavi is seeking at least $7.4 billion to reach its goal of delivering more than 3.2 billion doses of routine immunizations to children and families while continuing to fund emergency vaccine stockpiles and support the delivery of the inactivated polio vaccine in eligible countries. The United States, one of the top donors to Gavi, has supported the alliance’s efforts since its inception 20 years ago and made annual commitments of $290 million in FY 2018 and 2019. In promoting health security, contributing to economic development, and engaging implementing countries and the private sector in the move toward fully self-financed immunization programs, Gavi’s work is closely aligned with U.S. interests.
The United States has recently announced a commitment of $1.16 billion to Gavi over four years, essentially sustaining the annual commitments of $290 million through FY 2023. This sends a strong message to other donors, as well as eligible countries, that the United States remains confident in Gavi’s ability to deliver results. To reinforce its support, the United States should also: (1) encourage other donor countries to sustain or even increase their support for Gavi over a multi-year period; (2) identify opportunities to strengthen bilateral engagement on immunization programs, advocacy activities, and the mobilization of domestic resources for vaccines in priority countries; and (3) continue to support Gavi as it navigates the challenges to immunization programs posed by demographic change, urbanization, conflict, and migration over the 2021-2025 period and beyond."

McAuliffe, Marie, and Binod Khadri (eds). (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2019).
"The long-term and growing body of evidence on migration and mobility shows that migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues. As the processes of globalization deepen, these transformations increasingly shape our lives – in our workplaces, in our homes, in our social and spiritual lives – as we go about our daily routines. Increasing numbers of people are able to access information, goods and services from around the world because of the ongoing expansion in distance-shrinking technologies. There is also a sense that we are in the midst of a period of considerable uncertainty. Many commentators have called into question the solidity of aspects of the global political order forged in the immediate aftermath of the two world wars, including as they relate to alliances and common interests. Others are calling this time the 'age of anger', tracing back the current sense of geopolitical uncertainty and discontent to a dominant and relentless focus on 'logic' and 'liberal rationalism' at the expense of emotional responsiveness. It is within this context that this world migration report focuses on developments in migration over the last two-year period, with an emphasis on providing analysis that takes into account historical and contemporary factors. Historical in recognition that migration and displacement occur within broader long-term social, security, political and economic contexts. Contemporary in recognition that we are in the midst of profound global transformations, and that the resultant changes to our daily lives are impacting the current environment in which migration occurs and is discussed."

"Join Kathleen Hicks, senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as she speaks with experts on the most important defense debates in the 2020 U.S. election cycle."

Munich Security Conference Foundation. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2020).
“Is the world becoming less Western? Is the West itself becoming less Western, too? What does it mean for the world if the West leaves the stage to others? What could a joint Western strategy for an era of great power competition look like? The ‘Munich Security Report 2020’ sheds light on the phenomenon that it refers to as ‘Westlessness’ – a widespread feeling of uneasiness and restlessness in the face of increasing uncertainty about the enduring purpose of the West. A multitude of security challenges seem to have become inseparable from what some describe as the decay of the Western project. What is more, Western societies and governments appear to have lost a common understanding of what it even means to be part of the West. Although perhaps the most important strategic challenge for the transatlantic partners, it appears uncertain whether the West can come up with a joint strategy for a new era of great-power competition.”

"The 56th Munich Security Conference took place at Hotel Bayerischer Hof in Munich from February 14 to 16. For three days, Munich was once again at the center of international diplomacy and welcomed world leaders from politics, academia, and civil society."

Samaan, Jean-Loup. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph explores the emerging challenge of nonstate actors’ anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies and their implications for the United States and its allies by looking at two regions, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, with case studies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and separatist groups in Ukraine. The historical monopoly of states over precision-guided munitions has eroded, and this evolution eventually challenges the ability of the most advanced militaries to operate in specific environments. As they gain greater access to advanced military technology, some nonstate actors increasingly lean toward A2/AD strategies. The study underlines three key parameters to assess these emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies: a political shift toward the preservation of status quo vis-à-vis opponents; a focus of military resources dedicated to A2/AD capabilities—primarily missiles and rockets; and the adaptation of military units responsible for the implementation of this new strategy. The development of nonstate A2/AD postures currently remains dependent on the ability of the nonstate actors to attract state sponsorship. Without state sponsorship, these emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies would hardly constitute a major threat. Bearing this precondition in mind, if a scenario of multiple nonstate A2/AD ‘bubbles’ were to unfold, the United States and its allies could face unprecedented challenges, especially in the field of counterterrorism campaigns.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020).
“Members of Congress and Pentagon officials have placed a growing emphasis on U.S. programs to develop hypersonic weapons as a part of an effort to acquire the capability for the United States to launch attacks against targets around the world in under an hour. Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or ‘fleeting targets’ at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but restricted funding for several years. Recently, efforts to develop a long-range prompt strike capability, along with other efforts to develop extremely fast hypersonic weapons, have garnered increased support. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. Officials have argued that the long-range systems would provide a ‘niche’ capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020).
“The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective on the modern battlefield. Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV maybe subject to a high degree of congressional interest.”

McKay, Shawn, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
"This report examines how the U.S. Army can move ahead with the development and integration of automated driving technology for its convoy operations in the near future. Robotic ground vehicles are quickly maturing in the commercial sphere and could potentially save lives and increase efficiency if utilized in Army convoys. However, it may be many years until fully unmanned convoy vehicles are able to operate in rough terrain or manage adversarial attacks. In response, the authors of this report examine different employment concepts of automated trucks in Army convoys that appear viable in the next one to five years and would still reduce soldier casualties. The authors investigate technical and tactical benefits and risks of these concepts. A bridging option, the minimally manned employment concept, leading to the eventual use of a mix of manned and unmanned trucks in a convoy, is developed in this report to address the current technical and tactical risks of concepts requiring use of unmanned, automated trucks in Army convoys."

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The President’s defense budget request for FY2021 does have some important virtues. It does contain a wide variety of important initiatives to improve the readiness and effectiveness of important elements pertaining to each military service, invest in force modernization, and support military personnel. At the same time, however, the Defense Budget Overview begins with the statement that the FY2021 request is a ‘Strategy Driven Budget’ – but few things could be further from the truth. The only ‘strategy’ that is clearly reflected in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) FY2021 request is an effort to provide a justification for the separate spending goals of each military service. The end result turns the budget request into little more than an ‘Oliver Twist Strategy,’ in which each military service asks for more money – a major component of the DoD’s defense-wide efforts – without meaningfully addressing the major strategic problems and challenges that the United States will face over the coming decade. The DoD’s FY2021 budget request abandons virtually all of the past efforts to create an effective planning, programming, and budgeting system. It has devolved into a classic ‘input’-driven budget that focuses on meeting the spending goals of each military service without addressing the net assessments of threats, the role of strategic partners and allies, or the resulting levels of deterrence and war fighting capability.”

Pezard, Stephanie, and Ashley L. Rhoades. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“Deterrence presents an inherent dilemma: While it seeks to prevent aggression, a deterrent effort that is too heavy-handed or appears to represent an existential threat to the potential aggressor might prompt that precise response. In the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia relations, deterring without provoking requires an understanding of what Russia considers to be ‘redlines,’ defined as those triggers that Russian leadership claims cannot be crossed without provoking a major or hostile response on their part. The authors of this Perspective provide a better understanding of what provokes Putin's Russia. They identify Russia's claimed redlines before examining those developments that prompted Russia to escalate a dispute in the past and comparing them with the identified redlines. Next, they analyze how current and future deterrence efforts on the part of the United States and NATO might collide with Russian stated interests and cross these redlines. The authors find that predicting Russian reactions to U.S. and NATO movements is a challenging exercise, as some claimed redlines have proven not to be redlines at all, while in other cases, actions taken by the United States and its allies have triggered unexpectedly strong Russian responses. Overall, changes in force posture seem to hold the most potential for effective deterrence if carefully calibrated to minimize the risks of provoking Russia.”

Charap, Samuel, et al. (eds). (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“Disputes over the regional order in post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia are at the core of the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West and have created major security and economic challenges for the states caught in between: first and foremost Ukraine, but also Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Current policy approaches toward the regional order — i.e., the set of rules, norms, and institutions that govern the region — have exacerbated today's disorder and instability. The authors of this volume offer a comprehensive proposal for revising the regional order. The proposal, which addresses the security architecture, economic integration, and regional conflicts, was devised by three groups of experts convened by the RAND Corporation and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung's Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe. Each group included representatives from the West, Russia, and the states in between them. The approach proposed by the authors would boost regional security, facilitate increased prosperity, and better manage the long-standing conflicts in the region while increasing the chances of settling them. The revised order would thus limit the major-power confrontation in the region, stabilizing the overall competition between Russia and the West. Most importantly, the proposal would not cross any state's declared red lines, and thus might plausibly be acceptable to all of them. This vision for an alternative future would represent a significant improvement over the status quo.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 6, 2020, streaming video, 3:53:50
“In November 2018, the Department of Justice unveiled the China Initiative, which was established to fulfill the Department’s strategic priority of confronting national security threats presented by the People’s Republic of China, with a particular emphasis placed on the policies and practices that seek to challenge U.S. technological and scientific leadership. This half-day event brings together high-level officials from the U.S. government, private industry and academia, to discuss the most timely and relevant issues regarding the Department of Justice’s efforts to counter this economic malfeasance.”

Pfaff, C. Anthony. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“The United States has spent—and continues to spend—billions of dollars building Iraq’s military capabilities. Despite that fact, Iraq’s military performance, even after wresting control of its territory from the Islamic State, remains inconsistent at best. A survey of Iraqi military history suggests a pattern of strengths, weaknesses, and performance that includes courageous soldiers, cohesive units, incompetent leaders, divided loyalties, poor combat support, and weak institutions that have, on occasion, risen to the defense challenge. If the United States is going to be more successful in developing Iraqi military capabilities, it will need to change its approach to better account for the Iraqi Army’s culture, history, and political environment.
The United States will also have to be clear regarding the purpose of this cooperation. Security cooperation with Iraq is not just about defeating the Islamic State or other terrorist groups. The United States stands to gain when Iraq can play a constructive security role as an accepted member of the broader regional and international community. Iran cannot get the Iraqi military to that point, but the United States can. Thus, the long-term goal of US security cooperation with Iraq should be to establish its military as a valuable security partner, capable of participating in regional security arrangements, much in the same way Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Oman does. Of course, getting to that point depends on political developments the United States has limited ability to influence, much less control. Having said that, continued, steady engagement emphasizing the critical areas of development should serve to set conditions for meaningful improvement when political and social conditions permit. While no single measure is going to improve the Iraqi Army, taken together, the right combination give the Iraqi Army a chance to achieve a ‘tipping point’ that enables the kind of reform that can allow it to get beyond its historic limitations.”

Frederick, Bryan, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“In the aftermath of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, and with increasing tensions in the U.S.-China strategic competition, the question of whether U.S. overseas military presence can enhance deterrence remains central. At the same time, U.S. overseas military commitments are increasingly coming under question at home, both among the public at large and among many foreign- and defense-policy elites. This report provides empirical evidence on the deterrent effects of U.S. overseas military forces. It investigates how these effects might vary by the type, size, and location of these forces. The analyses provide the clearest evidence in support of the deterrent effect of heavy ground forces, particularly when deployed near but not directly bordering potential adversaries. The analyses show that the more mobile forces are, the less evidence there is of a deterrent effect. The report also assesses the effects of the deployment of U.S. forces during crises, finding that, although they can help avoid escalation and maintain the status quo, they are not necessarily well suited to altering the long-term strategic dynamics between states.”

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2019).
“The NIDS China Security Report is published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) to provide analysis conducted by its researchers on China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. The report is widely disseminated both in Japan and overseas. Since March 2011 it has been published annually in Japanese, Chinese, and English editions. The NIDS China Security Report has attracted significant interest from research institutions and the media in Japan and abroad, and the analysis offered in these reports has allowed NIDS to promote exchange and dialogue with research institutions and interested parties in a number of countries, including China.”

Bitounis, Leah, and Jonathon Price (eds).
“Between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei’s expansion of 5G network capabilities around the world, the opportunity for the United States to maintain its preeminent role in the fields of global infrastructure development, technology, and the economy is being challenged. The U.S. and China are competing for military power and positioning in the Indo-Pacific, on trade, for technological power, and in an ongoing debate about democracy versus authoritarianism. At the same time, the countries need to work with each other on climate change, stabilizing the global economy, and other issues. Can we learn simultaneously to compete and cooperate? Our goal over the summer was to begin a process of addressing these complicated questions and to help define a new policy with respect to the U.S. relationship with China. We began our conversations in Aspen with the central query: How do we get a clear-sighted view of China that doesn’t underestimate or overestimate it and allows us to develop a strategy without potentially disastrous historical aftereffects? This compilation captures our resulting conversations and policy recommendations. We hope your assumptions will be challenged and your understandings broadened through your reading of these papers, as ours were.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“This is the second CSIS Brief in a series called ‘Getting to Less,’ which explores different philosophies and motivations that could lead to a decreased emphasis on U.S. defense ends, ways, or means. In this brief, the authors discuss a strategy they have labeled the Innovation Superiority Strategy. The strategy is guided by a focus on achieving enduring American military advantage in the U.S.-China security competition. In orienting Department of Defense investments toward this goal, the strategy bets big on innovation efforts to create a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The authors explore likely changes that such a strategy might entail. The brief concludes by exploring the risks and opportunities associated with the Innovation Superiority Strategy.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“This is the third CSIS Brief in a series called ‘Getting to Less,’ which explores different philosophies and motivations that could lead to a decreased emphasis on U.S. defense ends, ways, or means. In this brief, the authors explore a defense approach they have labeled the Progressive Values Strategy. The strategy is grounded in a view that the military instrument is not well suited to meeting many of the security challenges facing the United States. Rather than seek military primacy, which only diverts resources and attention from more constructive statecraft solutions, the United States should strive for a level of military sufficiency that deters adventurism by others—as well as itself. The authors explore likely changes that such a strategy might entail. The brief concludes by exploring the risks and opportunities associated with the Progressive Values Strategy.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"This is the final CSIS Brief in a series called 'Getting to Less.' The series explores different philosophies and motivations that could lead to a decreased emphasis on U.S. defense ends, ways, or means. In this brief, the authors discuss a strategy that they have labeled the Minimal Exposure Strategy. The strategy’s core premise is that the United States is largely secure from military threats due to continental U.S. geography and the deterrent quality of its nuclear and other strategic capabilities. Moreover, the strategy holds that U.S. military adventurism abroad creates signif icant costs and risks. Accordingly, the Minimal Exposure Strategy attempts to scale down the size and operational scope of the U.S. military. The CSIS authors explore likely changes that such a strategy might entail. The brief concludes by exploring the risks and opportunities associated with the Minimal Exposure Strategy. "

Brannen, Samuel J., et al.
“In an era of global technological competition and diffusion of innovation, the United States must uphold the twin pillars of national security and national innovation. The overall success of the U.S. federal government in emerging technologies governance is at best a mixed case and is overall inadequate to the scale and stakes of the challenges and opportunities ahead. This report assesses the current effectiveness of the U.S. federal government approach to emerging technologies with recommended actions to enhance governance in domestic and international contexts.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies
January 24, 2020, streaming video, 1:55:30
"In an era of global technological competition and diffusion of innovation, the United States must uphold the twin pillars of national security and national innovation. There is a clear need for greater cooperation and engagement on the challenge set within government; between federal, state, and local levels; between governments; and between the public and private sectors. By recognizing its comparative strengths and weaknesses, the United States federal government can take measured steps that increase its chances of success and guard against risks.
CSIS’s Global Security Forum focuses on the challenges that emerging technologies pose to U.S. security and the policy priorities needed. The event will feature a keynote address from Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and the launch of a new report highlighting insights from the 2019 GSF Experts’ Workshop and actionable recommendations to inform a more effective U.S. federal government approach to emerging technologies."

Chatham House, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
"Council of Councils global perspectives roundups gather opinions from experts on major international developments. In this edition, members of four leading global think tanks offer their perspectives on the regional and global impact of the United Kingdom’s January 31 departure from the European Union.
When the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU), few expected that the ensuing negotiations would take over three years and trigger two general elections. Disagreement over the extent of and timeline for the UK’s separation from the bloc continued through the end of 2019. Only after the UK Conservative Party’s landslide victory in December did the path forward become clear. While the UK will formally leave the EU on January 31, 2020, it now enters a transition period during which it will remain in the EU’s customs union and single market until their future relationship is hashed out. Still, the Friday exit undoubtedly marks a new chapter in the Brexit saga."

Center for Strategic & International Studies
February 3, 2020, streaming video, 57:51
"At 11:00 PM on January 31st, the UK will formally withdraw from the European Union. How will the UK's foreign and security policy change? What security challenges will it prioritize? And will leaving the European Union bring the UK closer to the United States?
Please join us for a conversation with former UK Secretary of State for Defense (2010-2011), former Secretary of State for International Trade (2016-2019), and Conservative MP from North Somerset Dr. Liam Fox. Dr. Fox will offer his reflections on the vitally important role NATO must play in the future, the role of values in national security, the security challenges that Russia and China pose to the UK, the impact of cyber warfare, and the role of non-state actors and proxy groups in fueling future conflicts."

O'Rourke, Ronald, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated January 22, 2020).
“The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights… Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., and Joseph P. Federici. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This CSIS Brief is the first in a series that explores the contours and implications of strategies that might reduce the U.S. military’s mission space through greater constraints on its ends, ways, or means. Some analysts argue that America’s post-Cold War foreign policy has not made the country any safer, has needlessly cost lives, and has been too expensive. They argue instead for a more restrained approach. This first brief explores seven intellectual strains that argue for lessened objectives, more efficient ways, or decreased resources for the U.S. defense enterprise. The brief’s purpose is to inform active debates over the role of the United States in the world and over the role of the military in U.S. national security policy.”

Defense Intelligence Agency. (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019.)
“In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of the major foreign military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on Iran’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure, and capability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, our leaders, the national security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.”

Blackwill, Robert D. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“The Trump administration recognizes the China challenge, but it needs a grand strategy. Blackwill recommends decisive action, sustained diplomacy, collaboration among branches of the U.S. government, and working with allies in Asia and Europe, among other approaches.”

“Panel I: Politics and Leadership
Panel II: Security
Panel III: Economics and Trade”

Tang, Siew Mun, et al. (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS [Institute of Southeast Asian Studies]-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020).
“For the second year running, the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute conducted ‘The State of Southeast Asia’ survey from 12 November to 1 December 2019. A total of 1,308 respondents from the ten ASEAN member states participated in the 2020 edition of the survey, which seeks to understand the perceptions of Southeast Asians on regional affairs and ASEAN’s engagements with its Dialogue Partners, especially the major powers…The survey has eight sections: (1) background of respondents, (2) regional security outlook, (3) major powers’ regional influence and leadership, (4) geo- economics and regional integration, (5) geopolitics and regional architecture, (6) China and US’ engagements with the region, (7) perceptions of trust, and (8) soft power. The survey contains 58 questions, of which 18 touch on ‘baseline’ issues which were included in last year’s survey. The remaining 40 questions, which are highlighted in the report with an asterisk (*), address new issues for the regional discourse in 2020. The findings for the ‘baseline’ questions for the preceding and current years are presented side-by-side to facilitate comparative analysis. We have also taken the liberty to rearrange the ordering of the questions and organise them under new headings to improve the report’s clarity and cohesion. For the purpose of readability, the figures in this report are rounded up or down to the nearest one decimal point.”

Mecklin, John (ed.) (Chicago, IL: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2020).
“Humanity continues to face two simultaneous existential dangers—nuclear war and climate change—that are compounded by a threat multiplier, cyber-enabled information warfare, that undercuts society’s ability to respond…The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board today [January 23, 2020] moves the Doomsday Clock 20 seconds closer to midnight—closer to apocalypse than ever. In so doing, board members are explicitly warning leaders and citizens around the world that the international security situation is now more dangerous than it has ever been, even at the height of the Cold War.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2020).
“The 15th edition of the ‘World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report’ is published as critical risks are manifesting. The global economy is facing an increased risk of stagnation, climate change is striking harder and more rapidly than expected, and fragmented cyberspace threatens the full potential of next-generation technologies — all while citizens worldwide protest political and economic conditions and voice concerns about systems that exacerbate inequality. The challenges before us demand immediate collective action, but fractures within the global community appear to only be widening. Stakeholders need to act quickly and with purpose within an unsettled global landscape.”

Llewellyn, Viola, et al. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2020).
“As 2020 begins, it is important to reflect on the top developments that occurred in Africa, in U.S.-Africa relations, and in Africa's role in the global arena over the past year. The Wilson Center Africa Program continued its annual tradition of asking practitioners, experts, and policymakers to weigh in on the most important and impactful developments of 2019 for the continent, and their implications for U.S.-Africa relations. They responded with the brief and insightful essays in this volume.”

Atlantic Council's YouTube channel, 21 videos.
"The Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum has become the go-to conference on the geopolitics of the energy transformation, where energy and foreign policy leaders come together to set the energy agenda for the year and examine the longer-term geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the changing energy system. The 2020 iteration of the forum will focus on three key themes: the role of the oil and gas industry in the energy transition, financing the future of energy, and interconnections in a new era of geopolitics. The forum’s regional footprint will also expand to emphasize increasing energy demand in South and Southeast Asia."

McInnis, Kathleen J. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020).

Katzman, Kenneth, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2020).

Jones, Seth G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).

McCall, Stephen M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020).

Beyoghlow, Kamal A. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph analyzes the current political tensions between the United States and Turkey and suggests ways to manage them. The two countries have been strategic allies since at least the end of World War II—Turkey became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and participated with its military forces in the Korea War, and during the Cold War protected NATO’s southern flank against Soviet communism, and Turkey’s military and intelligence services maintained close relationships with their Western and Israeli counterparts. These relationships were not without problems, due mostly to differences over minority and civil rights in Turkey and over Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1973 and continued tensions with Greece. The special relationship with the United States was put to the final test after the Islamic conservative populist political party, Justice and Development, and its current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came to power in 2002. Turkey opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO-backed regime change in Libya in 2011. Most recently, Turkey has had strained relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel—all key US allies—and has alienated the US Congress and select NATO members further by its October 2019 invasion of Syria against Kurdish forces aligned with the US military against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, all against a background of a military rapprochement with Russia. This monograph highlights differences between US agencies concerning Turkey and ways to reconcile them, and offers several policy recommendations for new directions.”

Missile Defense Project. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified January 7, 2020).
“The People’s Republic of China is in the process of building and deploying a sophisticated and modern missile arsenal, though one shrouded in secrecy due to intentional ambiguity and unwillingness to enter arms control or other transparency agreements. Beijing features its missiles most prominently in its developing anti-access/area denial doctrines, which use a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air, land and sea to target U.S. and U.S. allied military assets in the Asia-Pacific theater. China is also developing a number of advanced capabilities such as maneuverable anti-ship ballistic missiles, MIRVs, and hypersonic glide vehicles. The combination of these trends degrade the survivability of foundational elements of American power projection like the aircraft carrier and forward air bases. China also has a relatively small but developing contingent of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. homeland, as well as a growing fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2020).
“The Trump Administration outlined its desire to produce a low-yield version of the W76 warhead in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It cited the need for additional ‘tailored’ and ‘flexible’ capabilities to address the danger of coercive nuclear use, a concept described below, by Russia and North Korea. The NPR stated that this warhead would supplement existing U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities to ‘enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies,’ and that low-yield warheads would not add to the number of deployed SLBM warheads, but would replace some ‘higher-yield [SLBM warheads] currently deployed.’ The NPR report, and its argument in favor of a low-yield SLBM warhead, launched a debate among U.S. experts about the rationale for the development of such a warhead and the benefits and risks that might accrue from its deployment. While some argue that this warhead is a response to Russia’s so-called ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy that will strengthen deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold, others contend that it will lower the threshold for U.S. use and increase the risk of nuclear war.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference. January 8, 2020, streaming video, 1:52:53.
“Strategic Japan draws on the newest research from Japanese scholars to inform the policy debate in Washington. This year, the CSIS Japan Chair has invited four scholars to examine Japan’s leadership role in international and regional institutions and avenues for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the future.”
Panel I: Japan’s Leadership Role in Regional Institutions
Panel II: Japan’s Leadership Role in Global Institutions

“Working papers by Japanese experts on potential areas for enhanced cooperation between the United States and Japan.”

Mix, Derek E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020).
“Beyond trade, negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship are expected to seek a comprehensive partnership covering issues including security, foreign policy, energy, and data sharing. Negotiations are also expected to address the numerous other areas related to the broader economic relationship, such as financial services regulation, environmental and social standards, transportation, and aviation. Officials and analysts have expressed doubts that such comprehensive negotiations can be concluded within 11 months. The two sides could temporarily address some areas, such as road transportation and aviation, through side deals granting interim provisions. The revised protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland would come into effect with ratification of the withdrawal agreement, and its provisions would begin to apply at the end of the transition period. Observers have questioned how exactly the revised protocol will be implemented, including where and how customs checks will take place. Such issues are to be decided by the Joint Committee (of UK and EU officials) during the transition period. Implementation is likely to remain a work in progress. Both parties seek to protect the Good Friday Agreement, while the EU seeks to safeguard its single market and the UK seeks to preserve its constitutional integrity.”

Stares, Paul B. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“Each year since 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action (CPA) asks foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on how likely they are to occur or escalate in the next year, and their possible impact on U.S. interests. This year, ‘perhaps as an indication of rising concern about the state of the world, respondents rated more threats as likely to require a U.S. military response for 2020 than in any other Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS) from the last eleven years,’ notes Paul B. Stares, CPA director and General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention. ‘Of the thirty conflicts in this year’s survey, only two were judged as having a low likelihood of occurring in 2020.’”

Alden, Edward, et al. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“In 2019, a number of significant patterns emerged or continued across the world. The editors asked seven CFR scholars to share the charts, graphs, and maps that offer a window into the future, looking at issues such as Asia’s aging societies and Africa’s housing crunch.”

Reagan Foundation YouTube Playlist.
“RNDF [Reagan National Defense Forum] is a bipartisan annual event held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. Key stakeholders come together to address the health of our national defense and to promote policies to strengthen the U.S. military”
Panel 1 — What Americans Think: Public Opinion on Defense & National Security Going Into 2020
Fireside 1 Chat — Training and Equipping the Joint Force to Execute the National Defense Strategy
Fireside 2 Chat — Conversation with Jeff Bezos Founder, Amazon, & Blue Origin
Panel 2 — Understanding and Leveraging the National Security Innovation Base
Panel 3 — Defense Transformation: Evolution or Revolution?
Keynote Address — The Honorable Mark Esper, U.S. Secretary Of Defense
Panel 4 —Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence: Modernizing the Triad and Sustaining Arms Control In a Post-INF World
Panel 5 — Harnessing and Securing American Innovation: How Venture Capital Impacts Defense
Panel 6 — U.S.-China Relations after the Trade War: Impacts for National Security and Defense
Panel 7 — Next Steps In Space: Launching America’s Sixth Military Branch
Panel 8 — The Technological Cold War? How Open and Closed Societies Compete In the 21st Century
Panel 9 — Advancing U.S. National Defense: Working with Allies and Partners
Panel 10 — From Syria to China: The Role of Freedom and Democracy in Defense Policy
Closing Session — The Honorable Robert O’Brien, U.S. National Security Advisor
Peace through Strength Award Dinner - 2019 Reagan National Defense Forum

December 04, 2019, streaming video, 2:45:00.
“The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. ChinaPower's annual conference features leading experts from both China and the U.S. to debate core issues underpinning the nature of Chinese power.”
Proposition: If Beijing and Taipei do not come to an agreement on unification by 2035, China will use military force to invade Taiwan.
Proposition: Beijing is seeking to export the Chinese development model.
Proposition: A technology Cold War between the United States and China will lead to separate spheres of technology influence.
Proposition: The US economy is better positioned than China’s to weather a long-term trade conflict.
Proposition: Xi Jinping will face a leadership challenge by 2025.

Glaser, Bonnie S., Matthew P. Funaiole, and Hunter Marston. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Ongoing geopolitical shifts are placing increased pressure on the rules-based international order that has facilitated decades of growth and development across the Indo-Pacific. The United States and Taiwan have responded by redoubling their respective commitments to the region. Leaders in both Washington and Taipei recognize that securing freedom and openness across this vast geographic space is essential for maintaining peace and promoting prosperity across the region. The United States has advanced its vision for the region through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which is founded on—and aims to protect—common principles that have benefitted all countries in the region. Taiwan upholds the same principles and has a similar vision for the Indo-Pacific. To this end, Taipei is implementing the New Southbound Policy (NSP), which seeks to leverage its cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic assets to strengthen Taiwan’s relations across the Indo-Pacific.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Shannon McKeown. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is the most important development institution in the Asia-Pacific region, addressing regional development problems using financing in the form of grants, loans, and advisory services. The ADB is one of two Asian regional development banks, the other being the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Both banks occupy the same space, have cofinanced numerous projects, and are subject to the economic volatility of the U.S.-Chinese trade war…The ADB’s vision for the Asia-Pacific seeks to address the region’s growing needs with efforts to make it more prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable. The key areas of operational focus include tackling social and gender inequalities, developing sustainable and quality infrastructure, mitigating and adapting to climate change, improving institutional capacity of governments, and furthering regional integration. The vision also seeks to improve and expand the ADB’s existing capabilities, as the creation of the AIIB has spurred the ADB to revamp its relevance and protocols and was among the developments that contributed to Strategy 2030. This policy brief discusses the ADB’s current role in the region and makes recommendations to shape the institution’s future operations.”

Balfour, Rosa. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The United Kingdom is holding elections in which polarized political leaders claim to represent the people against the elite. As British-based Turkish novelist Elif Shafak recently noted, this inflammatory language has been the soundtrack accompanying the deterioration of democracy around Europe, Brexit is emblematic of a generalized complacency about the strength of European democracies, and not just the product of the United Kingdom’s politics. It is also symptomatic of a new European fissiparousness that is likely to accelerate further fragmentation across the continent, also as a consequence of Brexit. Improving the health of its democracies will be critical if Europe wants to offer an alternative to the global disorder, power politics, and illiberalism that are taking hold.”

Conley, Heather A., Allie Renison, and Kati Suominen. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The United States and the United Kingdom are the world’s leading exporters of digitally-delivered services, and much of their trade is with each other. Both countries have increasingly been using foundational technologies, from blockchain to artificial intelligence, to perfect new applications and transform old processes. The potential for a vibrant and vast digital trade relationship is very exciting. What would a positive and far-reaching policy roadmap to facilitate and expand digital trade between the United States and the United Kingdom look like? This report offers a policy roadmap for a future digital trade agenda, tailored to two like-minded technology heavyweights who are massive users of e-commerce, data, and digital services. We conclude that the United States and the United Kingdom should be ambitious in furthering their bilateral digital trade agenda. To this end, they should use bilateral dialogues and any future free trade agreement to significantly expand digital trade volumes between the United States and the United Kingdom; establish new cooperation to accelerate the development of new technologies and the formation of new technology companies; and fuel the use of crucial technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, which have the potential to transform countless industries.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Christopher Metzger. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"Many countries around the world have large populations of impoverished people and high unemployment rates. In order to improve conditions in these countries, national governments must develop effective economic growth strategies with strengthening the creative industries at the forefront. The international community is only just beginning to recognize the socioeconomic potential of creative and cultural industries (CCIs), such as film, fashion, and music. The creative economy represents the trade of creative goods and services and grew at an average rate of 14 percent between 2002 and 2008, even during the 2008 global financial crisis. CCIs are more resilient to economic shocks and were not damaged by the 12 percent drop in global trade to the same degree as other sectors, such as manufacturing. Creative industries also produce non-rival goods that can be consumed locally or exported. Developing and developed countries around the world should invest further in creative industries to diversify their economies, reduce poverty, and create jobs for young people."

(Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019).
“Since 2000, the OECD has been evaluating the knowledge and skills of the world’s 15-year-olds through its Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey. Around 600,000 students in 79 countries and economies completed the test in 2018, representing about 32 million 15-year-olds…PISA 2018 covered reading, science and mathematics - with the main focus on reading. PISA results reveal what is possible in education by showing what students in the highest-performing and most rapidly improving education systems can do.”

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019).

Belkin, Paul. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2019).
“Heads of state and government from NATO’s 29 member states are scheduled to meet in London, United Kingdom (UK) on December 3-4, 2019; they last met in Brussels, Belgium, in July2018. Two key goals for the meeting will be to commemorate the alliance’s past achievements—2019 marks NATO’s 70th anniversary—and to advance efforts to address new and emerging security challenges, including renewed Russian aggression, terrorism, and cyber and hybrid threats. The meeting also could expose heightened political tension within the alliance and divergent views on a range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, relations with NATO member Turkey, and relations with Russia. NATO and U.S. officials have said they expect the following key deliverables from the London Leaders’ Meeting:
• Completion of a new Readiness Initiative, under which the alliance would have at its disposal 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.
• Declaration of space as a new operational domain for NATO and advances in combatting cyber and hybrid threats, including establishing new baseline requirements for telecommunications infrastructure.
• Increased defense spending by European allies and Canada.
• Renewed commitment to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa.
• Agreement to assess China’s impact on NATO and transatlantic security.
• Progress on finalizing North Macedonia’s accession to NATO.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Max Molot. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“NATO’s current burden sharing goals totally ignore military needs and effectiveness, and merely call for spending 2% of GDP on total defense spending levels, and at least 20% of annual defense expenditure on major new equipment. Such goals may seem simple, and it may seem hard to argue that more spending does not have benefits. This only begins to make sense, however, if one ignores any concern with what the added money buys. There are no serious aspects of life, however, where spending more is a substitute for spending wisely. The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a new report that examines the practical and mathematical weaknesses of these goals in detail…The analysis shows that NATO heads of state, Ministers, and parliaments/legislatures do not properly examine the priorities that would emerge from net assessments of the balance or on improving NATO’s capability to deter and fight. They fail to focus effectively on its many individual national problems and issues in strength and readiness, and they have failed to create coherent force and modernization plans for the future. Worse, this report presents considerable quantitative evidence that NATO’s current burdensharing goals actually focus the Alliance on the wrong objectives, and do so in ways that encourage pointless burden–sharing debates over the wrong objectives.”

Simón, Luis. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“Over the past two decades, discussions on EU-NATO relations have been closely associated with crisis-management operations and transnational threats. But that is yesterday’s world. The return of great-power competition is eliciting a shift in European security and transatlantic relations toward deterrence and defense. As such the conceptual framework that has so far underpinned debates on EU-NATO relations has been, by and large, rendered obsolete. The return of great-power competition and growing uncertainty about the United States' commitment to Europe have led to renewed calls to turn the EU into an autonomous pole in global politics. Some even toy with the notion of European equidistance in a global context that is increasingly defined by Sino-American competition. At the same time, the EU’s need to give its global role security and a transatlantic anchor underlines the potential of a more structured EU-NATO dialogue.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 21, 2019, streaming video, 6:07:25. Program begins about 8:19.
"In partnership with the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDU), CSIS is pleased to invite you to the eighth annual Transatlantic Forum on Russia. This year's conference will examine transatlantic policy towards Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova five years after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and military incursion into eastern Ukraine. The Transatlantic Forum on Russia is part of a broader effort to formulate an enduring transatlantic policy framework towards Russia, with an examination of regional security, political, and economic developments."

O'Rourke, Ronald, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2019).
“The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 18, 2019, streaming video, 3:29:36.
“The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) cordially invite you to ‘China’s Maritime Ambitions in the First Island Chain and Beyond.’
Agenda:
• East China Sea
• South China Sea
• Pacific Islands
• Implications for Regional Policy Coordination”

Gnanarajah, Raj. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2019).
“DOD completed its first-ever agency-wide financial audit in FY2018and recently completed its FY2019 audit. As expected, DOD received an agency-wide disclaimer of opinion from the DOD IG in both audits—meaning auditors could not express an opinion on the department’s financial statements because the financial information was not sufficiently reliable. DOD has stated it could take up to 10 years to receive a clean audit opinion. Some reasons for a disclaimer of opinion can include inadequate internal controls (i.e., a series of integrated actions that management uses to guide operations), financial statements not conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), insufficient property and inventory records, and financial management systems that do not provide sufficient evidence for the auditor to express an opinion…After describing what a financial audit entails, this report examines the FY2018 audit in detail and addresses several issues for Congress, including the audit’s cost (approximately $413 million in FY2018) and the challenges the material weaknesses identified in the FY2018 audit may create for congressional oversight of DOD.”

Morrison, J. Stephen, Kelly Ayotte, and Julie Gerberding. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“When health crises strike—measles, MERS, Zika, dengue, Ebola, pandemic flu—and the American people grow alarmed, the U.S. government springs into action. But all too often, when the crisis fades and fear subsides, urgency morphs into complacency. Investments dry up, attention shifts, and a false sense of security takes hold. The CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security urges the U.S. government to replace the cycle of crisis and complacency that has long plagued health security preparedness with a doctrine of continuous prevention, protection, and resilience. Such a strategic approach can restore U.S. leadership, strengthen financing and the speed of response, foster resilient health systems abroad, enhance the U.S. government’s ability to operate in disordered settings, and accelerate select technological innovations to secure the future.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Christopher Metzger. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Issue
• Providing clean water and sanitation will be one of the greatest global challenges over the next decade due to population growth and urbanization. Today, 785 million people lack access to clean drinking water, and over 2 billion lack access to a toilet.
• Additional sources of finance are needed in order to reduce the investment gap for water and sanitation programs. The World Bank estimates that current investment levels will need to at least triple in order to meet Sustainable Development Goal 6, which aims to ensure that people in all countries have access to sustainable water and sanitation.
• Through development agencies like USAID and OPIC, the United States can leverage additional private capital and increase the efficiency of existing water and sanitation programs. Reducing conflicts over water and ensuring stability in developing countries benefits U.S. development, security, and economic interests abroad.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).
“The relationship between the United States and China has seen its ups and downs over the years. This year, 2019, has been one of the most tumultuous. Early in the year, many had hopes that negotiators would successfully conclude a trade deal that would address longstanding concerns about China’s unfair trade practices and industrial policy, and set the trajectory of bilateral relations for years to come. Instead, the year was dominated by a breakdown in talks, followed by escalations and setbacks. The year looks set to conclude with the clash over China’s trade-distorting practices mostly unresolved and the broader political, technological, and security differences between the two sides solidifying into prolonged strategic competition.
The U.S.-China trade tensions have come at a bad time for Beijing. General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders face multiple internal and external challenges. On the economic front, Beijing is struggling to deliver economic growth—a key pillar of its legitimacy… Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the economic domain… In the Commission’s first hearing for 2019, we looked specifically at ‘Beijing’s Internal and External Challenges,’ where expert witnesses attested to the CCP’s growing unease over perceptions of its weakening political authority and legitimacy at home, China’s geopolitical setbacks abroad, and military shortfalls.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).
“Comprehensive list of the Commission’s recommendations.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).
The full report.

Schneider-Petsinger, Marianne, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2019).
“The current dispute between the US and China goes far beyond trade tariffs and tit-for-tat reprisals: the underlying driver is a race for global technological supremacy. This paper examines the risks of greater strategic competition as well as potential solutions for mitigating the impacts of the US–China economic confrontation.”

Chatham House. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2019).
“At a time of geopolitical uncertainty and with multilateralism under pressure, this conference brought together diverse actors to explore the evolving role of international law on critical security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific. From trade agreements to deep-sea mining, cyberwarfare to territorial disputes, the breadth of the discussion illustrated the growing reach of international law in the region. Hosted by the International Law Programme and the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House on 27 March 2019, the conference focused on three themes: trade and investment, maritime security and governance, and emerging security challenges. What trends are emerging in terms of engagement with international law in the region, and how can international standards play a greater role in encouraging collaboration and reducing tensions? And, with the eastward shift in geopolitical power, how will Asia-Pacific states shape the future of international law?”

Small, Andrew. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“Transatlantic cooperation on Asia, and on China in particular, is still characterized by missed opportunities and self-imposed obstacles. Yet it would be a mistake to underplay the constructive developments that have occurred during the Trump administration. At the working level, a great deal of groundwork has now been laid for the joint efforts that will be necessary on a range of Asia policy issues.”

Black, David. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The global prospects for democratization and democracy assistance are worse than at any time in several decades due to the culmination of six trends: a backlash against democracy assistance, disillusionment with the Western model of liberal democracy, increasingly resilient authoritarianism, efforts by Russia to undermine democratic institutions and development, China’s alternative development model, and the spread of ‘digital authoritarian’ technology. Democracy assistance has been adapting to these trends, but proponents of democracy are being outpaced by those who seek to undermine democracy or promote alternative models that are less sustainable, just, or equitable.”

Katzman, Kenneth. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2019).
“Successive Administrations have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran’s behavior. U.S. sanctions, including ‘secondary sanctions’ on firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran, have adversely affected Iran’s economy but have had little observable effect on Iran’s pursuit of core strategic objectives such as its support for regional armed factions and its development of ballistic and cruise missiles.”

McCormick, Rhys, Gregory Sanders, and Andrew P. Hunter. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Future Vertical Lift, the Army’s effort to develop a new generation of vertical lift systems, is one of its top modernization priorities. As part of this effort, the Army is pioneering the use of a combination of acquisition approaches that depart from the traditional defense acquisition system. Given the novelty of this approach, there are significant questions about the long-term affordability, sustainability, and industry dynamics of the Army’s approach. This report characterizes and assess the Army’s approach to vertical lift modernization; identifies long-term issues relating to programmatic, sustainment, and portfolio costs; and clarifies the long-term affordability implications of the Army’s portfolio approach to vertical lift modernization.”

Hersman, Rebecca, and Suzanne Claeys. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Chemical weapons are back. Today, old actors are employing new forms of chemical weapons, and new chemical weapons (CW) states are employing them in new ways. Meanwhile crude forms of chemical weapons have fallen within the reach of non-state actors. The willingness of some state and non-state actors to use or acquire chemical weapons appears to have increased, and the potential for state or non-state actors to field CW capabilities is growing rapidly. Unless the international nonproliferation regime can adapt to address the threat of chemical weapons, these concerning trends will almost certainly intensify in the foreseeable future as proliferation networks and emerging technologies with CW implications mature. This study examines the evolving and changing nature of chemical weapons and how the system of restraint—comprised of norms, taboos, deterrence, and denial of benefit—must adapt to ensure that the proliferation and use of chemical weapons do not reemerge as endemic features of the global security landscape. The study provides a framework for structuring the problem, identifies gaps and challenges, and puts forward options for improving the global effort to prevent the proliferation and use of these weapons.”

Wood, Dakota L. (ed.) (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2019).
“Each year, The Heritage Foundation’s ‘Index of U.S. Military Strength’ employs a standardized, consistent set of criteria, accessible both to government officials and to the American public, to gauge the U.S. military’s ability to perform its missions in today’s world. The inaugural 2015 edition established a baseline assessment on which each annual edition builds, assessing the state of affairs for its respective year and measuring how key factors have changed from the previous year. The ‘Index of U.S. Military Strength’ assesses the ease or difficulty of operating in key regions based on existing alliances, regional political stability, the presence of U.S. military forces, and the condition of key infrastructure. Threats are assessed based on the behavior and physical capabilities of actors that pose challenges to U.S. vital national interests. The condition of America’s military power is measured in terms of its capability or modernity, capacity for operations, and readiness to handle assigned missions successfully. This framework provides a single-source reference for policymakers and other Americans who seek to know whether our military power is up to the task of defending our national interests.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Many observers have concluded that the post-Cold War era of international relations—an era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and that was sometimes also referred to as the unipolar moment, with the United States as the unipolar power—began to fade in 2006-2008, and that by 2014, the international environment had shifted to a fundamentally different situation of renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. The shift to renewed great power competition was acknowledged in the Obama Administration’s June 2015 National Military Strategy, and more fully in the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia. DOD officials have identified countering China’s military capabilities as DOD’s top priority. The shift to renewed great power competition has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was prior to 2014, leading to a reduced relative emphasis in the conversation on counterterrorist operations (although such operations continue),and to anew or renewed emphasis in the conversation on
• grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense issues;
• nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;
• new U.S. military service operational concepts;
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
• capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia;
• maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons;
• innovation and speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy;
• mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia;•supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on components, subcomponents, materials, and software from Russia and China; and
• capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs should respond to the shift in the international environment from the post-Cold War era to the era of renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant or even profound implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.”

“This Saturday, November 9, marks the thirtieth anniversary of the day that a divided Europe was reunited. A barrier came down that had been, for nearly three decades, a physical representation of the oppression of millions of Europeans. This week the Atlantic Council gathered to reflect on the personal impact that the Berlin Wall had on them and the continued influence that its fall has had on the organization’s vision for a Europe whole and free.”

Jones, Seth G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Since 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have suffered multiple setbacks, from the 2006 death of al-Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden. Now comes the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. While significant in the short term, al-Baghdadi’s demise is unlikely to have a long-term impact. The persistence of jihadist movements has largely been a result of structural conditions like local grievances and weak governance. These conditions remain prevalent in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, raising the possibility of a new wave of violence.”

Rendon, Moises, Mark Schneider, and Jaime Vazquez. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Despite stiff sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and internal civil protests, Nicolas Maduro and his inner circle have resisted the pressures to negotiate an exit. Three internationally-sponsored dialogue processes and two efforts at mediated negotiations within the last five years have failed, with Maduro using the time to intensify his hold on power. Different factors are impeding a transition in Venezuela. This brief investigates challenges and opportunities to help support a transition toward democracy. It describes the possible role of a Track II diplomacy initiative to produce a feasible exit ramp for Maduro—essentially the achievement of significant progress outside of the formal negotiation process. The brief also discusses potential roles for chavistas in today’s struggle and for ‘day after’ challenges, the required elements for a transitional justice process, and the basic conditions necessary for holding free and fair elections to elect a new president.”

Shahbaz, Adrian, and Allie Funk. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2019).
“Internet freedom is increasingly imperiled by the tools and tactics of digital authoritarianism, which have spread rapidly around the globe. Repressive regimes, elected incumbents with authoritarian ambitions, and unscrupulous partisan operatives have exploited the unregulated spaces of social media platforms, converting them into instruments for political distortion and societal control. While social media have at times served as a level playing field for civic discussion, they are now tilting dangerously toward illiberalism, exposing citizens to an unprecedented crackdown on their fundamental freedoms. Moreover, a startling variety of governments are deploying advanced tools to identify and monitor users on an immense scale. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom declined for the ninth consecutive year in 2019.”

Ripple, William J., et al. "BioScience” (November 5, 2019).
“Scientists have a moral obligation to clearly warn humanity of any catastrophic threat and to ‘tell it like it is.’ On the basis of this obligation and the graphical indicators presented below, we declare, with more than 11,000 scientist signatories from around the world, clearly and unequivocally that planet Earth is facing a climate emergency.”

UN Environment Programme. (Nairobi, Kenya: UN Environment Programme, 2018).
“To mark ten years of the 'Emissions Gap Report,' and inform the Climate Action Summit, UNEP released Lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments. The report finds that the last ten years have, in some ways, been a lost decade of climate action. Greenhouse gas emissions have only grown, and faster and deeper cuts are now urgently needed. Climate ambition needs to rise at least fivefold to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement. However, it also finds that the last decade has seen huge advances in political and societal support for climate action, and technological and economic options to take this action. The world may be currently be heading for a temperature rise of over 3°C, it says, but there have never more opportunities for nations to increase action to the levels needed to ward off the worst impacts of climate change.”

World Bank Group. (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2020).
“Global value chains (GVCs) powered the surge of international trade after 1990 and now account for almost half of all trade. This shift enabled an unprecedented economic convergence: poor countries grew rapidly and began to catch up with richer countries. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, however, the growth of trade has been sluggish and the expansion of GVCs has stalled. Meanwhile, serious threats have emerged to the model of trade-led growth. New technologies could draw production closer to the consumer and reduce the demand for labor. And conflicts among large countries could lead to a retrenchment or a segmentation of GVCs. The ‘World Development Report (WDR) 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains’ examines whether there is still a path to development through GVCs and trade. It concludes that technological change is at this stage more a boon than a curse. GVCs can continue to boost growth, create better jobs, and reduce poverty provided that developing countries implement deeper reforms to promote GVC participation, industrial countries pursue open, predictable policies, and all countries revive multilateral cooperation.”

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2019).
“Reducing food loss and waste is widely seen as an important way to reduce production costs and increase the efficiency of the food system, improve food security and nutrition, and contribute towards environmental sustainability. Growing attention to food loss and waste is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG Target 12.3 calls for halving per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reducing food loss along production and supply chains (including post-harvest losses) by 2030. Reducing food loss and waste also has the potential to contribute to other SDGs, including the Zero Hunger goal (SDG 2), which calls for an end to hunger, the achievement of food security and improved nutrition, and the promotion of sustainable agriculture. The expected positive environmental impacts from reducing food loss and waste would also affect, among others, SDG 6 (sustainable water management), SDG 13 (climate change), SDG 14 (marine resources), SDG 15 (terrestrial ecosystems, forestry, biodiversity), and many other SDGs.”

