Current Students, Faculty, and Staff of the U.S. Army War College

Atlantic Council. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, Post updated as the story develops).
“On Wednesday, US President Joe Biden, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced a new defense partnership among their nations that will furnish Australia with new nuclear-powered submarines. The pact, known as AUKUS, is a clear challenge to China in the Indo-Pacific and a deepening of military ties among close allies of more than a century. But it could ruffle the feathers of other allies. Our Atlantic Council experts break down the implications.”

Niblett, Robin. (London, UK: Chatham House, September 18, 2021).

Chatham House. (London, UK: Chatham House, September 16, 2021).
“Chatham House experts examine the potential implications of the new defence and security partnership between the UK, US, and Australia known as ‘AUKUS’.”

Kapetas, Anastasia. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 21, 2021).

Jennings, Peter. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2021).

Barker, Geoffrey. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2021).

Nicholson, Brendan. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 16, 2021).

Stoltz, William A. (Canberra, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 17, 2021).

Schaus, John, and Michael Shoebridge. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 15, 2021).
“This memo comes out of cooperative work between two think tanks—the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)—and is intended to support President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Scott Morrison in setting directions and making decisions for the U.S.-Australia alliance for the purpose of advancing joint prosperity and security.”

Dortmans, Peter, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The Royal Australian Navy has embarked on an ambitious plan to modernise its maritime capabilities to support Australia's defence strategy. The ‘2020 Defence Strategic Update’ calls for Australia to be ready to shape the strategic environment, deter actions against its interests and respond with military force when required. Maritime capabilities feature heavily in the update, including those related to robotics, autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (RAS-AI). The Navy recently established the RAS-AI Directorate, giving it the responsibility of developing a maritime RAS-AI strategic roadmap to provide a path for developing and employing RAS-AI out to 2040. In this report, the authors provide an evidence base to inform the Navy's thinking as it develops its RAS-AI Strategy 2040. Analysing a range of information captured through a literature review, environmental scan, interviews and workshops, the authors make observations that should shape the evolution of the strategy. A framework for the strategy, consisting of the future operational context, potential RAS-AI effects and a high-level technology roadmap, is developed and populated, and objectives for RAS-AI and implementation lines of effort are identified and discussed. For the Navy's RAS-AI strategy to succeed, its implementation needs to be planned in a manner that recognises the evolving environment that the service will contend with over the next two decades.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated September 15, 2021).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress on three potential new shipbased self-defense weapons for the Navy - solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), also known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP).”

Posard, Marek N., Leslie Adrienne Payne, and Laura L. Miller. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The vast majority of military personnel and their families are not extremists. But even a small number of people engaged in extremist activities could damage the U.S. military's reputation, its force, its members, and the larger community. Extremist activities can also be harmful to the individuals who are radicalized and their friends and family. To address the problem of U.S. military service members' exposure to and potential involvement in extremist movements, the authors present a framework for understanding and reducing the risk of extremism in the U.S. military. The framework calls for recognizing and scoping the problem, preventing future extremist views and activities, detecting and intervening when observing extremism, measuring extremist trends, and evaluating intervention measures. The U.S. Department of Defense has existing programs that support personnel and their families, promote diversity and inclusion, and prevent violence. The authors recommend a community-based approach that leverages existing military programs to better support commanders with their responsibilities for combating extremism. Such an approach would not only help prevent service members and their families from associating with extremist groups but also assist the military in responding sooner - and more effectively - if members do engage in extremist activities.”

Connolly, Richard. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).
“This Emerging Insights paper analyses Moscow's ambitions for its 'pivot to the East', assesses its progress and evaluates the impact of the Indo-Pacific concept on Russian strategy.”

Quiggin, Daniel, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The risks are compounding, and without immediate action the impacts will be devastating.”
“At COP26, the governments of highly emitting countries will have a critical opportunity to accelerate emissions reductions through ambitious revisions of their nationally determined contributions (NDCs).
If emissions follow the trajectory set by current NDCs, there is a less than 5 per cent chance of keeping temperatures well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and less than 1 per cent chance of reaching the 1.5°C target set by the 2015 Paris Agreement. Unless NDCs are dramatically increased, and policy and delivery mechanisms are revised accordingly, many of the climate change impacts described in this research paper are likely to be locked in by 2040, and become so severe they go beyond the limits of what nations can adapt to. As well as the immediate physical and socio-economic consequences of changes in climate, the paper captures the systemic cascading risks likely to arise as these direct risks and impacts compound to affect whole systems, including people, infrastructure, the economy, societal systems and ecosystems.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 15, 2021).
“The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new PSCs (i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new Arctic Security Cutters (ASCs) (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). The PSC program has received a total of $1,754.6 million (i.e., about $1.8 billion) in procurement funding through FY2021, including $300 million that was provided through the Navy’s shipbuilding account in FY2017 and FY2018. With the funding the program has received through FY2021, the first two PSCs are now fully funded… The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of one heavy polar icebreaker, ‘Polar Star,’ and one medium polar icebreaker, ‘Healy.’ In addition to ‘Polar Star,’ the Coast Guard has a second heavy polar icebreaker, ‘Polar Sea.’ ‘Polar Sea,’ however, suffered an engine casualty in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then. ‘Polar Star’ and ‘Polar Sea’ entered service in 1976 and 1978, respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year service lives. The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of ‘Polar Star’ until the delivery of at least the second PSC. The Coast Guard is using ‘Polar Sea’ as a source of spare parts for keeping ‘Polar Star’ operational.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: September 9, 2021).
“The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the following, all of which relate to China and/or Russia:
• grand strategy and the geopolitics of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
• organizational changes within DOD;
• nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
• the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments;
• U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
• new U.S. military service operational concepts;
• capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
• maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
• innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
• mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
• supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
• capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to renewed great power competition with China and Russia, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2021).
“In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 8, 2021).
“The current and planned size and composition of the Navy, the annual rate of Navy ship procurement, the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans, and the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry to execute the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been oversight matters for the congressional defense committees for many years… The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s force-level goal, its proposed FY2022 shipbuilding program, and its longer-term shipbuilding plans. Key questions for Congress include the following: Is the Navy’s emerging force-level goal appropriate for supporting U.S. national security strategy and U.S. national defense strategy? Is the more distributed fleet architecture envisioned by the Navy the most cost effective fleet architecture for meeting future mission needs? Is the Navy’s proposed FY2022 shipbuilding program consistent with the Navy’s emerging force-level goal? Given finite defense resources and competing demands for defense funds, what is the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans? Does the U.S. shipbuilding industry, including both shipyards and supplier firms, have adequate capacity for executing the Navy’s shipbuilding plans?”

Brown, Ryan Andrew, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Terrorism and ideologically inspired violence represent persistent and serious threats to U.S. national security. The January 6, 2021, attack at the U.S. Capitol and other recent events emphasize the need for more research to inform prevention and deradicalization strategies. In this report, the authors aim to characterize why and how individuals joined extremist organizations, as well as how some of them exited these groups. Semistructured interviews were conducted with former extremists and their family members, representing 32 unique stories of 24 white supremacists and eight Islamic extremists.”

Huguet, Alice, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Media literacy (ML) education has emerged as a promising approach to slowing the spread of Truth Decay, described as the diminishing role that facts, data, and analysis play in political and civil discourse. Several factors contribute to Truth Decay, including a rapidly evolving information ecosystem and overburdened educational institutions. Many teachers believe their students lack the complex skills that are necessary to navigate today's information-saturated world. This gap—between students' existing competencies and those required to engage responsibly in a fast-paced media environment—could lead to negative consequences for individuals and society writ large.
However, teachers report a lack of guidance around promoting ML education in their practice, and rigorous research about what kinds of ML education work best, and in what conditions, remains limited. This report presents a framework for implementing and evaluating ML educational efforts. Following an introduction to the framework, the authors discuss six steps of ML implementation and evaluation: setting ML learning expectations; identifying conditions that can influence ML instructional efforts; exploring instructional resources; identifying measures of ML competencies; monitoring progress; and finally, measuring the summative impacts of ML education on student learning. By bringing this information together for implementors—such as district decisionmakers and teachers—as well as evaluators, the authors emphasize the important connections between these too often separate groups.”

Cohen, Raphael S., et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“How are state adversaries using disinformation on social media to advance their interests? What does the Joint Force—and the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in particular—need to be prepared to do in response? Drawing on a host of different primary and secondary sources and more than 150 original interviews from across the U.S. government, the joint force, industry, civil society, and subject-matter experts from nine countries around the world, researchers examined how China, Russia, and North Korea have used disinformation on social media and what the United States and its allies and partners are doing in response. The authors found that disinformation campaigns on social media may be more nuanced than they are commonly portrayed. Still, much of the response to disinformation remains ad hoc and uncoordinated. Disinformation campaigns on social media will likely increase over the coming decade, but it remains unclear who has the competitive edge in this race; disinformation techniques and countermeasures are evolving at the same time. This overview of a multi-volume series presents recommendations to better prepare for this new age of communications warfare.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Past NATO enlargement helped create a Europe whole, free, and at peace, but future enlargement, should it occur, faces a hostile and militarily revitalized Russia. This report examines the military requirements and resulting budget costs of extending NATO’s Article 5 commitment to countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, which are actively seeking NATO membership, and Sweden and Finland, about which there has been analysis and speculation about membership. Costs to the United States range from $11 billion per year to defend Ukraine to half a billion dollars or less to defend Sweden. The project recommends that NATO incorporate force requirements and cost considerations into its future decisionmaking.”