Irwin, Lew. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“Since its inception in 1908, the US Army Reserve has made important, diverse, and cost-effective contributions to our nation while demonstrating the ability to adapt to meet emerging requirements. The emerging complex threats in today’s strategic and operational environments require the Army Reserve to adapt again.”

“Stung by Kremlin interference in elections in the United States and throughout Europe, governments have made progress in investigating past intrusions, counteracting ongoing influence, and preparing for future malign operations. However, even as Western democracies work to construct responses and build resilience, the Kremlin and other state and non-state actors continue to develop new tools to spread false narratives and manipulate the political discourse. Additionally, major questions remain surrounding the role and responsibility of news and social media platforms in this challenge. As the tactics of malign actors evolve, it is critical to continue to provide a forum for experts to learn best practices, share innovations, and engage with the policy community in order to counter bad actors seeking to influence and destabilize democratic institutions through disinformation.”

Institute for Economics and Peace. (Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019).
“This report is a continuation of the prior work from the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and includes updated results for the annual Positive Peace Index (PPI). It also provides analysis of countries that are improving or deteriorating in Positive Peace, as well as the developmental factors that improve or deteriorate with changes in Positive Peace. The research incorporates systems thinking to understand how nations operate and societies develop over time. The introductory section of the report describes the fundamental concepts associated with systems thinking. In doing so, IEP provides a new interdependent framework and holistic approach to understanding peace and development. ‘The 2019 Positive Peace’ report outlines a new approach to societal development through the application of Positive Peace and systems thinking. Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. The same factors that create peace also lead to many other positive outcomes that societies aspire to, such as thriving economies, better inclusion, high levels of resilience and societies that are more capable of adapting to change. Other factors positively associated with Positive Peace are better performance on handling ecological challenges, wellbeing and happiness. Therefore, Positive Peace creates the optimal environment in which human potential can flourish.”

Schwab, Klaus (ed). (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2019).
“The 2019 edition of ‘The Global Competitiveness Report’ series, first launched in 1979, features the Global Competitiveness Index 4.0 (GCI 4.0). As the decade concludes and we look towards the dawn of the 2020s, the GCI 4.0 offers insights into the economic prospects of 141 economies. Drawing on these results, the report provides leads to unlock economic growth, which remains crucial for improving living standards. In addition, in a special thematic chapter, the report explores the relationship between competitiveness, shared prosperity and environmental sustainability, showing that there is no inherent trade-off between building competitiveness, creating more equitable societies that provide opportunity for all and transitioning to environmentally sustainable systems. However, for a new inclusive and sustainable system, bold leadership and proactive policy-making will be needed, often in areas where economists and public policy professionals cannot provide evidence from the past. The report reviews emerging and promising ‘win-win’ policy options to achieve the three objectives of growth, inclusion and sustainability.”

Gwartney, James, et al. (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019).
“The index published in ‘Economic Freedom of the World’ measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and compete, and security of the person and privately owned property. Forty-two data points are used to construct a summary index and to measure the degree of economic freedom in five broad areas. Area 1: Size of Government… Area 2: Legal System and Property Rights… Area 3: Sound Money…Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally…Area 5: Regulation…Gender Disparity Index: The index published in ‘Economic Freedom of the World’ now includes an adjustment for gender disparity to take into account the fact that in any nations women are not legally accorded the same level of economic freedom as men.”

Bill and Melina Gates Foundation. (Seattle, WA: Bill and Melina Gates Foundation, 2019).
“‘Goalkeepers’ is our annual report card on the world’s progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 17 ambitious goals the member states of the United Nations committed to reaching by 2030. As we write, billions of people are projected to miss the targets that we all agreed represent a decent life. If we hope to accelerate progress, we must address the inequality that separates the lucky from the unlucky.”

World Economic Forum. (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2019).
“Cyberattacks are one of the top 10 global risks of highest concern in the next decade, with an estimated price tag of $90 trillion if cybersecurity efforts do not keep pace with technological change. While there is abundant guidance in the cybersecurity community, the application of prescribed action continues to fall short of what is required to ensure effective defence against cyberattacks. The challenges created by accelerating technological innovation have reached new levels of complexity and scale – today responsibility for cybersecurity in organizations is no longer one Chief Security Officer’s job, it involves everyone.”

Sutherland, Michael D. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“China’s construction of a nationwide ‘social credit system’ has been identified as a major concern by both the executive branch and some Members of Congress because of the broad controls such a system is likely to give the Chinese government over U.S. citizens and companies operating in China. Recent reports of Chinese officials invoking the social credit system to pressure U.S. firms to take positions that align with Beijing’s interests raise questions for Congress about how to respond to the potential threat the system may pose to U.S. commercial actors in China.”

Blank, Stephen J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“Wherever one looks, Russia is carrying out aggressive military and informational attacks against the West in Europe, North and South America, the Arctic, and the Middle East. This ‘war against the West’ actually began over a decade ago, but its most jarring and shocking event, the one that started to focus Western minds on Russia, was the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Given this pattern, the National Security Council (NSC) in 2014 invited Stephen Blank to organize a conference on the Russian military. We were able to launch the conference in 2016 and bring together a distinguished international group of experts on the Russian military to produce the papers that were then subsequently updated for presentation here.
The results presented here are sobering, to say the least. Ray Finch and Aleksandr Golts high-light the domestic program of military mobilization of Russian society that began before 2014 and has only intensified since then. It aims to engender a positive, heroic image for the military and the idea that Russia is under siege from the West. This campaign has also gone hand in hand with signs of greatly enhanced defense spending, although there have been cuts in 2017-2018 due to sanctions. However, despite the fact that Paul Schwartz rightly points out that Russia’s science and technology sectors are wounded and suffer from excessive militarization, he and Steven Rosefielde undermine the complacent and excessively comfortable notion that Russian economic weak-ness? which is real—will lead to the collapse of the system or its retreat from its current posture.”

Mix, Derek E., Kristin Archick, and Shayerah Ilias Akhtar. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 4, 2019).
“The dynamics of Brexit are likely to evolve in relation to pivotal events and deadlines in October 2019. Possible scenarios include a new withdrawal agreement, another extension, a no-deal Brexit, and an early general election in the UK.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Navy in FY 2020 reflects the priorities of the department as a whole. It sustains the level of readiness built in the FY 2017-FY 2019 budgets and modernizes by increasing the production of existing ships, aircraft, and munition programs. Unlike the other services, the Navy is significantly expanding its force structure.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The Navy feels the capacity/capability tension acutely due to the high demands of day-to-day operations, long lead times, and high capital costs for weapons systems.
• In the face of this tension, the Navy is actively implementing force structure expansion plans, aiming to reach its 355-ship goal by FY 2034 through a mix of service life extensions and new construction.
• The Navy is also procuring unmanned surface and undersea vessels, with potentially revolutionary long-term force structure implications.
• Naval aviation inventories are stable and most modernization programs are operating smoothly; however, it is dogged by high costs to maintain its inventory and has been slow to field unmanned aerial vehicles.”

McCall, Stephen M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 2, 2019).
“At a National Space Council meeting on June 18, 2018, President Donald Trump said, ‘I am hereby directing the Department of Defense and Pentagon to immediately begin the process necessary to establish a space force as the sixth branch of the armed forces.’ One of the purposes for creating a separate military service for space is to protect American interest in outer space. On February 19, 2019, the President signed Space Policy Directive-4 (SPD-4) directing the Secretary of Defense to submit a legislative proposal that would establish a U.S. Space Force, if enacted by Congress. In alignment with the President’s National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Space, the Space Force is intended to secure the vital interest of unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space while expanding American dominance in the space domain. Subsequently, on February 28, 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a legislative proposal to Congress to create the U.S. Space Force.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The current crisis in Iraq is partly the result of the failures by its current leadership and political figures, the legacy of the fighting against ISIS, and the result of short-term policy decisions. It is also driven, however, by a range of civil forces that are the result of long-term structural problems that have led to major political upheavals and conflicts throughout the region, that lead to the rise of extremism and terrorism, and that affect every aspect of Iraq’s present and future. Iraq is scarcely the only case in point. The same long-term civil challenges have limited U.S. success in its other ‘long wars’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria — as well as in more limited involvements in nations like Libya and Yemen. The Burke Chair at CSIS is issuing an analysis that focuses on the fact that all five states have deep structural problems that make them 'failed states' in many similar areas of governance, major social changes, and development. It shows that these failures are so serious that they make the ‘host country’ or national government a key cause of civil unrest and conflict and – in many ways – as much of a threat as the extremist and terrorist movements the U.S. is seeking to defeat.”

Greenley, Heather L., Christopher M. Blanchard, and Michael Ratner. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 1, 2019).
“September 14, 2019, saw an attack on Saudi Aramco’s,Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, Abqaiq oil processing facility and Khurais oil field and processing plant. The attack, which used both missiles and drones, temporarily disrupted 5.7 million barrels per day (mb/d) of oil production, over half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production and about 5% of global supply. For context, U.S. crude oil production is approximately 12 mb/d.”

Meyer, Peter J. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2019).
“On September 11, 2019, the United States and 11other Western Hemisphere countries invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) to facilitate a regional response to the crisis in Venezuela. As a first step, on September 23, the countries that have ratified the treaty (“states parties”) agreed to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the government of Nicolás Maduro. They also pledged to meet again within two months to discuss additional measures. Congress may closely track the deliberations, given their potential implications for U.S. policy.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 4, 2019).
“The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers…The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administration’s FY2020 procurement funding request for the PSC program, and, more generally, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard’s overall plan for procuring new polar icebreakers. Congress’s decisions on this issue could affect Coast Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar missions, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.”

Pavel, Barry, Peter Engelke, and Alex Ward. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2016).
“Strategy should be the framework that gets a state, in this case the United States, from where it is to where it wants to go. Instead of merely responding to global events, the United States, with a sound strategy, could make progress over time to try to get ahead of them, and even to try to shape them for our national advantage as well as for that of our allies and friends. Without question, among the challenges facing the United States today in regard to its foreign and security policy is an inadequate amount of strategic thinking. For a variety of reasons, not least because the world appears to be spinning faster, actionable strategic thinking appears to be in short supply. This report, and future papers in this series, aim to help remedy this gap in strategy.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Burke Chair at CSIS has updated and expanded a report that uses official reports, maps, and graphics to examine Afghan military and civil progress, or the lack of it, in full detail. It draws on official reporting by the Resolute Support Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (1225 Report), the Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations (LIG-OCO), the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the United Nations. At the same time, it draws upon a variety of outside sources that raise serious questions about the accuracy of some of this official reporting.”

Daniels, Seamus P. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“On August 2, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist issued a memo calling for a ‘comprehensive zero-based review of all defense-wide (DW) functions and activities’ in the Department of Defense (DoD). The goal of this ongoing effort, led by the deputy secretary, is to ensure the alignment of resources with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) through the FY 2021 program review cycle and to ‘support a longer-term focus on structural reform” that generates future savings. In line with Norquist’s call to ‘begin immediately and move forward aggressively,’ the review kicked off on Saturday, August 10, only eight days after the memo was issued. This brief explains what the review entails, which defense-wide organizations are subject to it, and previous efforts at driving efficiencies in the ‘Fourth Estate.’”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile.”

Wheeler, Tom, and David Simpson. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2019).
“5G will be a physical overhaul of our essential networks that will have decades-long impact. Because 5G is the conversion to a mostly all-software network, future upgrades will be software updates much like the current upgrades to your smartphone. Because of the cyber vulnerabilities of software, the tougher part of the real 5G 'race' is to retool how we secure the most important network of the 21st century and the ecosystem of devices and applications that sprout from that network. Never have the essential networks and services that define our lives, our economy, and our national security had so many participants, each reliant on the other—and none of which have the final responsibility for cybersecurity. The adage 'what’s everybody’s business is nobody’s business' has never been more appropriate—and dangerous—than in the quest for 5G cybersecurity. The new capabilities made possible by new applications riding 5G networks hold tremendous promise. As we pursue the connected future, however, we must place equivalent—if not greater—focus on the security of those connections, devices, and applications. To build 5G on top of a weak cybersecurity foundation is to build on sand. This is not just a matter of the safety of network users, it is a matter of national security.”

Lété, Bruno. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The United Nations remains the best platform to shape global norms on state behavior in cyberspace. But, despite its achievements, the UN’s intergovernmental process struggles to make progress, not least because of deep divisions within the international community about which rules should apply in cyberspace. There is a need to reevaluate cyber governance efforts and to think of new practices that adopt a multi-stakeholder model, instead of relying solely on the current rigid intergovernmental approach. There may be renewed energy for such discussion now that the UN’s First Committee has endorsed two parallel processes on cyber norms—the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and a sixth round of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE). Other international organizations have already successfully institutionalized multi-stakeholder models involving NGOs or business in their policymaking processes. Their best practices and lessons learned for stakeholder input could be adapted and used at the UN level. This paper looks at the experience of several intergovernmental organizations active in various non-cyber domains…Based on these findings, this paper makes six recommendations on how to include non-governmental stakeholders in the UNGGE and OEWG process so as to make progress toward an open cyber governance model.”

Herbst, John E., and Jason Marczak. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“Venezuela presents an opportunity for Russia to play the role of spoiler—in some capacity—in a crisis near the United States, and to promote its own commercial interests, and preferred image as a growing power. It’s an opportunity to plant the flag, foster instability, and have leverage over key energy resources at the same time. It is imperative that the current dynamics are reversed so that Moscow’s foray into Venezuela comes at a higher cost and is seen as a public relations disaster for Putin back home. Continued meddling will only help to prolong the suffering of the Venezuelan people.”

Global Center on Adaptation. (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Global Center on Adaptation, 2019).
“This report focuses on making the case for climate adaptation, providing specific insights and recommendations in key sectors: food security, the natural environment, water, cities and urban areas, infrastructure, disaster risk management, and finance. It is designed to inspire action among decision-makers, including heads of state and government officials, mayors, business executives, investors, and community leaders.”

Jaffe, Amy Myers, et al. (New York City, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“Climate change affects virtually every aspect of the U.S. energy system. As climatic effects such as rising seas and extreme weather continue to appear across many geographies, U.S. energy infrastructure is increasingly at risk. The U.S. Gulf Coast—which is home to 44 percent of total U.S. oil refining capacity and several major ports—is highly vulnerable to flooding events and dangerous ocean surges during severe storms and hurricanes. The link between water availability and energy and electricity production creates another layer of risk to U.S. energy security.”

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019).
"The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report highlights the urgency of prioritizing timely, ambitious and coordinated action to address unprecedented and enduring changes in the ocean and cryosphere. The report reveals the benefits of ambitious and effective adaptation for sustainable development and, conversely, the escalating costs and risks of delayed action. The ocean and the cryosphere – the frozen parts of the planet – play a critical role for life on Earth. A total of 670 million people in high mountain regions and 680 million people in low-lying coastal zones depend directly on these systems. Four million people live permanently in the Arctic region, and small island developing states are home to 65 million people. Global warming has already reached 1°C above the pre-industrial level, due to past and current greenhouse gas emissions. There is overwhelming evidence that this is resulting in profound consequences for ecosystems and people. The ocean is warmer, more acidic and less productive. Melting glaciers and ice sheets are causing sea level rise, and coastal extreme events are becoming more severe."

Lehr, Amy K., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Human Rights are part of the American DNA. Congress has long advocated for human rights to play an integral role in U.S. foreign policy, with significant success. However, rising authoritarianism and the gross human rights violations taking place around the world call for immediate and stronger U.S. leadership and Congressional action. To that end, the Human Rights Initiative of CSIS worked with CSIS scholars, who developed recommendations relevant to their expertise that identify how Congress can build on its past human rights leadership to meet today’s challenges.”

Kurtzer, Jacob. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Principled humanitarian action is under attack around the world. Globally, 70.8 million people are considered forcibly displaced by armed conflict and nearly 132 million people need emergency humanitarian assistance. At the same time, there has been a steep escalation in the deliberate, willful obstruction of humanitarian access, impeding the ability of humanitarian aid to reach the most vulnerable people and vice versa. As humanitarian emergencies become increasingly complex and protracted, blocked humanitarian access will only increase without urgent action. To ensure the ability of aid to reach those who need it most and to uphold the principles of international humanitarian law, the United States should elevate humanitarian access as a foreign policy priority and work to reconcile tensions between critical national security measures and the growing needs of vulnerable populations in fragile, conflict-affected states. This report is the result of the CSIS Task Force on Humanitarian Access.”

Townshend, Ashley, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Matilda Steward. (Sydney, Australia: United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, 2019).
“America no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific and its capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power is increasingly uncertain…Over the next decade, the US defence budget is unlikely to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy owing to a combination of political, fiscal and internal pressures…America has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific — a challenge it is working hard to address…A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“In an international security environment characterized as one of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for roughly 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.”

Asia Maritime and Transparency Initiative. (Washington, DC: Asia Maritime and Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Explore the maritime claims of nearly 40 countries across the Indo-Pacific. All claims are shown based on states’ domestic legislation, treaties, and submissions to international bodies. The map is an unbiased depiction of claims; it does not judge their legality or guess at future delimitations. Click on any claim line for its source, including links to original documents where available.”

Bermudez, Joseph, and Victor Cha. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
• “Located 1,100 kilometers west of Tokyo and 165 kilometers northeast of Seoul the Kumchon-ni undeclared ballistic missile operating base houses a battalion- or regiment-sized unit equipped with Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).
• Media reports suggest that during wartime the 1,000-kilometer-range Hwasong-9 unit based at Kumchon-ni is tasked with striking targets in the southern half of Japan and, to a lesser degree, throughout South Korea.
• Should the missile unit based at Kumchon-ni be equipped with more recently emerging MRBMs (e.g., Pukkuksong-2/KN-15, etc.) the threat envelop could include all of Japan, including U.S. military bases on Okinawa, and beyond.
• This base is one of approximately 20 undeclared ballistic missile operating bases and one that is reported to be tasked with not only strikes against the southern half of Japan, but is also capable of striking all of South Korea.
• This is the first comprehensive public report detailing the development, organization, and threat posed by the Kumchon-ni missile operating base.
• North Korean missile operating bases would presumably have to be subject to declaration, verification, and dismantlement in any future final and fully verifiable denuclearization deal.”

Lewis, James Andrew. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“There are deep interconnections between the U.S. and Chinese economies, and China has built its technology base on what it has acquired from the West. China’s government and some Chinese companies will use any means, legal or illegal, to acquire technology. The United States’ relationship with China cannot continue unchanged, but given the interconnections, change must be managed carefully. New restrictions are needed, but counterintuitively, these should be shaped by recognizing that being open makes the United States stronger than being closed. The best approach is an incremental and flexible approach to technology transfer centered on the need to avoid harm to the U.S economy. This report outlines the policy tools that the United States can use to mitigate risk while maintaining the openness that is a hallmark of the U.S. economy.”

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Djibouti is pursuing an ambitious agenda to transform itself into a commercial trade hub for the Horn of Africa region. This effort is being financed largely by the People’s Republic of China(PRC), which is playing a growing role in the tiny country. China’s engagement is multifaceted, ranging from major infrastructure investments to the establishment of its first overseas military base in the country. China considers Djibouti part of its Belt and Road Initiative; in late 2017 the two countries declared that they had established a ‘strategic partnership.’ U.S. policymakers have raised concern about China’s role in Djibouti, given U.S. strategic interests in the region and the proximity of China’s base to U.S. military facilities there.”

Watts, John, et al. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“The forward march of advanced technologies, especially information technologies, and their integration into all aspects of society are creating tremendous opportunities—and an associated set of vulnerabilities. Both 5G networks and the Internet of Things (IoT) are going to connect us further in ways only limited by our imaginations. While this growth has been forecasted over the past few decades, few saw the scope and breadth of the implications, both positive and negative, on our society. The Department of Defense has recognized that hardware, software, and data now connect in ways that have created a cyber domain, much like the land, sea, air, and space domains. The implications have manifested themselves in the relentless competition underway between those that defend and those that attack on a continuous basis. This evolution in our thinking on the cyber problem demands strategic analysis. Numerous reports have been generated over the past several years, with thousands of recommendations. Yet, the problem only continues to grow… Forecasting is extremely difficult; some say it is impossible. That said, crafting a set of potential alternate futures, with a series of waypoints or decision points that validates or invalidates a given path or assumptions, is possible now. This approach drives action forward, and the competitive environment forces the normal action-reaction-counteraction competitive framework for action. Some change may be gradual, and some may be dramatic. What is most important is the ability to modify, adapt, or even pivot at speed across concepts, technologies, structures, and frameworks on a continuous basis, which creates a competitive advantage over time. This report starts that effort.”

Schiffrin, Anya. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“On both sides of the Atlantic, governments, foundations, and companies are looking at how to solve the problem of online dis/misinformation. Some emphasize the demand side of the problem, believing it important to focus on consumer behavior and the use of media literacy and fact-checking. Some focus on legal remedies such as platform-liability and hate-speech laws as well as privacy protections. Meanwhile, others try to raise the quality of journalism and support local news in the hope that creating more reliable content will be a counterweight to the dis/misinformation found online. In short, there are myriad solutions aimed at addressing the problem of online dis/misinformation. This study looks at one kind of fix: the small companies in the information ecosystem that use natural language processing as well as human intelligence to identify and, in some cases, block false or inflammatory content online. There are impediments to the success of this entrepreneurial approach, including the fact that disinformation detection by algorithms is complicated, it is hard to scale, and that it is unclear whether the platforms have an incentive to adopt such technology. It is very likely that platforms such as Facebook or Twitter—which already screen, block, and remove fake accounts and content—will copy the technology or will buy out the small firms for the skills of their staff and for their products in order to gain access to the AI needed for further screening.”

Stein, Aaron, and Emily Burchfield. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“The future of northeast Syria is unsettled after eight years of civil war and the US intervention to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). It also faces the various divergent interests of powerful external actors, including Russia and Turkey. In mid-April 2019, the Atlantic Council, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened a group of scholars, intermediaries, and civil-society members from the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to discuss Syria’s northeast at the granular level. The group focused on the building of local security and governance infrastructure, how these efforts interact with the interests of outside parties, and whether a broader power-sharing arrangement can be reached to manage, or help end, the conflict. Over the course of the two-day dialogue, a general consensus emerged that any solution in Syria will require a clear US position on the future of Syria and what Washington is prepared to accept in any post-conflict scenario. The same is true for Russia, the second-most-powerful external actor involved in the conflict, and the guarantor of security, locally and internationally, for the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus. A third actor, Turkey, has also managed to carve out a contiguous zone of control, stretching roughly from just west of the Euphrates river to a semicircular front line just north of Hama, which is patrolled by Russian and Turkish troops.”

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“While suicide remains a low incidence event, military suicide rates grew substantially in the early 2000s, peaking for the active component in 2012. For the past few years of reported data, suicide rates in the Army active and reserve components have been consistently higher than the other services. In addition, the Army National Guard suicide rate has been consistently higher than the other components. There is some evidence of an upward trend in suicide rates for the Air Force and Air Force Reserve. Rates for the other services and components have not exhibited any discernable trends.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Geopolitical competition is increasingly playing out in the space beyond diplomacy and short of conventional war, sometimes referred to as the gray zone. The nature of this compe¬tition is forcing the United States to confront the liabilities of its strengths. This report assesses current U.S. government actions to deter, campaign through, and respond to competitors’ gray zone tactics. Using the campaign planning framework established in ‘By Other Means Part I,’ the report provides recommendations aimed at ameliorating U.S. liabilities and building on its asymmetries to improve U.S. national security in the presence of rivals’ gray zone approaches.”

Sheppard, Lindsey R., and Matthew Conklin. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“This paper will discuss how intelligence, and particularly geospatial intelligence, can be collected, analyzed, and applied to better identify and enable the United States to anticipate and respond to gray zone challenges. It details past examples in which the United States effectively applied tools to monitor and respond to gray zone challenges. Key examples highlighted include China’s reef dredging in the South China Sea and Russia’s use of non-uniformed combatants in Ukraine. Interviews with representatives from the private sector, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations contextualize these examples.”

Stuckenberg, David; R. James Woolsey, and Douglas DeMaio. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
“In spring 2019 Air University hosted subject matter experts from across the country to expand on the accomplishments of the inaugural Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF). Building on the 2018 summit, the 2019 EDTF summit advanced and amplified recommendations to leaders nationwide, ensuring the call for awareness, preparation, defense, and mitigation is sounded far and wide. Using extensive research and expertise, EDTF 2.0 participants have contributed to understanding, preparedness, and resilience for communities throughout the United States.”

Crane, Conrad C. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
"The mission of US Army Cyber Command now reads that it 'integrates and conducts full-spectrum cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and information operations, ensuring freedom of action for friendly forces in and through the cyber domain and the information environment, while denying the same to our adversaries.' This appears to be a time of opportunity for that command to reestablish Army dominance in all aspects of information warfare. That may require a change in name, new doctrine, and regaining control of relevant organizations. Joint and national reform is also necessary. But considering the displayed competence and unity of effort of potential adversaries in information warfare, an aggressive and innovative response is required."

Bruscino, Thomas. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
"Military reform efforts, including reform in professional military education, all too often ignore experiences of the past, seeing them as outdated and irrelevant. At the same time, observers revere historical strategic leaders who grew up in these supposedly outdated systems. The great leaders of the past were rarely, if ever, natural strategic geniuses. They had to learn something along the way, which is why professional militaries have a school system in the first place. In order to gain greater clarity on the preparation of strategic leaders, this paper, which features extensive use of the rich USAHEC archives by a member of the US Army War College (USAWC) faculty, takes a closer look at the USAWC in the period between World War I and World War II, with a focus on Dwight D. Eisenhower's tenure as a student in the 1927-1928 school year. "

Flowers, Kimberly, and Sarah Ladislaw. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"Last week, a United Nations (UN) report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sounded the alarm that the world is moving toward irreversible damage by climate change that could place the future of food and the livelihood of millions in serious peril. The report comes amid growing public recognition of the frequency and severity of extreme weather phenomena such as droughts, floods, forest fires, heat waves, and stronger storms impacting communities across the globe. Based on research from over 100 scientists from 52 countries, the UN report highlights unsustainable land use and surging resource demands as key drivers behind a warming planet. Unless collective action is taken to dramatically reduce emissions, the global food system, including food prices, could face sweeping instability."

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019).
"An IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems."

Berger, David. (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2019).
“The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) provides the 38th Commandant’s strategic direction for the Marine Corps and mirrors the function of the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force. It also serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. This CPG serves as my Commandant’s Intent for the next four years.”

Mason, M. Chris (ed). (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
USAWC Integrated Research Project: “This monograph is the result of an integrated research project conducted by a group of eight officers at the U.S. Army War College during the 2017-2018 academic year…The group identified the four most important and challenging issues which the Resolute Support mission grapples with on a daily basis: (1) maintaining the equilibrium of power and control between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban at its current level; (2) bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table to begin peace talks with the Afghan Government; (3) getting Pakistan to curb its 17-year support to the Taliban; and, (4) start to roll back the pernicious dominance of opium production in the Afghan economy and its corrosive influence on national governance and state-building. Everyone involved in this project was keenly aware that thousands of dedicated U.S., Afghan, and international personnel from the military, diplomatic, and academic spheres have been struggling with these same four issues for almost two decades. The group’s intention was to enhance that ongoing effort through academic research and the application of the members’ experience in order to develop specific, implementable solutions for each of the four problems. The faculty tasked the group with avoiding both long history lessons and the kind of vague bromides (i.e., ‘so-and-so must do more such-and-such’) which tend to dominate external reviews of the challenges facing Afghanistan but which are too nebulous to implement."

U.S. Army War College YouTube page. 7 videos.
"The U.S. Army War College hosted the National Security Seminar (NSS), June 3-6, 2019. Selected representatives from across the United States were invited to join the graduate-level seminar and exchange thoughts about national security topics in the capstone phase of the USAWC graduate program."

U.S. Army War College YouTube page. July 16, 2019, streaming video, 58:52.
“The Army has faced many challenges since World War II has it has tried to reform and transform itself for changing warfare. It was very successful with the shift to AirLand Battle in the 1980s, but less so with the Pentomic Army of the 1950s, and its technological misdirection after DESERT STORM made the adjustment for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq even more difficult. Today it is turning once more to large-scale combat operations, along with the complexity of Multi-Domain Operations. Insights from the past can be useful as the service again wrestles with its future.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“This report is an experimental net assessment that addresses China's emergence as a global superpower, and its competition with the United States.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies Conference. July 24, 2019, streaming video, 2:35:41.
“This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. Panels will address the state of play in the South China Sea, the history and historiography of disputes in the South China Sea, pathways for dispute management, and the global stakes related to the South China Sea.
• State of Play in the South China Sea
• How Did We Get Here? History and Historiography
• Pathways for Dispute Management
• Global Stakes”

Atlantic Council YouTube page. 11 videos.
“In 2019 we mark several anniversaries that helped us build a Europe whole and free with Central European nations an integral part of it, including: one hundred years of relations between the United States and the countries of Central Europe that emerged from the horror of the First World War; thirty years since the overthrow of communism and the fall of the Iron Curtain; twenty years since the first NATO enlargement beyond the Iron Curtain; and fifteen years since the EU enlargement beyond the Iron Curtain and NATO's ‘Big Bang’ expansion. Our achievements must be celebrated but many challenges lie ahead. The conference will celebrate US-Central European relations while also galvanizing a community of leaders to strengthen these ties for the future. Furthermore, we will use this opportunity to launch a flagship report on US-Central European relations co-authored by the Atlantic Council and GLOBSEC.”

Fried, Daniel, et al. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“The year 2019 marks one hundred and one years of relations between the United States and the countries of Central Europe that emerged from the wreckage of the First World War. After a century of work together, of tragedy and achievement, Central Europe and the United States have much to celebrate and defend, but also much to do. After accessions to NATO and the European Union, Central Europeans may have thought that their long road to the institutions of the West, and to the security and prosperity associated with them, was finished. The United States began to think so as well, concluding that its work and special role in Central Europe were complete. Now, Central Europe, the United States, and the entire transatlantic community face new internal and external challenges. As a result, the transatlantic world has seen a rise of extremist politics and forms of nationalism that many thought had been banished forever after 1989. The great achievement of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, with Central Europe an integral part of it, is again in play. The Atlantic Council and GLOBSEC’s new report ‘The United States and Central Europe: Tasks for a Second Century Together’ examines a century of relations between the United States and Central Europe: what went right, what went wrong, and what needs to be done about it.”

Katzman, Kenneth. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership:
• Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime.
• Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes.
• Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of ‘greatness’ reminiscent of ancient Persian empires.
• Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s ‘oppressed’ and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs.
• Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have supported Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy.
• Supports acts of international terrorism, as the ‘leading’ or ‘most active’ state sponsor of terrorism, according to each annual State Department report on international terrorism since the early 1990s.
The Administration insists that an end to Iran’s malign activities is a requirement of any revised JCPOA and normalization of relations with the United States.”

Meter, Peter J. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Central America has received renewed attention from U.S. policymakers over the past few years as the region has remained a major transit corridor for illicit drugs and has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the United States. These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several countries in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The U.S. government and partners in the region have begun to implement new initiatives intended to address those challenges, but living conditions in Central America have yet to improve significantly.”

Carson, Charles, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“In the United States, there is currently a dichotomy: employers are unable to fill manufacturing jobs, and yet there are hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers looking for jobs. How can this be? Many point to a skills deficit across the U.S. workforce. Much like other aspects of daily life and the economy, technology is changing the way U.S. based companies manufacture goods for the global market. As technology permeates and alters the manufacturing industry, it has created a massive boost in manufacturing productivity, while simultaneously requiring fewer workers to maintain and increase production. For those still employed in the manufacturing sector, they also need to be better equipped with the skills to handle the new demands such advanced technology and techniques impose. This report analyzes different workforce development programs for advanced manufacturing across the nation, seeking to better understand what is required to educate and retrain the worker of the future.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Microsite
“‘On the Radar’ provides analysis on emerging technologies that are expected to reshape situational awareness across the spectrum of conflict, and examines the implications of these technologies for nuclear strategic stability. It is a product of a two-year research collaboration between the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Nuclear Policy Working Group (NPWG) at the University California Berkeley, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.”

Goodman, Matthew P. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The liberal international order set up under U.S. leadership at the end of World War II has produced enormous economic benefits for both the United States and the rest of the world. But recently, the order has been under severe strain, the result of shifting economic forces at home and challenges from new powers abroad. U.S. leadership remains critical to an international order that delivers broad-based prosperity for Americans and stability abroad. In a new essay collection, CSIS experts on economics, trade, energy, technology, and development share their thoughts on how the United States can reaffirm its leadership through smart policies both at home and abroad.”

Jones, Seth G., Nicholas Harrington, and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the Middle East, Russia is engaged in covert and overt cooperation with Iran in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. This analysis of commercial satellite imagery at Tiyas Airbase in Syria indicates the scope and proximity of Russian and Iranian military ties. If Washington wants to contain Tehran and prevent further Iranian expansion, U.S. policymakers will need to increase pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s activities in countries like Syria.”

Huguet, Alice, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
“Truth Decay — the diminishing role that facts, data, and analysis play in political and civil discourse — appears to result, in part, from an increasingly complex information ecosystem. Technology, in particular, offers continual access to information of varying quality and credibility, information that can blur the line between fact-based evidence and opinion. Not everyone is equipped with the skills necessary to navigate such uncertain terrain. The purpose of this report is to describe the field of media literacy (ML) education and the ways in which ML education can counter Truth Decay by changing how participants consume, create, and share information. One limitation of this research base arises from the variety of ways that literature defines and measures ML outcomes; while a multiplicity of viewpoints can be beneficial, it also presents challenges in terms of aggregating findings across studies. Despite this, the authors describe existing evidence that ML could be a useful tool for combating Truth Decay. They also provide an inventory of ML offerings available to the public. Finally, the authors make suggestions for moving forward, with the specific recommendation that professionals in ML and related fields strengthen their communication and collaboration, considering where there are opportunities for a common approach to researching ML. The authors recommend that policymakers and practitioners increase participation from diverse constituencies in scaling ML efforts.”

Markovich, Steven J., and Andrew Chatzky. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“U.S. space exploration inspired a generation of students and innovators, but NASA’s role has diminished, and the number of global space competitors is growing.”

Sayler, Kelley. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons - maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 - as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable ‘responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.’ Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.”

Sayler, Kelley, and Daniel Hoadley S. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“AI technologies present unique challenges for military integration, particularly because the bulk of AI development is happening in the commercial sector. Although AI is not unique in this regard, the defense acquisition process may need to be adapted for acquiring emerging technologies like AI. In addition, many commercial AI applications must undergo significant modification prior to being functional for the military. A number of cultural issues also challenge AI acquisition, as some commercial AI companies are averse to partnering with DOD due to ethical concerns, and even within the department, there can be resistance to incorporating AI technology into existing weapons systems and processes.
Potential international rivals in the AI market are creating pressure for the United States to compete for innovative military AI applications. China is a leading competitor in this regard, releasing a plan in 2017 to capture the global lead in AI development by 2030. Currently, China is primarily focused on using AI to make faster and more well-informed decisions, as well as on developing a variety of autonomous military vehicles. Russia is also active in military AI development, with a primary focus on robotics.
Although AI has the potential to impart a number of advantages in the military context, it may also introduce distinct challenges. AI technology could, for example, facilitate autonomous operations, lead to more informed military decision making, and increase the speed and scale of military action. However, it may also be unpredictable or vulnerable to unique forms of manipulation. As a result of these factors, analysts hold a broad range of opinions on how influential AI will be in future combat operations. While a small number of analysts believe that the technology will have minimal impact, most believe that AI will have at least an evolutionary—if not revolutionary—effect.”

Hoehn, John R., and Kelley M. Sayler. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. According to a Defense Innovation Board (DIB) report, in the military realm, 5G will additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control; and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations.”

Linscott, Mark, Trevor Cloen, and Nidhi Upadhyaya. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“‘Trade at a Crossroads: A Vision for the US-India Trade Relationship,’ a joint report with the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center and the U.S. India Strategic Partnership Forum, provides an expert analysis of the current state of the relationship, including recent negotiations, and recommendations for the path forward in the short-, medium-, and long-term. This report urges both countries to prioritize efforts to manage current tensions, reach an early agreement and build on successes to initiate a series of cooperative projects in areas such as intellectual property rights, digital trade and regulatory coherence, mirroring previous successes on the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Finally, the report provides a sober assessment of future prospects for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). While highlighting many compelling reasons to avoid rushing into exploration of an FTA in the near future, it concludes with a vision of this ultimate form of economic integration through trade negotiations.”

Pompeo, Michael R. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2019).
“The U.S. Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements provide country-specific information on the business climates of more than 170 countries and are prepared by economic officers stationed in embassies and posts around the world. They analyze a variety of economies that are or could be markets for U.S. businesses of all sizes.”

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
"The 2019 Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy updates the previous 2016 DoD Arctic Strategy as requested by Section 1071 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2019. This update includes a classified annex. Specifically, the 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy updates DoD’s strategic objectives for the Arctic region, in light of DoD’s renewed assessment of the evolving Arctic security environment and the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Anchored in NDS goals and priorities, this updated Arctic strategy outlines DoD’s strategic approach for protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic in an era of strategic competition. DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region in which U.S. national security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges. Protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic will require the Joint Force to sustain its competitive military advantages in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, identified in the NDS as key regions of strategic competition, and to maintain a credible deterrent for the Arctic region. DoD must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively to those threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the future. The 2019 DoD Arctic strategy outlines three strategic ways in support of the desired Arctic end-state:
•Building Arctic awareness;
•Enhancing Arctic operations; and,
•Strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic."

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"The United States is being confronted by the liabilities of its strength. Competitors are contesting the rules of the international system and U.S. leadership. With the significant costs of engaging the United States in combat, and the growing range of indirect and non-military tools at their disposal, rivals are finding avenues for threatening U.S. interests without triggering escalation. Their approaches lie in the contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare--the "gray zone." The United States has yet to articulate a comprehensive approach to deterring competitors in the gray zone. A concrete and actionable campaign plan is needed to deal with the gray zone challenge; in order to do so, the United States must identify and employ a broad spectrum of tools and concepts to deter, and if needed, to compete and win contestations in the gray zone."

German Marshall Fund of the United States. 21 videos of sessions from Brussels Forum 2019, held June 27-29, 2019.

Khalil, Lydia. (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2019).
"• Women will be important to the resurgence and transformation of the Islamic State from governance project to global terrorist insurgency.
• Islamic State has expanded both the potential and the scope of the roles and functions women can play, providing additional avenues for their participation in jihad in both kinetic and non-kinetic roles.
• The cohort of former caliphate members of mostly women and children now held in camps pose a key challenge for counterterrorism efforts around the world. Assumptions about women and violence can obstruct an accurate assessment of the threat female IS supporters pose and an accurate understanding of their agency."

Johnson, Kaitlyn. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"In 2018, President Trump requested that the U.S. military restructure its space offices and personnel to create a U.S. Space Force. Since then three competing visions for how the Department of Defense (DoD) should be restructured to better support its national security space enterprise have been crafted: one from the DoD itself and two from either chamber of Congress. This brief compares these three legislative proposals to create a new military service for space."

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (Geneva, Switzerland: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019).
"A UN human rights report published today urges the Government of Venezuela to take immediate, concrete measures to halt and remedy the grave violations of economic, social, civil, political and cultural rights documented in the country. The report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warns that if the situation does not improve, the unprecedented outflow of Venezuelan migrants and refugees will continue, and the living conditions of those who remain will worsen."

Lafakis, Chris, et al. (West Chester, PA: Moody's Analytics, 2019).
"In the absence of global pollution mitigation, anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide into the Earth’s atmosphere will raise global temperatures. Rising temperatures and shifting precipitation patterns will affect agricultural production and universally hurt worker health and productivity. More frequent and intense extreme weather events will increasingly disrupt and damage critical infrastructure and property. And sea-level rise will threaten coastal communities and island nations."

Network for Greening the Financial System. (Paris, France: Network for Greening the Financial System, 2019).
“Climate change is one of many sources of structural change affecting the financial system. However, it has distinctive characteristics that mean it needs to be considered and managed differently. These include:
• Far-reaching impact in breadth and magnitude: climate change will affect all agents in the economy (households, businesses, governments), across all sectors and geographies. The risks will likely be correlated with and potentially aggravated by tipping points, in a non-linear fashion. This means the impacts could be much larger, and more widespread and diverse than those of other structural changes.
• Foreseeable nature: while the exact outcomes, time horizon and future pathway are uncertain, there is a high degree of certainty that some combination of physical and transition risks will materialise in the future.
•Irreversibility: the impact of climate change is determined by the concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere and there is currently no mature technology to reverse the process. Above a certain threshold, scientists have shown with a high degree of confidence that climate change will have irreversible consequences on our planet, though uncertainty remains about the exact severity and time horizon.
•Dependency on short-term actions: the magnitude and nature of the future impacts will be determined by actions taken today, which thus need to follow a credible and forward-looking policy path. This includes actions by governments, central banks and supervisors, financial market participants, firms and households.
While today’s macroeconomic models may not be able to accurately predict the economic and financial impact of climate change, climate science leaves little doubt: action to mitigate and adapt to climate change is needed now. The NGFS recognises that there is a strong risk that climate-related financial risks are not fully reflected in asset valuations. There is a need for collective leadership and globally coordinated action and, therefore, the role of international organisations and platforms is critical."

Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. (Basel, Switzerland: Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, 2019).
"In June 2017, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (Task Force or TCFD)
released its final recommendations(2017 report), which provide a framework for companies and other organizations to develop more effective climate-related financial disclosures through their existing reporting processes. In its 2017 report, the Task Force emphasized the importance of transparency in pricing risk—including risk related to climate change—to support informed, efficient capital-allocation decisions. The large-scale and complex nature of climate change makes it uniquely challenging, especially in the context of economic decision making. Furthermore, many companies incorrectly view the implications of climate change to be relevant only in the long term and, therefore, not necessarily relevant to decisions made today. Those views, however, have begun to change...As part of its efforts to promote adoption of the recommendations, the Task Force prepared this status report to provide an overview of current disclosure practices as they relate to the Task Force’s recommendations, highlight key challenges associated with implementing the recommendations, and outline some of the efforts the Task Force will consider undertaking in coming months to help address some of the implementation challenges."

HM Treasury. (London, UK: HM Treasury, 2019).
"A comprehensive approach to greening financial systems, mobilising finance for clean and resilient growth, and capturing the resulting opportunities for UK firms."

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
The “‘2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’ (IPSR) affirms the enduring U.S. commitment to stability and prosperity in the region through the pursuit of preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.
• Preparedness – Achieving peace through strength and employing effective deterrence requires a Joint Force that is prepared to win any conflict from its onset. The Department, alongside our Allies and partners, will ensure our combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the region. Furthermore, the Joint Force will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high-end adversaries.
• Partnerships – Our unique network of Allies and partners is a force multiplier to achieve peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability. The Department is reinforcing its commitment to established Alliances and Partnerships, while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners who share our respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law.
• Promotion of a Networked Region – The Department is strengthening and evolving U.S. Alliances and Partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order. The Department also continues to cultivate intra-Asian security relationships capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.
Advancing this Indo-Pacific vision requires an integrated effort that recognizes the critical linkages between economics, governance, and security – all fundamental components that shape the region’s competitive landscape. The Department of Defense, in partnership with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, regional institutions, and regional Allies and partners, will continue to diligently uphold a rules-based order that ensures peace and prosperity for all.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 18, 2019, streaming video, 1:54:21.
“In July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced $113 million for new economic and energy initiatives to flesh out the administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. These announcements included nearly $50 million for Asia EDGE, an initiative to promote energy security and develop energy markets, and $30 million for an initiative to boost infrastructure investment through financial and technical assistance to partner countries. Secretary Pompeo also voiced strong support for the BUILD Act, which is set to double the U.S. government’s development-finance capacity to $60 billion to support U.S. private investment in strategic opportunities abroad. Nearly one year later, what impact have these initiatives had for U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia?”

June 19, 2019, streaming video, 3:59:58.
“The annual CSIS-JETRO [Center for Strategic and International Studies-Japan External Trade Organization] conference, available for streaming.”

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019).
“The global population of forcibly displaced increased by 2.3 million people in 2018. By the end of the year, almost 70.8 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations. As a result, the world’s forcibly displaced population remained yet again at a record high.”

Institute for Economics & Peace. (Sydney, Australia, Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019).
“This is the thirteenth edition of the ‘Global Peace Index’ (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace
(IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on peace, its economic value, trends, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace using three thematic domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to presenting the findings from the 2019 GPI, this year’s report includes analysis of trends in Positive Peace: the attitudes, institutions, and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. It looks at the relationship between the actual peace of a country, as measured by the GPI, and Positive Peace, and how a deficit of Positive Peace is often a predictor of future increases in violent conflict. It also looks at the dynamic relationship between changes in Positive Peace and changes in the economy."

Owen, Robert C. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
“This study is an assessment of whether the US Air Force (USAF) should anticipate modernizing its core theater airlift fleet with aircraft designed for super-short takeoffs or landings under rough-field conditions (SSTOL-RF) or aircraft designs focused on vertical takeoffs or landings (VTOL) with secondary SSTOL-RF capabilities (V/SSTOL-RF). Several considerations speak to the timeliness of this issue. Most importantly, the ongoing evolution of USAF and Army (USA) war-fighting concepts increase their demand for mobility and sustainment support in quantities and places that the aircraft in the present airlift fleet cannot provide. Also, the present mainstay of the theater airlift fleet, the C-130, has been an inadequate platform for vital missions for decades. It is too small to link effectively and efficiently with large intertheater airlifters, such as the C-5, C-17, and civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) jumbo cargo aircraft at intermediate staging bases. Also, the C-130’s runway requirements limit its ability to connect to battlefield airlift helicopters or deliver forces and sustainment at forward-most points of need and effect (PON/E) themselves. Intratheater airlift, consequently, is the weak link in the USAF’s ability to provide a smooth flow of air and land combat forces and their sustainment in the early stages of conflicts and crises. Finally, although the USAF has not published a formal plan for theater airlift modernization, most officials interviewed for this study suggested sometime in the 2040s as the window for the next aircraft to appear. Given the experience of the C-17 program, which took 19 years to move from development contract to the first squadron reaching initial operational capability, a program aimed at putting a squadron of future theater airlifters on line by the middle 2040s should begin sometime in the early 2020s. As a contribution to conceptualizing the best path to a modern theater airlift fleet, then, this study will assess the SSTOL-RF and V/SSTOL-RF design approaches in terms of their ability to fulfill critical USA and USAF requirements and their operational risk profiles.”

Weeden, Brian, and Victoria Samson. (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, 2019).
"SWF launched a project in the summer of 2017 to develop an open source assessment of global counterspace capabilities. The purpose of the project was to provide a public assessment of counterspace capabilities being developed by countries based on unclassified information. We hope doing so will increase public knowledge of these issues, the willingness of policymakers to discuss these issues openly, and involvement of other stakeholders in the debate. We convened a group of international experts to work with our staff to compile publicly-available information for various countries developing counterspace capabilities across several categories: direct ascent, co-orbital, directed energy, electronic warfare, and cyber. For each of these categories, we assessed what the current and near-term capabilities might be for the countries examined in the report, based on the open source information. We also assessed the potential military utility for each capability, which includes both the advantages and disadvantages of the capabilities. Finally, when possible, we also examined each country’s policy, doctrine, and budget to support the offensive counterspace capabilities being developed. Taken together, the analysis is intended to provide a more holistic picture of what each country is working on, and how these capabilities may be used."

Harrison, Todd, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Studies Aerospace Security Project, 2019).
“While the vulnerabilities of U.S. national security space systems are often discussed publicly, the progress other nations are making in counterspace systems is not as readily accessible. The purpose of this report is to review the open-source information available on the counterspace capabilities that can threaten U.S. space systems. It is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus their attention. The report focuses on four specific countries that pose the greatest risk for the United States: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. A fifth section analyzes the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, including some allies and partners of the United States, and some non-state actors.”

Harrison, Todd, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Studies Aerospace Security Project, 2019).

Podcast of the Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador. “TechPlomacy is an acknowledgement of the key role that technology and digitalisation plays and will increasingly play in the future for individuals and societies alike. It is also a recognition of the political and global influence that the tech-industry has in the 21st Century. Technology will contribute to solving some of the most acute global challenges and bring about a positive transformation with enormous potential for people around the world…Yet rapid developments in areas such as Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, Internet of Things and cyber security also raise fundamental issues as to the future of public policy, regulation and global governance. We need a stronger multi-stakeholder discussion on how we want these new technologies to shape our societies in the future. This requires us to rethink the relationship between governments, civil society and the private sector.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019).
“The Trump Administration is committed to advancing women’s equality, seeking to protect the rights of women and girls, and promoting women and youth empowerment programs. The United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS Strategy) responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which President Donald J. Trump signed into law on October 6, 2017. This is the first legislation of its kind globally, which makes the United States the first country in the world with a comprehensive law on WPS, and de facto, the first with a whole-of-government strategy that responds to such a domestic law. The WPS Strategy recognizes the diverse roles women play as agents of change in preventing and resolving conflict, countering terrorism and violent extremism, and building post conflict peace and stability. The WPS Strategy seeks to increase women’s meaningful leadership in political and civic life by helping to ensure they are empowered to lead and contribute, equipped with the necessary skills and support to succeed, and supported to participate through access to opportunities and resources.”

Keene, Shima D. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“This monograph provides an assessment of the emerging threat posed by foreign jihadist fighters following the reduction in territory controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and recommends ways that the U.S. Army should address the issues highlighted.”

Ganguly, Samit, and M. Chris Mason. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“As global competition with an increasingly assertive Chinese Government expands, the strategic relationship between India and the United States is assuming ever-greater importance. From a superficial perspective, a strategic partnership seems to make a great deal of sense for both countries. Yet, enormous political, cultural, and structural obstacles remain between them, which continue to slow the progress in security cooperation to a crawl, relative to China’s economic and military advances. The authors explore these impediments frankly and suggest practical ways to build trust and establish confidence.”

Pyykönen, Juha, and Stefan Forss. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“With enhanced cooperation from the U.S. Army, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Nordic partner nations could combine efforts with each other and with the Alliance to deliver effective and visible regional deterrence against a resurgent Russia in the Nordic-Baltic region. This monograph by two leading Finnish defense academics explores the regional defense environment and optimum roles for the United States.”

Flanagan, Stephen J., et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“The authors of this report assess how unconventional defense plans and capabilities — to include total and comprehensive defense, societal resilience, and resistance strategies — being pursued by the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (referred to as the Baltic states) can deter and counteract Russian hybrid aggression and military attacks in the Baltic region. They advance a framework for evaluating the utility of unconventional and total defense efforts at various phases of conflict for strengthening deterrence and defense. They identify military and civilian technologies that could enhance the effectiveness of these efforts, the cost of procuring those technologies, and possible tradeoffs with the development of conventional defense capabilities.”

Fox, Amos C. (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2019).
“The fight for the Donetsk airport, hammered out through two distinct battles between May 2014 and January 2015, illustrates that violent battles of attrition still loom large in the modern wars of the Information Age. Additionally, the contest illustrates the lengths to which the Russian Federation is willing to go to maintain its strategic and operational interests in Ukraine. The battles serve as the sinew between Russia’s summer and winter offensives; these offensives were initiated to preserve Russia’s proxy forces—the Donetsk People’s Army and the Luhansk People’s Army—and to destroy Ukrainian offensive capabilities. Consequently, these battles were catalysts for the winter offensive’s decisiveness in the campaign. The struggle for the Donetsk airport illustrates Russia’s effectiveness in deploying forces from every corner of the Federation, rapidly training those forces and feeding them into battle. The conflict also served as excellent training ground for Russian tank, infantry and artillery formations, and, as part of a larger campaign, provided the opportunity for 47 percent of Russian land forces to gain indispensable combat experience—a point that must not be taken for granted. In the end, these battles resulted in a pulverized airport, in the Ukrainian army being blunted and defeated and in Russia being able to maintain access and influence in eastern Ukraine.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“This presentation presents a survey of open source metrics and data on the situation in Afghanistan in the spring of 2019. It focuses on the areas where it is possible to map and quantify current developments – recognizing that such indicators can only cover part of the complex issues involved. It does, however, present material that helps address three key challenges shaping Afghanistan’s future:
• The need to address all of the key threats involved in the war – including those generated by the Afghan government and U.S. actions.
• The fact that the U.S. now seems to be on the edge of making hard choices about staying, seeking a peace, or finding ways to withdraw even if a peace is not reached.
• A long list of critical uncertainties, only some of which can be addressed with any confidence.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Burke Chair at CSIS is issuing the first report in a three-part survey of metrics that address the fighting in Iraq and Syria, the ongoing challenge of extremism…Part One – ‘Daesh, Syria and Iraq’ – contained some 60 different metrics covering the trends in war on Daesh in Syria and Iraq, the outcome of the fighting, and the remaining threats to stability in Syria and Iraq.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Part Two…surveys the broader trends in Islam, and in Islamic extremism. It then focuses on these trends in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the scale of the continuing threat they pose to the stability of the MENA region.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Part Three…provides a series of metrics that measure the extent of civil unrest and instability by region and by country. The break-outs by country are critical to understanding the forces at work. The MENA region is often described as Arab – despite the existence of Israel – and as Muslim despite the presence of large Christian and other minorities in many states and the diverse nature of sects within Islam. As the maps in this section show, however, it consists of highly a diverse mix of nations with different neighbors, populations, political and economic conditions, and often major ethnic, regional, tribal, and sectarian differences. In practice, this makes national vulnerability to extremism and terrorism highly case specific, and involves intangibles that cannot be easily quantified, if at all. At the same time, there are many problems and issues in the civil structure of MENA states and other heavily Islamic states that can lead to political upheavals, extremism and terrorism, and civil conflict. The UN’s Arab Development Reports have long warned about these problems, and so have a wide variety of outside intelligence reports, and academic and think tanks studies.”

Council of Councils. (New York, NY: Council of Councils, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
"Global think tank leaders grade the world's performance and prospects for 2019."

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2019).
"The 'NIDS China Security Report' is published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) to provide analysis conducted by its researchers on China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. The report is widely disseminated both in Japan and overseas. Since March 2011 it has been published annually in Japanese, Chinese, and English editions. The 'NIDS China Security Report' has attracted significant interest from research institutions and the media in Japan and abroad, and the analysis offered in these reports has allowed NIDS to promote exchange and dialogue with research institutions and interested parties in a number of countries, including China. The 'China Security Report 2019,' the ninth in this series and subtitled 'China’s Strategy for Reshaping the Asian Order and Its Ramifications,' analyzes the content and outlook of China’s strategy for the international order. This report further analyzes the country’s strategy for a new international order in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific island countries, detailing the sort of influence that it exerts on each of those areas. In writing this report, the authors have endeavored to present an objective analysis while taking note of suggestions gained by exchanging opinions with researchers and stake-holders in Japan and abroad. The primary and secondary sources of information referred to for this report are listed in the endnotes."

Golley, Jane, et al. (eds.) (Canberra, Australia: Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian Centre on China in the World, 2019).
"In 2018, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was, by most measures, more powerful than at any other time in its history and had become one of the most powerful countries in the world. Its economy faced serious challenges, including from the ongoing ‘trade war’ with the U.S., but still ranked as the world’s second largest. Its Belt and Road Initiative, meanwhile, continued to carve paths of influence and economic integration across several continents. A deft combination of policy, investment, and entrepreneurship has also turned the PRC into a global ‘techno-power’. It aims, with a good chance of success, at becoming a global science and technology leader by 2049 – one hundred years from the founding of the PRC. In surveying the various ways in which the Party-state wields its hard, soft, and sharp power, the ‘China Story Yearbook: Power’ offers readers a sense of the diversity of power at work both in China and abroad. Citizens of the PRC have long negotiated the state’s influence; increasingly diaspora communities and other actors are now being subject to its might. As with previous editions in the series, we place important developments in historical context, and adopt a cross-disciplinary approach: it is our view that economy and politics cannot be divorced from culture, history, and society. The Yearbook provides accessible analysis of the main events and trends of the year and is an essential tool for understanding China’s growing power and influence around the world."

Engelke, Peter, and David Michel. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
"Himalayan Asia is a shorthand term referring to the Asian countries that depend on river water from the high mountain ranges of the Tibetan Plateau. As the rivers produced by the Himalayas and other mountain ranges on the Plateau are under increasingly serious pressure, water insecurity threatens much of the continent’s peace and security. Himalayan Asia’s transboundary water dynamics threaten to erode interstate cooperation, including among the continent’s major powers, risk worsening geopolitical competition, and heighten the odds of domestic and interstate conflict. Yet there are viable pathways for avoiding such outcomes, the most important of which treat water as a shared resource to be managed cooperatively. This report focuses on the intersection between Himalayan Asia’s changing ecology and the dynamic competition for geopolitical leadership among its major powers. It seeks to better inform U.S. strategies and policies to preclude the degradation of societal cohesion across Asia and prevent the outbreak of major-power conflict over shared water resources. The goal is to facilitate cooperative, positive-sum solutions to resource use in this critical region of the world."

Milevski, Lukas. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block—combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent’s freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.”

Galvin, Thomas P., and Dale E. Watson (eds.) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
"With a Foreword from MG John Kem, 51st Commandant of the U.S. Army War College. The 4th edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer represents a major change in direction from previous editions. In the past, one could assume most U.S. Army War College students had little prior experience at the strategic level. In 2019, this is no longer the case, as some War College students have already served in enterprise-level assignments or performed duties at the strategic level in operational environments. The new Primer includes chapters on defining strategic leadership; understanding competitive environments both external and internal to the organization, competitive strategy; the evolving roles, competencies, and character required of leaders at the strategic level; and the need for continuous and lifelong development. The Primer is applicable for all senior service college students and graduates--whether military or senior civilian, US or international."

Giles, Keir. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).
“Big data amplifies a classical problem of military leadership, namely, making critical decisions based on limited and often unreliable information. This monograph considers three leadership models that provide an alternative to an overreliance on technological solutions to address new challenges emerging at the various stages of the intelligence process.”

Hwang, Tim. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).
“How should the defense community best organize to combat modern campaigns of propaganda and disinformation? Without a broader strategic concept of the nature of the challenge posed by these techniques, current efforts and investments run the risk of simply chasing the latest tactics without establishing enduring security. This monograph offers a way forward, proposing a cohesive strategic framework for thinking about modern information warfare and its effective conduct.”

Troeder, Elizabeth G. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).
“This monograph provides an assessment of gray zone tactics used by the most active U.S. adversaries and builds the case for requiring U.S. Federal agencies to request that the Deputy National Security Advisor convene a National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever any Federal agency deems a gray zone approach to an international issue is appropriate. It also recommends that the United States should pursue the development of a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for gray zone solutions, with sub-NSC/PCCs for each component of the 4+1 (Russia, China, Iraq, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations) so that experts can be quickly assembled in times of crisis.”

Mienie, Edward, and C. A. Pfaff. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“In August of 2017, Blackwater founder Erik Prince offered a plan for privatizing the war in Afghanistan, where he would replace the approximately 23,000 multinational forces (of which 15,000 are U.S. troops) and 27,000 contractors with 2,000 special forces and 6,000 security contractors who would embed with the Afghan National Army. Though the administration apparently rejected the plan at the time, multiple media outlets report there may be renewed interest, especially given the United States remains unable to resolve the conflict despite adopting a new, more aggressive strategy. Predictably, and justifiably, this interest has sparked a great deal of concern. Both former Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chief of Staff John Kelly, in addition to a host of others, are reportedly opposed to the plan. With their departure, another opportunity to reconsider Prince’s proposal may arise.”

Task Force on Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
“At the request of Senator Martha McSally during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 14, 2019, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan pledged to form a team of experts to take a fresh look at specific issues involving sexual assault, with a focus on the investigative and accountability processes. To this end, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force (SAAITF) to identify, evaluate, and recommend immediate and significant actions to improve the accountability process, specific to the investigation and disposition of cases in which members of the Armed Forces are either victims or alleged offenders of sexual assault, while ensuring due process for both. The SAAITF recognizes the significant military justice reform the Department has gone through since 2006 and, most recently, with the Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA 16), fully implemented earlier this year… In light of recent reforms, the charge of the SAAITF was to develop bold recommendations for improvements to the military justice system in the areas of accountability, in particular commander and military justice practitioner responsibilities and authorities, comprehensive support to victims, and protection of rights for both the victim and the accused. The end result is specific and significant recommendations to help Commanders set command/organizational climate, enhance victim support, and ensure fair and just support for the accused, to include:
• Improving the ability of the commander to set appropriate command climate by identifying sexual harassment as a ‘stand alone’ military crime vice being addressed under broader charges that do not highlight the severity of these behaviors
• Improving support to the victim by providing additional information and assistance throughout the process, including more consistent and regular updates and notifications
• Providing a dedicated investigation capability for defense counsel to help them defend accused Service members.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
“China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a ‘period of strategic opportunity’ during the initial two decades of the 21st century to develop domestically and expand China’s ‘comprehensive national power.’ Over the coming decades, they are focused on realizing a powerful and prosperous China that is equipped with a ‘world-class’ military, securing China’s status as a great power with the aim of emerging as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, China continued harnessing an array of economic, foreign policy, and security tools to realize this vision. Ongoing state-led efforts, which China implements both at home and abroad and which often feature economic and diplomatic initiatives, also support China’s security and military objectives.”

Chatzky, Andrew, and James McBride. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious infrastructure investment effort in history. But is it also a plan to remake the global balance of power?”

United States Institute of Peace. April 25, 2019, streaming video, 3:10:57.
“China hosted its second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on April 26-27, two years after hosting its inaugural forum that was attended by dozens of world leaders and put a spotlight on Beijing’s massive signature initiative and its global leadership ambitions. Now in its sixth year, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which Chinese President Xi Jinping has called the 'project of the century'—has been welcomed by countries seeking Chinese investment and loans. But it has also raised significant concerns about the sustainability of and intentions behind the initiative. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a conference that will look at the impact of China’s signature connectivity initiative on peace and security."

Feng Yujun, et al. (Beijing: Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2019).
“Despite the BRI’s prevalence in discussions of China’s global engagement, many experts are divided on how to interpret it. Is it a global strategy or just an interregional initiative? How can countries and international companies participate in its growth and development?”

"Dollar and Sense" podcast from Brookings. April 29, 2019, streaming audio, 0:25:08.
"Deborah Brautigam, director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, joins Senior Fellow David Dollar to discuss China's Belt and Road Initiative and its implications for Africa. Brautigam and Dollar address the scale of Chinese financing in Africa and around the world, debt-trap diplomacy, labor issues, and much more."

"Promoting research, conducting evidence-based analysis, fostering collaboration, and training future leaders to better understand the economic and political dimensions of China-Africa relations and their implications for human security and global development."

Center for Strategic and International Studies Global Infrastructure Task Force. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"Over the next 15 years, more hard infrastructure is projected to be built around the world than currently exists. This global build-out is already underway, and the changes it brings will only accelerate. Infrastructure projects, especially in the transport, energy, information and communications technology (ICT), and water sectors, have long been recognized as the backbone of modern economies. Going forward, emerging digital infrastructure, including fifth-generation (5G) networks, remote sensing, and other advanced technologies, will be especially critical. As our infrastructure is transformed, so will be the economies it fuels, the regions it connects, and the global commons it underpins. These trends are too powerful and potentially beneficial for the United States to stop, and too consequential to ignore."

Dasewicz, Agnes, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"The launch of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) in October 2019 is an extraordinary opportunity to accelerate capital flows into emerging and frontier markets in support of U.S. national security, development, and commercial objectives. The new agency is inheriting a fundamentally solid foundation to build upon from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). However, it would represent a tremendous missed opportunity if the USDFC merely replicated OPIC’s activities at a higher volume. This is especially the case for infrastructure finance, the sector where USDFC has the greatest potential to have impact. To help ensure success at scale, we recommend the USDFC:
A. Focus on fast-growing emerging market urban clusters by organizing investment opportunities around building Smart Cities.
B. Respond to unmet power needs by investing aggressively in both hard and soft energy infrastructure and technology.
C. Help close the digital divide with soft infrastructure investments."

Parton, Charles. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2019).
"This Occasional Paper seeks to outline the likely extent of the Chinese Communist Party's interference activities in the UK and to make some recommendations on what needs to be done to counter them."

Singer, Peter Warren. (Washington, DC: New America, 2019).
"Robots, artificial intelligence, cyberwar, 3D printing, bio-enhancements, and a new geopolitical competition; the 21st century is being shaped by a range of exciting, and scary, new trends and technologies. We should also expect them to shape the worlds of insurgency and terrorism. The following report will first explore the technologic changes that loom in the years leading toward 2030 and beyond, and then propose a series of their potential implications for conflict."

This Library Alert focuses on Europe, for two reasons. First, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recently had its seventh anniversary. Second, the recent Brexit extension. Brexit is a major geopolitical and geoeconomic event. As such, a succinct selection of resources from American and British think tanks is provided. Brexit is also a very fluid event. As such, some resources included may be slightly but not wholly dated by the fast pace of events.

Schroeder, Wayne A. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“As NATO reaches its seventieth anniversary in 2019, the Alliance is facing new challenges both externally and internally. The reemergence of Russia as a strategic threat has led to the reexamination of NATO’s warfighting capabilities and the gaps that exist to adequately defend and deter. At the same time, both renewed US focus and the emergence of new security threats have placed increased pressure on member states to reach established spending targets. The need to outfit and equip NATO for great power competition, as well as increased pressure to invest more in defense, provides an opportunity to strengthen NATO for the future. Yet the path forward is still unclear. What investments should be prioritized in the land, air, maritime, space and cyber domains? And how should the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent be modernized? In ‘NATO at Seventy: Filling NATO’s Critical Defense-Capability Gaps’ Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Dr. Wayne A. Schroeder offers a comprehensive menu of options for the Alliance to shape its investments in these critical areas and ensure that NATO retains its fighting mindset well past its seventieth anniversary in 2019. The report features a foreword by Air Marshall Sir Chris Harper KBE, former director general of the International Military staff at NATO (2013-16)."

The German Marshall Fund of the United States YouTube page, 18 videos
"On April 3-4, NATO’s founding date, Allied foreign ministers convened in Washington, DC to commemorate achievements over the last seven decades, address the challenges facing the Alliance today, and highlight its enduring value and mission going forward."

Atlantic Council. April 12, 2019, streaming video, 1:02:25. Program begins about 09:11.
“Much uncertainty remains regarding Brexit and the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom. At the same time, European citizens and businesses need clarity and expect vision. In this light, Vice President Dombrovskis will join the Atlantic Council for a very timely discussion on the future of the European Union. More specifically, he will explain the EU’s preparedness for different Brexit scenarios, including in the area of financial services. He will share his views about regulatory cooperation for global financial markets, sustainable finance, and will reflect on the international role of the Euro. Furthermore, he will preview what’s at stake at the European elections in May, possible foreign influence on the elections - and how they might be affected by populist discourse.”

Wemer, David A. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 12, 2019).

Roberts, John M. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 11, 2019).

Chatham House. April 4, 2019, streaming audio, 1:07:47.
“The panellists assess the future of the Atlantic alliance with a particular focus on Britain’s relationship with NATO. To what extent, if any, will Brexit reshape the power dynamics between NATO member states? With 80 per cent of the alliance’s defence spending expected to come from non-EU members, is the EU at risk of getting sidelined in meaningful strategic conversations moving forward? And how should Britain – which played a leading role in creating NATO in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War – respond to uncertainty about NATO’s future?”

Chatham House. February 14, 2019, streaming audio, 22:35.
“Debating the challenges of a new international economic order including the de-liberalization of international trade and the potential impacts of Brexit on the Japan-UK partnership.”

Chatham House. January 30, 2019, streaming audio, 59:25.
“Considering the recent divergence of UK and US policies in international affairs, our panel assesses the present state of the US-UK relationship and its future trajectory.”

Conley, Heather A., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Kremlin has developed a pattern of malign influence across Europe. It does so through the cultivation of ‘an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making.’ This network of political and economic connections—an ‘unvirtuous’ cycle of influence—thrives on corruption and the exploitation of governance gaps in key markets and institutions. Ultimately, the aim is to weaken and destroy democratic systems from within. There has been a visible political awakening to the national security threat posed by this widespread and insidious Russian malign influence since 2016. From the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 to strengthened anti-money laundering rules in the European Union, the transatlantic community has taken some steps to address this threat. But to truly eradicate this threat, Western democracies must acknowledge their enablement of malign economic influence and uproot it from their financial systems.”

McCarthy, Michael C., Matthew A. Moyer, and Brett H. Venable. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The United States lacks a cohesive strategy to deter Russian aggression. Despite being militarily and economically inferior, Russia has undermined the United States and its allies by exploiting the ‘gray zone,’ or the conceptual space between war and peace where nations compete to advance their national interests. In dealing with Russia, the United States must shift its strategic framework from a predominantly military-centric model to one that comprises a whole-of-government approach. The holistic approach must leverage a combination of diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) measures. In this timely and prescient monograph, three active duty military officers and national security fellows from the Harvard Kennedy School look to address this contemporary and complex problem. Through extensive research and consultation with some of the nation’s and academia’s foremost experts, the authors offer policymakers a menu of strategic options to deter Russia in the gray zone and protect vital U.S. national security interests.”

Hunzeker, Michael A., and Alexander Lanoszka. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face daunting challenges in the Baltic region. Russia is behaving aggressively. Its military is more capable than it has been at any point since the end of the Cold War. More importantly, Russia is finding creative ways to subvert the status quo and to sow discord without triggering Article 5 of NATO, which declares that an attack against one member is an attack against all. These problems are formidable, but we have reason to be optimistic. Far from shattering NATO’s cohesion and undermining its resolve, Russian aggression has reinvigorated the alliance. Nor is Russia an unstoppable adversary. It has many weaknesses. Indeed, Russian fears over those vulnerabilities might be driving its aggressive foreign policy. Even if this is not the case and Russia is indeed a relentless predator, it is nevertheless a vulnerable one. The United States and its NATO allies can take advantage of these vulnerabilities. After assessing Russian intentions, capabilities, and limitation, this monograph recommends a hedging strategy to improve early detection capabilities, enhance deterrence in unprovocative ways, and improve regional defenses against a hybrid threat. Achieving these goals should help the United States deter Russia and reassure regional allies more effectively while managing our own worst fears.”

Caton, Jeffrey L. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“In 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the DoD Cyber Strategy which explicitly calls for a comprehensive strategy to provide credible deterrence in cyberspace against threats from key state and nonstate actors. To be effective, such activities must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence efforts in the physical realm, especially those of near-peers impacting critical global regions such as China in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia in Europe. It is important for the U.S. Army to identify and plan for any unique roles that they may provide to these endeavors. This study explores the evolving concept of deterrence in cyberspace in three major areas:
• First, the monograph addresses the question: What is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace? The discussion includes an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence found in professional literature.
• Second, it examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in cyberspace deterrence? This section provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the deterrence efforts in cyberspace as well as in the broader context of strategic deterrence. The section also addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict.
• Third, the monograph provides recommendations for changing or adapting the DoD and Army responsibilities to better define and implement the evolving concepts and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic domain of cyberspace.”

Zacharias, Greg. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
"In 'Autonomous Horizons,' Dr. Greg Zacharias, Chief Scientist of the United States Air Force 2015–18, explores next steps in autonomous systems (AS) development, fielding, and training. Rapid advances in AS development and artificial intelligence (AI) research will change how we think about machines, whether they are individual vehicle platforms or networked enterprises. The payoff will be considerable, affording us significant protection for our Airmen, greater effectiveness in employment, and unlimited opportunities for novel and disruptive concepts of operations. Autonomous Horizons identifies issues and makes recommendations for the Air Force to take full advantage of this transformational technology."

Caudill, Shannon W. (ed.) (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
“Defending air bases from attack remains a major operational challenge in every theater and every conflict. Airfields are strategic targets; they allow for the generation and projection of crucial military power and are usually a key joint and/or coalition command and control node. The growing problem of adversary antiaccess and area-denial strategies only adds to the necessity of studying integrated base defense, with special emphasis on ground-based threats. Since the Vietnam War, ground-based threats have been our biggest challenge as adversaries have sought to counter US airpower from the ground rather than in the air. Future conflicts will continue to see enemy strategies designed to inhibit air operations from a distance through not only growing missile technologies but also traditional methods like indirect fire, special operations, and sapper attacks…Since AU Press released ‘Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency’ in May 2014, there has been a groundswell of support for a second project designed to add more depth and fill gaps in the literature. The first volume essentially bridged the gap in the literature that existed since the last publication on this subject in 1995. This second project examines more current topics like base defense in AirSea Battle (renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons), modern air support for base defense, counter-intelligence enablers, and commander responsibilities for air base defense. Further, it offers a more focused assessment of base defense in the Afghanistan theater of operation, projected technological advances in base defense, and unique air base defense challenges found in the beginning (getting in) and ending of conflicts (getting out). This volume also presents new research based on Colonel Caudill’s Air Command and Staff College base defense research elective, featuring a research partnership with the Air Force Historical Research Agency.”

Pompeo, Michael R. (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2018).
“The Department of State prepared this report using information from U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, foreign government officials, nongovernmental and international organizations, jurists and legal experts, journalists, academics, labor activists, and published reports. U.S. diplomatic missions abroad prepared the initial drafts of the individual country reports. Once the initial drafts of the individual country reports were completed by U.S. missions abroad, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), in cooperation with other Department of State offices with the relevant country and regional expertise, reviewed and edited the reports, drawing on its own sources of information and the Department of Labor. Bureau officers also consulted experts in the Department of State and elsewhere on worker rights, refugee issues, police and security issues, women’s issues, and legal matters, among many others. The guiding principles were that all information be reported objectively, thoroughly, and fairly. DRL, working with other Department offices as necessary, also ensured that all reports followed the same methodology and conformed to standard format and structure.”

Runde, Daniel F., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The fourth industrial revolution is underway, and technological changes will disrupt economic systems, displace workers, concentrate power and wealth, and erode trust in public institutions and the democratic political process. Up until now, the focus has largely been on how technology itself will impact society, with little attention being paid to the role of institutions. The relationship between societies and their institutions is changing, and countries will have to strengthen their capacities to avoid heightened social divisions. They must build resilience through gradual and intentional interventions designed for long-term, sustainable development. It is also essential that institutions work hard to build credibility and use available development tools, such as development finance institutions and foreign aid, to mitigate the risks of disruption. Countries and other stakeholders must pioneer these initiatives to successfully navigate the disruptions stemming from the fourth industrial revolution. The revision of existing models of education, skill development and investment and the integration of different stakeholders into the conversation will be critical in helping institutions play a productive role in rebooting the innovation agenda. This new report, ‘Rebooting the Innovation Agenda,’ analyzes the need for resilient institution and the role they are expected to play in the fourth industrial revolution.”

Roberts, Thomas G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Over 60 years ago, the Soviet Union used a derivative of its R-7 rocket—often called the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—to launch an artificial satellite into orbit, marking the first orbital space launch from the spaceport now known as the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Since then, launch vehicles have reached orbit from 27 spaceports around the world. With the rate of space launches projected to grow exponentially in the coming years, spaceports will become an increasingly important and potentially limiting factor in the global space industry. This report analyzes ground-based space launches from 1957 to 2018, including brief histories of all active and inactive orbital spaceports, 10 year launch records for the 22 spaceports still in use today, and the current status of several proposals to create new facilities capable of supporting orbital space launches. Ground-based spaceports are typically built in geopolitically favorable locations. Many spaceports are located in the most physically optimal regions available to operators, with geographic characteristics that include close proximity to the equator, opportunities for eastward or near-eastward launch, and favorable environmental factors. Historically, orbital space launch operations have been closely tied with ballistic missile research, leading several ICBM development and testing centers to later become spaceports. Due to the political risk associated with both missile development and orbital space launch testing, several spaceports were originally created such that their precise positions could remain ambiguous. In at least one case, a spaceport was created with the intention of being entirely secret—with its operator denying its existence for more than 15 years.”

Parello-Plesner, Jonas. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The EU’s current policy toward China needs to be updated to reflect the country’s continued authoritarian turn and to better secure European interests. China is no longer, as it still claims, a developing country; it has a clear plan for a strong global leadership role. It impacts the EU and its member states in many areas, from trade to technology to military matters. Reflecting that reality, there are important ways in which EU policy can be improved. On economic relations, the EU has moved toward demanding reciprocity but it needs enforcement on China’s subsidies and technology transfers. On technology and the issue of 5G, a standard that will become the backbone of the EU’s digital economy and democracy, a joint European approach is needed to avoid dependence on authoritarian China. More broadly, the EU’s policy needs a health check in many areas, including science cooperation that can benefit China’s military advancement and surveillance repression at home; academic, media and cultural relations where China can affect freedoms in the EU; and Chinese interference in European politics. For the EU, it is no longer only a question of trying to promote human rights in China, but of defending its values at home. And, ultimately, a stronger EU policy depends on the difficult task of getting buy-in by all member states.”

Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“This report analyzes the current character of competition between the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and examines how culture impacts the ways the services posture themselves to gain resources, authorities, access, and influence.
The report identifies cultural characteristics, primary goals, and competitive strategies exhibited by the military services and USSOCOM. Further, it explores the current modalities of competition and tactics of competition employed by each service. The authors evaluate whether the cultures of the services have changed substantively over time and whether the services wield as much influence as they did before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Finally, the authors assess how each service might adapt and respond if it faced major policy shifts in the future, focusing specifically on contingencies in China and North Korea. The authors make three essential arguments: First, service personalities are alive and well. They endure, but they also evolve slowly to allow adaptation to the present environment. Second, post–Goldwater-Nichols, services remain the most powerful organizational actors in national defense. However, their relative edge over the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff has decreased, leading to a more complex field of competition. Third, this complexity introduced by Goldwater-Nichols has created changes to the character of competition in the national security arena. The relevant actors have expanded to include elevated roles for the Marine Corps and USSOCOM, and the tactics and arenas of competition have changed.”

Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“Army enlisted service is an enduring American tradition. Men and women, often recent high school graduates, leave home to serve their country and experience the challenges of Basic Combat Training and the camaraderie of life on a military base. But there is much more to Army service than the outlines with which most Americans are familiar. A separate RAND Arroyo Center report details the service experiences of 81 junior enlisted soldiers across many similar topics. The objective of this report is to provide deeper insight into the junior enlisted experience in a way that is accessible to policymakers and senior Army leaders, junior leaders, recruiters, and individuals considering an Army career. This volume goes beyond the archetypes and bumper stickers to tell the stories of six soldiers in their own words. In these chapters, readers learn about their decisions to join the Army, the joys and frustrations of their jobs, and their considerations for the future. The narratives identify some leadership behaviors that support soldier success and others that make soldiers' lives more difficult. The interviews have been edited for clarity and readability, and some details changed to protect soldiers' confidentiality; otherwise, these words are theirs alone, with a few opening and concluding thoughts from the authors to capture key lessons.”

Galvin, Thomas P. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Strategic communication has come to be a popular term to describe the process by which U.S. military organizations managed and unified their planned communications efforts. Unfortunately, joint doctrine leaves many of the words associated with strategic communication undefined, including themes and messages, and "strategic communication" has long suffered from definitional problems. While many commentators and experts have criticized the shortcomings of U.S. communication efforts, especially in operational environments, very little attention has been given to documenting success stories that suggest tools that leaders can use to design and implement campaigns. This book details two case studies of successful strategic communication campaigns—the Multi-Year Roadmap in Stabilization Force-Bosnia and the creation of the U.S. Africa Command. Both campaigns began in environments unfavorable to the commanders and their organizations but, in both cases, the campaign helped turn perceptions of the command into a more favorable light. The book concludes by drawing on the facts of the two cases to present a general architecture for communication campaigns applicable in both enterprise and operational contexts.”

Giles, Keir. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, alarmed not only Western-leaning states in Central Europe and the Baltic but also Moscow’s traditional allies. These events signaled that Moscow is now willing and capable of using direct military force against perceived strategic threats in its self-proclaimed region of vested interests. With the exception of Ukraine and the Baltic States, this Letort Paper examines how Russia’s front-line states have adjusted their foreign policy posture since 2014. Belarus, Moldova, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus calculate the benefits and risks in their relationship with Moscow and either make concessions or strengthen their defenses accordingly to avoid triggering a Russian reaction. This Letort Paper provides a range of policy recommendations intended to maximize the opportunities of a new alignment with the West for these states while minimizing the risk of Russia, using again, those capabilities it has demonstrated in Ukraine and Syria.”

Crane, Conrad C., Michael E Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“The establishment of Army Futures Command (AFC) in August 2018 was the most significant change to the Institutional Army in a generation, and it signaled the value the Army placed on studying the future. While the establishment of a new four star headquarters might be seen as a bold move, it was in reality the culmination of 30 years of future development in the Army. Those three decades saw the development of numerous structures designed to examine the potential for future concepts and technology, with uneven success. The processes were good, but technological overreach, and over 20 years of war in the Middle East, doomed most efforts to put useful concepts into practice. Army visionaries such as Generals William E. DePuy and Donn A. Starry had planned for the future as early as the 1970s with an eye on the past, and initiated the programs and doctrine necessary to transform and modernize the Army following Vietnam.”

Crane, Conrad C., Michael E Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,’ provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. ‘Riding the Hydra,’ however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war. When President George W. Bush made the decision to launch the war in Iraq, the Army faced a two-front war for the first time since World War II. Though the Army in 2002 was much better trained, equipped, and ready than its predecessor sixty years before, it still showed the effects of declining budgets and lack of strategic focus. The modern, professional Army requires bureaucratic processes in order to coordinate a complex and highly sophisticated system. The defense budgets have declined over the years, but they remain as much as 14 percent of the total federal budget. Managing those funds properly and legally requires a system of firm controls.”

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities. The length of initial entry or Basic Combat Training (BCT) has also waxed and waned over the years, ranging from as long as 17 weeks (1943) (not including OSUT) to as short as 8 weeks (1980). There were always external factors that affected the amount of training time available, such as budgets, force structure, institutional infrastructure, and end strength. This study focuses largely, however, on how the Army used the time allotted. The analysis focuses primarily on infantry skills, but also examines other training where necessary for clarity. (Non-infantry, especially sustainment MOSs, have traditionally received less marksmanship training.) The unifying concept is that all initial entry-training categories have remained the same for Soldiers throughout the period, while time spent on each category has fluctuated. Soldiers received different training in specialties.”

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). This case study examines the political, economic, military, and strategic environment in the years between 1945 and 1950 to illustrate the complexity of the readiness issue. Readiness in the strategic context concerned many more issues than simply personnel status or equipment availability.”

Smith, Dan, et al. (The Hague: Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations and SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute], 2019).
“Climate-related events left no region unaffected in 2018. These events demonstrate how climate change impacts are worsening. Despite increased geopolitical tensions that seem to undermine the Agenda 2030 or the Paris Agreement, global and regional organisations have been able to achieve some progress in addressing and mitigating climate-related security risks. This report, prepared for the Planetary Security Conference taking place in The Hague on 19-20 February 2019, feeds into the conversation by sketching the past year’s trends in relation to climate and security.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019).
“Continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019).

Rayburn, Joel D., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War’ is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to ‘surge’ additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the ‘surge’ and its aftermath in the second volume.
This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of hand-picked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,’ represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.”

Rayburn, Joel D., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).

Fitzsimmons, Michael. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
"Scenario planning should be one of the Pentagon’s most important tools for developing strategy for an uncertain future. However, the formalized joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development—Support for Strategic Analysis—has faced many challenges over the past 2 decades, and has ultimately proven less influential than intended on strategic decision-making. Explaining why is the main purpose of this monograph. It argues that scenario analysis has been most effective in supporting capability and program development, while it has fallen short in shaping strategy and force structure. The reasons for this are numerous and are rooted in intrinsic, structural characteristics of decision-making in large organizations. The monograph concludes with several recommendations for rejuvenating scenario planning in the Pentagon."

Galvin, Thomas P. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Traditional approaches to strategic communication have focused on a single leader's ability to influence stakeholders and other audiences through exceptional communication skills. But there is much more to it. What about the content of the message? How well does the message permeate the organization, allowing it to speak and act as one with the leader? Is it necessary to change minds, or is it sufficient to discredit opposing messages? Using a broad base of literature from organizational studies and the author's experiences, this monograph offers a thought process for building communication campaigns that focus both internally and externally to the organization. Includes a Foreword by Mari K. Eder, U.S. Army Major General Retired and author of ‘Leading the Narrative: The Case for Strategic Communication.’”

Caton, Jeffrey L. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Cyberspace operations have become pervasive in the United States, and they enable many aspects of modern life for the average citizen, such as entertainment, communication, education, transportation, banking, and voting. The continuing development of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve component cyberspace units can leverage the capabilities and experience of industry and academia to help protect critical information infrastructure and enhance national security. What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force?”

Caton, Jeffrey L. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The first 7 years of U.S. Cyber Command operations are paved with milestones that mark the steady operationalization of modern cyberspace as the newest domain of military conflict as well as a realm of international power. The creation of the Cyber Mission Force and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber are significant steps toward improving the timeliness and effectiveness of cyberspace operations that directly support combatant commands and the whole-of-government responses to cyberspace threats. It focuses on the central question: “What is the context in which different military services approach cyberspace component operations internally as well as with the Department of Defense?”

Bunker, Robert J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“This monograph focuses on an understudied, but yet a critically important and timely component of land warfare, related to the battlefield use of chemical weapons by contemporary threat forces. It will do so by focusing on two case studies related to chemical weapons use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad regime and the Islamic State. Initially, the monograph provides an overview of the chemical warfare capabilities of these two entities; discusses selected incidents of chemical weapons use each has perpetrated; provides analysis and lessons learned concerning these chemical weapons incidents, their programs, and the capabilities of the Assad regime and the Islamic State; and then presents U.S. Army policy and planning considerations on this topical areas of focus. Ultimately, such considerations must be considered vis-à-vis U.S. Army support of Joint Force implementation of National Command Authority guidance.”

Munich Security Conference Foundation. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2019).
“Looking at the current state of international affairs it is difficult to escape the feeling that the world is not just witnessing a series of smaller and bigger crises. Rather, the entire liberal international order appears to be falling apart – nothing will we be as it once was. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global security landscape has never been more dangerous. We are experiencing an epochal shift, as one era is coming to an end, and for now only rough outlines of a new geopolitical age are visible. Although some states are committed to maintaining the liberal international order, it is questionable whether they – often distracted by other domestic and foreign policy challenges – are able to assume this role…This year's report analyses the reshuffling of core pieces of the international order. Besides looking at major powers like the United States, China and Russia, the report also highlights actors of the 'second row': liberal democracies such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. In addition, the report assesses current security policy developments in selected regions such as in the Western Balkans, in the Sahel region and in the Middle East. It examines the global challenge to arms control against the background of the recently suspended INF Treaty and emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons. Other global issues covered are the security policy implications of current developments in the areas of international trade, transnational organized crime and artificial intelligence.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2018).
“The growth in terrorists’ capabilities and aspirations and the spread of dual-use technology have made the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism progressively more acute, requiring a comprehensive strategy to defend the United States and its interests…The National Strategy for Countering WMD Terrorism is designed to achieve a set of strategic objectives whose common purpose is to greatly reduce the probability that extremist groups and individuals will conduct attacks using WMD. These objectives consist of the following:
- The agents, precursors, and materials needed to acquire WMD are placed beyond the reach of terrorists and other malicious non-state actors, and the global quantity of WMD and related materials is reduced.
- States and individuals are deterred from providing support to would-be WMD terrorists.
- An effective architecture is in place to detect and defeat terrorist WMD networks.
- United States defenses against WMD terrorism are strengthened, and state, local, tribal, and territorial preparedness to contend with WMD threats is enhanced.
- The United States is able to identify and respond to technological trends that may enable terrorist development, acquisition, or use of WMD.”

Defense Intelligence Agency. (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019).
“Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great power status. Indeed, China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests. With a deeper understanding of the military might behind Chinese economic and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range of options for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world. This report offers insights into the modernization of Chinese military power as it reforms from a defensive, inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security responsibilities to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary, and power-projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe.”

Stares, Paul B. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“Each year since 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action (CPA) has asked foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring or escalating in the next year and their potential impact on U.S. national interests. ‘The annual Preventive Priorities Survey is unique in providing a regular, forward-looking assessment of conflict and instability around the world in a way that helps policymakers focus attention on the most important risks,’ explains Paul B. Stares, General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and CPA director.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“The Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States. The interactive covers nearly thirty conflicts with background information and resources on each conflict.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2019).
“‘The Global Risks Report 2019’ is published against a backdrop of worrying geopolitical and geo-economic tensions. If unresolved, these tensions will hinder the world’s ability to deal with a growing range of collective challenges, from the mounting evidence of environmental degradation to the increasing disruptions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The report presents the results of our latest Global Risks Perception Survey, in which nearly 1,000 decision-makers from the public sector, private sector, academia and civil society assess the risks facing the world. Nine out of 10 respondents expect worsening economic and political confrontations between major powers this year. Over a ten-year horizon, extreme weather and climate-change policy failures are seen as the gravest threats. This year’s report includes another series of ‘what-if’ Future Shocks that examine quantum computing, weather manipulation, monetary populism, emotionally responsive artificial intelligence and other potential risks. The theme of emotions is also addressed in a chapter on the human causes and effects of global risks; the chapter calls for greater action around rising levels of psychological strain across the world.”

Poling, Gregory B. (Washington: DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019)
“Unseen fishing activity. Maritime militias in the Spratlys. Fishers have often been overlooked in the South China Sea disputes. CSIS, in cooperation with Vulcan, Inc., unveils a worrying narrative about the impact fishers and their fleets have in the region.”

Lamb, Zachary. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
"In the seven years since protesters in Syria first demonstrated against the four-decade rule of the Assad family, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and some twelve million people—more than half the country’s pre-war population—have been displaced. The country has descended into an ever-more-complex civil war: Jihadis promoting a Sunni theocracy eclipsed many opposition forces fighting for a democratic and pluralistic Syria. Regional powers backed various local forces to advance their geopolitical interests on Syrian battlefields. The United States has been at the fore of a coalition conducting air strikes on the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while Turkey, a U.S. ally, has invaded in part to prevent Kurdish forces, the United States’ main local partner in the fight against the Islamic State, from linking up their autonomous cantons. Russia too has carried out air strikes in Syria, coming to the Assad regime’s defense, while Iranian forces and their Hezbollah allies have done the same on the ground. After a long stalemate, regime forces and their foreign backers have turned the tide in Assad’s favor, capturing two of the last major rebel enclaves, in east Aleppo and the Damascus suburbs. But Syria likely faces years of instability to come. Assad has never been willing to negotiate his way out of power, but his continued rule is unacceptable to millions of Syrians, particularly given the barbarity civilians have faced. Meanwhile, the foreign forces on which he relies will continue to wield power. In the north, Kurds will be unlikely to cede their hard-won autonomy, and the near defeat of the Islamic State has led to a scramble for territory liberated in the country’s east."

McBride, James, and Sabine Baumgartner. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“The world in 2018 experienced many extreme weather events, from debilitating blizzards to raging wildfires to powerful hurricanes. They underscore the mounting costs and disruptions of changing climate patterns, experts say. While climate researchers agree that human-produced greenhouse gases have driven the increase in global temperatures, they say climate change is likely to impact specific regions in different ways. However, the global scientific consensus is that climbing temperatures, rising sea levels, and shifting atmospheric dynamics are already raising the probability that extreme weather events will be more frequent, more severe, and more deadly. Four notable trends made themselves felt in 2018.
I. Wide Temperature Swings and a Changing Jet Stream
II. Prolonged Heatwaves and Intensifying Wildfires
III. Rising Ocean Temperatures, Intensifying Storms
IV. Drought, Crop Failure, and Famine”

“This BAMS special report presents assessments of how human-caused climate change may have affected the strength and likelihood of individual extreme events. The U.S. Northern Plains and East Africa droughts of 2017, floods in South America, China and Bangladesh, and heatwaves in China and the Mediterranean were all made more likely by human-caused climate change, according to new research published today in the ‘Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society’ (BAMS). The seventh edition of the report, ‘Explaining Extreme Events in 2017 from a Climate Perspective,’ also included analyses of ocean heat events, including intense marine heatwaves in the Tasman Sea off of Australia in 2017 and 2018 that were ‘virtually impossible’ without human-caused climate change. Also included are analyses of Australian fires and Uruguay flooding. This is the second year that scientists have identified extreme weather events that they said could not have happened without warming of the climate through human-induced climate change.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“For two decades, the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been the epicenter of the deadliest conflict since World War II. Part of a vast country straddling the heart of Central Africa, the eastern Congo continues to defy efforts at pacification. As the conflict has morphed from a regional war to a series of tenacious local insurgencies, the civilians caught in the middle have paid the steepest price. In addition to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, continued instability in sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country by area has strategic implications for the entire region. The DRC’s vast natural resources hold great potential but also complicate efforts at peace. The eastern Congo’s minerals power the world’s consumer electronics, and the country’s largely untapped farmlands have the potential to feed the rest of Africa. Yet disputes over these resources drive the conflict, and rebel groups seek to control them to fund their own campaigns. Subject to foreign interference since the colonial era, the eastern Congo poses difficult questions about the role of international intervention. The UN mission—the largest peacekeeping deployment in the world until the one in South Sudan surpassed it in 2018—has provided crucial support for the DRC’s peace process, but many observers argue that it lacks a clear strategy for sustaining the peace and eradicating the plethora of armed groups that remain. With presidential elections originally scheduled for late 2016 delayed by two years, the Congolese government, Western policymakers, and regional leaders all face pivotal decisions that will determine whether the country can consolidate its democratic progress.”

Lewis, James A. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as ‘5G,’ promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the digital economy and will provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense demand for 5G networks and intense competition among companies and countries to meet that demand. The 5G contest is about networks, data, the direction the internet will take, how economies will grow, and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Part of this involves investing in and deploying 5G networks. But who makes 5G technologies, who sets the standards, and who owns the intellectual property (IP) has implications for security, innovation, and employment in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades. American companies have been strong performers in developing and preparing to deploy 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. There are no longer any U.S. manufacturers for core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. The choices for core network equipment are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Samsung, with its substantial chipmaking and equipment-making capabilities, has also entered the 5G race but still has a relatively small share of the market. Telecoms are a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. The outcomes in the 5G race will help determine national competitiveness and technological capabilities. 5G will affect the many industries that will be built on top of it, just like the app economy was built on top of 4G. Countries and companies that do better in making and deploying 5G will be richer and have an inside track in building a world where computing and connectivity are embedded in every device.”

Ellis, Evan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“There are numerous analyses about China and its future, as well as about Chinese engagement with Latin America. This report examines, in detail, how the growth of China, with its power and role in the global economy, is likely to transform Latin America and the Caribbean through economic, political, and other forms of engagement with the region. The report considers multiple scenarios regarding the future of China, the resolution of its security challenges, and possible departures from its current trajectory. It focuses primarily on the question of what Latin America and the Caribbean will look like if China succeeds in its ongoing economic and political engagement in the region.”

Crane, Conrad C. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Americans have always been uniquely attracted to airpower, a fact that has been successfully exploited by generations of U.S. Air Force leaders in information campaigns. But as a result, the nation has often entered conflicts with exorbitant expectations about what airpower could actually accomplish, creating unique challenges in strategic communications when promises did not match reality, especially in recent conflicts. Adaptive enemies have also become very adept at using their own carefully crafted information campaigns to counter what is America’s greatest asymmetric advantage on the battlefield.”

Keene, Shima D. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“The U.S. Army increasingly faces adversaries that are difficult to define. The threat landscape is further complicated by the silent partnership between criminal organizations, irregular groups, and nation-states. This collaboration, whatever its exact nature, is problematic, because it confounds understanding of the adversary, making existing countermeasures less effective, and thus directly challenging U.S. national security interests. Military action taken without full appreciation of the dynamics of the nature of these relationships is likely to be ineffective at best or suffer unintended consequences. This monograph provides a comprehensive assessment of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the silent partners, as well as how the vulnerabilities of the relationships could be exploited to the advantage of the U.S. Army.”

Aftandilian, Gregory. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“This monograph examines the conflicts in the Middle East region between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the so-called proxy wars that are being fought between them, and discusses ways that the United States needs to maneuver carefully in this struggle to preserve its long-term interests in the area. Although Washington has political, economic, and strategic equities with Riyadh, it needs to think carefully about being perceived as engaging in sectarian strife that would alienate Shia allies in Iraq, show bias in its human rights policy, and anger millions of Iranian young people who want better relations with the United States.”

Weitz, Richard. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Russia has strengthened its military position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus through a combination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has become the most important multilateral defense structure in the former Soviet Union and is an essential instrument in Russia’s resurgence. The CSTO has expanded its missions, authorities, and capabilities. However, it faces both internal and external challenges, especially debilitating divisions among its members.”

Brantly, Aaron, and Liam Collins. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2018)

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018).
“Few issues attract as much attention or are subject to as much controversy in international and domestic policy debates today as migration. Growing concerns over the increasingly large numbers of migrants and refugees moving across borders has directed most of this attention towards international migration, which has made it to the top of the international policy agenda. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) it embraces clearly recognize the importance of migration, the challenges it poses and the opportunities it provides.”

Shahbaz, Adrian. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2018).
“Disinformation and propaganda disseminated online have poisoned the public sphere. The unbridled collection of personal data has broken down traditional notions of privacy. And a cohort of countries is moving toward digital authoritarianism by embracing the Chinese model of extensive censorship and automated surveillance systems. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom declined for the eighth consecutive year in 2018.”