Faustman, Joshua M. Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2021).
“In this paper, the author argues for establishing a separate and complete organizational identity for the United States Space Force. Leaders must manage and incorporate new cultural artifacts to foster the desired identity of the Space Force through heraldry and other historical items. Through the use of organizational identity theory, the author proposes a methodology to help establish corporate-level cultural guidance to develop this identity now and in the future.”

Blanchard, Lauren Ploch. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 9, 2021).
“The conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region has fueled a large-scale humanitarian crisis and attracted international concern, amid reports of starvation and atrocities. The war has taken a heavy human and economic toll, and it is spreading beyond Tigray.”

McInnis, Kathleen J., and Andrew Feickert. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2021).
“After a rapid Taliban campaign to capture cities and territories formerly controlled by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), on August 15, 2021, the Taliban took Kabul and the President of GIRoA, Ashraf Ghani, fled the country. Information regarding the situation on the ground in Afghanistan and U.S. troop numbers is fluid and should be treated with caution. This Insight, which may be updated as circumstances warrant, is intended to assist Congress as it considers the military and defense implications of the withdrawal while events unfold.”

Thomas, Clayton. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 17, 2021).
“Afghanistan’s geography, complex ethnic composition, and history of conflict and instability have created space for numerous armed Islamist groups, some of which have engaged in transnational terrorist activity. This product outlines major terrorist groups active in Afghanistan that are affiliated and allied with Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS, ISIL, or by the Arabic acronym Da’esh), and relations between these groups and other state and non-state actors, most notably the Taliban. The Taliban are not a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). These dynamics may inform assessments of U.S. policy in Afghanistan in light of the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of the country.”

Thomas, Clayton, and Sarah R. Collins. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 18, 2021).
“The status of Afghan women and girls is increasingly precarious in light of the Taliban’s takeover of the country in mid-August 2021.”

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2021).
“The year 2020 dawned with the outbreak of the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) that the world has yet to contain successfully. What are the security environment implications of this pandemic, which changed our life? Grappling squarely with this question, Chapter 1 discusses ‘pluralization’ in international politics even under the divisive pressure of U.S.-China competition. Focusing on the roles of non-U.S. and Chinese major powers as well as small and mediumsized countries in the Pacific and Europe, it presents the struggle for agency and autonomy of those countries. Chapters 2 to 6 are country and region-based analyses of major developments during January to December 2020, including each country/region’s responses to U.S.-China competition as well as the impact of COVID-19 on domestic politics and foreign policy. This edition of ‘EASR’ [East Asian Strategic Review] examines the increasingly assertive diplomatic and military positions of the Xi Jinping government, South Korea’s search for reconciliation with the increasingly coercive North Korea, ASEAN member states’ responses to the pandemic and the South China Sea dispute, the Putin administration’s constitutional amendments, and the U.S. policy toward China and outlook for the Biden administration. Chapter 7 presents relevant policy reviews, including Japan Self-Defense Forces’ response to COVID-19 as well as the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty that marked its 60th anniversary.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. July 30, 2021, streaming video, 1:30:26.
“The CSIS Southeast Asia Program and Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative are pleased to present the Eleventh Annual South China Sea Conference: Session One on Friday, July 30, 2021. This monthly webinar series will provide opportunities for detailed discussion and analysis of key developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. Panelists will address the strategic balance in the region and U.S. policy under the Biden administration. This session will feature a keynote address by Representative Elaine Luria, Vice-Chair of the House Armed Services Committee, followed by a panel discussion on the state of affairs in the South China Sea with Bonny Lin, Director of the China Power Project at CSIS, Zack Cooper, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and Nguyen Nam Duong, Deputy Director-General of the East Sea Institute at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam.”

Matthews, Miriam, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The increasing frequency and intensity of information aggression targeting the United States and its European allies demands more thorough consideration of concepts and practices for protecting against, resisting, and mitigating the effects of psychological manipulation and influence. Russia in particular appears to use messaging and intimidation as part of its efforts to influence multiple actors and countries, including the United States and its European allies. Unfortunately, concepts and practices for understanding and resisting the potential effects of efforts conducted by Russia and its agents are few. To address this, United States European Command (USEUCOM) asked the RAND Corporation to identify strategies for defending against the effects of Russia's efforts to manipulate and inappropriately influence troops, government decisionmaking, and civilians. The authors describe apparent efforts conducted by Russia and its agents involving the use of information to shape Russia's operating environment, focusing on the European context; review and apply existing research on influence and manipulation to these efforts; and draw from existing practice to describe possible defensive approaches for USEUCOM and its various partners to consider using when defending against these actions. The framework the authors apply offers a way to conceptualize the objectives, tactics, and tools of Russian information efforts in Europe.”

Huxtable, Luke, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Despite the growing policy emphasis on understanding the value of UK defence, assessing the primary benefits of defence remains a challenge. Defence is inherently complex, and it remains difficult to prove that the non-occurrence of an event (e.g. a conflict) is directly related to the existence of defence capabilities and activities. Linked to these challenges, connecting defence activity and output to defence outcomes and benefits remains elusive. This study has explored the potential of five methodologies (lines of enquiry — LOEs) to measure the contribution of defence to UK prosperity in terms of its primary benefits (i.e. protection from external threats). These are:
LOE1 — defence analogue to Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs)
LOE2 — Value of a Statistical Life (VSL) measures;
LOE3 — insurance policy techniques;
LOE4 — logic models and proxy indicators; and
LOE5 — discrete choice experiments (DCEs).
This study has identified a range of insights for the Ministry of Defence on how to apply and further develop these methodologies towards measuring the primary benefits of defence. This study has been exploratory, and it was expected that not all approaches would be viable.”

Lim, Nelson, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The U.S. Coast Guard seeks to attract, recruit, and retain a workforce that represents all segments of U.S. society. However, in the current active-duty Coast Guard, representation of women and of members of racial and ethnic minority groups declines as rank increases, ultimately resulting in a less diverse senior leadership. These demographics are largely the cumulative effect of the service's personnel system in which the pool of potential senior leaders narrows at each stage of the career life cycle, along with the number of candidates from underrepresented groups. To identify the root causes of the underrepresentation of women and of members of racial and ethnic minority groups in the Coast Guard, researchers used a mixed-method approach involving literature reviews, analysis of personnel data, interviews with subject-matter experts, focus groups, and a survey of active-duty personnel. The team examined the factors that shape representation at each phase of the military career life cycle — recruiting, career development, promotion and advancement, and retention — and identified facilitators of and barriers to improving diversity in the Coast Guard. The report includes recommendations to help the Coast Guard achieve its ultimate goal of a workforce that looks like the nation it serves.”

U.S. Department of State. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021).
“The U.S. Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements provide country-specific information on the business climates of more than 170 countries and economies. They are prepared by economic officers stationed in embassies and posts around the world and analyze a variety of economies that are or could be markets for U.S. businesses of all sizes.”

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2021).
“The Working Group I contribution to the Sixth Assessment Report addresses the most up-to-date physical understanding of the climate system and climate change, bringing together the latest advances in climate science, and combining multiple lines of evidence from paleoclimate, observations, process understanding, and global and regional climate simulations.”

Pfaff, C. Anthony, and Keith R. Beurskens (eds). (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021).
Volume 10 of the Large-Scale Combat Operations Book Set.
“Volume 10, ‘Maintaining the High Ground: The Profession and Ethic in Large-Scale Combat Operations’ combines discussions and historical case studies from the past seventy-five years to address ethical challenges for the Army Profession. Healthy and functioning professions facilitate the employment of expert knowledge to serve a social good. In doing so, trust develops among professionals, as well as with the client, creating an acknowledged autonomy over its jurisdiction that allows the profession to maintain its effectiveness. For the Army, that jurisdiction is the application of land power and its client is the US government and the American public it serves. With today’s all-volunteer Army, maintaining public trust is critical, and large-scale combat operations require a professional class of leaders and soldiers with strong ethics and the ability to adapt and even shape their own future.”

Sayler, Kelley M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 9, 2021).
“The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons— maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable 'responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.' Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 27, 2021).
“The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective on the modern battlefield. Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV may be subject to a high degree of congressional interest.”