Hope, Ian. (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2018).
“On 11 November commemorations occurred throughout North West Europe and the British Commonwealth, marking the hundredth anniversary of the Armistice that ended the First World War. A significant commemoration was held in the city of Mons, Belgium, location of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and another in Brussels, location of NATO Headquarters. Many attending these commemorations will have had little knowledge of the direct link between the events of 11 November 1918 and the structure and workings of the Alliance today."

U.S. Global Change Research Program. (Washington, DC: U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2018).
“The National Climate Assessment (NCA) assesses the science of climate change and variability and its impacts across the United States, now and throughout this century…The impacts of climate change are already being felt in communities across the country. More frequent and intense extreme weather and climate-related events, as well as changes in average climate conditions, are expected to continue to damage infrastructure, ecosystems, and social systems that provide essential benefits to communities. Future climate change is expected to further disrupt many areas of life, exacerbating existing challenges to prosperity posed by aging and deteriorating infrastructure, stressed ecosystems, and economic inequality. Impacts within and across regions will not be distributed equally. People who are already vulnerable, including lower-income and other marginalized communities, have lower capacity to prepare for and cope with extreme weather and climate-related events and are expected to experience greater impacts. Prioritizing adaptation actions for the most vulnerable populations would contribute to a more equitable future within and across communities. Global action to significantly cut greenhouse gas emissions can substantially reduce climate-related risks and increase opportunities for these populations in the longer term.”

UN Environment Programme. (Nairobi, Kenya: UN Environment Programme, 2018).
“The goal of the Paris Agreement on climate change, as agreed at the Conference of the Parties in 2015, is to keep global temperature rise this century to well below 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. It also calls for efforts to limit the temperature increase even further to 1.5 degrees Celsius. The annual UN Environment Emissions Gap Report presents an assessment of current national mitigation efforts and the ambitions countries have presented in their Nationally Determined Contributions, which form the foundation of the Paris Agreement.”

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018).
“This report reviews the ongoing programs that will affect the expected size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force structure. It begins with an overview of this force structure during the Cold War, and summarizes the reductions and changes that have occurred since 1991. It then offers details about each category of delivery vehicle – land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers – focusing on their current deployments and ongoing and planned modernization programs. The report concludes with a discussion of issues related to decisions about the future size and shape of the U.S. strategic nuclear force.”

Reagan Foundation YouTube Playlist
“RNDF [Reagan National Defense Forum] is a bipartisan annual event held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. Key stakeholders come together to address the health of our national defense and to promote policies to strengthen the U.S. military”
Panel 1 — The American people believe... How are the American people looking at our military and the pentagon after the midterms?
Panel 2 — Security Cooperation & International Arms Sales: Is The U.S. Winning The Competition?
Panel 3 — A Defense Industrial and Innovation Base for the 21st Century: Will We Have the Technology to Compete with China?
Panel 4 — A Defense Industrial & Innovation Base Workforce for the 21st Century: Winning The Competition for Highly Skilled Workers Inside & Outside the Pentagon
Keynote Address with U.S. Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis Luncheon & Discussion — A View from Congress
Panel 5 — A View of Defense From the Silicon Valley: How Can We Better Engage the Tech World
Panel 6 — Star Wars: What Does SDI Teach Us about Technology in Military Competition?
Panel 7 — Winning in the Gray Zone: Countering Russia & China below the Level of Armed Conflict
Panel 8 — Iran, Syria, and ISIS: Does the Military Have the Right Footprint in the Middle East?
Panel 9 — Will The U.S. Remain the Preeminent Military Power? An Assessment of the National Defense Strategy
Panel 10 — The Role of Allies and Alliances in Great Power Competition
Panel 11 — Rebuild or Return to Sequestration? Assessing What We Can Expect in the Defense Budget
Panel 12 — A Tour of Global Hot Spots: How Are We Doing Today and What's the Outlook for Tomorrow?

Center for Strategic and International Studies Event
Program begins about 25:00
“The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. ChinaPower's annual conference features leading experts from both China and the U.S. to debate core issues underpinning the nature of Chinese power.”
I. Proposition: U.S. engagement policy toward China has failed.
II. Proposition: China is an illiberal state seeking to reshape the international system in its own image.
III. Proposition: Made in China 2025 and China’s broader industrial program pose a threat to global innovation and the world economy.
IV. Proposition: China is likely to be the leader of the coming artificial intelligence revolution.
V. Proposition: China has the capability to control the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.
VI. Afternoon Keynote (VTC): Admiral Philip S. Davidson; 25th Commander of United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM)

Center for Strategic and International Studies Event
"Over the past 27 years, the United States has often planned and operated as though competition has ended and that there would be an inexorable pull toward U.S.-led institutions and world views. The growing reemergence of state-based competition, even when it falls short of military conflict, signals that the optimism of U.S. policy has outpaced the reality of other countries’ own ambitions to create their own realities. Events over the past decade have led to a growing realization that several states have been investing in the tools and concepts necessary for them to gain advantage—economically, politically, and geographically—in ways that do not involve the military. Some of the most well-known examples are Russian efforts to sow discord in national elections throughout NATO members and China’s building of military outposts in international waters in the South China Sea. Many other examples exist where states compete while avoiding risking war. It has taken Washington some time to realize these activities are deliberate efforts to advance a country’s interest and often at the expense of the United States or a U.S. ally. CSIS’s 2018 Global Security Forum will focus on the challenges these gray zone tactics pose for U.S. security and the policy priorities needed. The event will feature an armchair discussion between Dr. Kathleen Hicks and Admiral Michael S. Rogers, 2nd Commander of the United States Cyber Command and 17th Director of the National Security Agency, the launch of a new report, Zone Defense, highlighting insights from the 2018 GSF Experts’ Workshop, and a series of interactive public education videos on the topic. Following the armchair discussion and product releases, Heather A. Conley will lead a panel on gray zone threats and U.S. priorities for the future of competition."

Hicks, Kathleen H., John Schaus, and Michael Matlaga. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Report of the 2018 Global Security Forum Experts Workshop.”

Center for Strategic Studies and the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding Event
“Please join us for the seventh joint conference of CSIS and the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDU), entitled, the ‘Transatlantic Forum on Russia.’ Since 2012 CSIS and CPRDU have partnered to examine the impact of Polish-Russian reconciliation and its wider regional and transatlantic implications. Following Russia’s 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea and military incursions into eastern Ukraine, and its military and covert operations in Syria, Salisbury, and elsewhere, the Forum’s focus has turned to formulating a long-term transatlantic policy framework towards Russia. The Forum convenes five months after the U.S.-Russia Summit in Helsinki, nine days after the U.S. mid-term elections, and four days after President Trump’s meeting with Russian President Putin in Paris on the margins of the centenarian commemoration of the end of the First World War. Regional and U.S. experts will assess the role that history plays in shaping both Russia’s and the West’s narrative as well as to examine the success that Russian malign influence has had in undermining confidence in democratic institutions and leaders in Europe and the United States.”

Sullivan, James. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2018).
“The recent activities of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – Russia’s military intelligence, otherwise known by its traditional (if slightly inaccurate) acronym of the GRU – on the territories of the UK and other European countries are by now well documented. However, less media and public attention is paid to the GRU’s hostile cyber activities, despite the fact that last month, the UK and its allies directly attributed a series of hostile cyber attacks to the Russian military intelligence service. This provides a better understanding of some of the Russian offensive cyber attack tools, the nature of certain Russian cyber operations and a glimpse into future trends in Russian cyber activity. And here is a brief rundown through some of the tools at Moscow’s disposal.”

Rockwell, Ernest Allan (ed). (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2018).
“From 20–22 August 2018, Air University brought together leading subject matter experts from government, industry, laboratories, and academia to discuss vulnerabilities and threats, raise awareness, and explore mitigation strategies on an array of national security challenges in the EMS [electromagnetic spectrum]…Conference participants found immediate actions are required to alleviate unmitigated strategic gray zone EMS threats. Toward the top of mitigation factors was the need to educate military forces about the existence of key vulnerabilities. Furthermore, there was consensus, from the standpoint of a state’s national defense, that the ability to attribute a hostile act to an actor is an essential requisite for strategic deterrence (i.e., maintenance of the status quo). Without intentional mitigating actions, the United States and NATO are vulnerable to significant threats from both external and internal actors and natural phenomena such as solar storms. Finally, the EDTF found that a free and secure EMS is life-support to the day-to-day function and continuity of military, government, and commercial operations and commerce in democratic nations.”

Harrison, Todd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The proposed creation of a new military service for space, known as the Space Force, is likely to be a hotly debated issue in the FY 2020 legislative cycle. One of the central questions about this proposal is how much it will cost and what the overall size and scope of the Space Force will be. This brief provides rough estimates for the number of military and civilian personnel, the number and locations of bases, the budget lines that would transfer to the new organization, and the additional personnel and headquarters organization that would be needed for the new military service.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2018).
“Over a quarter century ago, Deng Xiaoping famously instructed his countrymen to ‘hide your capabilities and bide your time’ and to ‘absolutely not take lead’ in world affairs. The last hint of this formulation for a cautious and conservative Chinese role in the world faded into history this year. The China that emerged from last October’s 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could not be more opposite in tone or bearing. Having amassed all titles of authority and successfully removed term limits on himself, Xi Jinping announced a ‘new era’ that sees his China ‘moving closer to the world’s center stage’ and offering a ‘Chinese approach’ to solving problems. Although the CCP emphasizes China’s peaceful rise and the ‘shared prosperity’ it claims to bring the world, this rhetoric conceals a coordinated, long-term effort to transform China into a dominant global power. As President Xi pursues structural changes in the global order to facilitate Chinese ambitions, how are other countries welcoming the economic or political opportunities it purports to offer? Is China’s attempt to frame its approach as a new alternative compatible with the existing order, or is it creating a new era of persistent competition? While these questions remain open, one answer is clear: many aspects of China’s attempts to seize leadership have undoubtedly put at risk the national security and economic interests of the United States, its allies, and its partners.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2018).
The full report.

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018).
“Some observers perceive that after remaining generally stable for a period of about 70 years, the U.S. role in the world-meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world-is undergoing a potentially historic change. A change in the U.S. role in the world could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights… The U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years or so) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key element of that role has been to defend and promote the liberal international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. Other key elements have been to defend and promote freedom, democracy, and human rights as universal values, while criticizing and resisting authoritarian and illiberal forms of government where possible; and to oppose the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world. The fact that the U.S. role in the world has been generally stable over the past 70 years does not necessarily mean that this role was the right one for the United States, or that it would be the right one in the future. Although the role the United States has played in the world since the end of World War II has many defenders, it also has critics, and the merits of that role have been a matter of long standing debate among foreign policy specialists, strategists, policymakers, and the public, with critics offering potential alternative concepts for the U.S. role in the world. One major dimension of the debate is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A number of critics of the U.S. role in the world over the past 70 years have offered multiple variations on the idea of a more restrained U.S. role.”

National Defense Strategy Commission. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018).
“The final report of the National Defense Strategy Commission is a compilation of the assessments of the National Defense Strategy and recommendations based on its analysis related not just to defense strategy, but also to the larger geopolitical environment in which that strategy must be executed. They consulted with civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense, representatives of other U.S. government departments and agencies, allied diplomats and military officials, and independent experts. This publication is the consensus report of the Commission. The Commission argues that America confronts a grave crisis of national security and national defense, as U.S. military advantages erode and the strategic landscape becomes steadily more threatening. If the United States does not show greater urgency and seriousness in responding to this crisis and does not take decisive steps to rebuild its military advantages now, the damage to American security and influence could be devastating.”

Scharre, Paul, and and Lauren Fish. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2018).
“No attributes are more foundational to success in combat than the physical and cognitive performance of warfighters. Technological advantage has always played a central role in war, from the bow and arrow to modern missiles, but technologies are mere tools in the hands of warfighters. People, not widgets, fight wars. Militaries have long sought to directly enhance the physical and cognitive performance of warfighters, and indeed some human performance enhancement drugs are widely used across the U.S. military today, such as caffeine. Existing technologies have demonstrated the ability to improve individual physical and cognitive performance above baseline levels and in key areas central to military competition: strength, focus, attention, learning, and resistance to fatigue. Many of these technologies are already being used in civilian settings, in licit or illicit contexts. The U.S. military is not fully capitalizing on the advantages enabled by human performance technology today and is woefully unprepared for some of the potential changes that could come from future advances in biotechnology. War is dangerous, and enhancements that allow soldiers to carry more protective gear, be more alert, or be better trained all have significant payoffs in terms of improving soldier survivability.”

Hunter, Andrew P., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Artificial intelligence (AI) has profound potential to affect the balance of power in both the global economy and in military competition. While AI has a long history, AI has begun to deliver results within the last decade, particularly with the recent rapid progress in machine learning and the increased availability of data and computing power. As impactful as the recent progress has been, AI remains highly problem-specific and context-dependent. It has proven extremely challenging to translate the progress in some fields to others, even those that are closely related. Enthusiasm in both the public and private sectors has obscured the importance of building the robust supporting capabilities for AI—an AI ecosystem—that are crucial to successful AI adoption. The AI ecosystem includes a skilled workforce and knowledgeable management; the digital capability for capturing, handling, and exploiting data; the technical foundation of trust, security, and reliability; and the investment environment and policy framework needed for AI to flourish. The government retains role in pursuing the harder areas of technology that do not deliver rapid returns on investment for the private sector; developing the tools required to establish AI reliability (including trust, explainability, validation, verification, and security) for critical government and national security applications; and developing and strengthening the AI ecosystem. This study presents the key steps to be taken to facilitate the successful integration of AI into national security applications based on an accurate understanding of where the AI field currently stands and what key factors are involved in successful AI adoption and management.”

Jones, Lawrence O. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2018).
“The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a finite resource critical to the US military’s ability to gain superiority in the five war-fighting domains. The Department of Defense’s (DOD) electromagnetic strategy is spectrum access, when and where needed, to achieve mission success. However, the future electromagnetic operating environment will find gaining assured access increasingly difficult due not only to adversaries actively contesting it, but also to the congestion attributed to the exponential growth in commercial and civilian access. Despite these signs, the US federal government and the DOD continue to cling to a century-old model for managing the EMS. A revolution is in order. This paper explores how the collision between technological advances in software-defined radios, machine learning, and cloud computing offers a viable solution to this growing problem. That solution is cognitive radio cloud networks.”

Dalton, Melissa, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The United States’ national security and defense strategies, as well as trends in U.S. military operations around the globe, reflect a preference for working by, with, and through partners to achieve common security objectives. Security partnerships can take a wide range of forms, from support operations and advise, assist, and accompany missions, to direct participation in hostilities through ‘joint’ or ‘partnered’ operations and coalitions. However, partnerships in armed conflict can aggravate or reduce the risk of harm to civilians, exposing civilians to a wide array of risks, including injury, death, trauma, displacement, and the destruction of homes, schools, infrastructure, and livelihoods. This report assesses the challenges and opportunities faced by policymakers, military actors, and humanitarian professionals in positively shaping the conduct of armed forces partnering with U.S. forces to mitigate civilian harm.”

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018).
“Three years into the 2030 Agenda it is already apparent that those living in fragile contexts are the furthest behind. Not all forms of fragility make it to the public’s eye: fragility is an intricate beast, sometimes exposed, often lurking underneath, but always holding progress back. Conflict, forced displacement, violent extremism, famine etc. are all causes and consequences of fragility. Hence the need to better understand, anticipate and respond to fragility. ‘States of Fragility 2018’ exposes the critical challenge posed by fragility in achieving the aspirations of the 2030 Agenda, sustainable development and peace. It highlights twelve key aspects of fragility, defying common assumptions and simplistic categorisation. It documents progress made in fragile situations on attaining sustainable development, unveiling exit doors from the fragility trap. It then illustrates the current state of financing to address fragility and suggests more effective approaches, accounting for its multidimensionality.”

World Bank Group. (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2019).
“At a time when the global economy is growing and the poverty rate is the lowest in recorded history, it would be easy to become complacent and over-look looming challenges. One of the most critical is the future of work, the subject of the ‘2019 World Development Report’…We know that robots are taking over thousands of routine tasks and will eliminate many low-skill jobs in advanced economies and developing countries. At the same time, technology is creating opportunities, paving the way for new and altered jobs, increasing productivity, and improving the delivery of public services. When we consider the scope of the challenge to prepare for the future of work, it is important to understand that many children currently in primary school will work in jobs as adults that do not even exist today. That is why this report emphasizes the primacy of human capital in meeting a challenge that, by its very definition, resists simple and prescriptive solutions. Many jobs today, and many more in the near future, will require specific skills—a combination of technological know-how, problem-solving, and critical thinking as well as soft skills such as perseverance, collaboration, and empathy. The days of staying in one job, or with one company, for decades are waning. In the gig economy, workers will likely have many gigs over the course of their careers, which means they will have to be lifelong learners. Innovation will continue to accelerate, but developing countries will need to take rapid action to ensure they can compete in the economy of the future. They will have to invest in their people with a fierce sense of urgency especially in health and education, which are the building blocks of human capital to harness the benefits of technology and to blunt its worst disruptions. But right now too many countries are not making these critical investments.”

Bandura, Romina, and Hammond, MacKenzie. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
Volume 1: A National Security Priority for the United States “Elevates the issue as one of strategic interest to the United States and proposes a more focused approach on job creation and workforce preparation abroad via U.S. bilateral development agencies and multilateral fora.”
Volume 2: Developing Country Trends and Insights from Four Country Case Studies: “Presents a summary of the future of work discussion in developing countries and provides insights from the four country case studies.”

Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).
“America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base ('the industrial base') supports economic prosperity and global competitiveness, and arms the military with capabilities to defend the nation. Currently, the industrial base faces an unprecedented set of challenges: sequestration and uncertainty of government spending; the decline of critical markets and suppliers; unintended consequences of U.S. Government acquisition behavior; aggressive industrial policies of competitor nations; and the loss of vital skills in the domestic workforce. Combined, these challenges –or macro forces –erode the capabilities of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and threaten the Department of Defense’s (DoD) ability to be ready for the ‘fight tonight,’ and to retool for great power competition. The following report explains the macro forces impacting the industrial base, identifies primary categories of risk, illustrates impacts within sectors, and provides recommendations for mitigation.”

Government Accountability Office. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2018).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. This state is due to the computerized nature of weapon systems; DOD’s late start in prioritizing weapon systems cybersecurity; and DOD’s nascent understanding of how to develop more secure weapon systems. DOD weapon systems are more software dependent and more networked than ever before… Automation and connectivity are fundamental enablers of DOD’s modern military capabilities. However, they make weapon systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Although GAO and others have warned of cyber risks for decades, until recently, DOD did not prioritize weapon systems cybersecurity. Finally, DOD is still determining how best to address weapon systems cybersecurity.”

Carter, William A. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“While cybersecurity awareness in the federal government is improving, along with efforts to provide more secure architectures and managed security services for federal networks, these efforts are focused on systemic risks and vulnerabilities in core infrastructures. Few extend to the millions of endpoint devices connected to these systems, many of which have both limited security features and known vulnerabilities that can be exploited to steal data and serve as an entry point for more sophisticated attacks on the network. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of experts from the federal government, key government agencies, and private industry to identify a path forward at a time when more secure technologies and services, such as cloud computing, often remain inaccessible due to dated federal system architectures, while the consumer space is flooded with new devices and potential threat vectors. The following report captures the major themes that emerged from the discussion.”

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018).
“An IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.”

Bermudez, Joseph, Victor Cha, and Lisa Collins. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel / Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“- Sakkanmol is an undeclared operational missile base for short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs).
- It is one of 13 out of an estimated 20 undeclared North Korean missile operating bases identified by Beyond Parallel research.
- Sakkanmol currently houses a unit equipped with SRBMs but could easily accommodate more capable medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
- The base is also one of the closest to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and Seoul, giving it the shortest flight time.
- North Korea’s decommissioning of the Sohae satellite launch facility, while gaining much media attention, obscures the military threat to U.S. forces and South Korea from this and other undeclared ballistic missile bases.”

CSIS [Center for Strategic and International Studies] Expert Working Group on the South China Sea. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The CSIS Expert Working Group on the South China Sea brings together prominent experts on maritime law, international relations, and the marine environment from China, Southeast Asia, and beyond. The members seek consensus on realistic, actionable steps that claimants and interested parties could take to boost cooperation and manage tensions at sea. The group meets regularly to discuss issues that it considers necessary for the successful management of the South China Sea disputes and produces blueprints for a path forward on each. The working group includes a diverse set of experts from claimant states and interested countries, including the United States. It is chaired by Gregory Poling, director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Members of the group gathered three times between July 2017 and July 2018 to produce the blueprints gathered in this report. The members believe these three proposed agreements add up to a robust model for managing the South China Sea disputes, one which would be both legally and politically feasible for all parties.”

Jones, Seth G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Moscow continues to wage an offensive information campaign designed, in the words of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, to ‘weaken and divide the United States.’ But Washington has been reactive, slow to respond, and focused on defensive measures. The United States needs to adopt a proactive, offensive campaign to coerce Russia to curb its information warfare efforts, punish Moscow when further incidents occur, and exploit Russian weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The Reagan administration’s strategy and actions offer a useful template.”

Ardis, John A. S., and Shima D Keene. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2018).
“There are many risks to the U.S. Army’s command and control (C2) operations and to its intelligence and information warfare (IW) capabilities. The challenges include: significant uncertainty; sudden unexpected events; high noise and clutter levels in intelligence pictures; basic and complex deceptions exercised through a variety of channels; the actions of hidden malign actors; and novel forms of attack on U.S. and allied command, control, communications, computers, information/intelligence, surveillance, targeting acquisition, and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) systems. If the U.S. Army is to secure and maintain information dominance in all environments, it must exploit complexity and uncertainty in the battlespace and not simply seek to overcome it. Innovation requires that new ideas are considered, and that old ideas should be robustly challenged. To achieve and maintain information dominance, the U.S. Army will also require a significant injection of innovation, a robust and resilient C2 and intelligence capability, novel technologies and an accelerated information operations capability development program that is broad, deep, sustained and well-coordinated. Furthermore, once information dominance is achieved, maintaining it will demand continuous change and development.”

Morgan, Edward, and Marcus Thompson. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“This paper provides an account of the Australian military’s developing information warfare capabilities as part of CSIS’s series on Indo-Pacific interoperability. It sets out Australia’s developing information warfare capabilities, with a view to generating discussion between Indo-Pacific security partners and allies on the nature of information warfare in a modern context, and the capabilities and frameworks required to meet this emergent challenge. This is especially important for the U.S.-Australia relationship as two key five-eyes partners.”

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress on three new ship-based weapons the Navy is developing that could improve the ability of Navy surface ships to defend themselves against missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and surface craft: the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), previously known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP). The Navy refers to the initial (i.e., Increment 1) version of SNLWS as HELIOS, an acronym meaning high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance. Any one of these three new weapons, if successfully developed and deployed, might be regarded as a 'game changer' for defending Navy surface ships against enemy missiles and UAVs. If two or three of them are successfully developed and deployed, the result might be considered not just a game changer, but a revolution. Rarely has the Navy had so many potential new types of surface-ship air-defense weapons simultaneously available for development and potential deployment."

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2018).
“America’s prosperity and security depend on how we respond to the opportunities and challenges in cyberspace. Critical infrastructure, national defense, and the daily lives of Americans rely on computer-driven and interconnected information technologies. As all facets of American life have become more dependent on a secure cyberspace, new vulnerabilities have been revealed and new threats continue to emerge. Building on the National Security Strategy and the Administration’s progress over its first 18 months, the National Cyber Strategy outlines how the United States will ensure the American people continue to reap the benefits of a secure cyberspace that reflects our principles, protects our security, and promotes our prosperity.”

Wood, Dakota L. (ed.) (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2018).
“The ‘2019 Index of U.S. Military Strength’ is the Heritage Foundation’s fifth annual assessment of the United States Armed Forces’ ability to provide for the common defense. The ‘Index’ assesses the strength of each of the U.S. military services, the status of the threats we face, and the favorability of the environment in which the U.S. and its allies must be prepared to operate. Since the initial publication of the ‘Index’ five years ago, the military has struggled in its capacity and readiness for operations—brought about by harmful budget caps, underinvestment in research and development, and decades of sustained engagement in the Middle East. Although the FY2018 and FY2019 defense budgets reflect positive growth for defense, military strength remains far below where it needs to be.”

"War Room" podcast, by Ty Mayfield and Jacqueline E. Whitt.
September 21, 2018, streaming audio, 26:08
“The U.S. military and the militaries of many of its partner nations regard themselves as professional organizations and comrades in the profession of arms. The military is heralded as a profession composed of professionals who enact a unique domain of expert knowledge. But the meaning of this changes over time through the evolution of civil-military relations, global security, and new or emerging threats. The Army underwent a period of reflection at the turn of the century based on its Cold War experiences and renewed its commitment to professionalism. Is the time nigh for another such period? This and other questions are discussed between Ty Mayfield of Strategy Bridge and WAR ROOM’s Podcast Editor Jacqueline E. Whitt.”

“War Room” (September 18, 2018).
“This is the second of two response posts for the Whiteboard on the U.S. military’s strategic proficiency (or deficiency). Thanks to everyone who submitted responses. The next Whiteboard is coming soon. Stay tuned!”

Hillison, Joel R. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“The ‘America First’ approach to foreign policy seems to call into question the value of institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). However, in a more competitive and uncertain strategic environment, NATO and the EU remain vital to promoting U.S. interests.”

Keene, Shima D. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and is a critical aspect of securing peace and preventing future conflict. However, recent experience in theaters such as Afghanistan has shown that establishing effective rule of law institutions and practices is not a straightforward task. Consequently, considerations as to how and when rule of law institutions can start to be developed and integrated into the stability transition process must not only be planned in advance, but also form part of the U.S. Army’s strategy from the start of any military intervention. The analysis provided in this monograph will assist the U.S. Army, and more broadly the Departments of Defense and State, in better facilitating a seamless rebalancing from military to police functions in post-conflict environments, and to ensure that sustainable and effective rule of law interventions are delivered as part of an exit strategy.”

Gregg, Melissa, and Robert D. Lamb. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Conflict and fragile environments are increasingly complex and unpredictable, but the U.S. policy system itself is much more complex and unpredictable than most leaders appreciate. In this monograph, the authors argue that until we get a grasp on this ‘dual-system problem,’ the United States will fall further and further behind in its strategic ambitions.”

Lewis, James A. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Information technology has reshaped international conflict. The 1990s vision that the end of the Cold War was a triumph for market democracy has proven to be an illusion. Several powerful trends, including the reaction to U.S. supremacy, the fraying of the international order created after 1945, and the political effect of information technology are reshaping international security. There is a broad discontent with the international status quo among new and resurgent powers, and competition and conflict among great powers has been reshaped by information technologies. The nexus of strategic competition is not jihad or defending some imaginary global commons, but over how the world will be ordered and who will order it.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Scholarship and punditry abound on the formation and nature of contemporary public and presidential foreign policy views. Yet there is remarkably little new research on the foreign policy views and motivations of the U.S. Congress…The terms traditionally used to describe congressional views on foreign policy—internationalist or isolationist; hawk or dove—can fail to capture the complexity of members’ perspectives on the U.S. role in the world. This report aims to help close the gap in our understanding of Congress’s foreign policy views. The CSIS study team reviewed the existing literature, assessed major recent foreign policy debates, and measured the views of a carefully selected group of 50 members in the 115th Congress. The resulting analysis provides insights on the core motivations of contemporary members of Congress and proposes archetypes to help characterize major streams of observed foreign policy views within the institution. The study team also recommends opportunities for strengthening bipartisan cooperation and congressional foreign policy leadership.”

Dastrup, Boyd L. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2018).
“The newest book from Army University Press tells the story of the US Army's Field Artillery over the last 25 years. Since Desert Storm, the Field Artillery has modernized its equipment and organization to address new adversaries, new missions, and new technology.”

Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018).
“This interim report of the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States explains why such a preventive strategy is needed and what it might entail. In 2019, the Task Force will propose a comprehensive preventive strategy to mitigate the conditions that give rise to violent extremism. This report begins by reviewing the new strategic environment that has emerged since 9/11— the increased fragility, the evolution in extremist strategy, and the rise of strategic competition that plays out in fragile states—and argues for a new understanding of the threat posed by extremism in fragile states to U.S. interests. The threat is based not only on the possibility of attacks against the homeland but also on the ability of the United States to compete against its adversaries globally. The report then examines the conditions and actors that contribute to the emergence of extremism in fragile states. Finally, it considers what a preventive strategy might look like by identifying the strategy's key objectives, highlighting the challenges for implementation, and reviewing evidence of what sorts of approaches can make a difference in fragile states. Ultimately, this report argues that the United States urgently needs a new strategy to strengthen fragile states and help them build resilience against extremism. Such a strategy would be difficult, but not impossible, to put in place. The current political winds are favorable to its adoption and successful implementation.”

"War Room" (September 12, 2018).
“Based on the judgment of the editorial board, the following (in no particular order) were among the best responses to the following question: Some analysts claim that the United States is tactically proficient, but strategically deficient. How sound is this critique?”

War on the Rocks, September 13, 2018, streaming audio, 43:48.
“How should the U.S. military prepare for the conflicts of the future? Military threats in the cyber, digital, and information domains present new training challenges. Synthetic training seeks to address these obstacles – but what is it, anyway, how does it work in practice, and is the military trying to throw too much new tech at the problem? Managing Editor Usha Sahay discussed the future of military training with three experts in the perfect setting: over cocktails in a seaside mansion-turned-bar in Newport, Rhode Island.”

McCormick, Rhys, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
∙ DoD contract obligations increased 13 percent between FY 2015 and FY 2017. However, growth was not uniform across what DoD procures. Defense products contracting increased 22 percent while defense services contracting grew by 5 percent and defense research and development (R&D) contracting grew by 6 percent.
∙ The last two years' defense contracting rebound most benefited the top tier of defense contractors, the Big Five, who have seen a 33 percent growth in defense contract obligations. Small (10 percent) and Medium (9 percent) vendors experienced more modest growth in defense contract obligations while Large vendors fared the worst, only experiencing a 1 percent increase in defense contract obligations.
∙ The rate of effective competition for defense contract obligations, after previously seeming impervious to change, fell to 44 percent in FY 2017 compared to the historical average of 49 percent between FY 2000 and FY 2015.
∙ Although defense contracting has rebounded over the past two years, the defense acquisition system currently sits at an inflection point that will likely transform both the acquisition system and its supporting industrial base as DoD shifts its priorities to speed and the 2018 National Defense Strategy's imperatives while also implementing the recent colossal acquisition reforms.

Hillman, Jonathan E. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
"Five years since it was announced, China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has yet to materialize on the ground as promised. According to Chinese officials, the BRI includes six economic corridors that will carry goods, people, and data across the Eurasian supercontinent. But a statistical analysis of 173 infrastructure projects finds that Chinese investment is just as likely to go outside those corridors as within them. The BRI appears to be less coordinated than Beijing hopes and some critics fear.”

Runde, Daniel F. and Sundar R. Ramanujam. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The demand for quality infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond is both a challenge and an opportunity for the international community. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that Asia alone will require more than $1.7 trillion annually through 2030, to support its growing infrastructure needs. Public finance on its own cannot close the infrastructure gap, and with foreign aid limited to a few hundred billion dollars each year, the global demand for quality infrastructure will require financing from diverse sources including the private sector, multilateral development banks (MDBs), and others. Conventional development assistance can be leveraged to catalyze private finance participation and create new opportunities for investment in several meaningful ways. Support for crowding in private investment is also a crucial part of the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy, which calls for ‘strengthened cooperation with allies on high-quality infrastructure’ in Asia. The Ise-Shima principles adopted by the G7 in 2016 indicate a strong endorsement for the promotion of quality infrastructure in terms of life-cycle cost, safety, resilience against natural disasters, job creation, capacity building, transfer of expertise and know-how, alignment with local development strategies, ensuring debt sustainability, and limiting social and environmental costs.”

Hellyer, H. A. (Ed). (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“The Islamic Tradition and the Human Rights Discourse is a collection of thought provoking articles that aim to elevate the conversation on Islam and human rights beyond the confines of "compatibility." The report, compiled and edited by Dr. H.A. Hellyer, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, sheds light on new methods for the exploration and engagement of the Islamic tradition and the rights discourse, featuring theoretical and practical accounts by Muslim scholars, academics, and human rights practitioners.”

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018).
“Climate change will have significant implications for agriculture and food security. By the middle of this century, higher average temperatures, changes in precipitation, rising sea levels, an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, as well as the possibility of an increase in damage from pests and disease, are expected to affect crop and livestock production, as well as fisheries and aquaculture. This impact will be uneven across regions and countries. In low-latitude regions, where most developing and least developed countries are located, agriculture is already being adversely affected by climate change, specifically, by a higher frequency of droughts and floods. For developing countries, climate change could exacerbate the food security challenges they already experience. Climate change impacts will be location specific, with significant variations across crops and regions. Arid and semi-arid regions will be exposed to even lower precipitation and higher temperatures and, consequently, experience yield losses. Conversely, countries in temperate areas, many of which have developed economies, are expected to benefit from warmer weather during their growing season. As a result, climate change could exacerbate existing inequalities and further widen the gap between developed and developing countries.”

Tsafos, Nikos. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
∙ The world needs to shift its energy system to meet its climate targets. The growth in energy demand must slow, and the carbon emitted from that energy must decline.
∙ Past global energy transitions have taken a long time—so we might conclude that the challenge we face is historically unprecedented and will require historically unprecedented action. This is partly right, but we tend to think of energy systems as far more static and stable than they truly are.
∙ Many countries that have managed to grow without consuming more energy have reduced their consumption of specific energy sources and have changed their energy mix in a decade or two.
∙ There is no reason to think that energy is immune from the disruptive forces that have transformed so many industries. History shows us that when change comes, it can be swift and dramatic.

∙ “Introduction: A Most Infamous Day: Marking the 17th Anniversary of the 9/11 Attacks” by Ryan Evans
∙ “Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: The Alliance that Started the Forever War” by Tricia Bacon
∙ “The Long Aftermath of 9/11: How Terrorism Doesn’t End” by Martha Crenshaw
∙ “With Us and Against Us: Understanding the Mixed Record of U.S. Partners on Counter-Terrorism Cooperation since 9/11” by Stephen Tankel
∙ “What Progress Has America Made after 17 Years of Global Counter-Terrorism Efforts?” by Michael P. Dempsey
∙ “Retrospect and Prospect: On Endless War” by David A. Brown, Tim Hoyt, and Craig Whiteside
∙ “Another Year of the War in Afghanistan” by A. Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner

Peter Bergen and David Sterman. (Washington, DC: New America, 2018).
“The United States has demonstrated its ability to deal substantial military defeats to jihadist groups that take territory. Yet jihadist groups remain a resilient threat, forcing a discussion of U.S. objectives and aims in its counterterrorism wars.”

Henry D. Sokolski. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2018). Second Edition.
“‘Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future,’ Second Edition explores what nuclear future we may face over the next three decades and how we currently think about this future. Will nuclear weapons spread in the next 20 years to more nations than just North Korea and possibly Iran? How dire will the consequences be? What might help us avoid the worst?”

Jeffrey L. Caton. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2018).
“The 2018 National Defense Strategy and National Space Strategy both reaffirm the vital interests that the United States has in the domain of space. However, space remains an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and competitive among the nations. What are ways for the U.S. Army to assure the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment where space systems are degraded for significant periods of time?”

“‘The Army War College Review,’ a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, ‘The AWC Review’ connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms. Topics Covered: Technological Innovation, Strategic Dimensions, and Military Force.
I. Technological Innovation
- “Russian Exploitation of the Cyber Gap in International Law” by Kenneth J. Biskner
- “Strategic Robotpower: Artificial Intelligence and National Security” by Patrick Sullivan
II. Strategic Dimensions
- “Time: Exploring the 4th Dimension of Strategy” by Joseph Andrew Brooks
- “Deception as a Supplement to the Instruments of National Security” by Patrick B. Quinn
III. Military Force
- “The U.S. Military. . . America’s Easy Button” by Scott A. Myers
- “The Great Enabler: The AVF and the Use of Force” by Scott W. Mueller

War on the Rocks, August 29, 2018, streaming audio, 56:08.
“In this episode, Ryan sat down with Gen. David Goldfein, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force. We had an in-depth, candid conversation about his service’s personnel challenges, the selection and education of leaders, as well as strategy, warfighting, and the books that have influenced him. Goldfein also explained why he engaged with the pseudonymous Col. ‘Ned Stark’ and why it is so important for people in the Air Force to write and publicly engage.”

Zachary Morris. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2018).
“The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains the most powerful military alliance in the world—and arguably in history. However, the greatest danger to it comes from within. Questionable allied political will and cohesion threatens the survival of NATO as a credible political and defense organization. Political will remains an understudied, underdefined and ambiguous concept, especially in connection with conflict studies. NATO’s political will is the extent of support among key decisionmakers for particular solutions to particular problems—necessary to overcome costs and risks—and for commitment to sustain efforts over time. Thus, NATO’s political will to defend Baltic allies is the support among alliance leaders to employ force against a Russian threat and sustain the costs and risks of those actions over time. Based on this definition, this paper will examine several necessary and sufficient conditions for political will. Political will requires: support from a sufficient group of decisionmakers; a common understanding of the threat; a commonly-perceived, potentially-effective solution; and commitment to sustain those actions.”

Trevor Thrall, et al. (Chicago, IL: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2018).
“Many observers have worried, in particular, about whether younger Americans will be willing to take up the mantle of global leadership. This question matters a good deal in light of the fact that the Millennial Generation, those born between 1981 and 1996, is now the largest generation of Americans. Like the Baby Boomers before them, Millennials have already had an outsized impact on American culture. As they age and begin to take leadership positions in business, government, and across society, their views – not those of their parents and grandparents – will be decisive.”

Anthony H. Cordesman. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The report draws on a wide range of official sources and is designed to provide an overview of official reporting on major trends rather than make an independent analysis. The U.S. provides a vast amount of detail on its annual budget request for military and international affairs spending – much of it in graphic, tabular, and summary form. The material presented here is an attempt to pick the key materials to show where the U.S. is focusing its military spending, how it relates to its strategy, how major force improvements will affect U.S. capabilities, and how the U.S. is dealing with its strategic partners and potential threats. However, the user should be aware that much of the material presented is often uncertain and is not comparable from source to source. There also is no easy or single way to summarize the trends in the U.S. defense budget. The materials that go into just the unclassified portions of the Department of Defense’s annual submission of President’s budget request to Congress, and the subsequent Congressional review of that request, run well over several thousand pages.”

Michael Ratner. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2018).
"The exchanges of threats between members of the governments of Iran and the United States, including the presidents of both countries, have again raised the specter of an interruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait), a key waterway for the transit of oil and natural gas to world markets. In the first half of 2018, approximately 18 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil and condensate, almost 4 million bpd of petroleum products, and over 300 million cubic meters per day in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exited the Strait. Iran accounted for about 10% of oil and 0% of the natural gas through the Strait. In a speech on July 22, Iranian President Rouhani stated, 'We are the…guarantor of security of the waterway of the region throughout the history. Don't play with the lion's tail; you will regret it.' (Western reporting took the reference to the waterway to mean the Strait of Hormuz, which is the narrow waterway that forms the entrance to the Persian Gulf from the Gulf of Oman and ultimately the Arabian Sea."

Victor Cha and Lisa Collins. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel / Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The growth of markets is the single most significant socioeconomic development to occur in North Korea over the last 20 years. An understanding of this change is critical for the formulation of North Korea policy, but the underlying issues have been relatively understudied in comparison to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and prospects for denuclearization. The North Korean economy is still theoretically run under a centrally-controlled and state-planned system. However, on-the-ground conditions show a reality that is quite different. Information from various sources, including internal in-country and external out-of-country data, demonstrates that the North Korean economy is increasingly penetrated by private market activity”

Andreas Schleicher. (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018).
“In a world where the kind of things that are easy to teach and test have also become easy to digitise and automate, it will be our imagination, our awareness and our sense of responsibility that will enable us to harness the opportunities of the 21st century to shape the world for the better. Tomorrow’s schools will need to help students think for themselves and join others, with empathy, in work and citizenship. They will need to help students develop a strong sense of right and wrong, and sensitivity to the claims that others make. What will it take for schools to be able to do this? Andreas Schleicher, initiator of the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and an international authority on education policy, has accompanied education leaders in over 70 countries in their efforts to design and implement forward-looking policies and practices. While improvement in education is far easier to proclaim than achieve, in this book Schleicher examines the many successes from which we can learn. This does not mean copying and pasting solutions from other schools or countries, but rather looking seriously and dispassionately at good practice in our own countries and elsewhere to understand what works in which contexts. Trained in physics, Schleicher offers a unique perspective on education reform: he convincingly argues that it should not necessarily be less of an art, but more of a science.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
“What Is China’s Strategy? Since 2002, Chinese leaders – including President Xi Jinping – have characterized the 21st century’s initial two decades as a ‘period of strategic opportunity.’ They assess that international conditions during this time will facilitate domestic development and the expansion of China’s ‘comprehensive national power.’ The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has distilled these objectives into President Xi’s ‘China Dream of national rejuvenation’ to establish a powerful and prosperous China...Building A More Capable People’s Liberation Army: In support of the goal to establish a powerful and prosperous China, the ‘China Dream’ includes a commitment to developing military power commensurate with that of a great power. Chinese military strategy documents highlight the requirement for a People’s Liberation Army (PLA) able to secure Chinese national interests overseas, including a growing emphasis on the importance of the maritime and information domains, offensive air operations, long-distance mobility operations, and space and cyber operations.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
“The Department of Defense’s 2018 report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China fulfills reporting requirements of the National Defense Authorization Act. This year’s report focuses on developments during 2017.”

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Five claimants occupy nearly 70 disputed reefs and islets spread across the South China Sea. They have built more than 90 outposts on these contested features, many of which have seen expansion in recent years. AMTI has gathered satellite imagery of each outpost, along with other relevant information, to document their current status and any changes they have undergone in recent years.”

Patricia M. Kim. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“Prepared statement by Patricia M. Kim Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow Council on Foreign Relations Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, United States House Foreign Affairs Committee United States House of Representatives 2nd Session, 115th Congress.”

U.S. Department of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
“Space is integral to the U.S. way of life, our national security, and modern warfare. Although U.S. space systems have historically maintained a technological advantage over those of potential adversaries, those potential adversaries are now actively developing ways to deny our use of space in a crisis. It is imperative that the United States adapts its policies, doctrine, and capabilities to protect our interests. Towards that end, the Department of Defense will marshal spaces resources into a Space Force. The Space Force will protect our economy through deterrence of malicious activities, ensure our space systems meet national security requirements, and provide vital capabilities to joint and coalition forces across the spectrum of conflict.”

Pamela L. Bunker and Robert J Bunker. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2018).
“This Strategic Studies Institute book provides a comprehensive research guide to radical Islamist English-language online magazines, eBooks, and assorted radical Islamist news magazines, reports, and pocketbooks published between April-May 2007 and November 2016, and generates strategic insights and policy response options.”

Seth G. Jones. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The August 14 attack in London is the latest reminder that terrorism persists in the West more than a decade and a half after September 11, 2001…Perhaps the most significant lesson from the London attack, however, is the resilience of the British public. They kept calm and carried on.”

Borhan Osman. (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2018).
“Despite widespread recognition that the only way toward ending the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan is a negotiated settlement, understanding of the Taliban’s thinking on the subject is remarkably scant. This report attempts to fill this gap by drawing on face-to-face interviews with Taliban foot soldiers, field commanders, and supporters to better understand the movement’s views on why they are fighting, what issues are negotiable, whether they have faith in negotiation as a way to peace, and what a peace process might look like.”

Kori Schake, et al. Texas National Security Review (August 7, 2018).
“Sir Lawrence Freedman's latest book, ‘The Future of War,’ asks why futurists have so often gotten it wrong when it comes to predicting war.”
- “Introduction: A Strategist at Work” by Kori Schake
- “War May not Be Predictable, but there Are Warning Signs” by Michael Brown and Pavneet Singh
- “The Future of War Ain't What It Used to Be” by Mike Gallagher
- “Technology, the Economy, and the Future of War” by Saku Panditharatne
- “Faulty Frames and Techno-Optimism” by Heather M. Roff

J. T. Reiner, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2018).
“One of the major developments in international law since World War II is the growth of human rights law dedicated to ensuring the protection of individuals from violence wherever they are, including from their own state. Tracking such changes, in recent decades, just-war theory has evolved from its traditional focus on state sovereignty in the direction of a rights-based approach that treats just wars as a form of global law enforcement. This monograph provides a survey of these developments, focusing on the increased scope for humanitarian intervention, principles of justice after war, and on the question of the responsibility of combatants for assessing the justice of their military's cause. It concludes by considering the call for strengthening international institutions and training programs in military ethics.”

John R. Deni (Ed.) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2018)
“This compendium of essays is based on presentations delivered at a one-day workshop sponsored jointly by the U.S. Army War College and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), with additional funding generously provided by the U.S. Army War College Foundation. The invitation-only event was held on May 1, 2018 at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC and included North American and European experts from the policy making community, academia, think tanks, the intelligence community, and the military services. These individuals gathered together to address Russia’ s geopolitical strategy, its operational capacity and capabilities, and its military modernization efforts, all in an effort to inform EUCOM and U.S. Department of Defense planning as well as strengthen allied deterrence in Europe.”

Clarence J. Henderson, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2018).
“We are an Army obsessed with the future. Our institutions, concepts, policies and evolving doctrines are always reconsidering the way we will fight and are always determining the tools necessary to outrange and outgun the adversaries of tomorrow. And for good reason—the character of war is evolving with the global diffusion of technologies, emerging economies and societal evolutions. But, as the character of war evolves, so too does the character of the citizen Soldier whom we recruit. The citizen Soldiers of today exist within a civil sector that is globally-oriented and is inundated with information technology. They are globally-astute and technologically-savvy and are imbued with new industry practices across all sectors of society. This human element of the All-Volunteer Force can provide the differential advantage over the diverse landscape of global threats to prevent future strategic surprise. Achieving this end will require senior leaders who first understand the changing character of the citizen Soldiers and then apply their evolving talents in the right place and time. If done well, this will have a profound effect on our operational capabilities well into the future.”

Michael Horowitz, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2018).
“Understanding what artificial intelligence ‘is’ from a historical perspective is critical to assessing the ways that it will likely impact the international security environment and the future of international competition. AI is more akin to electricity or the combustion engine than a particular weapon, such as a nuclear device, or a particular platform, like a battleship. Given the extent of the disruption that analysts believe AI could cause in the global economy, it is worth thinking about the consequences of AI in the context of the industrial revolutions of the past.”

James Andrew Lewis, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
"A number of proposals for international cybersecurity negotiations share a common feature: they offer unworkable ideas. The reason for this is the discrepancy between theory and practice, particularly when proposals diverge from state practice, which we can define as how states will behave to maintain or advance their interests. Some proposals also seem to ignore a changed international environment, where the post-1945 ideals, institutions, and powers are in decline and the United States lacks the influence it once had. Proposals that run counter to state practice or that discount the weakening of Western influence face serious and perhaps insurmountable obstacles."

Samm Sacks, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“In March 2018, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) issued a definitive report on the discrimination and intellectual property (IP) challenges that U.S. companies face operating in China. The report (the 301 investigation findings) was groundbreaking because it is the most comprehensive and detailed public documentation to date of problems that are making the China market so difficult for U.S. companies. A central feature of the report is the now notorious Made in China 2025 plan (cited 116 times in the report), a state blueprint released in 2015 for China to become ‘self-sufficient’ in high-tech sectors including advanced information and communication technology (ICT), aviation, and new energy vehicles. The report also touched on challenges posed by China’s Cybersecurity Law, a sweeping piece of legislation with a suite of market access issues, particularly around cross-border data transfer and new cybersecurity reviews. U.S. policymakers are grappling with how to manage the industrial policy and technological leadership challenges posed by China.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference
Program begins about 30:21.
“The CSIS Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative are pleased to present the Eighth Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference on Thursday, July 26, 2018. This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. The event will feature speakers from throughout the region, including claimant countries. Panels will address recent developments, legal and environmental issues, the strategic balance, and U.S. policy.”
Panel: State of Play in the South China Sea over the Past Year
Panel: Dispute Resolution in the South China Sea and Beyond
Panel: Environmental Issues in the South China Sea
Panel: The Military Balance in the South China Sea

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference
“More than one month after the Singapore Summit, little headway has been made on denuclearization of North Korea. Many attribute the slow progress to disparate definitions of denuclearization on the part of the United States and North Korea. This conference brings together regional and technical experts to take stock of where we are on the four elements of the Singapore Summit and to examine the following questions: Why do the United States and North Korea have different definitions of denuclearization? Is CVID feasible? What are the appropriate standards for a verification protocol for North Korea's denuclearization? What should be our goals in a denuclearization agreement? What are we willing to sacrifice in return? What does the road ahead look like?”

William A. Carter, Jennifer Daskal, and William Crumpler, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
"Whether you believe law enforcement is 'going dark' or we are in a “golden age of surveillance,” law enforcement faces substantial challenges in identifying and accessing digital evidence that is available and important to their criminal investigations. Some of these problems are no doubt related to encryption and ephemerality of data—the two issues that have absorbed most of the national attention to date. But the problems with digital evidence and digital technologies go far beyond those issues and affect over one-third of law enforcement cases. Over the past year, we conducted a series of interviews with federal, state, and local law enforcement officials, attorneys, service providers, and civil society groups. We also commissioned a survey of law enforcement officers from across the country to better understand the full range of difficulties they are facing in accessing and using digital evidence in their cases. Survey results indicate that accessing data from service providers—much of which is not encrypted—is the biggest problem that law enforcement currently faces in leveraging digital evidence."

UNAIDS, (Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS, 2018).
“The global AIDS response is at a precarious point—partial success in saving lives and stopping new HIV infections is giving way to complacency. At the halfway point to the 2020 targets, the pace of progress is not matching the global ambition. This report is a wake-up call—action now can still put us back on course to reach the 2020 targets.”

Anna Lührmann, et al., (Gothenburg: Sweden: V-Dem [Varieties of Democracy] Institute at the University of Gothenburg, 2018).
“We are pleased to present our second Annual Democracy Report...In the 2018 Democracy Report we find that global levels of democracy are still close to an all-time high. However, even though the electoral aspects of democracy have improved in many countries in recent years, freedom of expression, media, and civil society are under threat in other parts of the world. The report identifies disquieting trends in several key countries.”

“Each summer, the key homeland and national security issues of the day are explored in detail during three days of in-depth discussion by:
• Top level present and former government officials from all relevant agencies such as the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, State, Justice, and the Treasury;
• Industry leaders, including large and small national security-related companies, as well as private equity investors, merchant and investment bankers, venture capitalists, and other financiers;
• Thought leaders in other think tanks and academe; and,
• Nationally noted print and broadcast journalists.”

William J. Flavin (Ed.), (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2018).
USAWC Integrated Research Project: “The United States has a compelling national security interest to promote stability in select fragile and conflict-affected states. Such an operational environment is complex and requires a whole-of-U.S. Government response, coupled with non-governmental and international partners and supported by the affected nation to achieve their own national goals.”

Stephen Marr, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2018).
“Multi-Domain Battle (MDB) is an operational concept developed by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) that describes ground combat operations against sophisticated peer and near-peer threats. In February 2017, TRADOC published a white paper titled ‘Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century’ to initiate the discussion of MDB across the Army and the Joint Force. TRADOC subsequently published a more detailed description of MDB in ‘Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040’ along with the new Army Operations doctrinal series (ADP 3-0, ADRP 3-0, and FM 3-0) in October 2017. These documents are designed ‘promote thought and discussion concerning the methods and capabilities required to confront sophisticated adversaries’ as well as ‘to inform further concept development, wargaming, experimentation, and capability development.’”

Martin E. Dempsey. LinkedIn (July 9, 2018).
A brief piece about ethics and leadership.

“War Room” (July 19, 2018).
“Based on the judgment of the editorial board, the following (in no particular order) were the best responses to the following question: How good is the U.S. Army at developing strategic leaders? Give the organization a grade (from F to A+), and support your assessment.”

“War Room” (July 20, 2018).
“For this ‘Whiteboard,’ we polled members of the faculty who specialize in domestic security. They include reserve component officers, a visiting professor from the Department of Homeland Security, and the War College’s Director of Homeland Security. What do they have to say about the matter? Read on!”

David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "War on the Rocks" (July 17, 2018).
“Okay, fellow nat sec nerds — we know that you really don’t want to take a summer vacation. But we also know that to keep up your relationships, satisfy your significant other, or maintain harmony in the family, you have to go — and even pretend to love it. So once again this year, we are publishing our best ideas for your summer vacation reading, listening, and watching. And just like our lists in 2016 and 2017, here is the perfect way to hide behind your sunglasses, get a tan, and relax while catching up on great stuff in our field that you may have missed during the school year!”

(Nedlands, Western Australia, Australia: Walk Free Foundation, 2018).
“The 2018 Global Slavery Index provides a country by country ranking of the number of people in modern slavery, as well as an analysis of the actions governments are taking to respond, and the factors that make people vulnerable. This year, so that we might better understand the problem, we have also included an analysis of trade flows and data on state imposed forced labour in North Korea, risk factors in the fishing industry, and the prevalence of forced labour in the cocoa sector.”

(Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 2018).
“The Library of Congress' collection of North Korean materials is one of the largest in the world. Yet, few scholars are aware of Library of Congress’ holdings on North Korea. The bulk of the collection is therefore still unavailable to scholars and researchers. These materials are essential to advancing our knowledge of North Korea. The NKSIP [North Korean Serials Databases] project will provide a range of potential benefits. Access to these historical and cultural materials can provide insight into the policy, economic, political, social, historic, military, legal, financial, and governmental issues that affect contemporary foreign policy and strategies related to North Korea. For example, the collection of North Korean journals at the Library of Congress includes a large number of journals on literature and arts in addition to economic and political topics. In such journals, significant themes in the lives of general North Korean public are discussed in detail, for instance, they address information and advices in parenting, recipes, nutrition, culture, and also the concerns that were most prominent in people's everyday lives. The academic value of such articles are immeasurable given the information and data that are readily available generally focus on macro-scale overview of North Korea, for instance politics and economy, often based on second-hand observations. The collection contains publications from as early as 1948, the year the DPRK was established, through the present. At present, a total of 34,000 index records have been created for articles published in North Korean Collection. This database provides an in-depth and authoritative guide on what resources are available.”

NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.
“Programme of the meetings with links to transcripts, photos, audio and video.”

Kathleen Hicks, et al., (Washington, DC: Defense 360 ° - Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“In recent years, discussion about transatlantic security spending has increasingly focused on whether NATO members are spending 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, the benchmark mandated at the 2014 Wales Summit. Only four member states currently meet the 2 percent threshold that they are expected to reach by 2024, prompting criticism that members who fail to do so are not adequately sharing the burden of collective defense. Critics of the metric, on the other hand, argue that it unfairly recognizes spending levels regardless of whether those resources are employed in the service of allied security, and at the same time discounts the efforts of allies who make meaningful contributions to the alliance while falling short of 2 percent. The almost singular focus on meeting the NATO pledge of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense obscures many of the true challenges to growing national and collective capability and to strengthened transatlantic security. Although the transatlantic security community actively debates the merits of the 2 percent measure, it has not identified an alternative measure or set of measures to adopt instead. This report seeks to catalyze that political and analytical discussion of alternatives by widening the aperture for assessing and comparing the security contributions of NATO allies and key European partners. In addition to analyzing current NATO metrics (like the 2 percent measure), it examines in depth several metrics that provide a broader understanding of collective security contributions and identifies gaps in data collection and reporting, that, if mitigated, could improve the rigor of security spending analysis.”

Jim Townsend, (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2018).
“The fact is that NATO needs to have more forces on hand, at a higher state of readiness, and with more capabilities — and it needs to speed up its political decision-making to both generate and deploy those forces. It also needs to make force deployment quicker and smoother across Europe. However, to deal with this problem of burden-sharing and to avoid a political rupture with the United States, increased military forces and capabilities are needed from the major European Allies, particularly Germany. For Germany, spending 2 percent of its large GDP on defense represents a significant jump, a politically difficult decision to make given the German population’s deeply-engrained resistance to defense spending and having a large military force. In view of NATO's gap in capabilities, and even at the improved spending rates we see now by many Allies, it is not certain that NATO will be able to deliver the forces and capabilities it needs to balance out the burden of defending Europe.”

Heather Williams, (Paris, France: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2018).
“NATO is currently dealing with several challenges: Russian hostility, growing pressure internally for nuclear disarmament or withdrawal of non-strategic US nuclear weapons, as well as the questioning of America’s credibility as a guarantor of European security. Since these sources of tension are not felt symmetrically across the 29 member states, it has become necessary to adapt assurance measures on a case-by-case basis by adjusting the military capabilities involved and the communication according to the needs of each country. The purpose of this study is to identify the various options available to the United States to enable it to adapt capabilities, messaging strategies, and other tools, thereby providing more effective and consistent assurance in the face of the Russian threat. In order to respond effectively to a strategy aimed at accentuating the internal divisions of the Alliance, it is necessary to combine measures related to the ‘hardware’ of NATO’s posture (nuclear weapons, investments, conventional forces etc.) and others related to its ‘software’ (values, Alliance cohesion, communication, etc.).”

Anna M. Dyner, et al., (Warsaw, Poland: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2018).
“This report analyses the process of the adaptation of the North Atlantic Alliance to the deep and dynamic evolution of its security environment that has taken place between 2014 and 2018. The deep changes in NATO initiated by the summits in the Welsh city of Newport in September 2014 and in Warsaw in July 2016 were confirmed at the special meeting of NATO Heads of State and Government in Brussels in May 2017. It is widely expected that the summit in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, will consolidate the general direction of NATO’s adaptation, which is based on the ‘360-degree principle’ of building NATO’s capacity to effectively address the full spectrum of threats coming from both main strategic directions—the Eastern and Southern Flanks. In the east, the threats are of a political and military character and stem from Russia’s foreign and defence policy, mainly its offensive force posture towards NATO, which includes hybrid warfare tools such as cyberattack and disinformation/propaganda. In the South, NATO has to address asymmetric and non-military threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled migration, and organised international crime. One could not think of two more different sets of threats to cope with, and yet NATO is adapting to both in the east and south, so the three summits—in Newport, in Warsaw, and the upcoming one in Brussels—stand a good chance together to rewrite the foundations of the Alliance’s political and military strategy for the next decade or so.”

Anna Maria Dyner, et al., (Warsaw, Poland: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2018).
“The NATO-Russia Founding Act adopted in 1997 reflected the consensus within the Alliance that new security architecture in Europe should be based on three pillars: enlargement of transformed NATO, European integration and partnership with Russia. Self-limitation on the stationing and deployment of troops in the territories of new NATO members was conditioned upon Russia’s observance of the rule-based order. After the annexation of Crimea, the Allies decided to respect the spirit of the Founding Act to limit the risk of escalation and defend the security system Russia is interested in derailing. The Allies, however, should adopt a less dogmatic approach to NRFA [NATO-Russia Founding Act], which would offer additional flexibility in strengthening NATO’s cohesion and influencing Russian calculations.”

John R. Deni, “War on the Rocks” (June 27, 2018).
“The United States and its NATO allies have dramatically strengthened alliance deterrence against Russia in northeastern Europe through an initiative titled Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP). The initiative, which was born out of NATO’s 2016 Warsaw summit, provides a vital tripwire against a Russian attack. Now that NATO has been implementing EFP for just over a year, there have been a number of lessons learned – or at least encountered.”

Luke Coffey and Daniel Kochis, (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2018).
“The NATO summit in Brussels on July 11 and 12 is an opportunity for the Alliance to provide realistic and meaningful support to Ukraine. In 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine. Russia illegally occupies Crimea. Russia provoked and now supports a separatist movement in eastern Ukraine that did not previously exist. Russia is the aggressor, and Ukraine is the victim. Realistically, Ukraine has a long way to go before NATO membership, but that does not mean that the Alliance should disengage from Ukraine. On the contrary, NATO should deepen its partnership with Ukraine at the upcoming summit. It is in NATO’s best interest to assist Ukraine in countering Russian aggression and to work toward the nation’s long-term peace and stability.”

Daniel Kochis and Luke Coffey, (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2018).
“The security and defense of the Baltic states deserves to be a key topic at the NATO summit on July 11 and 12 in Brussels. The Baltic region is one of the most complex regions that the Alliance is obligated to defend. While decisions made at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, especially the creation of four battlegroups, were a step in the right direction, the region remains exposed. NATO should think strategically about putting in place durable, robust measures to better deter Russian aggression. The U.S. should lead the way in ensuring that NATO makes additional progress in bolstering the defense of the Baltic states at the Brussels Summit.”

Mara Karlin, et al., “Texas National Security Review.” (June 26, 2018).
“How important is military superiority for U.S. national security? We asked a few experts to join the debate in our latest roundtable.”
- Introduction: Dilemmas of Debating Military Superiority, by Mara Karlin
- More than the Military: Pitfalls in American Grand Strategy, by Paul K. MacDonald
- Avoiding Fair Fights: Military Superiority and U.S. National Security, by Evan Braden Montgomery
- Strategy First: What Price Is Military Superiority Worth? by Rosella Cappella Zielinski and Kaija Schilde

Robert A. Manning and Peter Engelke, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“‘The Global Innovation Sweepstakes: A Quest to Win the Future’ examines how emerging technologies will remake the global order and explores strategies for how the United States can retain its innovative edge. Tech-based innovation—in fields such as artificial intelligence, robotics, green energy, and biotechnology—will reshape the future of human civilization. Those nations that can create and adapt to cutting-edge technologies will realize enormous economic and geostrategic benefits in the decades to come. It is with this realization that the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, in partnership with Qualcomm, embarked on a global tour of technology hubs to find out which ones are at the cutting edges of innovation and which are at risk of falling behind.”

Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2018).
“We hope the report will provide a solid foundation for a healthy debate on how AI can be used responsibly to improve our national security. Indeed, it provides the intellectual vector for the CNAS Task Force on Artificial Intelligence and National Security…Driven by the desire to debate thoroughly the acceptable boundaries of AI and machine learning in security applications, the task force–consisting of a variety of experts from government, academia, and public/private businesses and organizations–will discuss such topics as:
- Ensuring U.S. leadership in AI research and innovation
- Empowering the federal government to take advantage of AI opportunities
- Ensuring safe and responsible uses of AI in national security applications
- Preparing to counter the malicious uses of AI
It will also try to find the right balance between the more pessimistic and optimistic narratives associated with AI and machine learning, and ensure the ethical and moral pursuit of these technologies.”

John Hartley, (Nedlands, Western Australia: Future Directions International, 2018).
“One of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s major endeavours has been to normalise Japan’s political and military environments. A major impediment to that endeavour, however, has been the country’s pacifist Constitution, particularly Article 9 within it. The Article has been interpreted over time to suit contemporary factors. In the aftermath of the Korean War, for instance, Clause 2 of Article 9, which states that ‘land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained’, was reinterpreted so as to permit a ‘military capability that does not exceed the minimum necessary level for self-defence.’ Prime Minister Abe used that interpretation during his first administration in 2006 because he believes it has become outdated over the seventy years since it was promulgated on 3 November 1946. As he remarked during his first stint in office in 2006, ‘I believe we should revise Article 9 from the point of view that we should protect Japan, and that the country should make a global contribution (to security).’ In other words, Abe wants Japan to become a ‘normal’ country again, one with the capacity to defend its interests and citizens, whenever they may be threatened. It is hardly surprising, then, that he has continued to work towards that goal in his current term.”

House of Commons Defence Committee, (London, UK: House of Commons, 2018).
“The Modernising Defence Programme (MDP) is a defence policy review which was removed from the wider and cost-neutral National Security Capability Review (NSCR) and placed under the control of the Ministry of Defence. This provides an opportunity for the Government to realign the size and structure of the Armed Forces with the scale and range of intensifying threats that face the United Kingdom. It also gives the Government the chance to confront the necessity of providing the level of finance required to strengthen the Armed Forces on a sustainable basis…In this preliminary report ahead of the MDP reaching its conclusions, we make a number of observations on capability and force structure, recruitment and retention, international partnerships, business and commercial practices and defence expenditure that we would expect to be explored in the course of the MDP. This is a ‘broad brush’ exercise based both on the evidence we have received and on the conclusions of reports produced by us and our predecessor Committee since November 2015.”

Jamie Fly, Laura Rosenberger, and David Salvo, (Washington, DC: Alliance for Securing Democracy, 2018.)
“This report, representing the consensus of the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s Advisory Council, a bipartisan, transatlantic group of national security experts, makes recommendations not only to government, but also to the various pillars of democratic society — civil society organizations, the private sector, including the tech companies, and media organizations — that all have important roles to play in defending democracies from foreign interference. The report also outlines the asymmetric tools and tactics that authoritarian regimes use to undermine democracy, the types of influence operations that have been conducted across the transatlantic space over the past two decades, and the overall strategic approach that government and society should adopt in order to protect our democratic institutions from malign foreign influence.”

Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The 2017 French presidential election remains the clearest failed attempt by a foreign entity to influence an electoral process in recent years. Taking aim at presidential candidate Emmanuel Macron, Russian interference succeeded neither in interfering with the election nor in antagonizing French society. This Brief examines how France successfully withstood the disinformation and interference; how this failed attempt can be explained; and, looking to the future, what lessons can be learned from this experience?”

Patrycja Sasnal, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“Migration is a natural and defining phenomenon of the globalized world. The challenge of governing migration lies in its inevitability, volume, and heterogeneity. As a portion of the global population, migrants represent around 3 percent, but their absolute number is rising. There were 170 million migrants in 2000; today there are roughly 260 million. Migration levels will certainly grow while hostilities continue in the most conflict-ridden regions of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, the global wealth gap persists, climate change aggravates living conditions in many areas, and the poorer half of the globe becomes more populous. Moreover, migration is a complex heterogeneous process. Depending on the cause, duration, and legality, migration can be voluntary or forced (refugees and internally displaced persons, including survival migrants such as climate and disaster refugees), permanent or circular, regular or irregular.”

Jinwoo Kim.
War Room (May 30, 2018).

Patrick McEachern.
Texas National Security Review (June 05, 2018).
“The history of denuclearization efforts on the Korean peninsula give reason for pessimism, caution, and optimism. Attempting to critically engage that history can help the United States narrow uncertainty, prepare for a long diplomatic process should one transpire, and perhaps learn some tactical lessons.”

Eleanor Albert, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“The United States and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat. It has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, which, combined with its missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear weapons. While it remains among the poorest countries in the world, North Korea spends nearly a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP) on its military, according to U.S. State Department estimates. Its brinkmanship will continue to test regional and international partnerships aimed at preserving stability and security. The planning of a historic U.S.-North Korea summit in June 2018 has opened the door for direct diplomacy, but many experts say the dismantling of North Korea’s arsenal would be a lengthy, challenging process.”

Tim Huxley and Ben Schreer, (Washington, DC: IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] Voices, 2018).
“Could a potential Trump–Kim meeting be an opportunity to reset the regional order in ways favourable to the interests of the US, its allies and security partners? At a time of unprecedented turbulence in Asian security affairs, Tim Huxley and Ben Schreer explain the preoccupations of regional policymakers.”

“The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue is Asia's premier defence summit, a unique meeting of ministers and delegates from over 50 countries. The 2018 conference, held on 1–3 June, featured major speeches by Narendra Modi and James Mattis.”

William G Braun, III, Kim Richard Nossal, and Stéfanie von Hlatky, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“In the wake of two extended wars, Western militaries find themselves looking to the future while confronting amorphous nonstate threats and shrinking defense budgets. The 2015 Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS) examined how robotics and autonomous systems that enhance soldier effectiveness may offer attractive investment opportunities for developing a more efficient force capable of operating effectively in the future environment. This monograph offers three chapters derived from the KCIS and explores the drivers influencing strategic choices associated with these technologies and offers preliminary policy recommendations geared to advance a comprehensive technology investment strategy. In addition, the publication offers insight into the ethical challenges and potential positive moral implications of using robots on the modern battlefield.”

Jose Luis Calvo Albero, et al., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“After a period of stability, the transatlantic community is facing considerable challenges in maintaining European security. Russia’s efforts to destabilize Europe, terrorism, climate change, energy insecurity, migration, fracturing European identity, and the reemergence of nationalist populism challenge the ability of European institutions to perform their central functions. Different visions for Europe’s future and the lack of a shared threat perception add to these dilemmas. The U.S. military can help to shape these ‘friendly force dilemmas’ by influencing European actors and institutions, promoting positive change through the U.S. interagency, and providing capabilities to tackle the theater-specific challenges.”

(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“DisinfoPortal.org is a one-stop interactive online portal and guide to the Kremlin’s information war. The portal aggregates open source research and journalism from the United States and Europe and presents it in a user-friendly way, with timely multimedia content produced by the Atlantic Council and its partners explaining Russia’s ongoing influence operations. The portal further complements and coordinates existing counter-disinformation efforts across the transatlantic community, offering a database of country-specific researchers and organizations who are willing to answer media inquiries and questions from government officials and other experts on disinformation threats posed by state and non-state actors.”

Daniel F. Runde, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The size and scope of the global forced migration crisis are unprecedented. Almost 66 million people worldwide have been forced from home by conflict. If recent trends continue, this figure could increase to between 180 and 320 million people by 2030. This global crisis already poses serious challenges to economic growth and risks to stability and national security, as well as an enormous human toll affecting tens of millions of people. These issues are on track to get worse; without significant course correction soon, the forced migration issues confronted today will seem simple decades from now. Yet, efforts to confront the crisis continue to be reactive in addressing these and other core issues. The United States should broaden the scope of its efforts beyond the tactical and reactive to see the world through a more strategic lens colored by the challenges posed—and opportunities created—by the forced migration crisis at home and abroad. CSIS convened a diverse task force in 2017 to study the global forced migration crisis. This report is a result of those findings.”

(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2018).
“This strategy provides the Department with a framework to execute our cybersecurity responsibilities during the next five years to keep pace with the evolving cyber risk landscape by reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience; countering malicious actors in cyberspace; responding to incidents; and making the cyber ecosystem more secure and resilient.”

Frances G. Burwel, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“In an age of transatlantic tensions over the Iran deal, trade balances, and steel tariffs, digital policy is uniquely poised to offer opportunities for greater US-EU cooperation. At the same time, the digital arena also has the potential to be a policy minefield, with issues such as privacy, digital taxation, and competition policy still unresolved. ‘Making America First in the Digital Economy: The Case for Engaging Europe’ addresses these challenges and explores how the US-EU digital agenda fits in the larger transatlantic relationship.”

(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2018).
“Women+ is the first Sourcelist database. Women and underrepresented genders in technology policy—a field at the intersection of Silicon Valley and the Washington Beltway—face a particular set of institutional barriers. These issues have not gone unnoticed and countless organizations have made important progress in raising awareness of the issue and educating stakeholders on the importance of greater gender diversity. Sourcelist seeks to help in the last mile of those efforts; it is a resource for those looking to put good intention into practice.
You need more diverse experts in technology policy. That includes Women+. Sourcelist has them.”

Thomas P. Galvin (Ed.) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Defense management is ultimately about making strategic decisions and rendering best military advice to the civilian leadership. The processes, systems, and massive amounts of data exist to help make the best decisions possible about the current preparedness and future requirements of the joint force. This Primer provides an introduction to the defense enterprise and the roles of senior leaders in it, especially for those who have limited experience in service, joint, or defense-level organizations.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies
May 18, 2018, steaming video, 8:26:33
Recording begins about 32:42
“The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to introduce the Future Strategy Forum, a new initiative to connect women scholars who research national security with its leading practitioners. U.S. national security would be better served if all talent were empowered to contribute, regardless of gender, and if cutting-edge academic research spoke directly to practitioner communities. And yet, women remain underrepresented in national security research and policymaking, and national security academics remain siloed from policy. The Future Strategy Forum confronts these two challenges by bringing together female scholars and practitioners to address critical challenges and advance women in national security. Open to all, the inaugural conference, ‘The Future of Force,’ will feature all women-panels devoted to the changing character of warfare and potential new strategies for the United States and its partners.”
• Panel 1: “Actors: Future of State Security Competition”
• Panel 2: “Actors: Future of Non-State Power
• Panel 3: “Tools: Future of Warfare Technology”
• Panel 4: “Solutions: Integrating the Toolkit”
• Panel 5: "From the Situation Room to the Seminar Room"

Tate Nurkin (Jane’s by IHS Markit, Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018.
“Jane’s research and analysis examined five categories of China’s advanced weapons systems: counter-space, unmanned systems, maneuverable reentry vehicles, directed energy and electromagnetic railguns. In addition, this report also focuses on China’s notable investment in and emphasis on development of artificial intelligence applications for national defense. The following key themes and insights across four linked analytical categories emerged throughout the course of our research:
• The strategic context in which China’s advanced weapons systems are being developed
• China’s defense industrial base and science and technology community
• The advanced weapons themselves
• Policy measures and investments required to mitigate risk and capitalize on opportunity generated by China’s advanced weapons systems and other dynamics identified in this paper.”

Iskander Rehman, et al. "Texas National Security Review" (May 15, 2018).
“We asked a group of experts to discuss whether the tensions between the United States and China amount to a 21st century Cold War.”
• “Introduction” by Iskander Rehman
• “Beware the Cold War Trap — It's a Geopolitical Competition, Instead” by Michael Auslin
• “Competition Aplenty, but no Cold War” by Robert Ayson
• “Beyond Cold War: Paradigms for U.S.-China Strategic Competition” by Elsa B. Kania
• “Are the United States and China Really in a New Cold War? A View from the Region” by Sheryn Lee
• “A New Era of Major Power Competition, Not a New Cold War” by Tiffany Ma and Brian O'Keefe
• “America Faces the Stakes and Style of a Cold War in Asia” Kori Schake

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference
May 11, 2018, steaming video, 5:19:19
“The United States and China are approaching the 40th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations. To commemorate this historic milestone, CSIS is hosting a half-day event on the morning of May 11, 2018, to discuss the twists and turns in the relationship over the last four decades and the challenges that lay ahead. The conference will feature key policy figures and experts from both the United States and China. We will begin with a keynote address from a current member of Congress, then have two star-studded panels discussing ‘The First 40 Years’ and ‘The Next 40 Years,’ and then wrap up with a luncheon armchair discussion featuring former Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Chinese Ambassador to the United States Cui Tiankai.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference
May 14, 2018, streaming video, 4:19:06
“India’s May 1998 nuclear tests served as a wake-up call to the U.S. strategic community—India was rising. Progress in the relationship, both in terms of economic and security ties, can sometimes feel slow. But over these last twenty years, the U.S. has risen to become India’s most important economic and strategic partner—and India is becoming increasingly important to American interests, too. On May 14, we will explore those early days as the U.S. and India planted the seeds for a more robust partnership. Our expert speakers will assess progress, and offer thoughts as to where the relationship may head next, and how policymakers can bring it to life.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference
May 8, 2018, streaming video, 3:15:21
“Please join us for a rich half-day discussion on the geostrategic and geo-economic future of the Arctic. In a moderated ‘exit interview,’ the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral Paul F. Zukunft, will discuss his active public advocacy for and interagency pursuit of securing greater U.S. capabilities and readiness for a rapidly changing Arctic, as well as offer some thoughts on the overall trajectory of the Coast Guard’s future mission in the polar regions. Subsequent panels will closely examine Russia’s future economic and security ambitions in the Arctic as well as address the key drivers of future economic growth and the forces that are shaping these new economic dynamics.”

(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Two Eastern Mediterranean countries—Syria and Turkey—present some of the most vexing problems for U.S. foreign policy today. The Syrian civil war has become a magnet for both terrorists and U.S. adversaries. Turkey, a NATO ally, is facing terrorism and a refugee crisis. Domestically, it is increasingly turning away from democratic principles and making choices that are at odds with the United States. The United States needs to take a new strategic approach to the Eastern Mediterranean, outlined in a CSIS report forthcoming in May 2018. An urgent part of that strategy, outlined here, is recalibrating U.S. policy toward Syria and Turkey.”

“Global think tank leaders grade the world's performance and prospects for 2018. Scroll down to explore the report.”

United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs (May 16, 2018).
“Today, 55% of the world’s population lives in urban areas, a proportion that is expected to increase to 68% by 2050. Projections show that urbanization, the gradual shift in residence of the human population from rural to urban areas, combined with the overall growth of the world’s population could add another 2.5 billion people to urban areas by 2050, with close to 90% of this increase taking place in Asia and Africa, according to a new United Nations data set launched today.”

Atlantic Council Conference
“Please join the Atlantic Council and the East Asia Foundation for what will be the first public convening in Washington, DC after the historic inter-Korean summit to feature senior ROK government officials. Members of a high-level delegation from Seoul will deliver remarks debriefing the Moon-Kim summit, addressing the future of North Korea’s nuclear program, the US-ROK alliance, and inter-Korean relations. Alongside US experts and policymakers, they will share their views on the inter-Korean dialogue and what it might signify for the United States-North Korea summit just on the horizon.”

US Army War College YouTube page
Session Topics:
- What Will Next-Gen Leaders Need To Be?
- Where Will the Military Find Its Future Strategic Leaders?
- What Will the Military's Future Ethic and Ethos Be?
- Strategy Leader Qualities - Army War College

Association of the United States Army YouTube page
Session Topics:
- LTG James H Dickinson
- Gen John E. Hyten
- Panel 1 - Developing Capabilities
- Panel 2 - Providing AMD Capacity
- Panel 3 - Provide Trained and Ready Missile Defense
- Panel 4 - Building Partner Capacity

Association of the United States Army YouTube page
Session Topics:
- Jordan Gillis - Acting ASA IE&E
- Panel 1 - Joint Installations
- Panel 2 - Enterprise Lessons
- Panel 3 - Installations of the Future

Beth A. Behn, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, 2018).
“A series of high-profile ethical lapses by senior military professionals has generated calls from levels as high as the commander in chief for a renewed emphasis on military ethics. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken a number of significant steps to address concerns about the apparent erosion of the military’s moral fabric, including the establishment of a list of desired leader attributes (DLA) that includes ‘the ability to make ethical decisions based on the shared values of the Profession of Arms.’ Leaders engaged in professional military education (PME) across the joint force have worked to ensure their programs support these DLAs. This paper explores and assesses the ethics education programs at the service senior leader colleges (hereafter referred to as war colleges).
In order to develop an assessment, this paper begins with a review of three fundamental questions facing those charged with teaching ethics to senior military officers. What are the desired outcomes of ethics education? How should the curriculum be structured to achieve those outcomes? And, finally, what is the correct faculty composition to develop and employ that curriculum? The answers to those questions produce a rough framework for a model war college ethics-education program. The second portion of this paper compares the current war college programs to this model program to determine areas of strength and weakness. Finally, this paper concludes with recommendations for areas to be sustained and improved in the war college ethics-education programs.”

George M. Reynolds and Amanda Shendruk, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“Deployed around the world, the armed forces are a pillar of U.S. power and influence abroad. But many civilians are unfamiliar with their composition. How much does the military resemble U.S. society at large?”

Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018).
“Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are enabling previously infeasible capabilities, potentially destabilizing the delicate balances that have forestalled nuclear war since 1945. Will these developments upset the nuclear strategic balance, and, if so, for better or for worse? To start to address this question, RAND researchers held a series of workshops that were attended by prominent experts on AI and nuclear security. The workshops examined the impact of advanced computing on nuclear security through 2040. The culmination of those workshops, this Perspective — one of a series that examines critical security challenges in 2040 — places the intersection of AI and nuclear war in historical context and characterizes the range of expert opinions. It then describes the types of anticipated concerns and benefits through two illustrative examples: AI for detection and for tracking and targeting and AI as a trusted adviser in escalation decisions. In view of the capabilities that AI may be expected to enable and how adversaries may perceive them, AI has the potential to exacerbate emerging challenges to nuclear strategic stability by the year 2040 even with only modest rates of technical progress. Thus, it is important to understand how this might happen and to assure that it does not.”

Michael A. Reynolds, (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2018).
“For centuries, American policymakers have likened Russia to a large, clumsy bear—a state whose power relies not on skill and appeal, but on brute force and the ability to intimidate. The unsuccessful Soviet invasion in Afghanistan seemed to confirm policymakers’ belief that Russia’s boorish foreign policy would fail among its Muslim neighbors to the south. However, this experience was an anomaly. Russia has since proved its agility in the Near East and outmaneuvered the United States. Moscow retained the loyalty of the Central Asian republics upon the Soviet Union’s disintegration. It prevailed in the Caucasus by cooperating with local Muslims. It turned the tide in the Syrian Civil War. And perhaps most remarkably, it drove a wedge between the U.S. and its formerly stalwart NATO ally, Turkey. While the clumsy bear caricature simplifies American planning, it leads to misguided policies. The past decades have shown that it is time for Washington to cast away this caricature and to study Russia with greater care and greater humility.”

ChinaPower, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Decades of economic growth coupled with its ongoing military modernization have enabled China to emerge as a major player in the global arms trade. For years, Beijing imported several times more conventional weapons than it sold overseas, but since 2013 the value of Chinese arms exports has surpassed that of its foreign acquisitions. Between 2008 and 2017, China exported some $14.4 billion worth of conventional weapons across the globe, making it the 5th largest arms supplier in the world – behind the United States, Russia, France, and Germany.”

John J. Sullivan, (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2018).
“The 2017 ‘Country Reports on Human Rights Practices’ (The Human Rights Reports) document the status of human rights and worker rights in nearly 200 countries and territories. These reports are required by U.S. law and are used by a variety of actors, including the U.S. Congress, the Executive branch, and the Judicial branch as a factual resource for decision making in matters ranging from assistance to asylum.
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes that corrupt and weak governance threatens global stability and U.S. interests. Some governments are unable to maintain security and meet the basic needs of their people, while others are simply unwilling. States that restrict freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly; that allow and commit violence against members of religious, ethnic, and other minority groups; or that undermine the fundamental dignity of persons are morally reprehensible and undermine our interests. The Governments of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, for example, violate the human rights of those within their borders on a daily basis and are forces of instability as a result.”

David Lai, John F. Troxell, and Frederick J. Gellert (Eds.), (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
USAWC Integrated Research Project: “The challenge for the U.S. administration, and for policy experts writ large, is to build an effective strategy for a whole-of-government action in moving forward from the ‘Rebalance’ in the direction of a free and open Indo-Pacific while avoiding the Thucydides Trap. This U.S. Army War College report provides analysis and policy recommendations on topics regarding the instruments of national power, regional affairs, and key Asia-Pacific countries. The key findings are rooted in the following overarching concepts:
• Strategic Goal: Ensure American leadership, security, and prosperity.
• Strategic Task: Accommodate China’s rise through competition without conflict.
• Strategic Vision: Economy by priority; enabled by military power; tempered by diplomacy.
Getting the Indo-Pacific and relations with China right is the key to a peaceful and prosperous 21st Century.”

Zack Cooper, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“China unveiled the concept for the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) in 2013 as a development strategy to boost infrastructure connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa. The MSR is the maritime complement to the Silk Road Economic Belt, which focuses on infrastructure development across Central Asia. Together these initiatives form the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative designed to enhance China’s influence across Asia. There is a shortage of infrastructure investment to meet the needs of developing nations across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region and most nations have welcomed the opportunity to bid for Chinese funding. At the same time, there are growing questions about the economic viability and the geopolitical intentions behind China’s proposals... CSIS has commissioned seven experts to unpack the economic and geostrategic implications of China’s infrastructure development across the Indo-Pacific region under the MSR. Their research is presented in this volume…The overall conclusion is mixed. China’s MSR projects are neither purely military nor purely commercial. Moreover, China’s overall approach is probably evolving. It is our hope that this study will help the United States and like-minded states refine their own response to MSR—hedging or deterring where necessary, but also working to encourage a more transparent and economically viable approach from Beijing.”

Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, (Washington, DC: C4ADS [Center for Advanced Defense Studies], 2018).
“Over the last decade, China has significantly increased its global investments, particularly in international and maritime infrastructure. Chinese firms have pledged billions of dollars to develop maritime ports and related projects across the Indo-Pacific Region since China announced its strategy to increase global trade connectivity through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI, China’s guiding foreign policy doctrine and one of the most ambitious economic initiatives in modern history, is portrayed by Chinese leaders as creating win-win economic development for all nations. Yet, some states question whether China’s infrastructure investments are driven by strategic interests.”

Edward Alden and Laura Taylor-Kal, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“The challenge facing the United States today is to rebuild the links among work, opportunity, and economic security for all Americans in the face of accelerating technological change.” “The world is in the midst of a transformation in the nature of work, as smart machines, artificial intelligence, new technologies, and global competition remake how people do their jobs and pursue their careers. ‘The Work Ahead: Machines, Skills, and U.S. Leadership in the Twenty-First Century’ focuses on how to rebuild the links among work, opportunity, and economic security for all Americans in the face of accelerating change. The United States needs to create new work opportunities, better career paths, and higher incomes for its people, while developing a highly skilled and adaptable workforce. To prosper and to lead, the United States needs to find new ways to meet the workforce challenges of the twenty-first century.”

Jeffrey L. Caton, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Over the last century, the domains of air, space, and cyberspace have joined the traditional warfighting domains of land and sea. While the doctrine for land operations is relatively mature, the doctrine for space and cyberspace continue to evolve, often in an unstructured manner. This monograph examines the relationships among these domains and how they apply to U.S. Army and joint warfighting. It concentrates on the central question: How are U.S. military operations in the newest domains of space and cyberspace being integrated with operations in the traditional domain of land? This inquiry is divided into three major sections:
• Existing Doctrine: This section presents an overview of the current state of joint and U.S. Army doctrinal development for each of the domains of land, space, and cyberspace.
• Operations in Multiple Domains: This section examines the concept of cross-domain synergy and its ability to enhance globally integrated operations.
• Future Operations: This section explores probable future operating environments as well as the resulting implications for U.S. Army and joint force development. It includes recommendations for policymakers and senior leaders regarding the future development and integration of space and cyberspace doctrine.
Anticipated future trends favor the decreased emphasis on traditional large-scale land operations and increased frequency and intensity of conflict in space and cyberspace, perhaps even where these newer domains may become preeminent for a given operation. The joint staff’s pursuit of achieving cross-domain synergy in planning and operations offers a credible method to face some of the challenges of the future joint force, but this will likely remain an evolutionary vice revolutionary endeavor.”

Jeff Lightfoot, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“The relationship between France and the United States is heading into a new and uncertain era reflecting the leadership of US President Donald Trump and French President Emmanuel Macron. With Macron’s April 24-25 state visit to the White House and address to a joint session of Congress as backdrop, ‘The French-American Alliance in an America-First Era’ explores the contrasting personalities and worldviews of these two presidents to consider whether they will overturn a generation of strengthening bilateral relations or if their unexpected bond will usher in new opportunities. Written by Atlantic Council expert Jeff Lightfoot, a nonresident senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, this report contextualizes current US-French relations in an examination of the broader trends in American and French politics, foreign policy, and shared history of cooperation. The report also identifies opportunities to strengthen the alliance and highlights that the bilateral relationship extends beyond the two presidents.”

Andrew Metrick and Kathleen H. Hick, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Northern Europe, and specifically the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, has been the site of increasingly provocative and destabilizing Russian actions. The country’s use of a range of military, diplomatic, and economic tools to undermine the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its allies highlights the need to monitor and understand Russian activity. The region is characterized by complex factors like unique geographic features, considerable civilian maritime traffic, the presence of advanced Russian and Western military capabilities, and strategic proximity to Russia and the Kola peninsula, home to the Russian Northern Fleet. While the Norwegian and Baltic Seas do differ in key ways, they are linked by the emerging risk posed by Russia’s long-range strike capabilities.
Responding to Russian challenges across the competitive space requires a deep understanding of the Northern European maritime environment. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), defined by the United States as the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation or region, is an exceptionally broad concept. At its core, MDA has three functions: the collection of raw data, the analysis of that data, and the action of disseminating information to and coordinating among the different components of the framework. In order to provide security in Northern Europe, NATO and its allies must use MDA frameworks to understand and respond to the challenges above, on, and underneath the sea, as well as the surrounding land environment. While some constructive work has been done to address the evolving Russian threat, NATO and its partners must make changes to their current MDA capabilities to evolve alongside with it.”

Noah Buckley, (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2018).
“Corruption has been a constant factor in Russia’s political economy. From one era to another, the multifarious forms of corruption continue to pervade Russian politics despite sincere and insincere efforts to fight it. The election of Vladimir Putin as president in 2000 brought a new effort at consolidating and organizing authority in the country. However, far from eliminating corruption, politics of the Putin era have merely changed the form of corruption, integrating corruption into the ‘power vertical’ through which Putin governs. In recent years, corruption has played an ever larger role in the regime’s stability. It serves as a force to co-opt and control the political elite and to replace formal institutions with something more flexible and more amenable to the needs of a consolidated authoritarian regime. Only deep changes, such as higher levels of political competition, have a chance of reducing corruption in the long run. The approaching fourth term of President Putin will continue to increase the role of informal institutions in Russian politics, in which corruption plays an increasingly large role in the Kremlin’s management of the political process.”

“The 2018 Global Development Forum seeks to examine the role and purpose of official development assistance against a backdrop of rising incomes, economic growth, youth unemployment, and other continued complex challenges in many parts of the world. To address these challenges, the new U.S. administration will need to apply new approaches and remain highly flexible in a rapidly changing development landscape. This conference will explore ways in which the next few years will shape the role of the United States in international development, and how the United States can work with official donors and key partners, including the private sector, civil society, and multilateral institutions. The third annual ‘Global Development Monitor,’ a publication that draws on CSIS’ diverse regional and thematic expertise, will be published around the conference.”

Conor M. Savory and Charles F. Rice, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“The face of global development is changing rapidly, and the CSIS Global Development Monitor seeks to address the complex issues highlighted by the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals. Over a dozen CSIS experts and affiliates examine the role and purpose of official development assistance against a backdrop of global trends, including forced migration, human rights, global health, urban planning, and the rise of competing multilateral development banks. In particular, the essays explore ways in which official donors and key partners, such as the private sector, civil society, and multilateral institutions, can improve livelihoods, strengthen governance, and facilitate access to key resources, including food, energy, and infrastructure.”

Daniel S. Roper, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2018).
“The U.S. Army and DoD are long overdue in addressing a significant capability and survivability shortcoming in its most fundamental formation—the infantry squad.”

U.S. Army War College YouTube page
March 27, 2018, steaming video, 1:41:46
“The global power balance is rapidly evolving, leaving the United States at a turning point with respect to its level of engagement and the role of its military.”

U.S. Army War College YouTube page
March 12, 2018, steaming video, 1:44:10
“Russia is projecting an autocratic model of governance abroad and working to undermine the influence of liberal democracies…How does Putin conceive of national interests, and why do Russian citizens support him? How should the United States respond to Putin’s foreign policy ambitions?”

Alexander Velez-Green, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs – Russia Matters, 2018).
“Russian military and civilian leaders have long debated what to do in the face of a NATO surprise attack. One group of authoritative military strategists believes that, in the near future, defensive operations alone will be unable to stop such an attack; consequently, they are arguing for Russia to adopt a doctrine of preemption to protect its territorial integrity and vital interests. This doctrine would authorize the first use of strategic nonnuclear or limited nuclear attacks on NATO military or civilian targets once an attack on vital Russian interests seemed imminent.
The Kremlin has apparently rejected calls for preemption thus far, excluding it from the country’s successive unclassified military doctrines. But if NATO’s offensive strike forces continue to outmatch Russian defenses, or are perceived to do so, then it is this author’s view that Moscow may well pivot toward preemption, significantly increasing the risk of major war—including nuclear war—between NATO and Russia. U.S. and NATO policymakers should act now to dissuade a possible shift toward preemption by enhancing the alliance’s force resilience in Europe, cyberspace and outer space, but doing so in a way that is unlikely to exacerbate Russian fears of a NATO surprise attack.”

Scott Boston, et al., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018).
“This report outlines how NATO and Russian force levels and capabilities have evolved in the post–Cold War era and what recent trends imply for the balance of capabilities in the NATO member states that border Russia in the Baltic Sea region. It is intended to inform debate over appropriate posture and force structure for NATO forces to respond to the recent growth in Russian military capability and capacity and to increased Russian assertiveness in the use of force. Given NATO's current posture and capability, including European battalions and a rotational U.S. armored brigade combat team, Russia can still achieve a rapid fait accompli in the Baltic states followed by brinksmanship to attempt to freeze the conflict. Nothing about this analysis should suggest that Russian conventional aggression against NATO is likely to take place; however, prudence suggests that steps should be taken to mitigate potential areas of vulnerability in the interest of ensuring a stable security relationship between all NATO members and Russia. NATO has sufficient resources, personnel, and equipment to enhance conventional deterrence focused on Russia; a more robust posture designed to considerably raise the cost of military adventurism against one or more NATO member states is worthy of consideration.”

“The tasks of securing outer space and cyberspace are converging. The internet increasingly depends on space-enabled communication and information services. Likewise, the operation of satellites and other space assets relies on internet-based networks, which makes these assets, like cars and medical equipment, devices on the internet of things. New government actors, companies, goals, and technologies are expanding and transforming space activities. However, neither space policy nor cybersecurity policy is prepared for the challenges created by the meshing of space and cyberspace, which could increase national security risks.”

SGDSN [Secrétariat Général de la Défense et de la Sécurité Nationale], (Paris, France: SGDSN, 2018).
English synopsis of the French white paper “Revue Stratégique de Cyberdéfense.”

Scheherezade Faramarzi, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“A predominantly Shia nation, the Islamic Republic of Iran has a substantial Sunni population that receives little attention compared to the country's other minorities. Last year's attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the capital Tehran have raised fears that disgruntled Iranian Sunnis, who have until now largely escaped extremist influences, could become targets of radicalization by regional jihadist groups. Our latest issue brief, ‘Iran's Sunnis Resist Extremism, but for How Long?’ authored by veteran journalist Scheherezade Faramarzi lays bare Iran's religious makeup, the history of the Sunni population, the influence of regional actors like Saudi Arabia, and efforts by the Iranian government to support Iranian Sunni leaders who advocate peaceful coexistence with Tehran. This comprehensive analysis deepens understanding of what the future may hold for Iran's Sunnis in the context of domestic discontent in Iran and growing rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.”

“This is the 16th report prepared pursuant to section 421 of the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-286), 22 U.S.C. § 6951 (the Act), which requires the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to report annually to Congress on compliance by the People’s Republic of China (China) with commitments made in connection with its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), including both multilateral commitments and any bilateral commitments made to the United States. The report covers calendar year 2016. It also incorporates the findings of the Overseas Compliance Program, as required by section 413(b)(2) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6943(b)(2).
Like the prior reports, this report is structured as an examination of the nine broad categories of WTO commitments undertaken by China. Throughout the report, USTR has attempted to provide as complete a picture of China’s WTO compliance as possible, subject to the inherent constraints presented by the sheer volume and complexity of the required changes to China’s trade regime and transparency obstacles. The report identifies areas where progress has been achieved and underscores areas of concern, as appropriate, with regard to the commitments that became effective upon China’s accession to the WTO as well as those commitments schedule to be phased in over time.”

Jens Stoltenberg, (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2018).
“The Report provides an overview of how NATO has become more agile and innovative in the face of a complex and evolving security environment. It includes details on how the Alliance is strengthening its deterrence and defence, and doing more to fight terrorism and project stability in its neighbourhood. It also illustrates progress that NATO has made on tackling new threats such as cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare, as well as on burden-sharing. The Annual Report includes the details of estimated 2017 national defence expenditures for all 29 NATO Allies.”

Rhys McCormick, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“In light of Section 881 of the National Defense Authorization act for Fiscal Year 2017 that expanded the definition in U.S. law of the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to include the United Kingdom and Australia, this report informs the NTIB partners on barriers and opportunities for effective NTIB integration. The expansion of the NTIB is based on the principle that defense trade between the United States and its closest allies enables a host of benefits including increased access to innovation, economies of scale, and interoperability. In order to reap the greatest benefits of a new era of NTIB, this report uses the lessons learned from study of the present state of integration to identify areas of opportunity for policy reforms and greater cooperation.”

Anthony H. Cordesman, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Whatever his other limitations, Vladimir Putin has shown he is a master in exploiting Russian nationalism and American and European sensitivities. His latest gambit—publicizing three new nuclear systems—two of which are in development and may have key components that are either untested or do not yet exist—give him political credibility in Russia in an election year, and emphasize the one key area where Russia remains a leading global super power: its possession of nuclear weapons. The key question is whether they represent any real change in the nuclear balance, Russian and U.S. ability to pose an existential threat to the other state, and mutual assured destruction. If they do not, they are more technological status symbols or ‘toys’ than real threats, although the proliferation of such weapons might allow smaller nuclear powers like Iran and North Korea to defeat today’s missile and air defense systems and technologies.”

Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, (New York, NY: Center on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the founding and ruling political party of modern China, boasting nearly ninety million members. In 2017, the CCP exalted President Xi Jinping and elevated new officials to support Xi in setting the agenda for the second-largest economy in the world. The party has maintained a political monopoly since its founding, despite the effects of China’s rapid economic growth, increasing social unrest, and political destabilization that challenge the country’s rise as a global power. A spate of political and corruption scandals has also exposed deep power struggles inside the infamously opaque organization. Nevertheless, through the course of Xi’s first term in power, he has taken drastic action to not only consolidate his hold on power via party levers, but experts say he has also positioned himself to become the most influential Chinese leader since Mao Zedong.”