Kamphausen, Roy. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2021).
“The 27th annual People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Conference - ‘The People in the PLA’ 2.0 - revisited a theme first explored at the 2006 conference but understudied since. This volume examines how the structure, education, training, and recruitment of PLA personnel have changed in the last decade and in the Xi Jinping era. Structural changes in the PLA have centered around two poles: improving the warfighting readiness of the PLA and strengthening Communist Party of China (CPC) control of the PLA. Reforms to the political work system, the evolution of the Second Artillery into the Rocket Force, and expansion of the PLA’s foreign-based force posture all indicate that the PLA is accelerating its drive to become a world-class military. To succeed in future ‘informatized’ wars, the PLA recognizes it must improve its members’ education level. It seeks to leverage better China’s civilian education system while also addressing legacy issues that frustrate professional military education and the care of its veterans. The PLA is also reforming joint education and seeking insight from its exchanges and interactions with other nations’ militaries. The revamping of its academic institutions to support better its most technical and advanced entities for network warfare and other operations is indicative of the PLA’s fast-paced evolution.”

Langeland, Krista, and Derek Grossman. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“The space-based capabilities of the United States have become integral to economic prosperity, to the defense of both the United States and its allies across all domains, and to facilitating cross-domain joint military operations. The U.S. government thus views the protection of these capabilities and the deterrence of any activity that could degrade them as vital to national security. Concurrently, China regards space capabilities as both a key enabler in terrestrial conflict and a means of bolstering its overall strength, and views United States activity in space as an obstacle to these goals. Accordingly, China may be motivated to exploit any evident U.S. vulnerabilities in the space domain to further its own objectives. Deterring China in space is therefore a priority for the United States Department of Defense and its allies and partners. The authors of this report consider deterrence concepts and examine how a deterrence strategy could be tailored to recognize the unique characteristics of the space domain and the particular objectives of China in space. To accomplish this, they review literature on classical deterrence theory and identify some key features that are particularly relevant to deterrence in the space domain. They then build a foundation for tailoring deterrence for China in space by examining Beijing's goals and approach to space deterrence as stated in openly available Chinese primary-source materials and identifying the implications of these findings for the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific.”

Chubb, Andrew. (Newport, RI: U.S Naval War College, 2021).
“This volume examines the role of popular nationalism in China’s maritime conduct. Analysis of nine case studies of assertive but ostensibly nonmilitary actions by which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has advanced its position in the South and East China Seas in recent years reveals little compelling evidence of popular sentiment driving decision-making. While some regard for public opinion demonstrably shapes Beijing’s propaganda strategies on maritime issues, and sometimes its diplomatic practices as well, the imperative for Chinese leaders to satisfy popular nationalism is at most a contributing factor to policy choices they undertake largely on the basis of other considerations of power and interest. Where surges of popular nationalism have been evident, they have tended to follow after the PRC maritime actions in question, suggesting instead that Chinese authorities channeled public opinion to support existing policy.”

Heginbotham, Eric. (Newport, RI: China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S Naval War College, 2021).
“This report examines Chinese views about the military balance of power between China and the United States in the Western Pacific. It argues that while there is no single ‘Chinese’ view on this topic, Chinese analysts tend to agree that 1) the gap between the two militaries has narrowed significantly in recent years, 2) the Chinese military still lags in important ways, and 3) Chinese military inferiority vis-à-vis the U.S. increases the further away it operates from the Mainland. In terms of specific areas of relative strength, the Chinese military has shown the greatest improvements in military hardware, but has farther to go in the area of jointness, training, and other military ‘software.’ Nevertheless, despite continued criticism from senior civilian leaders, training quality has likely improved due to a greater focus on realism, and recent military reforms have, to a degree, improved the prospects for jointness.”

American Enterprise Institute, Center for Strategic and International Studies, and War on the Rocks.
“The American Enterprise Institute, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and War on the Rocks formed a partnership to address a shared concern: lack of understanding about how defense strategy and security objectives are translated into concrete budget choices. To meet this challenge, the three organizations built the Defense Futures Simulator.”

Anderson, Michael G. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021). “In ‘Mustering for War,’ author Michael G. Anderson provides the ten-year evolution of National Guard mobilization processes in preparation for America’s Global War on Terrorism. Anderson offers a synthesized appraisal of how the United States Army altered its deploying structure to fit a protracted, rotational war that involved the ‘wholesale rotation of units within an all-volunteer force instead of individual replacements supported by conscription.’ Between 2001 and 2011, the Army Guard transitioned from a strategic reserve force into a more operationally responsive component, but not without its growing pains. Anderson’s book details the issues faced by the Army National Guard during mobilization and how they solved problems encountered in manning the force, equipping the force, health readiness, and training the formations for overseas service.”

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press.
“A podcast channel of the USAWC quarterly journal, ‘Parameters.’”

Kulesa, Łukasz. (New York, NY: Council of Councils, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Although virtually all countries - including the 191 states that are parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) - support the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, many disagree on the best way to achieve it. Two positions have emerged, with the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and their allies on one side and supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, in force as of January 2021) on the other side. The nuclear weapons states and their partners promote a gradual approach to disarmament and emphasize the continued importance of nuclear deterrence for their security, whereas supporters of the TPNW push for the abolition of nuclear weapons and an unconditional rejection of nuclear deterrence.”

Kronstadt, K. Alan, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 19, 2021).
“In recognition of India’s increasingly central role and ability to influence world affairs— and with a widely held assumption that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the United States - the U.S. Congress and three successive U.S. Administrations have acted both to broaden and deepen America’s engagement with New Delhi. Such engagement follows decades of Cold War-era estrangement. Washington and New Delhi launched a ‘strategic partnership’ in 2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale joint military exercises and significant defense trade. In concert with Japan and Australia, the United States and India in 2020 reinvigorated a Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (‘Quad’) as a flagship initiative in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Biden Administration has strongly embraced the Quad mechanism. In 2021, mutual efforts to address the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have been at the forefront of bilateral engagement. Bilateral trade and investment have increased, while a relatively wealthy Indian-American community is exercising newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals account for a large proportion of foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information technology sector.”

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. (New York, NY: Council of Councils, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Outer space is crowded, with more than eighty countries either owning or operating satellites. The types of actors are also increasingly diversifying. Space is no longer only a realm of states. A growing number of nonstate actors, including the private sector and academic institutions, are also jostling for access. Simultaneously, outer space has become a more contested arena. Fueled by changes in regional and global balances of power, increasing security-driven competition in space has compelled many states to develop counter-space capabilities that can be used to disrupt, deny, or destroy space systems. These activities need to be regulated to ensure safe, secure, and sustainable use of outer space for all.”

Fiertz, Natalie, et al. (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2021).
“The Fragile States Index (FSI) produced by The Fund for Peace (FFP), is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are outweighing a states’ capacity to manage those pressures. By highlighting pertinent vulnerabilities which contribute to the risk of state fragility, the Index - and the social science framework and the data analysis tools upon which it is built - makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.”

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (Copenhagen, Denmark: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Global Data Service, 2021).
“The main focus of this report is the analysis of statistical trends and changes in global forced displacement from January to December 2020 among populations for whom UNHCR has been entrusted with a responsibility by the international community. The data presented are based on information received as of 30 May 2021 unless otherwise indicated. At the end of 2020, the total number of forcibly displaced people was 82.4 million, while the total population of concern to UNHCR stood at 91.9 million people.”

UNAIDS. (Geneva, Switzerland: UNAIDS, 2021).
“The UNAIDS Global AIDS Update 2021 launched today, highlights evidence that people living with HIV are more vulnerable to COVID-19, but that widening inequalities are preventing them from accessing COVID-19 vaccines and HIV services.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 7, 14, and 21, 2021.
“CSIS, in partnership with the University of the Philippines, is pleased to present ‘Oceans of Opportunity: Southeast Asia’s Shared Maritime Challenges,’ a series of six virtual panels over three sessions on marine conservation, fisheries management, and maritime law. This session will feature expert panel discussions on protecting threatened fisheries and bolstering maritime domain awareness.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2021).
“This is the first in a series of papers that highlight new ways of thinking about global water resources. This Imagine If Water Series aims to inspire, provoke and invite new ideas. The first paper explores circular cities, where the use and reuse of water and wastewater resources are optimized, thereby unlocking the true value and potential of urban areas.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2021).
“Digital technology and business models are driving business disruption. The pandemic has accelerated this trend, making digital transformation critical for business success. However, it takes more than technology alone; leaders need to look at the human side of their organizations. Culture and the way people interact with technology are significant factors in digital success. This interactive guide, created in collaboration with business executives and academia, presents actionable frameworks and tools for executives to improve digital leadership and culture in their organizations.”

Ariga, Taka, and Stephen Sanford. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, June 30, 2021).
“As a nation, we have yet to grasp the full benefits or unwanted effects of artificial intelligence. AI is widely used, but how do we know it's working appropriately? This report identifies key accountability practices—centered around the principles of governance, data, performance, and monitoring—to help federal agencies and others use AI responsibly. For example, the governance principle calls for users to set clear goals and engage with diverse stakeholders. To develop these practices, we held a forum on AI oversight with experts from government, industry, and nonprofits. We also interviewed federal inspector general officials and AI experts…To help managers ensure accountability and responsible use of artificial intelligence (AI) in government programs and processes, GAO developed an AI accountability framework. This framework is organized around four complementary principles, which address governance, data, performance, and monitoring. For each principle, the framework describes key practices for federal agencies and other entities that are considering, selecting, and implementing AI systems. Each practice includes a set of questions for entities, auditors, and third-party assessors to consider, as well as procedures for auditors and third-party assessors.”

Blanchette, Jude, and Seth G. Jones. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“China's evolving perception of the United States' international influence and domestic resiliency has been an important component in how Beijing assesses the international balance of power and its own opportunities to shape—or challenge—the global order. Since the Global Financial Crisis in 2007–2008, Beijing has assessed that the United States is experiencing a slow but steady deterioration of its national power and international influence.
Events of the past 12 months have consolidated this consensus.
But is Beijing's perception of declining U.S. influence and power accurate? And is this narrative setting up the Xi Jinping administration to make strategic miscalculations by overestimating its own relative power? In this open-source analysis, Jude Blanchette, the Freeman Chair in China Studies, and Seth G. Jones, director of the International Security Program, explore the implications for the United States from Beijing's growing perception of U.S. decline.”

Lew, Jacob J., et al. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests. Since BRI’s launch in 2013, Chinese banks and companies have financed and built everything from power plants, railways, highways, and ports to telecommunications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables, and smart cities around the world. If implemented sustainably and responsibly, BRI has the potential to meet long-standing developing country needs and spur global economic growth. To date, however, the risks for both the United States and recipient countries raised by BRI’s implementation considerably outweigh its benefits.
BRI was initially designed to connect China’s modern coastal cities to its underdeveloped interior and to its Southeast, Central, and South Asian neighbors, cementing China’s position at the center of a more connected world. The initiative has since outgrown its original regional corridors, expanding to all corners of the globe. Its scope now includes a Digital Silk Road intended to improve recipients’ telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and other high-tech areas, along with a Health Silk Road designed to operationalize China’s vision of global health governance. Hundreds of projects around the world now fall under the BRI umbrella.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2021).
“The emergence of great power competition with China and Russia has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was during the post-Cold War era: Counterterrorist operations and U.S. military operations in the Middle East—which were moved to the center of discussions of U.S. defense issues following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001—are now a less-dominant element in the conversation, and the conversation now features a new or renewed emphasis on the following, all of which relate to China and/or Russia:
• grand strategy and the geopolitics of great power competition as a starting point for discussing U.S. defense issues;
• organizational changes within DOD;
• nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence, and nuclear arms control;
• the global allocation of U.S. military force deployments;
• U.S. and allied military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region;
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
• new U.S. military service operational concepts;
• capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare;
• maintaining U.S. superiority in conventional weapon technologies;
• innovation and speed of U.S. weapon system development and deployment;
• mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict;
• supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on foreign components, subcomponents, materials, and software; and
• capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense planning should respond to renewed great power competition with China and Russia, and whether to approve, reject, or modify the Biden Administration’s proposed defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs for addressing renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.”

Poling, Gregory B., Simon Tran Hudes, and Andreyka Natalegawa. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 6, 2021).
“The U.S.-Vietnam relationship has been on an upward trajectory defined by common interests since diplomatic relations between the two countries normalized a quarter-century ago. Vietnam was one of two Southeast Asian countries specifically referenced in the Biden administration’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, demonstrating the extent to which it has become an increasingly critical part of U.S. defense planning for the region. Bilateral trade has grown over 200-fold since normalization. People-to-people ties have also grown as Vietnam’s tourism industry has developed. Since normalization, Vietnam has welcomed U.S. tourists, former Vietnam War veterans, and even former refugees and their families. U.S. schools and companies in turn have attracted Vietnamese students and recent graduates, who are among the best educated in the world despite the country’s lower level of economic development.”

Hoehn, John R. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 8, 2021).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 7, 2021).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress on three potential new shipbased self-defense weapons for the Navy - solid state lasers (SSLs), the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG), and the gun-launched guided projectile (GLGP), also known as the hypervelocity projectile (HVP).
The Navy’s proposed FY2022 budget requests research and development funding for continued work on SSLs, but proposes suspending further work on the EMRG and GLGP programs and requests no research and development funding for them.
The Navy installed its first prototype SSL capable of countering surface craft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on a Navy ship in 2014. The Navy since then has been developing and installing additional SSL prototypes with improved capability for countering surface craft and UAVs. Higher-power SSLs being developed by the Navy are to have a capability for countering anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs). Current Navy efforts to develop SSLs include
• the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL-TM) effort;
• the Optical Dazzling Interdictor, Navy (ODIN);
• the Surface Navy Laser Weapon System (SNLWS) Increment 1, also known as the high-energy laser with integrated optical dazzler and surveillance (HELIOS); and
• the High Energy Laser Counter-ASCM Program (HELCAP).
The first three SSL efforts listed above are included in what the Navy calls the Navy Laser Family of Systems (NFLoS).
The Navy had been developing EMRG since 2005. It was originally conceived as a naval surface fire support (NSFS) weapon for supporting Marines and other friendly forces ashore. Subsequently, it was determined that EMRG could also be used for air and missile defense, which for a time strengthened Navy interest in EMRG development.
As the Navy was developing EMRG, it realized that the guided projectile being developed for EMRG could also be fired from powder guns, including 5-inch guns on Navy cruisers and destroyers and 155 mm artillery guns operated by the Army and Marine Corps. The concept of firing the projectile from powder guns is referred to as GLGP and HVP.”

Berris, Peter G., Michael A. Foster, and Jonathan M. Gaffney. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2021).
“Federal statute defines domestic terrorism to include dangerous criminal acts intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect government policy or conduct within the jurisdiction of the United States. Despite the federal statutory definition, no federal criminal provision expressly prohibits ‘domestic terrorism.’ Nevertheless, numerous federal statutes offer prosecutors options in charging violent and destructive conduct consistent with the statutory definition of domestic terrorism. Some of these statutes can be characterized as expressly focused on terrorism, listing criminal offenses to include, among others, providing material support or resources to terrorists and engaging in terrorism transcending domestic boundaries. Other generally applicable federal criminal laws may also be relevant to domestic terrorism prosecutions. For example, depending on the defendant’s motive, target, or means, various federal criminal statutes protecting certain property or persons, prohibiting violence motivated by particular biases, or criminalizing possession or use of specific weapons may apply. Depending on the circumstances, prosecutors may also rely on accomplice liability or inchoate offenses such as attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to charge conduct consistent with the definition of domestic terrorism. Beyond applicable offenses, domestic terrorism may be relevant in federal sentencing, either through specific statutes that authorize additional penalties in the domestic terrorism context or through the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which include an upward adjustment for offenses connected to terrorism.”

European Union Delegation to the United States and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Held June 28 - 29, 2021.
“Please join the European Union Delegation to the United States and CSIS for the tenth annual EU Defense Washington Forum, an annual symposium dedicated to strengthening EU-U.S. cooperation on security and defense.
The Biden administration’s Interim National Security Guidance is clear on the priority Washington places on working with allies and partners. The strategy promises to ‘reinvigorate and modernize’ alliances and partnerships, which the administration considers ‘America’s greatest strategic asset,’ in order to advance our common interests and uphold our shared values. Consistent and pragmatic transatlantic cooperation on security issues is essential to realizing this goal. The EU’s blueprint for cooperation with the new U.S. administration, ‘A New Transatlantic Agenda for Global Change,’ also prominently calls for further strengthening—and leveraging—our joint commitment to transatlantic and international security. This year’s forum will bring together leading stakeholders and experts from the transatlantic security and defense communities to focus on developing a shared analysis of the threat environment and of the capabilities required to improve our collective and individual response.”

Zerk, Jennifer, and Rosie Beacock. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“Political shifts, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the struggle for a shared vision of how to ‘build back better’, have reignited the debate about trade and human rights. Although many trade agreements take human rights impacts into consideration, the monitoring systems that have emerged so far are not comprehensive. Without robust human rights monitoring, trading partners have little chance of ensuring that their counterparts are meeting their commitments. While there are considerable structural, political and resource-related challenges to conducting more systematic and effective human rights monitoring, recent experiences in this field can help policymakers design more effective monitoring mechanisms for the future.”

Sargent, John F., Jr., and Marcy E. Gallo. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2021).
“For more than 70 years, the technological superiority of the United States military has offset the size and geographic advantages of potential adversaries. The Department of Defense (DOD), due in large part to the magnitude of its investments in research and development (R&D), has driven the global R&D and technology landscape. However, DOD and the federal government more broadly are no longer overriding funders of R&D, and this shift in support for R&D has substantial implications for how DOD obtains advanced technology and maintains the battlefield overmatch that technology has historically provided.
In 1960, the United States accounted for 69% of global R&D (measured in share of expenditures), with U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of global R&D (36%). Additionally, the federal government funded approximately twice as much R&D as U.S. business. However, from 1960 to 2019, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 30%, and the federal government’s share of total U.S. R&D fell from 65% to 21%, while business’s share more than doubled from 33% to 71%. As a result of these global, national, and federal trends, federal defense R&D’s share of total global R&D fell to 3.1% in 2019. This decline resulted primarily from more rapid increases in the R&D of other nations (public and private) and partially from increases in U.S. business R&D and federal nondefense R&D.
Some defense experts and policymakers have recognized the shift in the global R&D landscape and the need for DOD to rely increasingly on technologies developed by commercial companies for commercial markets. Among the challenges DOD faces in acquiring new, innovative technologies and maintaining U.S. military technical superiority are
• developing/modifying organizations and business models to access this technology;
• adapting the DOD business culture to seek and embrace technologies developed outside of DOD, the United States, and its traditional contractor base; and
• finding ways to adapt and leverage commercial technologies for defense applications.”