Heather A. Conley, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“It is important for U.S. policymakers to develop a better understanding of China’s Arctic strategy as it is both long term and strategic...and will have a noticeable impact on U.S. economic and security interests. While China’s Artic policy remains an evolving work in progress, 2017 represents a significant year for China in the Arctic.
Developments of note include:
• China’s inclusion in the Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation through its Arctic Council permanent observer status and Chinese involvement in environmental and climate research through the Council’s Task Force for Enhancing Scientific Cooperation;
• China’s participation in the so-called Arctic 5+5 agreement, which places a 16-year commercial fishing moratorium in the Central Arctic Ocean;
• The Arctic circumnavigation by the Chinese icebreaker “Xue Long” and the construction of China’s second icebreaker (to be launched in 2019);
• The announcement that China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will include a vision for maritime cooperation including the use and investment in Arctic routes on June 20, 2017;
• An agreement between Governor Bill Walker of Alaska and President Xi of China outlining Chinese investment in Alaska’s $43 billion LNG (liquefied natural gas) project in November; and
• The first LNG shipment from the Russian Yamal Peninsula on December 8, 2017, in which Chinese firms the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China’s Silk Road Fund hold nearly 30 percent of the project.”

Patricia I. Vasquez, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“Over the past ten years, Chinese companies and policy banks have steadily invested and lent hundreds of billions of dollars in Latin America's oil and gas sector. China's leaders have been pressured to secure energy resources because of stagnating domestic oil production coupled with rapid growth in consumption. Latin America's growing proven oil reserves have made it an attractive partner for China. The rise in capital flowing from China to the energy sector in Latin America, plus the lack of transparency around the deals however, has led to a rise in myths about the true motivation behind China's intentions. This report seeks to uncover the facts of Chinese investment and lending deals in the Latin American energy sector, explains what is reality and what are myths, and provides pointed recommendations of how all parties can help shape a better energy cooperation.”

Jonathan E. Hillman, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Just 10 years ago, regular direct freight services from China to Europe did not exist… Rail services are considerably cheaper than air and faster than sea…and could provide a compelling middle option for more goods in the coming years. Rail’s share of cargo by value is already growing, increasing 144 percent during the first half of 2017, as compared to the same period in 2016… China is the primary force behind these routes, and other countries have been eager to participate. Providing generous subsidies and state media promotion, China has made direct rail services a major feature of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which aims to bind the world with Beijing through $1 trillion of new infrastructure, trade agreements, and coordination across countless policy areas. Even countries that have been reluctant to endorse the BRI have embraced these new routes. When a train from Yiwu, China, arrived in London, UK, in January 2017, ‘The Telegraph’ called it ‘a new chapter in the history of the centuries-old trading route,’ and ‘The Guardian’ said it ‘heralds the dawn of a new commercial era.’ In the past two years, historic firsts have been celebrated for trains arriving in France, Latvia, and Finland, among other countries.”

Harvard Kennedy School - Belfer Center
“Led by Eric Rosenbach, the Defending Digital Democracy Project aims to develop strategies, tools, and technology to protect democratic processes and systems from cyber and information attacks.”

James Goldgeier, et al., Texas National Security Review, (February 20, 2018).
“We asked some leading academics to discuss the need to branch out beyond the university to reach both policymakers and the public.”

Texas National Security Review
“‘Horns of a Dilemma’ is a new series brought to you by the ‘Texas National Security Review,’ featuring the leaders and thinkers based at the University of Texas or who stop in to share their wisdom.”

U.S. Army War College YouTube page
Feb 2, 2018, steaming video, 1:45:11
“China has implemented a wide-ranging strategy of economic outreach and expansion of all its national capacities, including military and diplomatic capacities. What are Beijing’s geopolitical objectives? What leadership and political conditions in each society underlie growing Sino-American tensions? What policies might Washington adopt to address this circumstance?”

U.S. Army War College YouTube page
Mar 1, 2018, streaming video, 1:31:25
“Dr. Conrad Crane. Chief of Historical Services for the Army Heritage and Education Center. Looks at the historic shift away from Pax Americana that has promised peaceful international relations and an open economy. Geopolitical allies and challengers alike are paying close attention.”

German Marshall Fund of the United States
March 8 to 10, 2018
“Under the theme Revise, Reboot, Rebuild: Strategies for a Time of Distrust, GMF's Brussels Forum 2018 is designed to encourage policymakers and experts to work together to directly confront the challenging world we find ourselves in today. We aim to analyze the reasons for the breakdown of trust within and between societies and find new ways to build strong partnerships and networks that support our societies’ democratic ideals. How can we find effective solutions without trust as the foundation? And is there a way to rebuild the trust lost?”

Daniel Fried and Alina Polyakova, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“This paper is part of the broader transatlantic effort to identify democratic solutions for countering disinformation in the short term and building societal resistance to it in the long term. At this point, the transatlantic community has moved beyond acknowledging that it has a problem. Today, we need concrete solutions that can be readily implemented, tested, and refined. Rather than elaborating the details of the challenge, this paper presents a menu of options for key stakeholders: national governments, civil society, and tech companies.”

Patrick M. Dugga, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2018).
“The U.S. Army must change how it thinks about its military installations. Installations are not sanctuaries; they are vulnerable soft-targets for a growing host of sophisticated threats seeking to degrade U.S. Army combat capabilities long before they deploy. Now is the time to act and update U.S. Army installations or risk stifling current modernization efforts with an Industrial Age past.”

Climate and Security Advisory Group, (Washington, DC: Center for Climate and Security, 2018).
This "report notes that given the threats of climate change identified by the defense, national security and intelligence communities, a rise in destructive climate-driven impacts on the U.S., and an increased capacity to foresee these risks, the U.S. government has a ‘Responsibility to Prepare’ to address these challenges at home and abroad. Specifically, the group recommends that the Administration do so through three lines of effort: Assess, Prepare, and Support.
- Assess climate change risks to national and homeland security
Bottom line up front: Maintain and improve systems and processes for better understanding and assessing climate change risks to national and homeland security.
- Prepare for climate change risks to national and homeland security
Bottom line up front: Bolster the resilience of critical military and civilian infrastructure to climate change risks, and better organize and resource the U.S. government to manage those risks.
- Support allied and partner nation resilience to climate change risks
Bottom line up front: Maintain U.S. leadership by supporting allied and partner nation resilience to climate change risks in strategically-significant regions, and by reducing climate drivers of instability.”

Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Seamus Hughes, and, Bennett Clifford, (Washington, DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 2018).
“This study reflects the most comprehensive, publicly available accounting of Americans who traveled to join jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq since 2011. It identifies 64 travelers, the largest available sample to date. These individuals, and their stories, were uncovered during a multi-year investigation. Authors interviewed law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, and attended relevant court proceedings. Additionally, they reviewed thousands of pages of legal documents, filing information requests and federal court motions to unseal records where necessary. Finally, the authors conducted several interviews with American travelers who returned from the territories held by the Islamic State (IS).”

William A. Carter, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Machine Intelligence (MI) is poised to create profound changes to our lives, jobs, and economy. In breadth and scale of impact, MI will rival or exceed past technological revolutions while potentially altering centers of economic power and regional and global influence. Many countries are already making significant policy decisions to prepare for the impact of MI and are investing in MI research and development to outpace allies and competitors across economic and national security dimensions. If the United States wants to avoid being left behind in the “MI Revolution” we need to develop a coordinated national strategy that covers research and development, industrial specialization, and the social impacts of these technologies. This report offers a framework for determining which guiding principles should shape U.S. policy in response to the growth of MI applications in defense, education, health care, and the economy. The authors offer recommendations for how the United States can maintain a competitive advantage in MI and navigate the risks and challenges associated with it.”

Daniel F. Runde and Christopher Metzger, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Our competitors prioritize commercial diplomacy and offer upfront financing, speed, and intense intergovernmental facilitation and coordination, and we better draw a page from our economic competitors’ playbooks. The United States must leverage all the tools at its disposal in order to compete with its rivals on the continent. Since 2012, bilateral assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has represented over 30 percent of the United States’ total official development assistance (ODA) every year. U.S. agencies, both those focused on commercial and economic issues and those focused on development, must better coordinate with each other on the ground in Africa and help U.S. businesses compete more effectively with Chinese ones.”

Mark F. Cancian, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Surprise has always been an element of warfare, but the return of great power competition—and the high-level threat that it poses—gives urgency to thinking about surprise now. Because the future is highly uncertain, and great powers have not fought each other for over 70 years, surprise is highly likely in a future great power conflict. This study, therefore, examines potential surprises in a great power conflict, particularly in a conflict’s initial stages when the interaction of adversaries’ technologies, prewar plans, and military doctrines first becomes manifest. It is not an attempt to project the future. Rather, it seeks to do the opposite: explore the range of possible future conflicts to see where surprises might lurk.”

Atlantic Council
December 6, 2017, streaming video, 7:44:48
Program begins about 00:01:00
“As disruptive geopolitical, demographic, and technological trends converge, the task of envisioning the future has never been more difficult or important. Understanding and preparing for tomorrow’s challenges has always been a fraught task. But today its complexity is greater than ever. To be prepared for tomorrow’s military challenges requires forethought, agility, and adaptability. This is best achieved by harnessing diverse perspectives and robust discourse. To this end, The Atlantic Council’s Emergent Futures Lab has teamed up with the US Army’s Future Studies Group and Training and Doctrine Command to bring together a diverse range of experts to explore different approaches to thinking about the future, discuss some of the likely characteristics of the future operating environment, and analyze the implications for future Army force development. Panel discussions for the event will include: Agile or Divergent Thinking of the Future Introduction to the Future Operational Environment Application of Futures Study for Army Purposes Benefits and Risks of Future Forecasting Methodologies.”

Robert D. Blackwill and Philip H. Gordon, Council on Foreign Relations, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
This “report judges that the United States is currently in a second Cold War with Russia. Consistent with this assessment, the authors recommend what would be tantamount to a new containment policy, one that would include expanded sanctions, electoral and cyber countermeasures, and additional investments in European security. These policy prescriptions come from practitioners who have advised Republican and Democratic presidents and spent their time in government working to build constructive U.S.-Russia relations. The report is thus nuanced as well as sober. It calls for the United States to confront Russia more robustly, but at the same time it reminds readers that just as it did during the Cold War, the United States should continue to interact with Russia and look for ways to cooperate when it would be in the U.S. national interest.”

Heather A. Conley, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Twenty-five years of relative calm and predictability in relations between Russia and the West enabled European governments largely to neglect their military capabilities for territorial defense and dramatically redraw Northern Europe’s multilateral, regional, and bilateral boundaries, stimulating new institutional and cooperative developments and arrangements. These cooperative patterns of behavior occurred amid a benign security environment, a situation that no longer obtains. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its military incursion into eastern Ukraine, its substantial military modernization efforts, heightened undersea activity in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea, and its repeated air violations, the region’s security environment has dramatically worsened. The Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region have returned as a geostrategic focal point. It is vital, therefore, that the United States rethink its security approach to the region—what the authors describe as Enhanced Deterrence in the North.”

Melissa G. Dalton, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“With the range of security challenges confronting the United States in the 21st century, characterized by competition by both state and nonstate actors, the importance of working with allies and partners to address common challenges is paramount. Deeper examination of the relative effectiveness of U.S. security sector assistance and how it must nest in a broader foreign policy strategy, including good governance, human rights, and rule of law principles, is required. Improving oversight and accountability in U.S. security sector assistance with partners are at the core of ongoing security assistance reform efforts to ensure that U.S. foreign policy objectives are met and in accordance with U.S. interests and values. This report examines key areas in security sector programming and oversight where the U.S. Departments of Defense and State employ accountability mechanisms, with the goal of identifying ways to sharpen and knit together mechanisms for improving accountability and professionalism into a coherent approach for partner countries.”

Jonathan D. Moyer, et al., (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2018).
“‘Power and Influence in a Globalized World’ outlines the strategic framework of the international system's capabilities and interactions amongst the global community. The report shows how power and influence are derived from more than just coercive military capabilities, but are exercised through networks of economic, political, and security interactions involving states as well as non-state actors. The function of this report is to fill in the conceptual and empirical gaps, by creating a new index, the Foreign Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC) Index. The FBIC is tasked with identifying the key influencers in the international community, and analyzing those that register above or below their weight in the world, altogether clarifying where the United States and others stand in the international system. The FBIC Index is based on the interaction between states, as well as the relative dependence of one state on another.”

Cheang Ming, Feb 15, 2018, CNBC.
“China's Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa with a vast logistics and transport network, using roads, ports, railway tracks, pipelines, airports, transnational electric grids and even fiber optic lines. Widely seen as an attempt by China to construct a massive, multi-national zone of economic and political influence that has Beijing at its core, the plan at one point included 65 countries, which together accounted for one-third of global GDP and 60 percent of the world's population, or 4.5 billion people, according to Oxford Economics. It's all part of Beijing's push to increase global clout — building modern infrastructure can attract more investment and trade along the route. The policy could also boost the domestic economy with demand abroad, and might soak up some of the overcapacity in China's industrial sector. Assessing Chinese President Xi Jinping's flagship project, some have expressed optimism about the initiative — while others have concerns about lopsided benefits to China at the expense of partner nations."

Bruno Maçães, World Economic Forum, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2018).
“In recent years, Chinese authorities have increasingly taken on this task and with the Belt and Road Initiative, a development project of unmatched ambition, they intend to be firmly in control. Spanning some 70 countries and requiring investment approaching $4 trillion, the initiative is deliberately intended to reshape the global political and economic order. China's trade with countries along the Belt and Road rose 17.8% year-on-year in January 2018.”

ChinaPower, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The advantages of developing space capabilities are manifold. Satellites facilitate military and civilian communications. Human spaceflight garners international prestige, while also providing opportunities for cutting-edge research. Experiments conducted in space have resulted in numerous breakthroughs that have been used to address medical, environmental, and technological challenges back on Earth. China seeks to enhance its capacity for scientific and technological innovation by building a large modular space station. Chinese leaders also hope that research conducted on the Chinese Space Station (CSS) will support their long-term goals for space exploration, including missions to the Moon and Mars. This page offers insight into the development of the CSS, compares China’s space station with those of other countries, and explores how China may use manned space missions to bolster domestic innovation.”

James Michel, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“‘Fragility’—the combination of poor governance, limited institutional capability, low social cohesion, and weak legitimacy—leads to erosion of the social contract and diminished resilience, with significant implications for peace, security, and sustainable development. This study reviews how the international community has responded to this challenge and offers new ideas on how that response can be improved. Based on that examination, the author seeks to convey the importance of addressing this phenomenon as a high priority for the international community. Chapters explore the nature of these obstacles to sustainable development, peace, and security; how the international community has defined, measured, and responded to the phenomenon of fragility; how the international response might be made more effective; and implications for the United States.”

Munich Security Conference Foundation, (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2018).
“Under the heading "To the Brink - and Back?", the Munich Security Report 2018 provides an overview of major security policy issues and features data, analyses, maps and infographics. As a companion and impulse for the 54th edition of the Munich Security Conference, the Munich Security Report serves as background reading for conference participants, but is also made available to the general public.”

Suzanne E. Spaulding and Eric Goldstein, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“This report, informed by a CSIS-convened Experts Group, calls for a whole-of-nation approach to address the threat to, and improve the resilience of, the country's democratic institutions. The report proceeds in four sections. First, it outlines the nature of the threat posed by the Russian government, building upon what Russia has done in other countries, as well as in the United States. The second section describes how technology has magnified this threat. The third section examines essential elements of a ‘National Strategy to Counter Russian and Other Foreign Adversary Threats to Democratic Institutions.’ The final section is a call for action.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies
January 24, 2018, streaming video, 3:34:12

James Andrew Lewis, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The U.S.-China relationship is one that neither country can escape. Both benefit from it in important ways. The question for quite some time, though, has been whether China’s economy, international presence, and participation in global institutions would come to look more like our own, or whether it would seek to challenge the order the United States has built and led over the past 70 years. While China’s economic size does not necessarily threaten the United States, China’s willingness to use its economic leverage to forge a global economy closer to its image raises complicated questions considering its lack of transparency. The essays in this volume, written by a diverse group of CSIS scholars, address some of the key issues that currently vex the U.S.-China economic relationship.”

General Electric, (Boston, MA: General Electric, 2018).
“From Chaos to Confidence: Emerging Players, Emerging Technologies, Emerging Challenges”

Thomas Karako and Wes Rumbaugh, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“Despite the rising salience of missile threats, current air and missile defense forces are far too susceptible to suppression. Today’s U.S. air and missile defense (AMD) force lacks the depth, capacity, and operational flexibility to simultaneously perform both missions. Discussions about improving AMD usually revolve around improvements to the capability and capacity of interceptors or sensors. Rather than simply doing more of the same, the joint integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) efforts might be well served by new or reinvigorated operational concepts, here discussed collectively as “Distributed Defense.” By leveraging networked integration, Distributed Defense envisions a more flexible and more dispersible air and missile defense force capable of imposing costs and dilemmas on an adversary, complicating the suppression of U.S. air and missile defenses. Although capability and capacity improvements remain essential to the high-end threats, the Distributed Defense concept focuses on creating a new architecture for today’s fielded or soon-to-be fielded IAMD force to boost flexibility and resilience.”

Africa Center for Strategic Studies, (Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2018).
“The G5 Sahel is ramping up its joint security force in order to address the growing threat posed by militant Islamist groups in the Sahel. The Force is emerging as a focal point for transnational security efforts in the region.”

Council on Foreign Relations, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
“An exploration of its root causes and the human toll.”

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, (Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2018).
“Based on preliminary analysis, the average annual temperature for the contiguous U.S. was 54.6°F, 2.6°F above the 20th century average. This was the third warmest year since record keeping began in 1895, behind 2012 (55.3°F) and 2016 (54.9°F), and the 21st consecutive warmer-than-average year for the U.S. (1997 through 2017). The five warmest years on record for the contiguous U.S. have all occurred since 2006. Since 1895, the CONUS has observed an average temperature increase of 1.5°F per century. Nationally, the average minimum (low) temperature was 42.8°F, the fourth warmest on record, while the average maximum (high) temperature was 66.4°F, the fifth warmest on record.”

James N. Mattis, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018).
“The Department of Defense’s enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America’s traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. Today, we are emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding. We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”

Rhys McCormick, Andrew P. Hunter, and Gregory Sanders, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“The presence of a technologically superior defense industrial base has been a foundation of U.S. strategy since 1945. While the implementation of the budget cuts in the Budget Control Act of 2011 has caused concerns for the industrial base, the resulting debate has been lacking in empirical analysis. The purpose of this research is to measure the impact of the current defense drawdown across all the tiers of the industrial base. This report analyzes prime and subprime Defense Department contract data to measure the impacts of the drawdown by sector to better understand how prime and subprime contractors have responded to this external market shock.”

World Economic Forum, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2018).
“Each year the Global Risks Report works with experts and decision-makers across the world to identify and analyze the most pressing risks that we face. As the pace of change accelerates, and as risk interconnections deepen, this year’s report highlights the growing strain we are placing on many of the global systems we rely on.”

“War Room” podcast, Robin Rand and Buck Haberichter.
January 23, 2018, streaming audio, 21:04
“The U.S. Army War College routinely hosts senior military and civilian leaders who come to meet and work with faculty and students on matters of national security, strategic leadership, and professional military education. ‘WAR ROOM’ is pleased to welcome Gen Robin Rand, U.S. Air Force, Commander of the U.S. Air Force Global Strike Command who graciously accepted our invitation to come to the studio and provide his perspectives on strategic leadership. ‘WAR ROOM’ Social Media Editor Buck Haberichter moderates.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies
January 18, 2018, streaming video, 1:09:35
“The Trump Administration has emphasized civil and commercial space as one of its top priorities with the reinstatement of the National Space Council, the signing of Space Policy Directive 1, and the recent National Security Strategy, which prioritized the improvement of our U.S. space architecture resiliency. The Administration’s renewed focus on civil space requires a broader public discussion on America’s current civil space systems and how best to improve their resilience. ‘En Route to the Moon’ will focus on how NASA and others can promptly adapt civil space architectures in pursuit of the Administration’s mission objectives.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies
“The Aerospace Security Project at CSIS explores the technological, budgetary, and policy issues related to the air and space domains and innovative operational concepts for air and space forces.”

ChinaPower, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“China has emerged as one of the world’s largest providers of development finance. Between 2000 and 2014, China extended a total of $354 billion in loans, grants, and other resources to countries across the globe. As China continues to establish itself as a major source of development finance, it is important to consider how this spending intersects with Beijing’s growing political and economic interests.”

Samm Sacks, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The Chinese leadership has made clear that the digital economy and information and communication technologies (ICT) now underpins the country’s economic development. Consensus is forming around two main points. The first is China’s internet companies are no longer mere “copycats” or clones of western companies. The second is that BATJ are making a strong push to expand to global markets. This report demonstrates that China’s internet companies are at once disruptive innovators, micro-innovators, and copycats. It also demonstrates that trends in China’s digital economy are increasingly shaping US and global companies, and vice versa. Lastly, this report reviews policy challenges to innovation in China.”

Daniel Keohane, (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2018).
“Since its formal birth in 1999, most defense experts have noted EU military cooperation more for its absence than its presence on the international stage. During 2017, however, EU governments and institutions invested much time and energy in efforts to re-energize EU military cooperation. This is partly because of the U.K.’s impending departure from the EU, which has changed political calculations. It is also because of strategic necessity: Europeans increasingly understand that they should take more responsibility for their own security. But EU military cooperation should be understood more in the context of its utility for national defense policies across Europe, and less through its relationship with NATO or its role in European integration. In particular, the positions of France, Germany, Italy, and Poland will be crucial for the future success of EU military efforts. If the EU helps its governments to better spend their defense budgets and deepen their military cooperation, NATO will benefit too, as 21 countries will remain members of both the union and the Alliance. However, that will require EU governments to capitalize on the convergences and manage the divergences of their disparate national defense.”

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (New York, NY: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2017).
“World Humanitarian Data and Trends (WHDT) 2017 highlights major trends in the nature of humanitarian crises, their causes and drivers. This year’s report includes case studies on Official Development Assistance in protracted crises, diversifying funding tools, hunger indicators, sexual and reproductive health in emergencies, aid worker security and 10-year trends in conflict.”

Rob Smith, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2018).
“The cost of war is staggering. At the end of 2016 an unprecedented 65.6 million people around the world had been forced from their homes – that’s equivalent to the population of the United Kingdom. But as well as devastating lives, communities and countries, war also has a huge impact on the global economy. The Institute for Economics and Peace estimates that conflict and violence cost us $13.6 trillion in 2015. In 2016 the price tag was even higher, at $14.3 trillion, or 12.6% of global GDP, according to the World Humanitarian Data and Trends report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).”

Thomas M. Sanderson, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“Together, Russia and the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia have seen more of their citizens and residents travel to Syria and Iraq as foreign fighters than have any other parts of the world. Although numbers vary from source to source, roughly 8,500 individuals from these six countries have traveled to join a host of Salafi-jihadi factions—most predominantly the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Among these individuals are many militants from Russia’s north Caucasus, some of whom bring with them experience in asymmetric and insurgent warfare learned from their involvement in the first and second Chechen wars of independence and the insurgency that has torn apart the North Caucasus region since those wars. These battle-hardened and competent fighters serve important roles within ISIS and Al Qaeda as bombmakers, propagandists, and field commanders. They are joined by Russian speakers who quickly build that experience in combat in Syria, sometimes in groups dominated by North Caucasian and Central Asian leaders and members.”

Pete Kilner, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2017).
“The advent of cyber conflict should push us to reassess and update the ethics of war. The ethical rules that have informed political and military leaders for generations do not provide adequate moral guidance on cyber operations in war because those rules are based on assumptions that no longer apply.”

Collin Anderson and Karim Sadjadpour, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2018).
“Cyberspace has become the newest frontier in the four-decade-long U.S.-Iran cold war. Perhaps more than any government in the world, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the target of uniquely destructive cyber attacks by the United States and its allies. At the same time, groups associated with Iran’s security forces—namely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence—have become increasingly adept at conducting their own offensive cyber operations. The targets of such operations include Iranian government critics at home and abroad, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as the economic, defense, and diplomatic institutions of countries including Germany, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. The Iranian government has provided conflicting public accounts of its offensive cyber operations, touting its capabilities while denying responsibility for attacks attributed to it. Consistent with its use of proxy groups to assert its regional power, Tehran frequently masks its involvement in such operations using cutouts (intermediaries) to avoid attribution and provide it plausible deniability. Despite these denials, it is clear Iran has invested in indigenous cyber capabilities for both defensive and offensive purposes, and is willing to use them in the event of conflict.”

Arthur Holland Michel and Dan Gettinger, (Annandale-on-Hudson, New York: Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, 2018).
“Like each of the five years since the Center for the Study was founded, 2017 was a busy one in the world of drones. In both the military and civilian spheres, this year saw remarkable technological advances, major deals, expanded regulations, and new debates that will have a profound impact for many years to come. This report documents the most important events and trends that we observed this year, and offers insights into what to expect in 2018 and beyond. The report is divided into two broad sections: one addresses developments in the military sphere while the other considers the civilian sector.”

Rex W. Tillerson, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, February 2017).
“WMEAT 2017, the 35th edition of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (WMEAT), published in December 2017, covers the years 2005 through 2015. The year 2015 was not covered in any previous edition of WMEAT.”

Max M. Mutschler, (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2017).
"Compiled by BICC, the Global Militarization Index (gmi) presents on an annual basis the relative weight and importance of a country's military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The GMI 2017 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2016). The index project is financially supported by Germany's Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development."

Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“International attention has shifted away from the slow-moving crisis in the South China Sea over the course of 2017, but the situation on the water has not remained static. While pursuing diplomatic outreach toward its Southeast Asian neighbors, Beijing continued substantial construction activities on its dual-use outposts in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China completed the dredging and landfilling operations to create its seven new islands in the Spratlys by early 2016, and seems to have halted such operations to expand islets in the Paracels by mid-2017. But Beijing remains committed to advancing the next phase of its build-up—construction of the infrastructure necessary for fully-functioning air and naval bases on the larger outposts.”

Lisa S. Meredith, et al., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017).
“The U.S. Army is facing challenges stemming from behavioral health issues, misconduct, and adjustment to changing demographics. Long-term solutions to these problems very likely require changes in the Army's organizational culture and climate, but institutional change in large organizations is typically very difficult. To deal with these challenges, researchers identify promising approaches to institutional change from the literature on organizational culture and climate. Researchers use findings from a systematic literature review, vetted by a panel of experts on organizational culture change and the military context, to develop recommendations. At the conclusion of this report, researchers recommend promising strategies for embracing change in the Army based on the literature. These strategies should help the Army prioritize organizational culture change; adopt a common definition of organizational culture; determine target problems amenable to culture change; assess the Army's current culture and climate in the problem context; develop a strategy for culture change with clear goals; engage stakeholders at all levels in the Army; and target training to maximize resources and uptake.”

Patricia Frost, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2017).
“Nearly two decades into the 21st Century, the United States finds itself immersed in a security environment of unprecedented complexity; one defined by re-emerging nationalism, religious radicalism, uncertainty and volatility. America faces a number of existential threats, ranging from the emergence of several capable regional peer competitors to the extension of war into cyber and space domains. The offensive cyber capabilities of America’s enemies continue to evolve and have now reached the point that the Army’s weapon systems, the industrial controls used to manufacture them and the supply chain employed to sustain them are vulnerable to compromise.”

Fergus Hanson, et al. (Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2017).
“The Cyber Maturity in the Asia–Pacific Region report is the flagship annual publication of the ASPI International Cyber Policy Centre. This report assesses the national approach of Asia–Pacific countries to the challenges and opportunities of cyberspace, taking a holistic approach that assesses governance and legislation, law enforcement, military capacity and policy involvement, and business and social engagement in cyber policy and security issues. The 2017 report is the fourth annual cyber maturity report. It covers 25 countries and includes assessment of Taiwan and Vanuatu for the first time.”

Thomas Wright, (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2017).
“Over the past 10 years, starting in the Obama administration and accelerating in the Trump administration, the United States has retrenched diplomatically and politically from Europe. The commitment to NATO stands out as the exception rather than the rule in U.S.-European relations. While the continent faces a wide array of problems— including the eurocrisis, Russia, refugees, the erosion of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, Brexit, regional separatism, difficult relations with Turkey, and terrorism—Washington is strikingly absent from efforts to resolve them. This paper examines the legacy of U.S. political engagement in Europe, how the continent is likely to address its numerous challenges as it is left behind by the United States, and what a post-American Europe means for Washington. The Trump administration and future U.S. administrations face a strategic choice between (1) taking short-term advantage of European divisions even if it might spur disintegration, (2) benign disinterest in Europe’s internal problems, and (3) a return to deep engagement in positively shaping a Europe that is coherent, prosperous, and effective on the world stage. Engagement may be a difficult sell domestically, but it is the best way of ensuring that Europe is a full partner of the United States in upholding the postwar international order of alliances, an open global economy, and support for democracy. However, Europeans cannot count on the United States consistently pursuing such engagement, and must continue efforts to strengthen autonomous European capabilities.”

Christine Nissen, (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2017).
“This week constitutes yet another step towards the materialization of an ‘EU defence union’. On 13 November the so-called ‘PESCO’ provision was launched, which allows groups of willing EU member states to make binding commitments to each other on security and defence. 23 EU member states immediately signed up to participate, and since then, Ireland and Portugal have also joined in, which means that the only hold outs are Malta, Denmark and the United Kingdom…This new DIIS report focuses on the recent developments and trends in EU defence and security policy after the Brexit referendum in June 23 2016. Since the watershed decision made by the UK to leave the European Union, the remaining 27 member states have launched a plethora of new proposals aimed at raising the EU’s ambition level for security and defence cooperation as well as showcasing the unity of EU27 and the resilience of the EU project as a whole. The report also evaluates the role played by the UK in EU security and defence cooperation, and discusses how the forthcoming Brexit will affect the EU’s ability to act within security and defence matters.”

US Government Accountability Office, (Washington, DC: US Government Accountability Office, 2017).
“The expected impacts of weather effects associated with climate change pose operational and budgetary risks to overseas infrastructure according to the Department of Defense (DOD), but DOD does not consistently track the impacts' estimated costs. Operational risks (including interruptions to training, testing, and missions) and budgetary risks (including costs of repairing damages) are linked to these impacts. However, installations inconsistently track these costs because there is no requirement for such tracking. Without a requirement to systematically track such costs, DOD will not have the information it needs to integrate climate-related impact resource considerations into future budgets.”

Sarah Opitz Stapleton, et al, (London, UK: Overseas Development Institute, 2017).
“This report presents an overview of the current evidence base on the complex relationships between climate change and human mobility…There is a lack of clarity as to the direct influence of climate change on human mobility. We know that some areas worldwide are becoming less habitable due to increasingly extreme climate-related hazards. We know that other areas could become more habitable, allowing new economic activities such as agriculture or tourism. International processes, particularly those on migration and displacement, climate change and disaster risk reduction, increasingly refer to the links between climate change and human mobility. However, these links are not always grounded in evidence, and this increased attention has not led to the coordinated, significant policy or legislative change that is required. This report responds to these challenges.”

Louise van Schaik & Tammo Bakker, (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael, 2017).
“This Policy Brief considers the interlinkages between climate change, migration and security. It argues that despite the lack of scientific consensus the potential consequences are too large to ignore and no-regret policy options should be adopted. Furthermore it discusses the relationship between climate change, migration and security. This relationship is academically contested. Research is inconclusive on key issues, such as how many migrants may come to Europe due to climate change. However, given the political urgency and potential scale of the issue, it is not possible to wait for academic consensus to emerge. The relationship between youth unemployment, irregular migration and instability in the context of climate change is politically recognised as a likely risk with high impact, even though contemporary policies still focus primarily on responses to forced or irregular migration. Currently an opportunity exists to make the most of available insights and invest wisely in countries of origin. Several no-regret policy options could be envisaged that boost (youth) employment opportunities, restore degraded lands and ecosystems, strengthen food, water and energy security and reduce inequalities between groups in society. These problems are at the core of many conflicts and contribute to instability, especially in cases of poor governance. Addressing them in an integrated way is therefore of the utmost importance to securing a sustainable future.”

ACAPS, (Geneva, Switzerland: ACAPS, 2017).
“‘Humanitarian Overview 2018’ examines major humanitarian crises worldwide to identify likely developments and corresponding needs. The report focuses on countries where the crisis trend indicates a deterioration in 2018 and a corresponding increase in need. It also includes countries where crisis is not predicted to worsen, but is likely to remain severe: Ethiopia, Iraq, Nigeria, Palestine, Sudan, and Syria. Across these countries, food security, displacement, health, and protection are expected to be the most pressing humanitarian needs in 2018.”

President Donald J. Trump, (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017).
“The publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) is a milestone for any presidency. A statutorily mandated document, the NSS explains to the American people, U.S. allies and partners, and federal agencies how the President intends to put his national security vision into practice on behalf of fellow citizens.”

Center for Preventive Action, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
The Council on Foreign Relations' tenth annual Preventive Priorities Survey identified eight top conflict prevention priorities for the United States in the year ahead, highlighting armed confrontations between the United States and North Korea and Iran as serious international concerns. The survey, conducted by CFR's Center for Preventive Action (CPA) asked foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring or escalating in the next year and their potential impact on U.S. national interests.”

Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen, (Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2017).
“The ‘Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems’ report presents the key findings and recommendations from a one-year mapping study on the development of autonomy in weapon systems. The report aims to help diplomats and members of civil society interested in the issue of lethal autonomous weapons (LAWS) to improve their understanding of the technological foundations of autonomy, and obtain a sense of the speed and trajectory of progress of autonomy in weapon systems. It provides concrete examples that could be used to start delineating the points at which the advance of autonomy in weapons may raise technical, legal, operational and ethical concerns. The report is also intended to act as a springboard for further investigation into the possible parameters for meaningful human control by setting out some of the lessons learned from how existing weapons with autonomous capabilities are used. In addition, it seeks to help diplomats and members of civil society to identify realistic options for the monitoring and regulation of the development of emerging technologies in the area of LAWS.”

Anthony Carroll, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“As Anthony Carroll details in the Africa Center’s newest report, ‘Forging a New Era in US-South African Relations’, the United States has a significant stake in South Africa’s future. The country has the potential to serve as a peacekeeper and economic flagship for the whole of Africa…This report assesses the potential role of the United States in assuring South Africa’s passage through a difficult political and economic period, and recommends a new high-level effort to investigate progress on four tracks: trade liberalization, business-to-business relations, government-to-government relations, and university and think tank collaboration. South Africa is a strong and independent nation, and relations with the United States have been strained. The findings of this report suggest a need—on both sides—for a stronger and more vigorous relationship between Pretoria and Washington.”

Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe y China (Buenos Aires, Argentina).
A series of excellent annual works about China and Latin America and the Caribbean. The majority of works are in Spanish.

Robert J Bunker, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“Armed robotic systems—drones and droids—now emerging on the battlefield portend new strategic realities not only for U.S. forces but also for our allies and future potential belligerents. Numerous questions of immediate warfighting importance come to mind with the fielding of these drones and droids that are viewed as still being in their experimental and entrepreneurial stage of development. By drawing upon historical weapons systems life cycles case studies, focusing on the early 9th through the mid-16th-century knight, the mid-19th through the later 20th-century battleship, and the early 20th through the early 21st-century tank, the monograph provides military historical context related to their emergence, and better allows both for questions related to warfighting to be addressed, and policy recommendations related to them to be initially provided.”

Jeffrey L Caton, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, which officially recognized cyberspace as an operational domain akin to the traditional military domains of land, sea, air, and space. This monograph examines the 2015 DoD Cyber Strategy to evaluate how well its five strategic goals and associated implementation objectives define an actionable strategy to achieve three primary missions in cyberspace: defend the DoD network, defend the United States and its interests, and develop cyber capabilities to support military operations. This monograph focuses on events and documents from the period of about 1 year before and 1 year after the 2015 strategy was released. This allows sufficient time to examine the key policies and guidance that influenced the development of the strategy as well as follow-on activities for the impacts from the strategy. This inquiry has five major sections that utilize different frameworks of analysis to assess the strategy:
- Prima Facie Analysis: What is its stated purpose and key messages?
- Historical Context Analysis: What unique contributions does it introduce into the evolution of national security cyberspace activities?
- Traditional Strategy Analysis: Does it properly address specific DoD needs as well as broader U.S. ends in a way that is appropriate and actionable?
- Analysis of Subsequent DoD Action: How are major military cyberspace components—joint and Service—planning to implement these goals and objectives?
- Whole of U.S. Government Analysis: Does it integrate with the cyberspace-related activities of other U.S. Government departments and agencies?
The monograph concludes with a section that integrates the individual section findings and offers recommendations to improve future cyberspace strategic planning documents.”

Allied Command Transformation, (Norfolk, VA: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Command Transformation, 2017).
“The Strategic Foresight Analysis (SFA) 2017 Report aims to support NATO leadership’s visualization of the future security environment, which is characterized by a rapid rate of change, complexity, uncertainty and interconnectedness. The SFA sets the foundation for the follow-on report, the Framework for Future Alliance Operations (FFAO). Together, the SFA and FFAO provide military advice and inform the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), as well as other NATO and national processes that require an assessment of the long-term future.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference, 2017.
“In partnership with the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understandng (CPRDU), we are pleased to invite you to the sixth annual Transatlantic Forum on Russia. As the transatlantic community continues to search for an enduring policy framework toward Russia, this forum will examine the power of historical understanding and grievances that shape Russia's foreign and security policy as well as assess opportunities to reinvigorate the Helsinki Final Act to restore stability and transparency to Europe's security environment.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference, 2017.
“The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. ChinaPower's annual conference features leading experts from both China and the U.S. to debate core issues underpinning the nature of Chinese power.”

38 North (Washington, DC: The US-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 2017).
“Commercial satellite imagery of the Sinpo South Shipyard from November 5 indicates that North Korea is on an aggressive schedule to build and deploy its first operational ballistic missile submarine.”

Atlantic Council Conference, 2017.
“The ‘Nuclear Strategy and Security in the Second Nuclear Age Conference’ aims to understand the emergence of Asia as the epicenter of the 'second nuclear age' with India and Pakistan developing arsenals of surprising scale and scope. The panels in this conference will focus on: nuclear modernization and the future of the nonproliferation regime, technological changes and the future of deterrence stability, the nature of the nuclear competition in Asia during the second nuclear age, and the dueling significance of terrorism versus insider threats to the safety of nuclear arsenals.”

Atlantic Council Conference, 2017.
Program begins about 3:18.
“The ‘Nuclear Strategy and Security in the Second Nuclear Age Conference’ aims to understand the emergence of Asia as the epicenter of the 'second nuclear age' with India and Pakistan developing arsenals of surprising scale and scope. The panels in this conference will focus on: nuclear modernization and the future of the nonproliferation regime, technological changes and the future of deterrence stability, the nature of the nuclear competition in Asia during the second nuclear age, and the dueling significance of terrorism versus insider threats to the safety of nuclear arsenals.”

Gaurav Kampani and Bharath Gopalaswamy, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“It is now a truism among foreign and defense policy practitioners that the post Cold War nuclear buildup in the India Pacific region constitutes the drawn of the ‘second nuclear age.’ From the 1990s onward, China's decision to stir out of its strategic languor and modernize its nuclear arsenal, along with the resolve of India and Pakistan to deploy operational nuclear forces, and, more recently, North Korea's sprint to develop reliable long range nuclear capabilities that can credibly threaten the continental United States, has led many to aver that the ‘second nuclear age’ will rival the worst aspects of the first.”

Dan Gettinger, (Annandale-on-Hudson: Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, 2017).
“The U.S. military’s spending on drones is set to reach a five-year high. The Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2018 budget request contains $6.97 billion for drone-related procurement, research and development, and system-specific construction. The President’s Budget 2018 maintains funding for existing unmanned aircraft at roughly the same level as the previous year and increases funding for research and development. It lays the groundwork for programs that will develop new unmanned ground and maritime drones, as well as the next generation of unmanned aircraft. This report examines the U.S. military’s proposed budget for drones in Fiscal Year 2018. It considers underlying trends and recent developments that will affect the future development of unmanned systems in the air, ground, and sea.”

James M. Acton, et al., (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017).
“The risk of an inadvertent nuclear war is rising because of the entanglement of non-nuclear weapons with nuclear weapons and their command-and-control capabilities.”

James L. Schoff and Li Bin, (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017).
“U.S.-China strategic nuclear relations are becoming more salient to U.S. defense planning and alliance management, as military tension and mutual suspicion rise in Northeast Asia. The North Korean nuclear catalyst and the need to balance allied interests make this expanding nuclear dimension increasingly complex.
To improve mutual understanding of strategic stability and introduce the alliance element, Carnegie facilitated discussions between American, Chinese, and Japanese security experts. They focused on: a shared concept and definition of strategic stability; its purpose; and its establishment. While participants agreed on certain traditional characteristics of strategic stability, divergent views about the sources and possible remedies for currently fragile crisis and arms race stability will be difficult to bridge and do not bode well for the region, absent appropriate leadership attention.
The workshop highlighted four interconnected areas that will frustrate attempts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S.-China relations or U.S.-alliance concerns: the extent of linkage between regional/conventional conflict and the nuclear realm; Japan’s role; perceptions of mutual vulnerability; and North Korea’s role. Follow-on dialogue is recommended.”

John Blaxland and Greg Raymond, (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University College of Asia & the Pacific, 2017).
“John Blaxland and Greg Raymond’s study breaks new ground in our understanding of Thai strategic and military culture and how Thai security elites view the United States, China, and the shifting geopolitical landscape in Asia. This analysis provides a roadmap to scholars seeking to understand shifting Thai policies and for policymakers seeking to maintain a strong footing for the U.S.-Thailand alliance during a time of strategic flux.”

J. Berkshire Miller, (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2017).
“This past July, the US, Japan and India conducted the annual MALABAR [] naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal. The MALABAR exercises, along with Japan’s inclusion as a permanent member in 2015, have been the watermark of a rapidly improving trilateral relationship between Delhi, Tokyo and Washington. But MALABAR exercises, despite their importance, are not sufficient to drive forward the trilateral relationship. The US and Japan continue to drive forward this relationship and press India, which has been traditionally hesitant to formalize strategic relations perceived by some in the region as a ‘quasi-alliance’, for stronger integration. While Delhi continues to be cautious on rapidly deepening trilateral – and potentially quadrilateral with Australia – relations with Washington and Tokyo, this trend is dynamic especially as geopolitical tensions ebb and flow with China. In sum, policymakers in India, the US and Japan should be cognizant of the limitations and pace of trilateral cooperation but should continue apace on niche areas of cooperation related to their shared security challenges in the Indo-Pacific.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2017).
“On behalf of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, we are pleased to transmit the Commission’s ‘2017 Annual Report to the Congress’—the fifteenth major Report presented to Congress by the Commission—pursuant to Public Law 106–398 (October 30, 2000), as amended by Public Law No. 109–108 (November 22, 2005); as amended by Public Law No. 110–161 (December 26, 2007); as amended by Public Law No. 113–291 (December 19, 2014). This Report responds to the mandate for the Commission ‘to monitor, investigate, and report to Congress on the national security implications of the bilateral trade and economic relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The Commission reached a broad and bipartisan consensus on the contents of this Report, with all 12 members voting to approve and submit it to Congress.”

Danielle Pletka, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has managed to hold onto power through the civil war and has the determined support of Iran to thank for his position. In ‘Tehran Stands Atop the Syria-Iran Alliance,’ author Danielle Pletka examines ties between Syria and Iran, the power relationship that has emerged, and the legacy it leaves for the next Syrian ruler.”

Minke Meijnders, Jaïr van der Lijn, and Bas van Mierlo, (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael Institute, 2017).
“Policy makers trying to grapple with and prepare for Syria’s future are facing a complex and difficult task. How will the future evolve? What are the possibilities when these future materialise?
These scenarios aim to answer these questions. It identifies policy options for the future of Syria, using four potential scenarios in 2019. These scenarios are built on the basis of two key uncertainties: the level of violence in the Syrian conflict, which can either increase of decrease, and if governance in Syria will further fragment or be more centralised, either by design or use of force.
A scenario framework was designed, resulting in the following scenarios: ‘Fragile Peace,’ ‘Reconquista,’ ‘Warlordism,’ and ‘Frozen Conflict.’”

Audrey Alexander, (Washington, DC: Program on Extremism, George Washington University, 2017).
“Until 2016, Twitter was the online platform of choice for English-language Islamic State (IS) sympathizers. As a result of Twitter’s counter-extremism policies - including content removal - there has been a decline in activity by IS supporters. This outcome may suggest the company’s efforts have been effective, but a deeper analysis reveals a complex, nonlinear portrait of decay. Such observations show that the fight against IS in the digital sphere is far from over. In order to examine this change over time, this report collects and reviews 845,646 tweets produced by 1,782 English-language pro-IS accounts from February 15, 2016 to May 1, 2017.”

Nitin Agarwal, et al., (Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2017).
“The study investigates misinformation and disinformation on social media in the context of the rise of ‘fake news’ and the birth of the ‘post-truth’ era. Are these concerns substantiated by facts? What are the consequences of these phenomena for the information environment? Most importantly, do these phenomena pose a threat for our societal security? This study will provide actionable knowledge by answering to these questions. This introduction is an attempt to position the emergence of ‘fake news’ in a wider societal context. Particular emphasis is placed on the cognitive biases that enable information manipulation. In turn, this will lead to a discussion about the tactics employed by adversarial actors to carry out information activities.”

Council of Foreign Relations Report (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 2017).
"Despite women’s contributions to preventing and resolving conflicts, they are often excluded from negotiating tables. Explore original data and country case studies to learn how women have participated in peace processes and what effect they have had."

To access, click on the link above and look in the right-hand box of the webpage.
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Keynote Address: Rosa Brooks
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Amplifying the Women, Peace and Security Agenda -
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Training Education and Reform -
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Media and Film Promoting the Power of Women -
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Asia Pacific: Japan
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Ongoing Concerns - The Next Decade (Part 1)
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Ongoing Concerns - The Next Decade (Part 2)
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: International Operational and Tactical Perspectives
Women, Peace & Security 2017 | Panel Discussion: Athena Rising - How and Why Men Should Mentor Women

Samuel R. White, Jr. (Ed.), (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
USAWC Integrated Research Project - “The Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), begun in November 2014 by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, is intended to ensure U.S. military superiority throughout the 21st century. The DII seeks broad-based innovation across the spectrum of concepts, research and development, capabilities, leader development, wargaming, and business practices. An essential component of the DII is the Third Offset Strategy—a plan for overcoming (offsetting) adversary parity or advantage, reduced military force structure, and declining technological superiority in an era of great power competition. This study explored the implications for the Army of Third Offset innovations and breakthrough capabilities for the operating environment of 2035-2050. It focused less on debating the merits or feasibility of individual technologies and more on understanding the implications—the second and third order effects on the Army that must be anticipated ahead of the breakthrough.”

Richard Barrett, (New York, NY: The Soufan Center, 2017).
“As the so-called Islamic State (IS) loses territorial control of its caliphate, there is little doubt that the group or something similar will survive the worldwide campaign against it so long as the conditions that promoted its growth remain. Its appeal will outlast its demise, and while it will be hard to assess the specific threat posed by foreign fighters and returnees, they will present a challenge to many countries for years to come.”

"War Room" podcast, Emmanuel Kotia and Brian Foster.
November 3, 2017, streaming audio, 14:50
“War Room welcomes our distinguished guest, Brigadier General Emmaneul Kotia, Deputy Commandant of the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Ghana. BG Kotia stopped by while visiting War Colleges in the U.S. to discuss opportunities for further collaboration in peace operations and training. In this podcast, BG Kotia explains the roles and offerings from the KAIPTC and addresses the complexity of peace operations in Africa, such as the high number of disparate factions usually involved in conflicts and the challenge of brokering peace agreements so the peacekeepers can operate under clear guidance and rules of engagements. Brian Foster from the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute moderates.”

Joseph C. Guido, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“The idea to deny sanctuary to terrorist groups lies at the heart of contemporary U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Violent extremist organizations in North Africa, most notably the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have used remote and sparsely populated areas in the Sahara for protection from security forces to perform a range of activities such as training, planning, and logistics in order to conduct terrorist operations like kidnapping, murder, and bombing. Even after 16 years since the September 11 attacks and the resources dedicated to efforts to deny sanctuary, the concept of sanctuary remains largely unexplored. To deny sanctuary requires an understanding of what sanctuary is as an object and how sanctuary is used by terrorist organizations. This monograph proposes a functional understanding of sanctuary and offers fresh ideas to control sanctuary using a detailed case study of the most notorious of the North African terrorists, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, from his arrival to Mali in the late 1990s until the French intervention in early 2012. This multi-disciplinary inquiry utilizes a wide range of open-source documents as well as anthropological, sociological, and political science research, including interviews with one-time Belmokhtar hostage, Ambassador Robert Fowler, in order to construct a picture of what a day in the life of sanctuary-seeking terrorists is like. Belmokhtar and other violent groups remain active and at large in the Sahara in spite of a large French military presence, a small U.S. military presence, and local security forces conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. Additionally, the Islamic State movement could be viewed as the emergence of mega sanctuaries for terrorists and other violent extremist organizations. These threats require a new strategy to isolate, contain, or defeat terrorists and violent extremists in their sanctuary areas.”

China Power Project, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“Military diplomacy can be broadly defined as a set of non-combat activities carried out by a country’s armed forces to advance its national diplomatic interests. Military diplomatic activities often take the form of joint military exercises, high-level military dialogues, and naval port calls. In the case of China, its ongoing military modernization has enhanced the frequency and complexity of these activities. In general, military diplomatic activities provide China with opportunities to improve its global image and support its broader diplomatic agenda, while simultaneously enhancing its military operational capabilities.”

Samm Sacks, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 19th Party Congress concluded on October 24. The week-long session marked a twice in a decade leadership reshuffle and codified President Xi Jinping’s elevated status in China’s political system. Yet, the Party Congress has received less attention for what it reveals about the leadership’s approach to the digital economy and building China into a “cyber superpower.” Key leadership changes and policy statements from the Congress make clear that the development of information and communications technology (ICT) has become a political priority as Xi enters his second term.”

Bonnie S. Glaser, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“In a landmark address that kicked off the 19th Party Congress, President Xi Jinping articulated his vision for China’s future. The three and half hour reading of the work report witnessed Xi waxing poetic about the priorities of rejuvenating Chinese power and realizing the Chinese Dream. Although Xi’s primary focus was on domestic achievements, goals and challenges, his speech provides crucial insights into how China’s strongman leader seeks to advance his country’s role in the world. The main takeaway for the international community is that Xi Jinping is extremely confident in China’s growing national power and sees international trends working in China’s favor. Against the background of China’s expnding global interests, these assessments suggest that the international community may face an even more assertive China in the years to come.”

June Teufel Dreyer, (Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2017).

Urvashi Aneja, (New Delhi, India: Observer Research Foundation, 2017).
“New Delhi is increasingly positioning itself as a significant player in African peace, security and development. Examining the question of how India responds to state fragility in Africa, this brief finds that India’s engagement is mostly transactional: working around, rather than on, sources of political fragility. Development and security interventions tend to operate in silos, but might change if Indian commercial investments are threatened by persistent instability. New Delhi’s pronouncements at global forums increasingly call for a more cohesive and comprehensive approach to development and security in Africa, while framing its own contribution in terms of building new development partnerships for mutual economic growth.”

Wuebbles, D.J, et al., (Eds.) (Washington, DC: US Global Change Research Program, 2017).
“The climate of the United States is strongly connected to the changing global climate. The statements below highlight past, current, and projected climate changes for the United States and the globe. Global annually averaged surface air temperature has increased by about 1.8°F (1.0°C) over the last 115 years (1901–2016). This period is now the warmest in the history of modern civilization. The last few years have also seen record-breaking, climate-related weather extremes, and the last three years have been the warmest years on record for the globe. These trends are expected to continue over climate timescales.
This assessment concludes, based on extensive evidence, that it is extremely likely that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence. In addition to warming, many other aspects of global climate are changing, primarily in response to human activities. Thousands of studies conducted by researchers around the world have documented changes in surface, atmospheric, and oceanic temperatures; melting glaciers; diminishing snow cover; shrinking sea ice; rising sea levels; ocean acidification; and increasing atmospheric water vapor.”

US Department of Defense, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2017).
“The strategic environment has changed with the expanding capability of world actors. The future environment is less predictable and demands our national deterrence strategy accounts for the nature of this uncertainty.
- Nuclear Forces: The basis of strategic deterrence includes nuclear weapon-armed long-range aircraft, land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarines, along with the vital communications elements the president of the United States uses to command and control these forces.
- Missile Defense: Missile defense protects the United States, its military forces abroad and its allies and partners from the threat of a ballistic missile attack by destroying such missiles in flight before they reach their intended target.
- Modernization: Rebuilding and modernizing capabilities and infrastructure is essential to the continued effectiveness and resiliency of the U.S. nuclear deterrent.”

Jerry Hendrix and Adam Routh, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017).
“Due to a confluence of strategic events and initiatives, space is a key domestic and foreign policy area in which the Trump administration can make a substantive, long-lasting contribution to the U.S. global position. However, the government must move quickly, first to establish and then to solidify policy initiatives that will change the direction of U.S. policies concerning space. After decade of neglect, the regions beyond Earth are emerging as a key area of international competition. As with many new technologies and areas of competition, it is necessary to convey developing complexities in commonsense terms.”

Matthew Kroenig and Miyeon Oh, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“If the twentieth century could be characterized as the ‘Trans-Atlantic Century,’ the twenty-first century may well become known as the ‘Trans-Pacific Century.’ According to some projections, the majority of all global economic activity could take place within Asia by 2050. Military might often follows economic power, and Asian countries are already spending more than European states on defense. Both of these developments reflect a broader shift in global power from West to East.
At the end of World War II, Washington and its allies established an open, rules-based international order that has governed the international system ever since. This order helped to create a world that is more peaceful, wealthy, and free than at any point in human history. In Asia, however, the foundation of that order has been creaking under the weight of: shifting power balances; questions about whether existing power structures serve broadbased popular interests beyond a narrow globalized elite; a fracturing consensus on some key global and regional values; disruptive technological change; and other major, emerging trends. In the face of these challenges, one could be tempted to stubbornly cling to a rigid system in the face of changing underlying conditions. On the other hand, one could reduce the post-World War II order to its lowest common denominator, or abandon it altogether. However, there is also a third way.
This ‘Atlantic Council Strategy Paper’ makes several concrete policy recommendations to move from broad principles to practical steps. By following these steps, the United States and its Asian and European partners can begin to work together to revitalize the rules-based order in Asia and better secure their interests in the ‘Trans-Pacific Century.’”

Kenneth M. Pollack and Bilal Y. Saab, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“In their new paper, entitled ‘US Strategy Options for Iran’s Regional Challenge,’ Kenneth M. Pollack, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, and Bilal Y. Saab, senior fellow and director for defense and security at the Middle East Institute, present five alternative strategies that the United States could pursue to limit Iran’s destabilizing activities. After weighing the pros and cons of each option, they conclude that the most effective US course of action would be Pushback—an approach that would seek to measurably weaken Iran’s regional influence and eliminate its meddling in key states by bolstering US partners under pressure from Iran.”

Mary Manjikian, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“Many different actors oppose the use of unmanned autonomous weapons (UAV’s) from adversary states, to international governmental organizations to policymakers and academics. However, the basis for their opposition varies, as do the assumptions behind their arguments. This Letort Paper lays out distinctions between arguments about technology, arguments about policy, and arguments about strategy.”

Pete Kilner, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2017).
“Conversations about the morality of war can be terribly frustrating. People tend to have strong moral feelings about war but muddled understandings about how to make moral judgments on war. Consequently, discussions about the morality of war often deteriorate into disputes about historical facts and attacks on the other person’s moral character. As a military ethicist who strives to keep such conversations constructive, I’ve come to recognize five popular misconceptions that sabotage efforts to think critically about morality and war. The mistaken assumptions undermine any realistic possibility of a war being morally justified. Therefore, the misconceptions must be addressed and debunked.”

Elsa Kania, et al, (Washington, DC: New America, 2017).
“The article, which a team of analysts has translated in full below, outlines the major elements of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s strategic thinking on one of Chinese cyberspace policy’s watchwords: 网络强国 (wǎngluò qiángguó). It’s a pithy formulation in Chinese that can be translated as ‘cyber superpower,’ or ‘building China into a national power in cyberspace,’ and the strategic concept attached to it ties together a series of concepts and initiatives that Xi has pushed in major speeches and the Chinese government has moved to enact.
The CAC [Cyberspace Administration of China] ‘Theoretical Studies Center Group,’ apparently making its debut here, draws on the legitimacy of its Xi-established parent organization and the special status of the journal Qiushi to provide an authoritative synthesis of recent strategic thinking, attributed to Xi, on how to take China from being a cyber power to being a cyber superpower—a goal that implies rough parity with the United States. This comes as U.S.–China cyberspace dialogue continues in a piecemeal fashion across several official channels, although a dedicated dialogue on ‘law enforcement and cybersecurity’ announced in April (and alluded to in the article below) has not yet met.
According to the CAC authors, China’s strategy calls for developing capabilities and governance capacity in four major baskets: managing Internet content and creating ‘positive energy’ online; ensuring general cybersecurity, including protecting critical information infrastructure; developing an independent, domestic technological base for the hardware and software that undergird of the Internet in China; and increasing China’s role in building, governing, and operating the Internet globally. The essay’s authors outline this wide-reaching set of goals under the unifying banner of that four-character phrase, wǎngluò qiángguó.”

Ministère des Armées, (Paris, France: Ministère des Armées, 2017).
“On 29 June last, the President of the Republic entrusted the Minister of the Armed Forces, Florence Parly, with responsibility for conducting a strategic review of defence and national security.
The strategic review is designed to establish the strategic framework for the drafting of the 2019-2025 military programming law (MPL), which is to increase our defence spending to 2% of GDP by 2025. It draws lessons from changes within an unstable and unpredictable environment since the 2013 White Paper, which has been marked by the persistently high terrorist threat, simultaneous crises, the assertion of the military positions of established and emerging powers, the weakening of multilateral frameworks and the acceleration of technological transformations. Against this backdrop, the review examines the interests of France, its defence ambitions and, on this basis, determines the priority capabilities required by our Armed Forces.
This review, which was placed under the direct authority of the Minister of the Armed Forces, was conducted by an 18-strong drafting committee, comprising representatives of civilian and military institutions and experts, particularly from civil society, and was chaired by the MEP, Arnaud Danjean. The committee consulted a representative body of elected representatives, decision-makers from the public and private sectors and researchers from France and abroad, particularly from Europe. All in all, the committee heard or met with 140 experts from France and abroad and made 4 trips abroad (EU, NATO, the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom).”

Paul Lieber and Yael Lieber, (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2017).
“What this occasional paper explores are alternative approaches for SOF to engage with radicalized groups. As an example, at present, mainstream defense and intelligence analysts proclaim the prowess of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in social media—a result of both reach and authenticity. The solution? Comprehensive engagement in the narrative space to defeat the effects of ISIS in the psychological and sociological aspects of the human domain. The Department of State’s recently activated Global Engagement Center (GEC) is tasked with an arguably overdue role in coordinating U.S.-wide, counter-violent-extremist communication efforts. The GEC not only aims to reduce duplication of effort, it likewise aspires to identify nationwide priorities and ways and means for agencies to complement each other’s counter-narrative efforts by comparing notes across those agencies.
Even with improved coordination and perspective, communication narratives can never tell an entire political violence or radicalization story. For example, research finds that individuals pre-disposed to causing harm are more vulnerable to terrorist recruitment. Also, assessment of narratives and/or social media data ignores the impact/effect of a growing female recruitment base on vulnerable males. Therefore, it’s important to think wider and deeper. Rethinking this problem from a joint social psychology—notably realistic conflict theory (RCT)—and social network analysis approach can yield unprecedented insights on the inner workings of radicalized groups and their penchant for political violence. Specifically, it extends the understanding of an organization’s true threat beyond the immediate, and with it, how SOF can be effective in countering them long-term.”

Jean-Loup Samaan, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“Although collective security in the Gulf is the topic of numerous policy publications, most of the available literature focuses on the political environment without considering the operational requirements of this scenario. This monograph offers an evaluation of Gulf defense cooperation programs in order to stir the discussion on the future of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as the ‘NATO of the Gulf.’”

A joint publication of "War on the Rocks" and the Texas National Security Review.
“The ‘Texas National Security Review’ is a new kind of journal committed to excellence, scholarly rigor, and big ideas. Launched in 2017 by ‘War on the Rocks’ and the University of Texas (as a part of its Texas National Security Network) we aim for articles published in this journal to end up on university syllabi and the desks of decision-makers, and to be cited as the foundational research and analysis on world affairs…By focusing on the production and publication of top-tier scholarly work that serves both academic and ‘real-world’ audiences and goals, we aim to create something we know is difficult but we believe is well worth pursuing.”

Dakota L. Wood (ed), (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2017).
“The Heritage Foundation Index of U.S. Military Strength gauges the ability of the U.S. military to perform its missions in today's world, and each subsequent edition will provide the basis for measuring the improvement or weakening of that ability.”

Mark F. Cancian, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
"Strategies are shaped by the processes that produce them. If designed well, a strategy formulation process enables decisionmakers to evaluate the political, security, and budgetary environments, identify choices for an organization, weigh risks, opportunities, and tradeoffs, and determine the best way forward. A strategy formulation process determines which issues will be raised for decision, how issues are elevated to senior levels, what options are presented, who participates in the decisionmaking, and how the results are communicated both internally and externally. Formulating 'National Security Strategy: Past Experiences and Future Choices' is released as the Trump Administration is developing a new defense and national security strategy. However, the strategy formulation process and the resulting documents have been heavily criticized in the past. This report, prepared for DOD and mandated by the Congress, identifies key choices for policymakers in constructing a strategy formulation process and makes recommendations on best practices based on analysis of previous processes."

Richard H. Speier, et al., (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017).
“Hypersonic missiles — specifically hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles — are a new class of threat because they are capable both of maneuvering and of flying faster than 5,000 kilometers per hour. These features enable such missiles to penetrate most missile defenses and to further compress the timelines for a response by a nation under attack. Hypersonic missiles are being developed by the United States, Russia, and China. Their proliferation beyond these three could result in other powers setting their strategic forces on hair-trigger states of readiness. And such proliferation could enable other powers to more credibly threaten attacks on major powers. The diffusion of hypersonic technology is under way in Europe, Japan, Australia, and India — with other nations beginning to explore such technology. Proliferation could cross multiple borders if hypersonic technology is offered on world markets. There is probably less than a decade available to substantially hinder the potential proliferation of hypersonic missiles and associated technologies. To this end, the report recommends that (1) the United States, Russia, and China should agree not to export complete hypersonic missile systems or their major components and (2) the broader international community should establish controls on a wider range of hypersonic missile hardware and technology.”

Todd Harrison, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1, the first human-made object to orbit the Earth. Precisely 60 years later, space-faring nations face a much different space environment; one that’s more diverse, disruptive, disordered, and dangerous. Today’s space domain presents a number of asymmetries that differ from other domains, creating a specific deterrence environment with unique policy implications. ‘Escalation and Deterrence in the Second Space Age,’ a new report by the CSIS Aerospace Security Project, discusses the evolution of space as a contested domain, the changing threats to U.S. space systems, deterrence theory and its applications to the space domain, and findings from a space crisis exercise administered by CSIS last year.”

New York Cyber Task Force, (New York, NY: SIPA School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, 2017).
“On September 28, 2017, the New York Cyber Task Force released a series of recommendations that would help make it easier to defend cyberspace without sacrificing the utility, flexibility, and convenience that has made the Internet so essential to our economies and personal lives. In its report, entitled ‘Building a Defensible Cyberspace,’ the task force highlights strategies for government, cybersecurity companies, and other IT-dependent organizations.
Among other things the report finds that:
• It is possible to establish a more defensible cyberspace—an Internet where defenders have the advantage over attackers.
• Defending cyberspace will not require a ‘Cyber Manhattan Project.’ Security professionals have developed effective strategies in the past, and with the right kind of innovations defenders will once again enjoy the advantage.
• Improvements may come from unexpected places and rely on unglamorous strategies.
• The best options use leverage—innovations across technology, operational, and policy that grant the greatest advantage to the defender over attackers at the least cost and greatest scale.”

Bryan Clark, Mark Gunzinger, and Jesse Sloman, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2017).
“This follow-on study to the 2015 report ‘Winning the Airwaves: Restoring America’s Advantage in the Electromagnetic Spectrum’ will describe how U.S. forces could create new options to counter ‘gray zone’ and hybrid warfare being employed by Russia and China. The report will propose new operational concepts and associated technologies for electromagnetic warfare to enable precise strikes and electronic attacks, including ways to use swarms of small unmanned vehicles or loitering payloads that are currently under development.”

Gal Luft, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“The balance in Eurasia is shifting. China’s President Xi Jinping has ambitious visions for Asia, while the rest of the world reshuffles to find its place in the rapidly changing global order. Each nation guesses at the United States’ new role in the world, while China broadcasts its own role across the globe, ready to challenge those who stand in opposition to its vision. China’s impact is global: reaching from the perils of the Korean peninsula; stretching across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa; and influencing regimes along the way. During this historic moment, the importance of Asia to US interests grows all the greater. Launched in 2013 by China’s President Xi Jinping, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI or OBOR) is poised to be the most ambitious and all-encompassing economic development program in human history. The multi-trillion-dollar initiative will connect China and Europe over land, and will traverse the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea. The United States would be better off engaging with the BRI and trying to influence its design and mechanics from within, rather than staying on the sidelines and witnessing its allies gravitating toward China. To realize this goal, this paper recommends that the United States neither reject nor fully embrace the BRI. Instead, it should adopt a third strategy: constructive participation.”

Erol Yayboke and Charles Rice, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
“The world faces a confluence of changes and technological advances that are fundamentally altering the relationship between individuals, economies, and society. Innovations in a diverse set of fields including robotics, genetics, artificial intelligence, Internet-enabled sensors, and cloud computing are individually disruptive. Collectively they are world changing. Experts around the world have come up with different names and descriptions for this phenomenon: Klaus Schwab calls it the ‘fourth industrial revolution’; Alec Ross points toward the ‘industries of the future’; Steve Case recognizes it as the ‘third wave’ of the Internet; and Martin Ford looks toward the ‘rise of the robots.’ Although these thinkers have slightly different visions for the future, there is a shared recognition that existing assumptions and economic models need adjustment. For both developed and developing countries, the innovation- and technology-driven economy offers significant risks and opportunities. On the one hand, this change offers the potential for increased global prosperity, efficiency, and quality of life. On the other hand, if poorly managed, this transition could disrupt employment models, pathways out of poverty, and stability around the world.”

"War Room" podcast, Martin Lacourt and Ryan McCannell.
October 11, 2017, streaming audio, 26:26
“‘Most of the time, law [of warfare] is one war or two wars late. … [The] law should evolve if it is clear that it is not enough.’ War Room welcomes special guest Martin Lacourt, the senior armed forces delegate to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) regional delegation to the US and Canada. In addition to discussing the role the ICRC plays in monitoring conflict and protecting human rights and dignity during war, M. Lacourt also discusses the relationship that the ICRC has had with the U.S. military, a relationship that has grown since the turn of the 21st Century. He discusses the urgency of keeping the laws of warfare current and relevant in today’s dynamic and increasingly dangerous world, and offers advice for strategic leaders on how to properly engage with international actors. War Room associate editor Ryan McCannell moderates.”

Rachel Vogelstein and Jamille Bigio, (Washington, DC: Council of Foreign Relations, 2017).
“Last week, the United States government enacted the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which was signed into law by President Trump on October 6. The bipartisan act will strengthen efforts to prevent, mitigate, and resolve conflict by increasing women’s participation in negotiation and mediation processes.”

Continuing Series of recorded webcasts. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017).
“Last year, the Center for a New American Security started a project on getting new audiences to think and talk about issues of gender, inclusivity, and national security. We’ve written reports and hosted events on the topic, and we’ve learned that while some audiences were receptive to sharing, learning, and broadening their views, others were frustrated we were making a big deal out of a matter they considered closed. But among the women we know, it didn’t feel nearly as clear cut. So instead of discussing it abstractly, we asked women in national security – from CEOs to interns – to talk about their experiences. This podcast series goes to the source: their stories, lessons and advice on living and working as a woman in national security.”

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, (Arlington, VA: Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2017).
“‘Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan’ is the second in a series of lessons learned reports to be issued by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. The report examines how the U.S. government—primarily the Departments of Defense, State, and Justice—developed and executed security sector assistance (SSA) programs to build, train, advise, and equip the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), both unilaterally and as part of a coalition, from 2002 through 2016. The report identifies lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions at the onset of and throughout a contingency operation and provides recommendations for improved performance. In Afghanistan today, the U.S. effort to train, advise, and assist the ANDSF does not appear to be over. In light of the administration’s current focus on strategy in Afghanistan, this report provides timely and actionable recommendations for our current and future efforts there.”

Thomas Galvin, (Carlisle, PA: War Room, September 26, 2017).
“Success stories [in strategic communication] do exist. The formation of the U.S. Army’s African Command (AFRICOM) was … a case of turning the communication environment from open hostility to general favorability in two short years.”

"War Room" podcast, Alexander Leskaris and Ryan McCannell.
September 28, 2017, streaming audio, 29:02
“‘AFRICOM was never conceived to be a warfighting command. It was conceived to be a soft-power hybrid command. Then history intervened and the Libya situation came about. Every day I see this dramatic tension played out – ‘Are we soft-power based or a warfighting command? And the answer is ‘yes’!’ In this ‘War Room’ podcast, Ambassador Alexander M. Leskaris, current civilian deputy to the commander, reflects on the uniqueness of the command and growing importance of interagency cooperation, a hallmark of AFRICOM’s first decade. Along with reflections on strategic leadership, Ambassador Leskaris discusses the challenges of AFRICOM’s identity between being a ‘hard power’ warfighting command and a ‘soft power’ organization focused on preventing war and building security capacity. War Room associate editor Ryan McCannell hosts.”

Ryan McCannell, (Carlisle, PA: War Room, September 29, 2017).
“Ryan McCannell describes why AFRICOM's efforts to collaborate among partners in diplomacy, development, and defense have been generally successful and what lessons it provides for the U.S. Government. Interagency coordination requires huge expenditures of time, effort, and energy to build trust and cross bureaucratic and cultural barriers, but it can be done.”

“War Room” podcast, Josh Kennedy, Buck Haberichter and Jacqueline E. Whitt.
October 6, 2017, streaming audio, 20:50
“Josh Kennedy and Buck Haberichter the popular but wrong perception that special forces are capable of resolving all national security dilemmas without the need for conventional forces. The elite selection process, specialized training, and long history of success are what make Special Forces ‘special.’ But, as the podcasters explain, they are neither superhuman nor endowed with magical powers. Yet they are often treated that way, viewed as a simple and cheap solution to the thorny problems of the world. Listen in as the podcasters discuss the effects this misperception has on strategic decisionmaking, resourcing, and civil-military relations. Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.”

Atlantic Council podcast.
September 26, 2017, streaming video, 06:32:03
Program begins about 13:24
Panel I: Transatlantic Response to Disinformation: Paving a Way Forward
Panel II: Straight Out of the Kremlin’s Toolkit: Strategies of State Actors
Panel III: Social Media and Radicalization: The Challenge of ISIS and Other Non-State Actors

R. Evan Ellis, (Paris, France: Asia Center, 2017).
“This article examines the character of Chinese expansion into Latin America and the Caribbean in eight points, with an emphasis on recent developments and their strategic implications for the U.S. and the region.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies Original Documentary Film
September 2017, streaming video, 58:43
“Healthcare and humanitarian workers are increasingly in the crosshairs as hospitals and aid centers have become part of the battlefield in today’s wars. So far, there has been little to stop the profound surge of violence seen across several open-ended conflicts which has claimed thousands of lives, destroyed health systems, triggered mass displacement and state collapse, and exposed the crisis facing the norms of international humanitarian law contained in the Geneva Conventions.
The ‘New Barbarianism’ is a CSIS Global Health Policy Center original feature documentary (58 minutes) that examines the crisis, its causes, the limited international response and possible ways forward through dozens of interviews and original footage obtained from inside Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan. It builds on several years of prior GHPC work on the intersection of health and security, the role of militaries, and the human tragedies seen in Syria and Yemen.”

World Economic Forum, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2017).
“The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) tracks the performance of close to 140 countries on 12 pillars of competitiveness. It assesses the factors and institutions identified by empirical and theoretical research as determining improvements in productivity, which in turn is the main determinant of long-term growth and an essential factor in economic growth and prosperity. ‘The Global Competitiveness Report’ hence seeks to help decision makers understand the complex and multifaceted nature of the development challenge; to design better policies, based on public-private collaboration; and to take action to restore confidence in the possibilities of continued economic progress.
Improving the determinants of competitiveness, as identified in the 12 pillars of the GCI, requires the coordinated action of the state, the business community, and civil society. All societal actors need to be engaged to make progress on all factors of competitiveness in parallel, which is necessary to achieve long-lasting results. This year the GCI points to three main challenges and lessons that are relevant for economic progress, public-private collaboration, and policy action: first, financial vulnerabilities pose a threat to competitiveness and to economies’ ability to finance innovation and technological adoption; second, emerging economies are becoming better at innovation but more can be done to spread the benefits; third, labor market flexibility and worker protection are needed for competitiveness and shared prosperity in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.”

World Economic Forum, (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2017).
“The Global Human Capital Index featured in this ‘Report’ aims to provide a holistic assessment of a country’s human capital—both current and expected—across its population. It enables effective comparisons across regions, generations and income groups. The ‘Report’ defines ‘human capital’ as the knowledge and skills people possess that enable them to create value in the global economic system. The Index aims to quantify key concepts and provides a practical tool to policy-makers and business leaders. It formulates a human-centric vision of the future of work that recognizes people’s knowledge, talents, creativity and skills as key drivers of a prosperous and inclusive economy. The ‘Report’ argues for the rationale of building up deep, diverse and resilient talent pools and skills ecosystems that allow for inclusive participation in good quality, skilled jobs by the largest possible number of people.”

Continuing Series of recorded webcasts. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017).
Scroll to the bottom of the webpage to find the following recordings.
- Statoil's Climate Roadmap - September 22, 2017
- A Conversation with Minister Vidar Helgesen of Norway - June 6, 2017
- A Conversation with Minister Catherine McKenna - March 15, 2017
“While the challenges of dealing with climate change are often assumed to be similar worldwide, the approach that each country takes is highly dependent on their overall development status, their political economy, governance structure, existing natural resources, and a variety of other factors…Each country has a different approach to its own climate strategy and yet, each feels that tackling the challenge of climate change is firmly rooted in its own interest.
Generally, companies are similarly oriented—beyond near-term efforts to improve efficiencies and reduce emissions, various companies are positioning themselves to be competitive in a lower-carbon future. Many companies have already accepted the inevitable transition to a lower-carbon future and have adapted their strategies in response.
The Energy & National Security Program’s Climate Change and the National and Corporate Interest will host speakers to foster insightful discussions about a variety of corporate and country perspectives on the costs and benefits of their climate strategies and why those actions are in their interest.”

Chris Bolan, (Carlisle, PA: War Room, September 19, 2017).
“Is a revival of the Korean War necessary? Senior U.S. leaders are considering military options for dealing with North Korea’s pursuit of an intercontinental nuclear capability. In response to North Korea’s most recent provocative missile test flying over Japan last week, President Trump indicated that preventive military action was under strong consideration as he emphasized that U.S. military options to respond were both ‘effective and overwhelming.’ National security advisor Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster confirmed at a White House press conference that ‘for those who have…been commenting about a lack of a military option, there is a military option’ for dealing with the emerging threat from North Korea. While there are no easy choices for what to do about North Korea, a preventive attack is a very bad idea. First, it is not yet necessary. The option space for decisions has not diminished to the point that such an attack is justified. Second, it poses enormous risks, such that the costs would far outweigh the benefits. Indeed, it would likely provoke the very North Korean nuclear attack that U.S. policy seeks to avoid. A far more prudent course of action would have U.S. policymakers take immediate steps to strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrence postures in order to blunt this emerging threat.”

Oriana Skylar Mastro, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2017).
“Despite Pyongyang’s recent ballistic missile and nuclear activity and threats, Beijing continues to resist US requests to apply greater economic pressure on North Korea. This measured response aside, nuanced but highly significant changes in China’s thinking on North Korea are clear. China may now be willing to envision both a future in which North Korea is not a sovereign state and a greater role for the Chinese military in any contingency. This Peace Brief reviews this thinking as well as potential Chinese motivations to intervene militarily in a Korea contingency and the implications for US policy.”

38 North, (Washington, DC: 38 North, 2017).
“A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. and Jack Liu.”

Roman Muzalevsky, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“Barring major policy failures, the U.S. military will still enjoy unrivaled capabilities in the coming decades. But a series of megatrends and region-specific dynamics will challenge the U.S military and economic leadership, exposing the United States to crises and opportunities on the battlefield and in the market. These megatrends will define the evolving multicentric system of interaction among actors, facilitating further dispersion of influence that will undermine the U.S. position as the most influential actor while enabling its rivals to move up the ranks fast.
This system is expected to have neither the place nor the tolerance for unipolarity, as once ascribed to the United States in the 1990s. Instead, it will have plenty of room for numerous actors exercising considerable influence in different domains. The U.S. military will need to adapt to these megatrends to retain its strategic edge. Otherwise, protecting U.S. interests in a continuously evolving world will be a fruitless enterprise, one that will hasten the perceived U.S. decline as the greatest military power the world has ever known.
This monograph helps explore and prepare for the possible and the probable in a transformed world of 2050. Relying on forecasting, scenarios, and wild cards, it envisions the evolution of these megatrends and an emerging operational threat environment and strategic landscape for the U.S. military.”

Daniel D. Maurer, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“This monograph reimagines war’s fundamental nature, extending Clausewitz’s theory of its political origin and ‘Trinitarian’ elements in a way that embraces alternative, sociological explanations like that of John Keegan. Ultimately, it proposes a new way to visualize the complexities of war’s intrinsic elements, operating at any scale, and expresses war with a completely new and universal definition.”

“War Room” podcast, Patrick Bratton and Jacqueline E. Whitt.
September 15, 2017, streaming audio, 16:14
“‘There [are] a lot of preconceived notions about Mahan. . . I got it. Big fleet. Big guns. Big battleship. World War II proved him wrong. Moving on! There’s a . . . way of dismissing Mahan and a lot of his more interesting aspects to his writing.’ In this fourth episode of War Room’s special series on Great Strategists, Patrick Bratton explores Alfred Thayer Mahan’s ‘The Influence of Seapower’ upon History and its relevance to the 21st century. Writing at the turn of the 20th century, Mahan was explicitly thinking about the role of sea power for the United States as it emerged onto the world stage, and his ideas, though very influential at the time, have fallen somewhat out of favor in more recent thinking about sea power. Mahan’s emphasis on big fleets and decisive battles have led some to dismiss Mahan as hopelessly out of date, but Mahan was also writing about broader political questions about the maritime domain. And in the 21st century, rising powers, particularly in Asia, are reading Mahan quite seriously, so it remains a text worth reading and exploring seriously. War Room podcast editor Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.”

Iskander Rehman, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, 2017).
“Although his name is not as well-known as it once was, Belisarius has long been considered one of history’s finest tacticians. Under the orders of the Byzantine emperor Justinian I, the sixth century general reclaimed vast tracts of Western Roman territory, from northern Africa to the Italian peninsula. Frequently outnumbered and leading an eclectic grouping of warriors composed of romaioi (Eastern Romans), foederati (Barbarian allies), and ethnikoi (specialist ethnic troops), the Thracian commander greatly expanded the footprint of the Byzantine empire at a time when many thought that Rome’s ancestral lands had been irredeemably lost. The fact that many of these conquests, as we shall see, only proved fleeting, has, if anything, only burnished his myth, transmogrifying the soldier into something of a crepuscular icon — Western Europe’s last great Roman protector before the advent of the so-called Dark Ages.”

R. Evan Ellis, Testimony to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, Wednesday, September 13, 2017.
"The outcome of the ongoing crisis in Venezuela has strategic significance for not only the United States, but also for its global competitors, including Russia and the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.). Both countries have exploited the financial needs and political receptivity of the current Venezuelan regime to gain privileged access to that country’s substantial petroleum reserves, mineral wealth, and markets, including for military goods. Reciprocally, Russian and Chinese purchases of Venezuelan petroleum, injections of capital, and other forms of support have exacerbated the current crisis by prolonging the life of the Venezuelan regime beyond the natural limits created by its poor management and anti-democratic practices. The principal risk regarding Russian and Chinese activities in Venezuela in the near-term is that they will exploit the unfolding crisis, including the effect of U.S. sanctions, to deepen their control over Venezuela’s resources, and their leverage over the country as an anti-U.S. political and military partner."

“The CSIS Americas Program podcast, ‘35 West’, discusses various political, economic, security, and social challenges in the Western Hemisphere through interviews and discussions with other CSIS experts and leaders throughout the region and the world.”

“Who We Are: Divergent Options is not politically aligned nor does Divergent Options conduct political activities.
What We Do: In 1,000 words or less, Divergent Options provides unbiased, dispassionate, candid articles that assess a national security situation, present multiple options to address the situation, and articulate the risk and gain of each option. Please note that while we assess a national security situation and may provide options, we never recommend a specific option.
Who We Communicate To: Our intended audience is National Security Practitioners worldwide. We keep our articles short and to the point because we know that Practitioners have a limited amount of time and are likely reading our content on a digital device during a commute, a lunch break, or in-between meetings.”

Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, September 15, 2017).
“A new nuclear state, in a major crisis with a conventionally superior nuclear-armed adversary, contemplates and prepares to move nuclear assets in the event it has to use them. Who controls the nuclear forces? Who decides when they might be assembled, mated to delivery vehicles, moved, and launched? Who has nominal authority to order those decisions? Who has the physical ability to implement them even without proper authorization? How experienced are the relevant units in these operations? What could go wrong?”

Scott A. Snyder, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, September 14, 2017).
“Given Russia’s desire to remain relevant as a player on Korean peninsula-related issues, Moscow’s primary objective will be to secure a continued presence in any future revival of multilateral diplomacy with North Korea. A more aggressive scenario might have Russia play a spoiler role in opposing U.S. interests, but this strategy is risky given the unpredictability and historically-evident costs of being dragged into renewed North Korean-made military conflict.”

Joshua Rovner, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, September 13, 2017).
“Kim Jong Un has rekindled a decades-old debate among international relations scholars: Are some leaders too irrational to be deterred? Some in the Trump administration think so. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster recently suggested that the North Korean regime is so brutal that deterrence theory does not apply. His comments echo previous concerns about rogue states that are impossible to deal with. Others have sought to reassure nervous Americans that deterrence worked against murderous regimes in the past, and we can rely on it today to deter North Korea from nuclear war. This is an important debate, to be sure, but it is incomplete. The question of deterrence is not simply about preventing war, because a nuclear North Korea can act in several ways that threaten U.S. interests even if it never uses nuclear weapons in anger. Some of these actions are probably beyond U.S. control. But Washington can deter the most dangerous threats, even if it can’t deter everything. So what, exactly, is the United States trying to deter?”

Jeff Baron, (Washington, DC: 38 North, September 7, 2017).
“Fluent in Korean and a specialist in North Korea’s economy, Mitsuhiro Mimura has visited North Korea 45 times since 1996, spending about a year on the ground there. After his most recent trip in August 2017, the senior researcher at Japan’s Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia (ERINA) told me about the changes he’s seen in North Korea’s economy and society. The level of detail in his explanations surprised me. ‘When I ask North Koreans colleagues I’ve gotten to know over the last 20 years about how their economy works, they talk openly about policy and practice,’ Dr. Mimura said. ‘And when I travel around the country, the production innovations I see at farms and factories are in line with what they’ve told me. I don’t ask what they think of their political system and I wouldn’t expect an answer if I did.’”

Alon Levkowitz, (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 7, 2017).
“On August 29, 2017, North Korea launched a Hwasong-12 missile over Japan that landed in the Pacific Ocean – a show of force that once again illustrated Japan’s vulnerability to North Korea’s ballistic missiles. Tokyo should reconsider its newly conciliatory method of coping with the threat from Pyongyang. It will not be able to deter North Korea alone, and may have no choice but to be more active militarily. Over the years, North Korea has launched dozens of short-range missiles. They have ranged from less than 1,000 km to the latest ICBMs, which had a range of almost 8,000 km. Some of North Korea’s missiles have landed close to the exclusive economic waters of Japan, while others – three since 1998 – flew above Japan and landed in the Pacific Ocean. North Korea’s ballistic capabilities pose a security threat to Japanese security. Pyongyang has stated outright that Japanese and American bases in Japan are legitimate targets in case of war on the Korean Peninsula, or in retaliation for any limited strike on the DPRK. For the time being, Tokyo does not face possible invasion by the DPRK. The more pressing issue is the ballistic missile threat. Tokyo has several policy strategies it might consider with which to deal with this threat.”

John Mauk, (Carlisle, PA: War Room, September 6, 2017).
“The U.S. has long held the position that a North Korean nuclear capability that threatens the U.S. homeland is unacceptable. Expert opinion is that North Korea either already has, or soon will have, precisely that capability. It is too late to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons or an effective, long-range delivery platform. Thus, the threat that multiple democratic and republican presidential administrations have said they cannot accept is now real. Equivocation and failed policy approaches mean the Trump administration is now at a critical point of decision. The U.S. can either change its policy or do something dramatic to address the threat.”

38 North, (Washington, DC: 38 North, September 5, 2017).
“A 38 North exclusive with analysis by Frank V. Pabian, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Jack Liu.”

Louis René Beres, (Ramat Gan, Israel: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, September 5, 2017).
“To deal with the growing nuclear threat from North Korea, US policy will need to be drawn from theoretical decision models. Four such models should be constructed along the axes of rationality and intentionality. With these models in hand, President Trump and his senior strategists would be better prepared to assess and counter the threats posed by Kim Jong-un to the US and its allies. In the latter regard, the North Korean leader maintains ties to some of Israel’s core enemies in the Middle East, including Syria, Hezbollah, and Iran. To best prepare for any impending nuclear crisis with North Korea, the US must approach the problem in a systematic and intellectually disciplined manner. This means factoring into any assessment (a) the expected rationality or irrationality of principal decision-makers in Pyongyang and Washington; and (b) the intentional or unintentional intra-war behaviors of those same decision-makers. If a distinction is made regarding the rationality and intentionality variables, four logically possible and analytically useful scenarios will result. These scenarios should be considered by Trump’s senior military planners and strategists. All four can subsequently be nuanced by the introduction of additional factors.”

Scott A. Snyder, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, September 05, 2017).
“North Korea’s sixth test pushes the United States closer to a strategic choice between two unacceptable options: acquiescence to North Korea as a nuclear power, or ‘catastrophic’ military conflict to permanently end the North Korea threat. Even if North Korea were to be recognized as a nuclear state, it is not clear that Kim’s sense of vulnerability would be reduced. Kim must not be allowed at all costs to export his vulnerability to the rest of the world: that should be Trump’s primary goal.”

Eleanor Albert, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, September 05, 2017).
“The United States and its Asian allies regard North Korea as a grave security threat. It has one of the world’s largest conventional military forces, which, combined with its escalating missile and nuclear tests and aggressive rhetoric, has aroused concern worldwide. But world powers have been ineffective in slowing its path to acquire nuclear weapons. The North’s leader, Kim Jong-un, sees the nuclear program as the means to sustain his regime. While it remains among the poorest countries in the world, North Korea spends nearly a quarter of its GDP on its military, according to U.S. State Department estimates. Its brinkmanship will continue to test regional and international partnerships aimed at preserving stability and security.”

Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, September 4, 2017).
“After months of anticipation, it finally happened. On Sunday morning, September 3, at precisely noon local time, North Korea detonated its sixth nuclear device ever to test a presumably new thermonuclear bomb design. The explosion generated an earthquake that was felt across the border in China and suggested a total explosive yield on the order of hundreds of kilotons, or ten times greater than the weapon the United States dropped on Hiroshima in August 1945 — and likely similarly an order of magnitude greater than North Korea’s fifth nuclear test almost exactly a year ago.”

Ankit Panda, (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, August 29, 2017).
“North Korea has threatened to test-fire four unarmed intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) that would fly over Japan and land in the waters around Guam, a U.S. territory that hosts multiple military facilities. Pyongyang has never conducted such a test, and it would be among the most provocative actions ever taken by the regime against the United States and Japan. On August 28, North Korea, for the first time, fired a ballistic missile designed to carry nuclear payloads over Japan that landed in the northern Pacific Ocean. While the United States and Japan did not do so during this launch, they may seek to intercept future launches of this kind with a range of defense systems—especially if the missile appears to be on a trajectory for Guam. There are risks associated with both attempting and not attempting to destroy the missiles.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies YouTube page
August 28, 2017, streaming video, 2:27
“In early August, North Korea threatened to launch four ballistic missiles towards Guam, targeting waters less than 30 kilometers off the island’s coast. How and when would U.S. missile defense forces respond if an attack like this were to take place? Written and produced by the CSIS Aerospace Security Project and the CSIS Missile Defense Project, in conjunction with the CSIS iDeas Lab. Narrated by Todd Harrison and Tom Karako.”

Janka Oertel, (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, August 28, 2017).
“The latest developments in the North Korean nuclear crisis have stoked fears in Europe about a potential military escalation. There is a great degree of international consensus about the growing threat Kim Jong-un’s regime poses. By putting all options — including military options — on the table, the Trump administration has raised the stakes of the conflict for European allies. Despite transatlantic dissonance on other issues, the imminence of the North Korean threat to global security calls for a proactive and unified response. While a U.S. military strike remains very unlikely, Europe has serious contributions to make and levers to use to support a diplomatic solution. Transatlantic interest on a peaceful transformation of the crisis is closely aligned. The seriousness of the conflict warrants level-headed diplomacy — on both sides of the Atlantic.”

Andrew O'Neil, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, August 18, 2017).
“Conventional wisdom tells us that because North Korea’s elites are rational actors, they will conclude that the benefits of employing nuclear weapons will be outweighed by the costs. Regime extinction is identified as the most compelling cost, and Kim Jong Un’s instinct for self-preservation is said to override all other considerations. But the prospects of North Korea using nuclear weapons during crises, or in the initial stages of a conventional (that is, non-nuclear) conflict, are greater than generally acknowledged. This is not based on any assumption about the rationality or otherwise of the Kim regime; rather, that nuclear first use may itself be seen as a rational option if a U.S. first strike is regarded as inevitable.”

Patrick Cronin, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, August 2, 2017).
“While allied militaries must be ready to fight tonight, U.S. leaders need to remain clear-eyed in the face of danger. Over the long course of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs, the United States has periodically looked hard at the cost-benefit analysis of launching a surgical strike. Each time, U.S. officials ‘blinked,’ because the risk seemed higher than the reward. Once again, we appear to be moving in the direction of the brink of war, but in reality, officials are apt to reach the same conclusion as before. The game has not changed so much as it has intensified. The United States finds itself not at the brink of war, but in a position where it must exercise constant vigilance to manage regional stability — or else find itself forced to choose between taking action that it will regret, or ‘blinking’ and suffering a blow to its credibility. Because the problem of North Korea is neither new nor going away easily, the best way forward necessarily builds on past policy. It calls for containing the threat and managing down risk. If U.S. policymakers lose their heads and think this is a crisis that must be resolved in the short term, they stand to lose a great deal. If instead they understand that time is on the side of strong and prosperous democracies, then the United States can eventually work its way out of this security predicament.”

Denny Roy, (Honolulu, HI: East-West Center, August 2017).
“As North Korea gets closer to deploying working nuclear missiles, it is more important than ever to dispense with four common misunderstandings. First, characterizations of the regime as irrational are wrong. Fundamentally weak and deeply insecure, North Korea tries to compensate by cultivating an image of eagerness to go to war in the hope of intimidating its adversaries. Second, paranoid about subversion, Pyongyang is extremely unlikely to exchange its nuclear weapons for greater trade opportunities with democratic countries. Third, the option of using military action to prevent North Korea from getting nuclear missiles is not ‘on the table.’ Finally, depending on China to solve the problem is fruitless because the Chinese fear a collapse of the regime more than they fear a nuclear-armed North Korea. Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington should focus on mitigating the dangers of living with deliverable North Korean bombs.”

Marius Grinius, (Calgary, Alberta, Canada: Canadian Global Affairs Institute, August 2017).
“Despite global condemnation and more UN sanctions North Korea will achieve its goal of an inter-continental range ballistic missile with a viable nuclear warhead. The only question is when. While the US maintains that all options remain on the table, military options, including a pre-emptive strike, are not viable. Options are further constrained when, in the context of the new Great Game between China and the United States, it is still in the interest of China, and its junior partner Russia, to diligently ensure Kim Jong-un’s regime survival. The question then is how to cope with the new reality. Part 1 examines some of the relevant assumptions that swirl around any discussion about North Korea. They include China’s relations with North Korea, the effectiveness of UN sanctions, North Korean regime survival, Korean unification, the likelihood of a refugee tsunami, ballistic missile defence, the possibility of negotiating with North Korea and the larger context of a new ‘Great Game’ between an emerging China and a retreating United States. If the premise, the worst-case scenario, that a nuclear North Korea will be capable of delivering a viable nuclear warhead onto the United States is reasonable, Part 2 will suggest some elements in a coping strategy. This will require an honest conversation between China and the US about Korean unification, the power of information seeping into North Korea, the possibility of regime change or exile for Kim Jong-un and what to do with Pyongyang’s military and political elite. Much will depend upon how Chinese President Xi Jin-ping, who has yet to meet Kim Jong-un, will see his legacy as he leads China to truly global status and leadership. A faster and smoother realization of his ‘Chinese Dream’ will be helped by a stable, unified Korea and not by a failing rogue state with nukes.”

Albert Wolf, (West Point, NY: Modern War Institute, July 14, 2017).
“Bismarck once said, ‘Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable—the art of the next best.’ The Trump administration needs to give up the dream of a nuclear-free North Korea and focus upon what kind of deal is possible. The United States should work to prevent reactive proliferation in Asia, to deter North Korea from selling sensitive materials to terrorists, and with China to prevent Pyongyang from adopting a provocative nuclear posture.”

Richard Fontaine, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, July 7, 2017).
“The unveiling of this new ICBM should inject a dose of realism into its North Korea policy. Too often, U.S. policy has aimed at attractive but unattainable objectives, and sought them through unrealistic means. The United States should respond to North Korea’s ICBM launch with a series of tough measures based on the actual, prevailing dynamics of power on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This requires dropping a few illusions.”

Missile Threat - CSIS Missile Defense Project, May, 16, 2017.
"The Hwasong-12 is a single-staged, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic missile produced by North Korea. It was successfully test launched for the first time on May 14, 2017."

Michael McCaul, (Washington, DC: War on the Rocks, March 8, 2017).
“Most of time, North Korea is a minor international irritant: a regime that throws public temper tantrums and makes outlandish claims and accusations. However, in recent weeks the world was reminded why the North poses a persistent threat to American and international security—and why the United States should do more to deter Pyongyang’s increasing belligerence.”

Frank L. Jones, et al., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
USAWC Integrated Research Project – “The fiscal year (FY) 2017 ‘National Defense Authorization Act,’ which includes a title to reform the Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation, has far-reaching implications for U.S. defense interests in Africa. As the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee notes, ‘the Department of Defense continues to place greater emphasis on security cooperation, to include building partner capacity.’ The term ‘building partner capacity’ (BPC) widens the focus of security cooperation as a whole-of-government effort, and makes clear congressional interest in treating security cooperation as a defense institution building endeavor. In response to the law, this book examines and recommends specific steps the DoD can take to build partner capacity successfully in Africa and meet congressional direction.”

Aubrey Hruby, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“China’s major financial commitments to Africa, coupled with its double digit returns, have discouraged American companies from breaking into African markets. Amid growing concerns regarding China’s expanding economic influence on the continent, a reassessment of America’s business edge and overall competitiveness is past due. Rather than engaging in a fist-fight for influence with Chinese competitors, ‘Escaping China’s Shadow: Finding America’s Competitive Edge in Africa’ argues that US companies should instead focus on their strengths and be more artful in leveraging the United States’ competitive advantages in unoccupied or less occupied spaces. Hruby outlines these ripe investment opportunities for US companies and maps a path to American business success on the continent.”

Aleksandra W. Gadzala, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“For America’s consumer goods companies, the latest shifts in African consumer trends hold much promise. Africa’s population is growing at an outstanding rate and spending by consumers and businesses on the continent is forecast to grow significantly over the next decade. However, US investors often oversimplify and misunderstand African markets, which remain highly segmented, fluid, and absent of a discernible ‘middle.’ ‘Capturing the African Consumer Market: Truths, Trends, and Strategies for the Road Ahead,’ by Aleksandra W. Gadzala, unpacks this complexity, and in doing so offers effective strategies for American companies to capture the opportunities afforded by Africa’s growth.”

“War Room” podcast, Vanya Eftimova Bellinger and Jacqueline E. Whitt.
August 22, 2017, streaming audio, 20:31
“‘This is the biggest idea. . . . There is no cookbook [of] how to wage war. There is no formula, people. There is no secret out there. Clausewitz believed that war is such a complex activity, shaped by its own time and circumstances, depending on a thousand little details, which can go wrong. And also on individuals, who can also act irrationally.’ This podcast is the first episode of a ‘War Room’ special series featuring some of history’s greatest strategists. Featured is Carl von Clausewitz, famed for his book ‘On War’ (Vom Kriege) which is a staple of professional military education in the U.S. and many partner nations. This is remarkable given that the original text of ‘On War’ is an unfinished manuscript published posthumously by his wife Marie. Clausewitz scholar Vanya Eftimova Bellinger and ‘War Room’ podcast editor Jacqueline Whitt explore the book’s major theses and implications they present for modern scholars and practitioners of strategy.”