Jones, Seth G., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“This report examines the implications of scientific innovations and emerging technologies on geopolitics in Northeast Asia. It focuses on five areas: (1) data-driven techniques and software-intensive technologies, (2) advanced materials and supply chains, (3) cybersecurity, (4) uncrewed systems and robotics, and (5) space technologies, including satellites and missiles. The applications of today’s emerging technologies are exacerbating regional tensions, bringing new considerations to longstanding security challenges, and propelling new non-state and commercial actors onto the global stage. The report explores the implications of these technologies and recommends policy responses: engaging the private sector; establishing norms and standards; and extending bilateral cooperation to a ‘high-tech’ alliance. The findings are a reflection of expert perspectives and analyses, including from leading experts within the security and foreign policy communities in both the United States and the Republic of Korea.”

Belkin, Paul. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 3, 2021).
“The United States has continued to play a key role in advancing NATO’s response to a range of security challenges. In the seven years since Russia occupied Crimea and invaded Eastern Ukraine, the United States has been an architect of NATO’s increased focus on deterring Russian aggression, including through the deployment of an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of about 4,500 troops to the three Baltic States and Poland. NATO also has bolstered its response to terrorist threats and instability in the Middle East and North Africa, primarily through partnerships and training activities. In February 2021, NATO defense ministers agreed to expand NATO’s training mission in Iraq, from its current level of about 500 trainers to potentially as many as 4,000. The allies also are expected to discuss the end of NATO’s ‘train and assist’ in Afghanistan; to address the potential security implications of Chinese investment and engagement in Europe; and to bolster resilience to nonmilitary security threats, ranging from pandemics to climate change.
In response to recent transatlantic tensions and questions about NATO’s longer-term relevance, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg launched the NATO 2030 Initiative to advance proposals to strengthen the alliance, both militarily and politically. At the June 14 summit, the allies are expected to consider Stoltenberg’s recommendations to reinforce alliance unity, broaden NATO’s approach to security, and defend the rules-based international order. Recommendations could include updating NATO’s strategic concept, last updated in 2010, to better reflect today’s security environment, especially with respect to Russia and China; enhancing NATO’s capacity to counter nonmilitary threats; and strengthening NATO’s commitment to democratic values and enhancing its relationships with like-minded partners across the globe.”

German Marshall Fund of the United States. June 14-28, 2021. 30 videos.
“GMF's Brussels Forum is the preeminent platform for global leaders, policymakers, and experts across sectors to shape the transatlantic agenda and debate the most pressing global challenges. It is designed to encourage transatlantic leaders to work together to directly confront the challenging world we find ourselves in today. Our mission as a conference is to create a platform for debate in an inclusive and intimate atmosphere. We accomplish this by showcasing diverse voices across regional and demographic backgrounds, promoting candidness and openness in our dialogues and forming close bonds between conference participants.”

Kerr, Paul K. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 21, 2021).
“Several U.N. Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010 required Iran to cooperate fully with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) investigation of its nuclear activities, suspend its uranium enrichment program, suspend its construction of a heavywater reactor and related projects, and ratify the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement. Iran did not comply with most of the resolutions’ provisions. However, Tehran has implemented various restrictions on, and provided the IAEA with additional information about, the government’s nuclear program pursuant to the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which Tehran concluded with China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. On the JCPOA’s Implementation Day, which took place on January 16, 2016, all of the previous resolutions’ requirements were terminated. The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted on July 20, 2015, compose the current legal framework governing Iran’s nuclear program. The United States attempted in 2020 to reimpose sanctions on Iran via a mechanism provided for in Resolution 2231. However, the Security Council did not do so.
Iran and the IAEA agreed in August 2007 on a work plan to clarify outstanding questions regarding Tehran’s nuclear program. The IAEA had essentially resolved most of these issues, but for several years the agency still had questions concerning ‘possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme.’ A December 2, 2015, report to the IAEA Board of Governors from then-agency Director General Yukiya Amano contains the IAEA’s ‘final assessment on the resolution’ of the outstanding issues.A June 2020 IAEA Board of Governors resolution calls on Iran to satisfy more recent agency requests concerning possible undeclared nuclear activities in Iran. This resolution does not contain a formal finding of noncompliance.
This report provides a brief overview of Iran’s nuclear program and describes the legal basis for the actions taken by the IAEA board and the Security Council. It will be updated as events warrant.”

Runde, Daniel F., Conor M. Savoy, and Janina Staguhn. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Covid-19 is unlikely to be the last pandemic or health crisis that the world faces, especially as deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change increase the possibility of further spillover of zoonotic diseases. Therefore, this pandemic should serve as an inflection point for the international community to cast aside what the World Health Organization (WHO) has called the ‘panic-then-forget’ cycle, which has been emblematic of previous international responses to global health emergencies. While exclusively strengthening health systems and shoring up health supply chains will not be sufficient to prevent or counter the next public health emergency, stronger and more resilient health systems and supply chains will still be critical to ensuring that future pandemic preparation, detection, and responses can be delivered efficiently, effectively, and equitably. Key takeaways include—but are not limited to—the importance of multisectoral approaches to preparing for in-country delivery (e.g., having an emergency response plan in place), maintaining and expanding geographically diverse manufacturing capabilities, and prioritizing public–private cooperation, as well as establishing or leveraging existing platforms for vaccine administration. Coordination and communication among governments, donors, and private-sector entities (such as third-party logistics firms and manufacturers) is critical. Looking forward, it will be helpful to start by investing in multisectoral approaches that strengthen general health systems and supply chains.”

Devermont, Judd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue:
The U.S. government is grappling with three distinct priorities—violent extremism, democratic backsliding, and strategic competition—in coastal West Africa and the Sahel. The evergreen challenge of tough tradeoffs and limited resources has made policy choices regarding subregion prioritization stunningly difficult.
The emerging tug-of-war between the Sahel and coastal West Africa has in part contributed to a problematic framing of the threat’s source, trajectory, and strategic significance to the United States. Washington should avoid the tendency to cast coastal West Africa as the ‘next Sahel,’ a region on the verge of implosion.
To advance U.S. objectives, the United States will have to play it smarter. It should lean into the reality that there is significant convergence and interdependence between the Sahel and coastal West Africa. The U.S. government should elevate policies and programs that simultaneously tackle these challenges, specifically justice and rule of law programming; anticorruption efforts; and security sector accountability.”

Brown, Oli. and Taylor Dimsdale. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“Most international organizations were not designed to deal with the consequences of climate change. An overhaul of risk management, taking specific account of climate-related risks, is therefore needed to ensure the continued operational effectiveness of UN bodies and other agencies. Climate change is likely to have profound impacts on such organizations in the future: increasing demand for their services, undermining programme implementation, and hindering their ability to fulfil their mandates.
This paper is an attempt to ‘climate stress test’ the international system and provide an early measure of its level of preparedness for climate change. The paper maps the current climate risk approaches of roughly two dozen international organizations, based on a review of official documents as well as on interviews with their staff. The paper offers recommendations for how international organizations can continue to achieve their missions by strengthening their climate risk management frameworks.”

MacColl, Jamie, Jason R. C. Nurse, and James Sullivan. (London, UK: RUSI, 2021).
“Cyber risk poses a complicated and growing challenge for governments, businesses and consumers. This paper explores cyber insurance’s potential contribution to solving this problem.”

Fosher, Kerry B., and Lauren Mackenzie (eds). (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
“Though the priorities of senior military leaders inevitably change over time, the pressing need for American Service personnel to accommodate the human dimension for success in their ongoing military operations has not diminished. That capability now may be even more important than ever. Almost inevitably, the requirement will reach a critical stage in some future crisis. This book compiles the insights and findings of some of the most determined and resourceful scientists, scholars, and practitioners engaged in the programs to inculcate the new capabilities in the early twenty-first century. The authors do not gloss over failures and dead ends. Rather, their expectation is that by presenting the bad with the good, they can help future generations engaged in the same task avoid their pitfalls and build on their work. More importantly, the authors hope that their writing might reach those who are still engaged in building cultural capabilities and that they will find encouragement to continue this essential work.”