"War Room" podcast, Paul Kan and Jacqueline E. Whitt.
August 29, 2017, streaming audio, 11:42
“You have Sun Tzu saying, ‘This is kind of the environment in which we live. It’s bloodier; it’s more warlike, so you probably can’t be more peaceful. You probably can’t re-establish the old order. So maybe we can just make warfare less bloody and have it end more quickly.’ In ‘Sun Tzu and the Art of War,’ Paul Kan explains the impacts of Sun Tzu’s famed treatise on war. Although little is known about Sun Tzu, 'The Art of War' has been applied to many contemporary issues and stands in contrast to the teachings of Carl von Clausewitz.”

"War Room" podcast, Larry Goodson and Jacqueline E. Whitt.
September 1, 2017, streaming audio, 26:38
“‘[Kautilya] is considered the first great political realist. Most international relations scholars treat [his ‘Arthashastra’] as a treatise of unvarnished realism.’ In this third episode of ‘War Room'’s special series on Great Strategists, Larry Goodson presents the writings of Kautilya, who is lesser known to military audiences that Clausewitz or Sun Tzu. As counsel to a young emporer in 4th century BCE India, Kautilya developed and published the earliest known works explaining the international relations philosophy known today as realism. ‘Conquer or be conquered’ and ‘the friend of my enemy is my enemy’ are among the teachings originating from the ‘Arthashastra’, a collection of 14 books that covered matters of both military and civilian governance.”

“MWI [Modern War Institute] Podcast" John Amble and Russell Glenn.
August 16, 2017, streaming audio, 41:04
“In this episode of the Modern War Institute podcast, MWI editorial director John Amble speaks to Dr. Russell Glenn, a senior adviser for plans and policy to the deputy chief of staff, G-2, of the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command. Dr. Glenn has spent nearly twenty-five years studying the city as a battlefield. During this conversation, he discusses the challenges it poses and what the US military should be doing to prepare to operate effectively in dense urban terrain in the future. Dr. Glenn highlights the unique tactical challenges presented by cities: ‘Every window, every balcony, every manhole cover, every doorway, every corner in a street is a possible firing position.’ But he also argues convincingly that, equally, we need to be thinking about the difficult operational and strategic challenges presented by the density of people and structures. ‘Operating in a rural area,’ he explains, ‘is like having three colored balls on a pool table . . . and you strike the cue ball. Chances are it may never touch anything else. Operating in a city . . . is like having seven racks of the colored balls on the table and you strike the cue ball, and you have no idea what the ultimate consequences are going to be when they all start to impact each other.’”

Bruce Bedford, et al., (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“The Atlantic Council's ‘State Department Reform Report’—written by a group of ten foreign policy experts—explores the critical subject areas of structure and process, personnel, budget, congressional relations, and USAID. The report serves as a foundation for reform efforts that will lead to the empowerment of the State Department at a time when a rapidly evolving global environment consistently poses new challenges and threats. The department's role is indeed unique and vital in the US national security apparatus; diplomacy based in continued and robust support for US interests and values is critical to favorable long-term outcomes, including a more secure and stable global environment.”

James Sherr, (Washington, DC: Transatlantic Academy, 2017).
“Over the past ten years, Russia has displayed an impressive degree of political-military integration in pursuit of its state objectives. Far from being improvised or opportunistic, the expansion of Russia’s military power is a coherent and purpose-driven activity designed to challenge Western dominance of an international order that Russia’s state leadership perceives as harmful to its interests and intrinsically vulnerable. Despite Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in eastern Ukraine, its aim is to alter political rather than physical borders in Europe. Nevertheless, Russia’s political and military establishments believe that a potential for war is inherent in the conflict of interests and ‘systems’ that now exists. It will continue to use military and non-military instruments to force material changes upon the West as long as it believes that it has the capacity to do so. If the West is to meet this challenge, it must accept the existential nature of it. Deeper engagement will not persuade Russia to perceive the West as it wishes to be perceived. ‘Grand bargains’ in current conditions will not make Europe safer. In the absence of a serious military strategy, Russia’s economic difficulties will not solve our problems for us. Deterrence only becomes a strategy if it addresses the threat to be deterred. Russia’s wartime aims will be to shatter the cohesion of NATO, destroy its forces in the immediate theater of operations, and force it to concede defeat at the earliest possible moment. The aim of NATO’s deterrence must be to convince Moscow that even a short war will have harrowing costs and lead to the long war that Russia fears and is bound to lose. To do this, the priority for Western military establishments should not be to outmatch the Russians where they are naturally strong, but to invest in the antidotes to these strengths. This is not beyond us. Time does not naturally favor Russia. If it is used with resolve and wisdom, Russia will be obliged to conclude, as it did under Gorbachev, that the use of force to resolve political problems is no longer feasible.”

Scott Kennedy, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“Broadly speaking, whether one looks at China in isolation or puts the country in comparative perspective, China’s innovation performance has gradually improved over the last decade along a number of indicators, separating China from other major emerging economies. Yet China still has a substantial distance to travel before it approaches the level of innovation found in the world’s most advanced economies. Most importantly, the level of inputs China is mobilizing is not consistently and smoothly translating into successful technology innovation outputs. This low ‘metabolism’ of inputs into successful high-tech advancement is why we characterize China as a ‘fat’ high-tech dragon. China is dedicating an unprecedented amount of funding to research and development (R&D)… Regardless of the level of support they receive from their government, Chinese companies will face growing challenges in their interactions with multinational businesses and in overseas markets. Foreign governments and multinational businesses likewise need to decide how to strategically respond to China’s approach. They could take a firm stand in opposition, try to influence China’s approach at the margins, or go along with the strategy as best they can. In any case, if they are not careful, they could end up under the heavy foot of a fat tech dragon.”

Erin Miller, (College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism [START], 2017).
“In 2016, more than 13,400 terrorist attacks took place around the world, resulting in more than 34,000 total deaths, including more than 11,600 perpetrator deaths. This represents a 9 percent decrease in the total number of terrorist attacks, and a 10 percent decrease in the total number of deaths, in comparison to 2015. Although terrorist attacks took place in 108 countries in 2016, they were heavily concentrated geographically. The vast majority of attacks (87%) and deaths (97%) occurred in the Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. This overview summarizes patterns of terrorism in key regions in 2016, focusing on trends over time, tactics, and perpetrators. First, however, we examine patterns of terrorist attacks carried out around the world by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as well as ISIL-affiliated and ISIL-inspired perpetrators.”

Olga Oliker and Andrey Kortunov, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“At a time when tension between the US and Russia is higher than it has been in decades, we cannot forget that the relationship between these two countries is among the most important for global security. On any number of issues, from arms control to the Middle East, failure of the U.S. and Russia to communicate will make things much, much worse, with repercussions that will last for generations and affect the entire world. For this reason, CSIS and RIAC convened some of Russia’s and America’s top experts to think through the future of the bilateral relationship. The result is a series of papers that identify both the spheres where coordination is crucial and those where it may be possible, responding to mutual interests and potentially helping to stabilize the relationship and buffer against conflict in the future. For both, they offer concrete recommendations and a clear-eyed take on what can, and what cannot be done. The analyses that follow examine prospects for Russia-U.S. cooperation in several crucial regions and fields: economics, energy, the Arctic, Euro-Atlantic security, the Middle East, strategic stability, cybersecurity, and countering terrorism and extremism. They offer actionable recommendations in each area, some of which can, and should be undertaken today, and some of which should be considered by policymakers in Moscow and Washington as they chart a course through dangerous and uncertain times.”

Atlantic Council, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“The late summer of 2017 could see one of the largest Russian military exercises in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Zapad 2017, a joint strategic exercise involving Russian and Belarusian military forces, is expected to take place in September 2017 in Russia’s western military district, the Kaliningrad exclave, and across Belarus. Rising tensions in Europe have created a heightened sense of instability and insecurity, making the plans for a large-scale military exercise much more than just a routine matter. This quick-guide provides a helpful overview of what Zapad 2017 is, why it matters, and what it might mean for Europe and the United States and NATO.”

David Albright, (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2017).
“Summary of Major Findings in Conjunction with PowerPoint Slides Presented During a Series of Talks Given in DC.”

Simon Veronneau, Geoffrey Torrington, and Jakub Hlavka, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017).
“Additive manufacturing (AM), often called 3D printing, enables new capabilities that have the potential to structurally change commercial and military supply chains as they exist today. Although much focus has been paid to improving maintenance, repair, and operations, the next wave of AM capability will focus on customizable material properties and novel industrial manufacturing capabilities. The United States is far from the only country in a global competition for technological superiority. Gaining a significant lead in this technology will give a dual strategic advantage to nations in both economic and military spheres. Within the military supply chain, the expeditionary downstream operator requires the ability to make parts rapidly, regardless of technology. For the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to be successful in deploying 3D printing, a considerable number of issues must be addressed, including intellectual property and cybersecurity issues and the need for revisions to acquisition policy and processes to ensure that they consider current and future implications of 3D printing for military platforms. This Perspective describes potential uses of 3D printing in a military context to help DoD understand the structural and policy changes that might be required to support these efforts. It discusses different types of 3D printing technologies, tracing 3D printing from its origin to its potential to transform supply chains for DoD. By applying a capability-based, technology-agnostic definition of 3D printing, this Perspective provides a framework to help DoD think about future impacts on its supply chain.”

U.S. Government Accountability Office, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2017).
“Since 2008 DoD has used biometric and forensic capabilities to capture or kill 1,700 individuals and deny 92,000 individuals access to military bases. These capabilities were mainly developed through rapid acquisition processes and were resourced with Overseas Contingency Operations funds—funds that are provided outside of DoD’s base budget process. As a result, concerns have been raised about DoD’s long-term ability to fund these capabilities. The House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence included provisions in committee reports for GAO to review DoD’s progress in institutionalizing deployable biometric and forensic capabilities. This report examines, among other issues, the extent to which DoD since 2011 has (1) validated long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities; and (2) taken actions to meet long-term requirements for deployable biometric and forensic capabilities and overcome any related challenges. GAO examined DoD directives, strategies, policies, plans, and requirements and met with cognizant DoD officials. GAO is making 6 recommendations, including that DoD update its biometric enterprise strategic plan; take steps to more effectively manage the acquisition of a recent biometric capability; and consider developing a geographically dispersed back-up capability for its authoritative biometric database. DoD concurred with all of the recommendations and cited actions it plans to take to address them.”

P. S. Suryanarayana, (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, 2017).
“The prolonged military stand-off between India and China, with no exchange of fire to-date, on the Doklam plateau in the Himalayan range, which Bhutan has portrayed as its territory, has strategic implications for each of these three neighbours. China is bracing to expand its strategic space in the high Himalayas by seeking to build roads in Doklam (also known as Dong Lang) which Beijing considers to be its historical sovereign territory. China says that India was notified in advance about the road construction, meant for ‘improving local transportation’, ‘grazing by livestock’, and ‘border troops’ patrolling’. However, New Delhi views the Chinese activities and statements as a matter of ‘serious security implications for India‘, particularly for ‘the determination of the tri-junction boundary point between India, China and Bhutan’. India also wants to protect its North-eastern strategic artery which runs close to the tri-junction. For Bhutan, its long-standing security ties with India are at stake, given the current controversy over whether or not Thimphu explicitly invited the Indian troops to stop the Chinese from building roads in Doklam. This is complicated by China’s view that ‘matters concerning the boundary tri-junction have nothing to do with this incident’. In all, the unfolding situation will likely shape not only Sino-Indian engagement but also that of China and Bhutan, going forward.”

Caitlin E. Werrell, et al., (Washington, DC: The Center for Climate and Security, 2017).
“The world in the 21st century is characterized by both unprecedented risk and unprecedented foresight. Climate change, population shifts and cyber-threats are rapidly increasing the scale and complexity of risks to international security, while technological developments are increasing our capacity to foresee those risks. This world of high consequence risks, which can be better modeled and anticipated than in the past, underscores a clear responsibility for the international community: A ‘Responsibility to Prepare.’ This responsibility, which builds on hard-won lessons of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework for preventing and responding to mass atrocities, requires a reform of existing governance institutions to ensure that critical, nontraditional risks to international security, such as climate change, are anticipated, analyzed and addressed systematically, robustly and rapidly by intergovernmental security institutions and the security establishments of nations that participate in that system.”

“DARPA’s podcast series, ‘Voices from DARPA,’ offers a revealing and informative window on the minds of the Agency's program managers. In each episode, a program manager from one of DARPA’s six technical offices—Biological Technologies, Defense Sciences, Information Innovation, Microsystems Technology, Strategic Technology, and Tactical Technology—will discuss in informal and personal terms why they are at DARPA and what they are up to. The goal of ‘Voices from DARPA’ is to share with listeners some of the institutional know-how, vision, process, and history that together make the ‘secret sauce’ DARPA has been adding to the Nation’s innovation ecosystem for nearly 60 years. On another level, we at DARPA just wanted to share the pleasure we all have every day—in the elevator, in the halls, in our meeting rooms—as we learn from each other and swap ideas and strive to change what’s possible.”

Anthony Cordesman, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“Terrorism has become one of the dominating national security threats of the 21st century. It is also one of the most complex — mixing the actions of states, extremists, and other non-state actors in a wide range of threats and types of conflicts. Terrorists range from individuals carrying out scattered terrorist acts, to international terrorist networks of non-state actors, to state terrorism including the use of conventional forces and poison gas to terrorize portions of a civil population. Terrorism has also become a key aspect of civil war, insurgency/counterinsurgency, and asymmetric warfare, as well as ideological, ethnic, and religious warfare…The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a graphic overview of these trends as of the end of 2016. It traces the patterns since 1970, and focuses on the period from 2011-2016 — the years since the sudden rise of massive political instability and extremism in the MENA region. It covers global, regional, and key national trends and compares different estimates and sources for 2015 and 2016. The report draws primarily on reporting in the START database, but uses other reporting from sources like EU/Europol, IHS Jane's, and the IEP to illustrate different estimates, different perspectives, and the uncertainties in the data.”

"'The Army War College Review,' a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.”
Table of Contents
"Human Trafficking in Belize” - Asariel Loria
“Understanding Syria through the Islamic State’s Eyes” - Benjamin R. Jonsson
“Taming the LTTE: Counterinsurgency Insights from Sri Lanka” - Mark O’Connell
“Russian ‘Lawfare’ in Ukraine” - Stephen E. Schemenauer
“The Funnel of Darkness” - Colonel James McNeill Efaw

"War Room" podcast, MG William Rapp and Andrew A. Hill.
July 27, 2017, streaming audio, 19:23.
“In the ‘War Room Podcast’, ‘Why War Colleges?’ Andrew A. Hill interviews the 50th Commandant of the U.S. Army College, U.S. Army Major General Bill Rapp to discuss the history, roles, and responsibilities of war colleges to develop future strategic leaders, both military and civilian, and to develop ideas that address current and future needs of the defense enterprise.”

"War Room" podcast, Joe Brooks and Doug Douds.
August 10, 2017, streaming audio, 21:46
“'America has been very good at accelerating conflict. We have the technology, we have the means, and we have the strategy … but a lot of times, you may look at it and wonder if our opponents are playing a longer game.’ In this ‘War Room’ podcast, ‘Time as a Dimension of Strategy,’ Joe Brooks and Doug Douds take a critical look at concepts that may too often be taken for granted in strategy – time and space. Drawing from philosophy, political science, and culture, the podcasters discuss a range of perspective on how time and space have defined and measured throughout history. How do our understandings of time shape our strategy? And how do we develop strategies that shape an environment occupied by those whose perspectives on time differ?”

Colin S. Gray, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“Does history repeat itself? This monograph clearly answers ‘no,’ firmly. However, it does not argue that an absence of repetition in the sense of analogy means that history can have no utility for the soldier today. This monograph argues for a ‘historical parallelism,’ in place of shaky or false analogy. The past, even the distant and ancient past, provides evidence of the potency of lasting virtues of good conduct. This monograph concludes by offering four recommendations: 1) Behave prudently. 2) Remember the concept of the great stream of time. 3) Do not forget that war nearly always is a gamble. 4) War should only be waged with strategic sense.”

Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2017).
“Partially autonomous and intelligent systems have been used in military technology since at least the Second World War, but advances in machine learning and Artificial Intelligence (AI) represent a turning point in the use of automation in warfare. Though the United States military and intelligence communities are planning for expanded use of AI across their portfolios, many of the most transformative applications of AI have not yet been addressed. In this piece, we propose three goals for developing future policy on AI and national security: preserving U.S. technological leadership, supporting peaceful and commercial use, and mitigating catastrophic risk. By looking at four prior cases of transformative military technology—nuclear, aerospace, cyber, and biotech—we develop lessons learned and recommendations for national security policy toward AI.”

Graham Webster, et al., (Washington, DC: New America, 2017).
“The present global verve about artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning technologies has resonated in China as much as anywhere on earth. With the State Council’s issuance of the ‘New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan’ on July 20, China’s government set out an ambitious roadmap including targets through 2030. Meanwhile, in China’s leading cities, flashy conferences on AI have become commonplace. It seems every mid-sized tech company wants to show off its self-driving car efforts, while numerous financial tech start-ups tout an AI-driven approach. Chatbot startups clog investors’ date books, and Shanghai metro ads pitch AI-taught English language learning…In this three-part brief, produced by a team of analysts with diverse backgrounds who have jointly translated the plan in full, we present three perspectives on the new document and China’s AI development trajectory. In part one, Rogier Creemers of the Leiden Asia Centre puts the plan in the context of China’s own framework for regulatory problem-solving. In part two, Paul Triolo of the Eurasia Group and Graham Webster of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center describe the prospects for leadership in AI and China’s policy world linked with the plan. And in part three, Elsa Kania addresses China’s pursuit of indigenous innovation to enable its advances in next-generation AI.”

Daniel F. Runde, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“The Department of State and USAID have been on the front lines in conflict and post-conflict settings over the last 20 years; over this time development and diplomacy have become linked—or even synonymous—in the minds of many policymakers. The result has been a proliferation of programmatic responsibilities for the State Department, responsibilities that have progressively pulled its personnel away from doing the things at which they excel: formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy, state-to-state relations, alliance building, containment of global security threats, and international crisis management. Given this reality, and the long-term nature of these types of assistance programming, a strengthened USAID is a more suitable agency to lead these efforts. Development and diplomacy, though complementary and powerful when working together effectively, are two different disciplines with their own unique skills, cultures, and approaches. Ultimately, putting American interests first means leading abroad. Any mission for U.S. foreign assistance should support the broader national security strategy to ensure that it maximizes its foreign policy impact and puts American interests first. The best, most effective foreign assistance has always been driven by a combination of enlightened self-interest and a desire to effect positive change in the world. The Trump administration is well-positioned to achieve these goals while increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. This task force hopes that the administration utilizes and benefits from this report—which offers context and recommendations on all three reform areas—in the preparation of its strategy.”

Michael A. Matera, et al., (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“CSIS held three off-the-record roundtables on Caribbean policy based on the premise that the passage of the United States–Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 needed to trigger expert analyses of key policy issues. There were also two practical considerations: first, a need to provide support to those in the executive branch tasked with drafting the outlines of U.S. policy and report to Congress, as required under the terms of HR 4939; and second, an assumption that policymakers would welcome this kind of input, if only to help formulate longer-term views of policy, which Washington often finds difficult to envision, let alone sustain. This report provides a thorough summary of three key policy issues on which the U.S. government must focus as a result of the passing of the legislation: strategic Caribbean security issues; U.S.-Caribbean economic issues; and the future of Caribbean energy.”

“‘Engaging Indian States’ is a knowledge portal which tracks significant developments in India’s states and provides context and analysis. While the focus of international engagement with India has primarily been the central government, the trajectory of India’s economic growth is dependent on the actions and vision of its state governments. ‘Engaging Indian States’ is a comprehensive tool for businesses, research institutions, policymakers, and journalists who seek greater insight into the potential for engagement with India’s subnational governments. This portal will help readers to follow state policy and regulatory changes in key sectors identified as critical to India’s growth. In its first phase the site will focus on the performance of state governments in the energy sector, a critical lynchpin of India’s development ambitions.”

“The Army War College Review, a refereed publication of student work, is produced under the purview of the Strategic Studies Institute and the United States Army War College. An electronic quarterly, The AWC Review connects student intellectual work with professionals invested in U.S. national security, Landpower, strategic leadership, global security studies, and the advancement of the profession of arms.”
Table of Contents
"Deterrence through Reassurance: Russia in Eastern Europe" - Geoffrey William Wright
"Major General Fox Conner: 'The Indispensable Man'" - Carter L. Price
"Unaligned: Maneuver Warfare Theory and the Australian Army" - Darren Huxley
"Did the United States Lose China Again?" - David Christopher Menser
"The Rebirth of Japan’s Amphibious Forces" - Jaren Keith Price

Andrew Hunter and Rhys McCormick, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“The U.S. Army currently faces a difficult truth: without changes to its modernization strategy, the Army risks losing qualitative tactical overmatch. A lost procurement decade and recent, significant modernization funding declines have resulted in an Army inventory that remains heavily leveraged on the ‘Big Five’ programs, originally procured in the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, technology proliferation has made potential state and nonstate adversaries increasingly capable; shrinking the U.S. overmatch advantage and in some cases surpassing it. While current, and projected future Army modernization funding is below historical averages, necessitating increased modernization funding to ensure continued U.S. qualitative tactical overmatch, the Army’s modernization problem cannot be fixed only by increasing modernization funding. Additional funds also need to be accompanied by an updated Army modernization strategy that presents a compelling case for modernization funding and sets clear priorities for fulfilling future operational requirements.”

Anthony H. Cordesman, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
This report “provides a detailed picture of the challenges Iraq must meet, drawing on material from a wide range of sources—such as World Bank, IMF, CIA, UN, Transparency International, Institute for the Study of War, and IISS—to address the deeper critical challenges that Iraq must address over time if it is to achieve any degree of lasting strategic stability.
In doing so, the analysis focuses on six key sets of challenges:
- Impact of past divisions and conflicts,
- Ethnic and sectarian challenges,
- Human challenges,
- Governance Challenges,
- Economic Challenges, and
- Military and Security Challenges”

John W. Parker, (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017).
“This is not an exhaustive narrative of Russia’s military intervention in Syria. It is instead a fresh look at the motivations and timing of the major inflection points in Russian decisionmaking from spring 2015 to early 2017 that have resulted in a fundamental reorientation of Russia’s posture in Syria and the Middle East. These in turn have impacted U.S. national security interests and policy choices going forward in the region.”

Elihugh M. Abner, (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2017).
“Russian President Vladimir Putin’s overarching goal is to create a multipolar world in which Russia is a leading entity. He will attempt to do this by regaining his control over Ukraine, expanding his interests in the Middle East, strengthening partnerships with China and undermining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Putin is a strong believer in the Spheres of Influence concept in which larger nations will attempt to exert leverage over smaller nations to advance their own strategic interests. While Russia’s efforts may appear to be belligerently hostile to the Western world, they are not without reason. From Moscow’s doorstep, Russian strategic analysts have been observing the actions of what they feel is an unchecked NATO, beginning with its intervention in Bosnia and ending in the Libyan bombing campaign. Putin believes that by creating a multipolar world, Russia will be in a better position to resist NATO’s seemingly aggressive behavior. However, if he wants to solidify Russia’s position as a leader in a multipolar world, he will not only try to resist NATO but will also endeavor to create a rift in the alliance by attempting to demonstrate to its members Russian diplomatic and military superiority over the United States.”

International Crisis Group, (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2017).
“China, traditionally averse to intervening abroad, is testing the role of peacebuilder in South Sudan, where it has unique leverage. This could portend a growing global security role, but further Chinese engagement will likely be tempered by self-interest, capacity constraints and aversion to risk.”

July 18, 2017, streaming video, 8:08:37
Program begins about 33:50
"The CSIS Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) are pleased to present the Seventh Annual CSIS South China Sea Conference. This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of the future of the South China Sea disputes, and potential responses, amid policy shifts in Beijing, Manila, and Washington. It will feature speakers from throughout the region, including claimant countries. Panels will address recent developments, legal and environmental issues, the strategic balance, and U.S. policy under the Trump administration.
- Renewing American Leadership in the Asia-Pacific
- State of Play in the South China Sea over the Past Year
- Legal and Environmental Issues and Next Steps
- Militarization, Counter-Coercion, and Capacity Building
- U.S. South China Sea Policy under the New Administration"

July 13, 2017, streaming video, 7:18:44
Program begins about 35:15
"Co-hosted by the Freeman Chair in China Studies and China Power Project, CSIS and The Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University.
Panel 1: US-China-Taiwan Relations: Strategic and Economic Initiatives
Panel 2: China's Political and Economic Transitions
Panel 3: Cross-Strait Relations: Strained but Stable?
Panel 4: Conclusions and Prospects"

Mary Carlin Yates and Kelsey Lilley, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
"Despite Sudan’s checkered diplomatic history with the United States, the Trump administration has an opportunity to recalibrate what could be a constructive relationship in a critical part of the world. In determining what a successful US-Sudanese relationship could look like, the administration has an opportunity to both serve US interests in Sudan and beyond and encourage peace and security for Sudan’s citizens. In light of the Trump administration’s July 11 announcement to delay by three months a final decision on the course of US-Sudan relations, the Atlantic Council Sudan Task Force’s new report ‘Sudan: A Strategy For Re-engagement’ argues for sustained and deepened US engagement with Sudan in the next three months and beyond. Doing so could both achieve US interests and support peace, security, and inclusive governance for the Sudanese people, including Sudan’s ethnic, religious, other minorities, and other marginalized groups."

Karim Mezran and Elissa Miller, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“More than six years after Libya’s 2011 revolution against Muammar al-Qaddafi, the situation in the country is significantly more complex and dangerous. The failure of the 2011 NATO intervention to assist the country with a comprehensive stabilization process led to rapid deterioration on the ground and created an opportunity for external actors to pursue competing self-interests in the country. While in most cases the factional rivalries in Libya have real roots, they have been exacerbated by the interests of both regional and international actors, and the resulting proxy conflict in Libya has significantly weakened the UN-led negotiation process.”"

Edward Alden and Robert E. Litan, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2017).
“The challenge of how to help those left behind by rapid economic change—whether caused by technology or global competition—has moved to the center of the U.S. national debate in a way it has not been since the 1930s. Trade competition, especially from China, has been a significant factor in declining U.S. manufacturing employment over the past decade. Trade also became a major issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, despite the larger role played by automation and technological change in displacing manufacturing workers for decades. This process will only continue in coming years, with advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and software that will eliminate many jobs while creating others, regardless of what policies the federal government may adopt toward trade and outsourcing. The central economic policy challenge faced by the United States—and by other advanced economies—is how to prepare its workforce to manage this rapid pace of change. It is far from obvious that there will be a shortage of work—indeed as the population ages, some countries in Europe are already struggling to fill available jobs. The problem will instead be to ensure that the workforce is trained to fill the new sorts of jobs that will become available, and that the labor market and public policy are working together to create rising living standards for most.”

William G. Braun III, et al., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2016).
USAWC Integrated Research Project - "The context of the Asia-Pacific rivalry between the United States and China has evolved over the last 5 or 6 decades. Issues associated with territorial dispute resolution, response to a bellicose nuclear-armed North Korea, and partner concerns over China’s increasingly assertive foreign policy now challenge the relationship, once characterized by strong elements of cooperation and economic growth. This report examines U.S.-China gray zone competition in the Asia-Pacific, and identifies land forces capabilities and initiatives necessary to advance U.S. national interests in the face of that competition. The report offers nine specific recommendations and a two-tier implementation plan to integrate those recommendations into defense management processes."

May 26, 2016, streaming video, 1:13:59
USAWC Integrated Research Project - "Counter-intuitively, Asia-Pacific is a maritime / army-center theater. US-China competition in the gray zone is the central determinant dynamic for the future. A USAWC research project team shares findings from an 8-month, quick-turn exploration of how to create a force capable of contesting effectively in the gray zone."

Clarence J. Bouchat, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
“U.S. landpower is an essential, but often overlooked, element of national power in semi-enclosed maritime environments like the South China Sea. This monograph gives U.S. policymakers a better understanding of the role of the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the region through potential combat operations employing wide area defense and maneuver; deterrence through forward presence and peacetime operations; and security engagement with landpower-dominant allies, partners, and competitors in the region. Landpower’s capabilities are also essential for direct support of the air and sea services and other government organization’s success when operating in this theater in direct support of U.S. national interests.”

Richard Weitz, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2017).
"The U.S.-Indian security relationship has markedly improved since the Cold War with increased cooperation in a range of areas. The two countries have established stronger military, economic, and political ties based on mutual interests in combating terrorism, promoting democracy, preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and addressing China’s rise. Their bilateral defense engagements now include a range of dialogues, exercises, educational exchanges, and joint training opportunities. The partnership benefits both countries, enabling them to realize their core security goals. Yet, U.S. and Indian national security leaders must take new steps to ensure that the relationship realizes its potential.”

Tarek N Saadawi and John D Colwell, Jr. (Eds), (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2017).
“Despite leaps in technological advancements made in computing system hardware and software areas, we still hear about massive cyberattacks that result in enormous data losses. Cyberattacks in 2015 included: sophisticated attacks that targeted Ashley Madison, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the White House, and Anthem; and in 2014, cyberattacks were directed at Sony Pictures Entertainment, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan Chase, a German steel factory, a South Korean nuclear plant, eBay, and others. These attacks and many others highlight the continued vulnerability of various cyber infrastructures and the critical need for strong cyber infrastructure protection (CIP). This book addresses critical issues in cybersecurity. Topics discussed include: a cooperative international deterrence capability as an essential tool in cybersecurity; an estimation of the costs of cybercrime; the impact of prosecuting spammers on fraud and malware contained in email spam; cybersecurity and privacy in smart cities; smart cities demand smart security; and, a smart grid vulnerability assessment using national testbed networks.”

David A. Deptula, (Arlington, VA: Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2017).
“Fifteen years of dramatic growth in demand for the sensor and strike capabilities that remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) afford have left the Department of Defense (DOD) struggling to meet burgeoning mission demand. Despite efforts by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and military services to surge RPA capacity, their collective actions have been largely uncoordinated. This has yielded a disjointed enterprise where effectiveness and efficiency are not what they could have been, or can be.”

Links available on the page linked to above.
Annual symposium from the USAWC.
- Implications of the Third Offset Strategy for the Army, Prof. Sam White
- The Army's Ability to Fight a Great Power War, Dr. Antulio Echevarria
- Chinese Economy, Prof John Troxell
- Risk and Assessment in Contemporary Defense Strategy, Prof. Robert Hume
- Economic presentation of DIME, Dr. Jeffry Frieden

Links available on the page linked to above.
Annual symposium from the USNWC.
- Adm. John M. Richardson: National Security and Fleet Design
- Panel Discussion: Enduring Strategic Principles and Present-Day Challenges
- Gen. Robert B. Neller: Keynote Address
- Michael Auslin: Keynote Address
- Panel Discussion: National Security and the Maritime Force
- Harlan K. Ullman: Keynote Address
- Panel Discussion: Fleet Design – Future Challenges and Ways Ahead
- Robert D. Kaplan: Keynote Address

Kathleen H. Hicks, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“A defense strategy is an approach that ties together the goals, approaches, and resources (people, technology, dollars, etc.) that can best advance priority interests by exploiting opportunities and overcoming challenges. It must account for, and in some cases seek to shape, a complex and dynamic backdrop of American domestic politics and economic realities, as well as developments in operational concepts and technology, demography and workforce, and of course geopolitics. U.S. defense strategy is almost never considered successful in fulfilling these roles and forecasting well along these dimensions. Then again, it’s hard to know what right would look like. Some strategies lauded in the near-term have turned out to be short-lived in perspective, such as the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which was built on several assumptions that aged poorly. Some strategies praised by commentators today were deeply criticized at the time, such as Harry Truman’s NSC-68 or Bill Clinton’s Bottom-up Review. These observations should assure the well-intentioned and thoughtful strategist that, in strategy, the term paper rarely earns an ‘A.’ Good strategy is a non-linear process that must constantly be tended and adapted, and vigilance is rewarded.”

Anthony Cordesman, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2017).
“One of the striking aspects of American military power is how little serious attention is spent on examining the key elements of its total cost by war and mission, and the linkage between the use of resources and the presence of an effective strategy. For the last several decades, there has been little real effort to examine the costs of key missions and strategic commitments and the longer term trends in force planning and cost. Both the Executive Branch and the Congress have failed to reform any key aspect of the defense and foreign policy budgets to look beyond input budgeting by line item and by military service, and doing so on an annual basis.”

Elie Abouaoun, et al., (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
“‘Islam and Human Rights: Key Issues for Our Times’ is a collection of essays edited by Geneive Abdo and authored by Elie Abouaoun, Harith Hasan Al-Qarawee, Moataz El Fegiery, Mohammad Fadel, Omar Iharchane, Driss Maghraoui, Imad Salamey, and Asma T. Uddin. This publication is part of the Hariri Center’s Islamic Law and Human Rights in the Middle East initiative. By presenting the reader with a range of contemporary thinking on the most pressing issues facing Muslims today, including questions of democracy, free expression, human rights, gender and minority rights, and the notions of legitimate governance, this volume reflects new thinking on these issues.”

Nathan P. Freier, et al., (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017).
USAWC Integrated Research Project - “The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent fundamental change in its strategic and operating environments. This report suggests this reality is the product of the United States entering or being in the midst of a new, more competitive, post-U.S. primacy environment. Post-primacy conditions promise far-reaching impacts on U.S. national security and defense strategy. Consequently, there is an urgent requirement for DoD to examine and adapt how it develops strategy and describes, identifies, assesses, and communicates corporate-level risk. This report takes on the latter risk challenge. It argues for a new post-primacy risk concept and its four governing principles of diversity, dynamism, persistent dialogue, and adaptation. The authors suggest that this approach is critical to maintaining U.S. military advantage into the future. Absent change in current risk convention, the report suggests DoD exposes current and future military performance to potential failure or gross under-performance.”

July 1, 2017, streaming video, 1:29:46
USAWC Integrated Research Project - "With the U.S. defense strategy review underway, leaders in the Department of Defense must address a complex question: how should the Pentagon adapt its framework for assessing risk to reflect a security environment defined by persistent, disruptive change? In partnership with the U.S. Army War College, the CSIS International Security Program will host a conversation on strategic and military risk, providing a range of perspectives to examine challenges, opportunities, and recommendations for assessing risk in the contemporary security environment. The discussion will also feature findings from a U.S. Army War College study on assessing corporate-level risk in the Department of Defense enterprise."

Defense Intelligence Agency, (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2017).
"Russia continues to modernize its extensive nuclear forces and is developing long range precision-guided conventional weapons systems. It is manipulating the global information environment, employing tools of indirect action against countries on its periphery and using its military for power projection and expeditionary force deployments far outside its borders. Its ultimate deterrent is a robust nuclear force capable of conducting a massed nuclear strike on targets in the United States within minutes. Within the next decade, an even more confident and capable Russia could emerge. The United States needs to anticipate, rather than react, to Russian actions and pursue a greater awareness of Russian goals and capabilities to prevent potential conflicts. Our policymakers and commanders must have a complete understanding of Russia’s military capabilities, especially as U.S. and Russian forces may increasingly encounter each other around the globe. DIA will continue to provide our leaders decision-space, ensuring they have the time and information necessary to protect our nation. The wrong decisions—or the right ones made too late—could have dire consequences. This report examines a resurgent Russia’s military power to foster a deeper understanding of its core capabilities, goals, and aspirations in the 21st Century.”

“The MissileThreat website brings together authoritative and up-to-date open source information and analysis about ballistic and cruise missiles around the globe and the systems designed to defend against them. MissileThreat is a product of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which looks at a wide range of policy, program, and strategic issues related to missile defense. Technological and geopolitical factors have driven increased global supply and demand for high-velocity, unmanned, missile-based weapons and their corresponding counters. Besides more recognized cruise and ballistic missile threats, global missile proliferation now consists of a spectrum including precision-guided rockets, anti-ship missiles, air defenses, hypersonic delivery systems, and counterspace weapons.”

"Adversary missile forces represent one of the most pressing threats to the power projection capabilities of the U.S. military. Ballistic, cruise, and air defense missile systems can be used to hold U.S. bases and platforms at risk and deny the U.S. military access to and freedom of action within contested areas. Restoring the United States’ ability to operate within a denied environment requires a high degree of integration among offensive and defense capabilities, from stealthy aircraft that can penetrate enemy air defenses and strike time-sensitive mobile targets to air and missile defense systems that can protect U.S. forces operating in theater. In 2013, the Joint Staff published Integrated ‘Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020’, which laid out a plan to integrate across capabilities and to develop new concepts, tactics, and training."

Barry Pavel and Robert A. Manning, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
"The policies of the last three US Presidents that were designed to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons have failed. Despite twenty-five years of consistent US policies focused on multilateral dialogue and an ever-improving US-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance, the North Korean nuclear threat to the region and to the US homeland is accelerating."

Thomas Shugart and Javier Gonzalez, (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017).
“In a time of rising geopolitical tension in Asia, U.S. leaders and policymakers should understand that in the event of an unforeseen U.S.-China crisis, especially one that appears to threaten China’s claimed core strategic interests or the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, a preemptive missile strike against the forward bases that underpin U.S. military power in the Western Pacific could be a real possibility. This might be the case particularly if China perceives that its attempts at deterrence of a major U.S. intervention – say in a cross-strait Taiwan crisis or in a brewing dispute over the Senkaku Islands – have failed. Driven partly by distinct first-mover advantages associated with the employment of modern long range precision weaponry, such a preemptive strike appears consistent with available information about China’s missile force doctrine and military strategy, and satellite imagery shown below points to what may be real-world Chinese efforts to practice its execution. But does China have the missile forces necessary to execute a preemptive missile strike, and would it work against U.S. and allied missile defenses in Asia? We conducted an analysis to attempt to answer these questions. The results of our modeling and simulation, which show the potential for devastation of U.S. power projection forces and bases in Asia, are deeply concerning – and a call for action.”

“For the past year, experts in the United States and China have been working on parallel reports on US-China relations. Teams of experts have developed analyses and policy recommendations on several critical areas that shape the relationship: military relations, the Asia-Pacific region, economic relations, global governance, and domestic politics. This event will feature the release of the US side’s report, entitled ‘Joint US-China Think Tank Project on the Future of US-China Relations: An American Perspective’. Contributors to both sides’ reports will discuss and compare their respective findings, conclusions, and recommendations.”
Panel #1: Military and Regional Affairs
Panel #2: Economics, Global Governance & Domestic Politics

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2017).
"Over the past two decades, the global population of forcibly displaced people has grown substantially from 33.9 million in 1997 to 65.6 million in 2016, and it remains at a record high. The growth was concentrated between 2012 and 2015, driven mainly by the Syrian conflict along with other conflicts in the region such as in Iraq and Yemen, as well as in sub-Saharan Africa including Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, and Sudan."

Jason Pack, Rhiannon Smith, and Karim Mezran, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
"For the past three decades, Libya has been a rich recruiting ground for the global jihad. Investigating the precursors and then subsequent evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and other extremist actors throughout this period presents actionable insights into how jihadist actors coalesce; how they interfere in post-conflict state building; the threats they pose to civilians, nascent economies, and external states; and finally, what complexities remain when their hold on territory has been eradicated, but their adherents have not been killed nor their ideology debunked. In The Origins and Evolution of ISIS in Libya, Jason Pack, Rhiannon Smith, Karim Mezran examine ISIS’s pre-history, birth, expansion, consolidation, and dispersal in Libya, as well as the broader political context of the country. They offer advice and recommendations for how Western governments and militaries should approach jihadist actors globally."

Maximilian Gebhardt, (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2017).
"As the European Union aims to deepen integration, particularly in the field of infrastructure, ‘it is necessary to understand those goals from a Chinese context, especially in light of China’s [BRI] infrastructure project,’ writes Gebhardt. He explains that the BRI, with its emphasis on the role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), could provide incentives to promote geopolitical alignment, particularly in creating a security sphere in Central Asia. Before any realization of the grand dream of ‘One Belt, One Road,’ however, there are a number of issues that need to be taken into consideration–from the lack of a successful precedent for Chinese-built or Chinese-financed transport projects in the EU to date to the possibility of the EU supporting the BRI’s southern route which would go through Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. Given the ‘the economic reality . . . that China and Europe are already deeply interconnected’ and more Chinese firms pushing to enter the EU transport and infrastructure procurement market, Gebhardt argues the European Union must develop a clear plan forward for meaningful and specific engagement with China’s BRI goals.”

“The IISS [International Institute for Strategic Studies] Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore is the most important regular gathering of defence professionals in the Asia-Pacific region, a vital annual fixture in the diaries of ministers and their civilian and military chiefs of staff. Since its launch in 2002 the Dialogue has built confidence and fostered practical security cooperation, by facilitating easy communication and fruitful contact among the region’s most important defence and security policymakers.”

"Today the world faces a volatile convergence of instability, state weakness, and conflict. Lethal civil conflicts rage in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, and South Sudan, stoking regional rivalries, offering safe havens to violent extremist groups, and triggering immense and unprecedented humanitarian crises...The United States must be prepared to operate in a range of complex environments to meet a range of security challenges and threats, such as humanitarian emergencies, terrorism and violent extremism, great power aggression, health security crises, and international criminal violence. This study focuses on these five functional security imperatives and illustrates each imperative through regionally or subnationally defined operating environments. In each case, the selected security imperative must be addressed in the near term to help meet other U.S. objectives."

"Today the world faces a volatile convergence of instability, state weakness, and conflict. These conditions are complicating the ability of the United States to operate and pursue security objectives in a number of critical regions. The United States needs to be able to work within the constraints of fragile environments, to implement approaches that address pressing security threats and objectives and meet relatively urgent security or humanitarian needs. A new report by the International Security Program at CSIS, 'Meeting Security Challenges in a Disordered World,' explores how the United States can best meet security challenges in the midst of increasing state fragmentation and fragility around the globe."

Panel 1: Navigating Instability and Fragility

Panel 2: Responding to Security Imperatives in Complex Environments

Panel 3: Challenges and Opportunities in the Syrian Conflict

Urben, Heidi A. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017).
“Past research contends that with the exception of voting in presidential elections, military officers’ political participation is fairly muted. Moreover, most allegations of political outspokenness tend to be levied at retired officers, not those on active duty. Department of Defense directives provide guidelines on permissible but traditional forms of political expression for active duty members of the military, but largely neglect social media as a forum for political activity. Through a survey of more than 500 military elites attending the United States Military Academy and National Defense University, this project seeks to establish the nature and extent of political expression by members of the military throughout social media and whether or not such expression is in keeping with the norm of nonpartisanship.”

The 2017 GPI provides a comprehensive analysis on the state of peace. It shows that amidst continuing social and political turmoil, the world continues to spend enormous resources on creating and containing violence but very little on peace. The key to reversing the decline in peace is through building Positive Peace – a holistic framework of the key attitudes, institutions and structures which build peace in the long term. The 2017 GPI finds:

•The world slightly improved in peace last year but has become less peaceful over the last decade

•There has been a decline in militarisation over the past three decades

•Globally, the economic impact of violence on the economy is enormous

•Current peacebuilding spending focused on building peace is well below the optimal level

•Falls in Positive Peace make countries susceptible to populist political movements"

“The African nations have rarely been perceived as essential partners in the pursuit of US national security and economic interests, but a re-assessment of Africa’s strategic importance is past due.
Transnational threats emanating from the continent continue to evolve, and trade and investment relationships have deepened. A better and broader understanding of the threats and opportunities posed by the countries of Africa is urgently needed, both to strengthen United States-Africa bilateral relations and to create a coherent regional policy.”

“The report of the Task Force on the Future of Iraq chaired by Ambassador Ryan Crocker offers a strategy for how the United States can build on the success that the Iraqi government and its coalition partners have had in liberating areas once occupied by ISIS, in order to bring about a lasting defeat of the extremist group and to and secure US national security interests in Iraq over the long term."

"Military action alone cannot bring an end to the forces that shape the instability in any such country, and that no short-term form of ceasefire or conflict resolution in likely to avoid a return to new forms of fighting, it is equally clear that Syria and the other conflict countries cannot succeed without both creating new and more effective forms of governance and without substantial outside aid.

• First, any strategy based solely largely on warfighting will both fail and end in steadily increasing the level of human suffering.

• Second, some form of nation building is essential. Syria and other conflict states can only recover and develop if they can develop politics and governments that can take responsibility for that recovery and development.

• Finally, if outside states focus on military competition in conflict states like Syria, rather than focus on cooperating in aiding recovery and development, the end result is almost certain to be self-def

“The global governance of displaced and trapped populations, forced migration and refugees is not prepared for the numbers likely to manifest under climate change. The Group of Twenty has a responsibility to prepare, push for reform and initiate annual reviews to enhance humanitarian responses to aid climate mobility. International policy and law build on the false assumption that displaced people and refugees can return to their place of origin when conditions improve, conflicts subside or homes are rebuilt. This cannot hold for many of those affected by climate change. Governance reform is needed to strengthen rights and obligations of peoples and governments in countries of origin, transit and destination, recognizing the special circumstances and needs of ‘climate refugees’ or migrants.”

“In the Center for Climate and Security’s multi-author volume, ‘Epicenters of Climate and Security: The New Geostrategic Landscape of the Anthropocene,’ security experts identify 12 key climatic risks to international security that may shape the geostrategic landscape of the 21st century. In the wake of extraordinary upheaval in the international effort to address climate change, the report presents a compelling case for why tackling these climate and security ‘epicenters’ – major categories of climate-driven risks to international security – should be a top priority for governments and institutions around the world. The report also outlines the key tools for managing systemic risks that should be included in every climate security practitioner’s and policy-maker’s toolbox.”

“Water plays a critical role in development strategies at global, regional, national and local levels. Many aspects of water can threaten human security, for example floods from rivers or the sea as well as water pollution, but water scarcity is regarded as the most important water issue in relation to political tension and conflict.

In situations where water has become scarce, competition over water (and the remaining fertile land) has the potential to spark tensions between users at levels ranging from local communities up to international river basins. Water and climate conditions in the world are expected to change dramatically due to population growth, further economic development and climate change. It is projected that these developments will lead to increased water stress affecting conflict risks at local, national and river-basin levels."

“In 2016, the armed forces of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began implementing the sweeping organizational reforms that President Xi Jinping and other Chinese leaders unveiled in 2015. This reorganization is the latest phase in China’s long-term military modernization program, which China’s leaders have characterized as essential to achieving great power status and what President Xi calls the ‘China Dream’ of national rejuvenation. The leadership portrays a strong military as critical to advancing China’s interests, preventing other countries from taking steps that would damage those interests, and ensuring that China can defend itself and its sovereignty claims.”

“Once again, authoritarians are challenging the world’s leading democracies, using twenty-first century versions of aggression, propaganda, and subversion. The very notion of a rules-based, democratic-leaning international order—the Free World—seems in doubt, questioned also by newly-emboldened nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic. In ‘The Free World,’ Ambassador Dan Fried, who retired this year as the United States’ longest-serving diplomat, reminds us what the Free World achieved, where it has gone wrong, and what democratic forces can do to restore the momentum of ideas that still represent the best hope for American interests, democratic values, and the world.”

Program begins about 16:02.

"The Delegation of the European Union to the United States and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) invite you to the 6th edition of the annual symposium on the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)...Senior European and U.S. defense and security stakeholders will discuss the state of play of EU-U.S. cooperation on strategic challenges and the way ahead. Topics covered will include hybrid warfare, counterterrorism, investment in defense, threat perception, and maritime security."

- Panel 1: Protecting the Transatlantic Homeland: Counterterrorism, Financial Intelligence and Law Enforcement Cooperation

- Keynote: Investing in the Future: European Union Action on Security and Defense

- Panel 2: Threat Perception and Future of Security and Defense

- Panel 3: Russian Influence and Hybrid Warfare

- Panel 4: Maritime Insecurity?: A Transatlantic Challenge

"Please join CSIS and the United States Naval Institute (USNI) for a Maritime Security Dialogue event featuring a discussion with Vice Admiral Thomas J. Moore, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command on the U.S. Navy's maintenance challenges."

A podcast series from the Strategic Studies Institute.

“The Strategic Studies Institute is the U.S. Army's institute for geostrategic and national security research and analysis. The Strategic Studies Institute conducts strategic research and analysis to support the U.S. Army War College curricula, provides direct analysis for Army and Department of Defense leadership, and serves as a bridge to the wider strategic community.”

Program beings at 51:10

"A Full Day Conference on Civil-Military Relations in Policy, Politics and Public"

Note: Conference agenda and a recording of the conference available on the page linked to.

Welcome and Overview

Panel I – The Military and Policymaking

Panel II – The Military and Politics

Panel III – The Military and the Public

Keynote: The Military Profession

Closing Remarks