U.S. Senate. (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2021).
“On January 6, 2021, the world witnessed a violent and unprecedented attack on the U.S. Capitol, the Vice President, Members of Congress, and the democratic process. Rioters, attempting to disrupt the Joint Session of Congress, broke into the Capitol building, vandalized and stole property, and ransacked offices. They attacked members of law enforcement and threatened the safety and lives of our nation’s elected leaders. Tragically, seven individuals, including three law enforcement officers, ultimately lost their lives. Rioters were intent on disrupting the Joint Session, during which Members of Congress were scheduled to perform their constitutional obligation to count the electoral votes for President and Vice President of the United States and announce the official results of the 2020 election. Due to the heroism of United States Capitol Police (‘USCP’) officers, along with their federal, state, and local law enforcement partners, the rioters failed to prevent Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty. In the early hours of January 7, the President of the Senate, Vice President Pence, announced Joseph Biden and Kamala Harris as the President-elect and Vice President-elect of the United States. This report addresses the security, planning, and response failures of the entities directly responsible for Capitol security—USCP and the Capitol Police Board, which is comprised of the House and Senate Sergeants at Arms and the Architect of the Capitol as voting members, and the USCP Chief as a non-voting member—along with critical breakdowns involving several federal agencies, particularly the Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’), Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’), and Department of Defense (‘DOD’). The Committees also made a series of recommendations for the Capitol Police Board, USCP, federal intelligence agencies, DOD, and other Capital region law enforcement agencies to address the intelligence and security failures.”

Schell, Terry L., et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“This report describes analyses designed to identify service member and environmental characteristics that are associated with service members' risk of sexual assault or sexual harassment. The researchers find that experiencing pre-service sexual assault, being younger, and being single were all strong predictors of experiencing sexual assault and sexual harassment. Service history and unit environment characteristics were also associated with risk, although these effects were smaller. Risk factors for men and women and for sexual assault and sexual harassment were strongly correlated, suggesting that a common set of risk factors underlie these experiences for men and women. The authors conclude the report with recommendations for how the Department of Defense (DoD) can use the findings to modify programs and training that address sexual assault and sexual harassment. Data for these analyses were drawn from the 2014 RAND Military Workplace Study, an independent assessment of sexual assault and sexual harassment in the U.S. military.”

Morral, Andrew R., and Terry L. Schell. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Much of the focus of research on sexual assault in the military has been on the risk faced by women. However, in civilian populations, individuals who identify as lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) are known to be at especially high risk for sexual assault. In this report, RAND researchers examine evidence from the 2016 and 2018 Workplace and Gender Relations Survey of Active Duty Members (WGRA) survey to estimate the proportion of military sexual assaults that are against LGB service members and others who do not describe themselves as identifying as heterosexual. They find that assaults on the minority of service members who do not describe themselves as heterosexual constitute almost half of the military's sexual assault numbers. The authors discuss sexual assault risks for these individuals and recommend modifying prevention programs to better address a large and previously unquantified proportion of all military sexual assaults.”

McGarry, Brendan W. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2021).
“The Department of Defense Appropriations Act is one of 12 annual appropriations measures typically reported by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the largest in terms of discretionary funding. The act funds activities of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) except for military construction and family housing programs. The legislation also funds certain activities of the intelligence community…This report compares funding levels for certain defense accounts and programs in the enacted FY2020 appropriations, the Trump Administration’s FY2021 request, and FY2021 legislation.”

Heath, Timothy R., Derek Grossman, and Asha Clark. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“Focusing on the international and defense dimensions of U.S.-China competition, the authors of this report make three contributions. First, they intend this report to serve as a planning tool by positing international and defense strategies that could allow China to outcompete the United States. Second, they mean to educate readers on Chinese strategy and policy processes. Third, the authors seek to encourage greater public debate about the nature and stakes of the competition. As presented by the authors, China's international strategy aims to establish the country's primacy in the Asia-Pacific region and leadership of the international order. The international strategy presented seeks to achieve this end state through peaceful methods, although it does not rule out the possibilities of militarized crises or even conflicts of a limited scope, such as proxy wars. The core of the proposed international strategy is a reliance on China's economic prowess and diplomatic maneuver to put Beijing into a position of advantage from which it cannot be dislodged by the United States. A complementary defense strategy would aim to constrain Washington's ability to forestall or prevent its own eclipse by building a superior Chinese military that renders the risks of military conflict intolerably high. A major Chinese military responsibility would be to support diplomatic efforts to shape a favorable international environment by building strong security ties with client states and discrediting or weakening the appeal of the United States as an alternative.”

Campbell, Caitlin. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 4, 2021).
“China’s military modernization is a major factor driving some observers’ concerns about China’s rise, China’s intentions toward the United States and its allies and partners, and the role China aspires to play in the world. China’s military progress also informs the widely-held view that the United States and China are engaged in a ‘great power competition.’ Congressional actions on these issues could shape, and be shaped by, U.S. defense strategy, budgets, plans, and programs; U.S. policy toward China, U.S. partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific, and the region more generally; and U.S. defense industrial policies, among other things.”

German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Bertelsmann Foundation. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Bertelsmann Foundation, 2021).
“‘Transatlantic Trends 2021’ includes the results of surveys conducted in 11 countries representing all corners of the transatlantic community: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. This research is not just transatlantic in focus—it is a true transatlantic collaboration between several U.S. and European organizations and institutions. The findings in the pages that follow benefit in intellectual richness from the diversity of perspectives that informed everything from framing the questions to interpreting the resulting data. Divided into five chapters, ‘Transatlantic Trends’ provides a detailed picture of transatlantic public opinion on core and contemporary issues: the transatlantic relationship; international security and defense; trade, economic, and technology policies; relations with China; and global challenges.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (May 26-27, 2021). 6 videos available.
“The Conference on Diversity in International Affairs brings together college and graduate students and young professionals from diverse backgrounds for plenaries on foreign policy topics, seminars on professional development, and opportunities to interact virtually with senior foreign policy professionals. The 2021 conference featured a keynote session with President of the Ford Foundation Darren Walker. The 2021 Conference on Diversity in International Affairs is a collaborative effort by the Council on Foreign Relations, the Global Access Pipeline, and the International Career Advancement Program.”
Sessions:
• Race and Policy: America’s Standing in the World
• Keynote Session: A Conversation with Darren Walker
• Nationalism Around the World
• Making the Transition Between the Public and Private Sector
• Building Your Brand
• Pandemics and the New Way of Working

Gavin, Michelle. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Although major power competition is a reality, giving it an outsized role in policymaking would be a mistake. Rather, U.S. policy should be dictated by a farsighted understanding of its goals in regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms in Africa. The United States benefits when African states are able to provide for their own security and address transnational threats emanating from within their borders; when African economic growth provides opportunity to African citizens and to those abroad who trade, invest, and co-create with them; when Africa is a rule-governed region that bolsters respect for universal rights and the rule of law; and when Africa is invested and active in international institutions that mitigate global crises. To help realize this vision, the United States should capitalize on what makes it a compelling partner to African states, work more closely and strategically with like-minded partners, create more space for African agendas in its vision for future global governance, and work to build lasting affinities.”

Hall, Natasha. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• The Syrian government has restricted humanitarian access to opposition-controlled areas of Syria as part of its efforts to regain control of the entire country.
• In 2014, the United Nations (UN) designated four border crossings for delivering aid to those in need without government approval. Russia and China blocked the UN from using all but one border crossing, which serves northwestern Syria, and its mandate is set to expire on July 10, 2021.
• The end of UN cross-border aid would pose severe risks not only to the population of northwestern Syria, but also surrounding states and the broader region, since there is no reliable aid alternative.
• Major donors to the Syria response—five of them UN Security Council members—should seek to reopen closed crossings and lengthen the mandate, making it clear that a Russian veto would obstruct future negotiations on reconstruction, sanctions, and additional aid through Damascus.
• The cross-border issue should prompt more consistent high-level negotiations and coordination among donors to expand access in Syria and ensure that warring parties cannot use aid as leverage.”

Sayler, Kelley M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 7, 2021).
“Quantum technology translates the principles of quantum physics into technological applications. In general, quantum technology has not yet reached maturity; however, it could hold significant implications for the future of military sensing, encryption, and communications, as well as for congressional oversight, authorizations, and appropriations.”

Kamarck, Kristy N. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 25, 2021).
“Over the past two decades, Congress has taken legislative action to address sexual misconduct in the military and to improve prevention, response, and accountability through the military justice system. Despite legislative changes and Department of Defense (DOD) initiatives, sexual assault reporting and prevalence data indicate continued risk factors and room for improvement across several metrics. A recent independent review at Fort Hood which found ‘ineffective implementation’ of the Army’s sexual harassment and assault prevention program, has raised additional congressional concerns. Bills introduced the 116th and 117th Congress would require certain changes to the military justice system with respect to sexual harassment and assault. One proposed change applies to military commanders’ statutory authority, under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ; Chapter 47, Title 10 United States Code), to dispose of certain sex-related cases. Members of Congress, victim advocacy groups, DOD officials, legal scholars, and other stakeholders continue to debate proposals to transfer this authority from commanders to career prosecutors. In a February 26, 2021, memorandum, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III ordered the creation of a 90-day Independent Review Commission (IRC) to address sexual assault in the military. According to DOD reporting, the IRC has four lines of effort: 1) accountability, 2) prevention, 3) climate and culture, and 4) victim care and support. The commission began work on March 24, 2021, and has provided some initial recommendations to Secretary Austin, including those related to the commander’s authority. While some officials have argued against transferring authority from commanders to career prosecutors, a few senior military leaders recently expressed openness to changing military justice processes.”

Harris, Laurie A. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 19, 2021).
“In the past decade or so, increased computing power, the accumulation of big data, and advances in AI techniques have led to rapid growth in AI research and applications. Given these developments and the increasing application of AI technologies across economic sectors, stakeholders from academia, industry, and civil society have called for the federal government to become more knowledgeable about AI technologies and more proactive in considering public policies around their use…AI holds potential benefits and opportunities, but also challenges and pitfalls. For example, AI technologies can accelerate and provide insights into data processing; augment human decisionmaking; optimize performance for complex tasks and systems; and improve safety for people in dangerous occupations. On the other hand, AI systems may perpetuate or amplify bias, may not yet be fully able to explain their decisionmaking, and often depend on vast datasets that are not widely accessible to facilitate research and development (R&D). Further, stakeholders have questioned the adequacy of human capital in both the public and private sectors to develop and work with AI, as well as the adequacy of current laws and regulations for dealing with societal and ethical issues that may arise. Together, such challenges can lead to an inability to fully assess and understand the operations and outputs of AI systems—sometimes referred to as the ‘black box’ problem. Because of these questions and concerns, some stakeholders have advocated for slowing the pace of AI development and use until more research, policymaking, and preparation can occur. Others have countered that AI will make lives safer, healthier, and more productive, so the federal government should not attempt to slow it, but rather should give broad support to AI technologies and increase federal AI funding. In response to this debate, Congress has begun discussing issues such as the trustworthiness, potential bias, and ethical uses of AI; possible disruptive impacts to the U.S. workforce; the adequacy of U.S. expertise and training in AI; domestic and international efforts to set technological standards and testing benchmarks; and the level of U.S. federal investments in AI research and development and how that impacts U.S. international competitiveness. Congress is likely to continue grappling with these issues and working to craft policies that protect American citizens while maximizing U.S. innovation and leadership.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 16, 2021).
“Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.- Russian arms control agreements. Some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the Nuclear Posture Review released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nuclear weapons: a new low yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile. The Navy had deployed the first of these, in small numbers, on U.S. ballistic missile submarines.”

Hoehn, John R. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 24, 2021).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods.”

Reimer, Stephen, and Matthew Redhead. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).
“Numerous deadly terrorist attacks across Europe – from the 2015 ‘Charlie Hebdo’ attack in Paris and the Manchester Arena bombing of 2016 to the far-right firearms assault in Hanau, Germany in early 2020 – demonstrate that self-activating terrorism (sometimes referred to as lone actor or small cell terrorism) has become a major security concern for the continent. Much of the current ‘conventional wisdom’ around these kinds of actors assumes that terrorist financing and a counterterrorist financing (CTF) response are not relevant to this growing threat. Reports of attacks involving little to no preparation or financial resourcing have shaped a false perception that self-activator activity produces no usable financial intelligence. This has generated a high degree of unease among both CTF professionals in law enforcement, whose role it is to use legal investigatory powers to apprehend terrorists and would-be terrorists, and practitioners in the financial services sector, whose controls and instruments are designed to identify and report abuse of the financial system by terrorists planning attacks. The natural fear is that if the private sector cannot produce the kind of financial intelligence required, then law enforcement cannot do its job as effectively as it might. In light of this, the European Commission commissioned RUSI Europe to carry out this research study as part of Project CRAAFT, which seeks to answer two related research questions:
How do self-activating terrorists operating in Europe conduct their financial attack preparations?
How should the CTF regime be changed to meet this pervasive terrorist threat?”

Rendon, Moises, and Claudia Fernandez. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Venezuela is facing a national crisis like no other. Millions have left the country, fleeing the authoritarian regime of Nicolás Maduro. Millions more are starving and sick, ravaged by deadly surges of Covid-19. One of the few remaining options to bring democracy to the country is through negotiations, but what goes into a successful negotiation? Who needs to be represented in the talks? Who needs to be in the room? Who needs to be at the table to ensure that real and lasting change can be brought to combat an increasingly autocratic state, increasing political censorship, and a pandemic? To prepare for this crucial future moment, CSIS hosted a series of workshops aimed at identifying lessons learned from Venezuela’s long history of failed negotiations, as well as other examples from the region and beyond. These findings informed a roadmap that Venezuelan political leaders and the international community could follow to circumvent obstacles and improve the prospects of using negotiation as a tool to resolve the crisis.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2021).
“The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region…Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. The geopolitical environment for the Arctic has been substantially affected by the renewal of great power competition. Although there continues to be significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Coast Guard are devoting increased attention to the Arctic in their planning and operations. Whether DOD and the Coast Guard are devoting sufficient resources to the Arctic and taking sufficient actions for defending U.S. interests in the region has emerged as a topic of congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and has received funding for the procurement of two of at least three planned new polar icebreakers.”

Cahill, Ben, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Covid-19 recovery window offers a rare opportunity to transform economies and accelerate the green transition. There is renewed openness to large scale public investment as governments seek to restore their economic health, boost long-term growth potential, and accelerate decarbonization. But the inequality exposed by the Covid-19 crisis also demonstrates the need for policies that can advance equity and justice. This paper examines green recovery measures through the lens of a just transition. We use three key dimensions of a just transition—distributional impacts, social inclusion, and transformative intent—to assess green recovery interventions around the world. We highlight promising examples of just and green recovery measures in various countries and suggest policy insights with principles and best practices for future action.”

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies China-Africa Research Initiative and Boston University Global Development Policy Center
“The Chinese Loans to Africa (CLA) Database is an interactive data project started by the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-CARI). Since 2007, SAIS-CARI researchers have collected, cleaned and analyzed publicly-available data to create a database on Chinese lending to Africa. The data sources include official government documents, contractor websites, fieldwork, interviews, and media sources. Between 2000 and 2019, SAIS-CARI estimated Chinese financiers signed 1,141 loan commitments worth US$153 billion with African governments and their state owned enterprises. The figures are not equivalent to African government debt, as the database does not track disbursement or repayment. As of March 29, 2021, the Chinese Loans to Africa Database is managed by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.”

Amendolagine, Vito. (Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies China-Africa Research Initiative, 2021).
“Participating in the process of global production fragmentation by connecting to global value chains (GVCs) provides a ‘golden’ opportunity for developing countries to access international markets and boost economies. International institutions such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization have expended great effort to promote proper policies that can help low-income countries take advantage of such opportunities. This work explores the extent to which international development lending can support African countries in trading intermediate goods with foreign partners, with the goal of further specializing in high value-added activities within cross-national production networks. The empirical analysis relies on a dataset that includes both Chinese and World Bank loans to a set of 35 African countries from 2000 to 2018. Based on this research, it appears that Chinese lending increases the involvement of borrowing countries in the international trade of intermediate goods, while World Bank loans contribute to move African countries toward higher valued added activities along GVCs. This first result is explained by the different sectoral composition of Chinese and World Bank loans, with the former focusing more extensively on infrastructure, particularly transport and communications, and the latter on social sectors, such as education and health. The second research question investigates the specific role Chinese lending plays in infrastructure sectors. My research provides evidence that loans to transport and communication sectors significantly improve African countries’ participation in GVCs by reducing trade costs and enhancing connection to foreign partners. Such results become more evident over time, especially with concessional loans.”

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021).
“This annual report of worldwide threats to the national security of the United States responds to Section 617 of the FY21 Intelligence Authorization Act (P.L. 116-260). This report reflects the collective insights of the Intelligence Community (IC), which is committed every day to providing the nuanced, independent, and unvarnished intelligence that policymakers, warfighters, and domestic law enforcement personnel need to protect American lives and America’s interests anywhere in the world. This assessment focuses on the most direct, serious threats to the United States during the next year. The order of the topics presented in this assessment does not necessarily indicate their relative importance or the magnitude of the threats in the view of the IC. All require a robust intelligence response, including those where a near-term focus may help head off greater threats in the future, such as climate change and environmental degradation.”

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General. (Alexandria, VA: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, 2021).
“The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which DoD Components provided access to DoD information technology and communications during the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.”

International Energy Agency. (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2021).
“The number of countries announcing pledges to achieve net-zero emissions over the coming decades continues to grow. But the pledges by governments to date – even if fully achieved – fall well short of what is required to bring global energy-related carbon dioxide emissions to net zero by 2050 and give the world an even chance of limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5 °C. This special report is the world’s first comprehensive study of how to transition to a net zero energy system by 2050 while ensuring stable and affordable energy supplies, providing universal energy access, and enabling robust economic growth. It sets out a cost-effective and economically productive pathway, resulting in a clean, dynamic and resilient energy economy dominated by renewables like solar and wind instead of fossil fuels. The report also examines key uncertainties, such as the roles of bioenergy, carbon capture and behavioural changes in reaching net zero.”

Tsafos, Nikos, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Clean energy technologies are now big business. Vast sums of money in clean energy supply chains promise to rearrange the geopolitics of industrial competition and energy security. Further, to achieve their increasingly ambitious climate goals, countries are likely to do far more to reshape industrial sectors, compressing in a few years a process that normally takes decades. This report looks at how the United States can strengthen supply chains for clean energy technologies through the lens of industrial competition, cybersecurity and trade policy. It finds that the United States can apply some of the mental models, tools, and institutions used for conventional energy sources to think about supply chains in clean energy—and grow its economy and boost its national security in doing so.”

Lewis, James Andrew. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The term ‘National Security Industrial Base’ (NSIB) appeared in the 2018 National Security Strategy. The NSIB is the ‘network of knowledge, capabilities, and people—including academia, National Laboratories, and the private sector—that turns ideas into innovations [and] transforms discoveries into successful commercial products.’ This report outlines elements of the NSIB and how a commercially driven innovation differs from a defense-centric approach to technology. The U.S. innovation ecosystem is based on a mix of strong research universities, flexible financial systems, a competitive business focus, and risk-taking, entrepreneurial culture that is skilled at commercializing research. Other countries have similar strengths, but not at the same scale.”

Stohl, Rachel, and Shannon Dick. (Washington, DC: Stimson, 2021).
“Reflecting on the ways in which the U.S. drone program has defined and has been defined by the United States’ nearly 20-year-old approach to the use of lethal force in counterterrorism operations around the world, the Stimson Center aims to offer an updated inventory of the challenges and consequences wrought by such an approach. This report serves as the fourth installment of our analyses on the U.S. drone program and seeks to emphasize the need for a thorough review and reconfiguration of the United States’ approach to the use of lethal force in order to ensure U.S. policies and activities are responsible and accountable in the short, medium, and long term.”

Lissner, Rebecca. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“To manage the increasingly stark geopolitical power shifts of the past decade-plus, the United States should pursue arms control strategies that regulate rivalry and introduce a broader array of reciprocal restraints.”

Kulesa, Łukasz. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Although virtually all countries—including the 191 states that are parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—support the goal of complete nuclear disarmament, many disagree on the best way to achieve it. Two positions have emerged, with the five nuclear weapons states of the NPT (the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) and their allies on one side and supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, in force as of January 2021) on the other side. The nuclear weapons states and their partners promote a gradual approach to disarmament and emphasize the continued importance of nuclear deterrence for their security, whereas supporters of the TPNW push for the abolition of nuclear weapons and an unconditional rejection of nuclear deterrence.”

Afrobarometer. (Accra, Ghana: Afrobarometer, 2021).
“In 2015, all United Nations member states adopted the Sustainable Development Goals as a universal call to action to end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity by 2030. Tracking progress toward these goals is challenging but essential for informing national decision-making. Afrobarometer survey data can make a unique contribution by providing a little-heard perspective – that of the ordinary citizen in Africa. Newly developed Afrobarometer SDG Scorecards highlight citizens' experiences and evaluations of their country's performance on democracy and governance, poverty, health, education, energy supply, water and sanitation, inequality, gender equity, and other SDG priorities that can be compared to official UN tracking indicators.”

Hanks, Matthew S., with Williamson Murray. (Quantico, VA; Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
“Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Warfighting Exercise (MWX) 1-20 was one of the largest and most comprehensive exercises conducted by the 2d Marine Division (2d MarDiv) throughout the last several decades. The concept was to test how the Marine Corps would fight a future conflict against a peer adversary. The participants divided into two groups: an exercise force built around 2d MarDiv and an adversary force built around 7th Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. Both forces contained multidomain and all-spectrum capabilities from elements across the Marine Air-Ground Task Force and encompassed multiple units and personnel from the Joint force and several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-ally coalition partners. The exercise took place 1–9 November 2019 at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California. It was facilitated by the Marine Corp Tactics and Operations Group and Tactical Training Exercise Control Group, and was largely free play to facilitate the most realistic conditions and series of events possible. This work is not an analytical discussion of MWX…Instead, ‘Khaos Company’ offers a short story written with the intent to provide Marines with the perspective of what it is like to operate and fight at the company- and small-unit levels in operations of such large scale and scope. All of the events herein are based on the actual sequence of events that occurred during the exercise, and the conversations are generally expressed how they occurred but should not be taken as direct quotes.”

Boston University - Center for Global Policy Development.
“Welcome to China’s Global Power Database, a new interactive created by Boston University's Global Development Policy Center. China’s Global Power Database tracks all the world's power plants financed by Chinese foreign direct investment and/or China's two global policy banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. At the end of 2018, Chinese capital is involved in upwards of 777 power plants overseas, providing a total of 186.5 GW of power generation capacity. Among these power plants, Chinese participation includes foreign direct investment (FDI), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), greenfield investments, and debt finance. The database also tracks and displays the deal types, Chinese investors/financiers, percentage of ownership by investor, amount of capacity (in MW), type of technology, operating status, and the estimated annual CO2 emissions of the power plants.”

Boston University - Center for Global Policy Development.
“This dataset is the first global, harmonized, validated, and geolocated record of Chinese development finance. It covers the years 2008 through 2019, to include equal time before and after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. It includes all loans from the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China to governments, inter-governmental bodies, and state-owned entities.
This interactive database includes 858 loans, detailing each project's lender, year, amount, sector, and length in kilometers, where applicable. Among those 858 projects, 615 have specific geographic footprints, and these 615 projects are shown in the visual map. The remaining 243 projects are included in the full list of projects, below the map.
We aim to give context to China’s development finance by showing projects in relation to several types of socially and ecologically sensitive territories:
Indigenous Peoples’ Lands
National Protected Areas
Critical Habitat”

Medeiros, Evan S. (New York, NY: Council of Foreign Relations, 2021).
“Policymakers and analysts need to devote more energy and time to identifying and weighing risks of strategic competition—bilaterally, regionally, and globally—before determining the risks and costs the United States and its allies can and should assume to shape and deter China without provoking armed conflict. In other words, conflict prevention is only becoming more central to U.S.-China relations as competition becomes the defining frame for U.S. policy.”

Bermudez, Joseph, et al. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel – Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 15, 2021).
“Key Findings
• Recently acquired LANDSAT 7 and 8 thermal infrared imagery of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center provide strong indications that during March and April 2021, activity involving the heating of buildings and operations of facility support systems had resumed at several locations.
• These indications reveal clear patterns, distinct from the surrounding terrain and daily solar heating patterns, that suggest that the Radiochemistry Laboratory, its associated thermal plant, and the centrifuge plant resumed operations during the early part of March 2021 and have continued into mid-April 2021.
• Thermal patterns alone may not be able to explain the full extent of the operations by themselves, however, they may (and do in this case) provide clear evidence of operations at these locations.
• Likewise, these images provide strong indications that the IRT-DPRK reactor, 5MW(e) reactor, and the Experimental Light Water Reactor are not operating.
• As noted in our March 2021 report, this renewed activity is likely an indicator of a new reprocessing campaign designed to expand North Korea’s inventory of fissile material for nuclear weapons – a strategic political move by Kim Jong-un to continue slowly ratcheting up pressure on both the Biden administration and South Korean president Moon Jae-in, or a combination of both.”

Mix, Derek E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2021).
“Many U.S. officials and Members of Congress view the United Kingdom(UK) as the United States’ closest and most reliable ally. This perception stems from a combination of factors, including a sense of shared history, values, and culture; a large and mutually beneficial economic relationship; and extensive cooperation on foreign policy and security issues. The UK’s January 2020 withdrawal from the European Union (EU), often referred to as Brexit, is likely to change its international role and outlook in ways that affect U.S.-UK relations.”

Bouchet, Nicolas, Alexander Kleibrink, and Oana Popescu-Zamfir. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“Resilience is the key angle through which policymakers imagine the next-generation Eastern Partnership (EaP). Achieving it is a tough challenge for the EaP countries. They are exposed to geopolitical risks and some of their internal and border conflicts are escalating. The coronavirus pandemic has put pressure on their societies and state resources. This brief draws from the discussions at a conference organized by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, KfW Development Bank, and GMF.
This yielded recommendations for the new, ambitious, and measurable post-2020 deliverables—centered around building more resilient economies, empowering vibrant civil societies, and ensuring responsive and accountable state institutions.
While no one-size-fits-all solution is readily available, there are general guidelines that the EU could follow to improve the chances of success for the EaP, in line with its own policy of differentiation and ‘more for more.’ In particular, the future EaP could rely on building up the following pillars: strong civil society, conditionality, e-governance and digitalization, and fighting hybrid threats.”

Gallo, Marcy E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 16, 2021).
“The results of research and development (R&D) help inform the decisions that policymakers and the public reach on a wide range of issues, including human health and safety, the environment, agriculture, energy, and transportation. For example, scientific information is essential to the review and approval of drugs and medical devices and the setting of air quality standards. There is broad agreement among policymakers and the scientific and engineering community about ensuring the integrity of the conduct, communication, and management of R&D, and its use in policy development and decisionmaking. However, recently, some policymakers and others have alleged that presidential administrations of both parties have violated the principles of scientific integrity. Assertions of such violations include weighting the membership of federal advisory committees toward a particular viewpoint or constituency, targeting individual scientists for harassment or adverse actions, appointing agency officials with significant conflicts of interest or antagonistic views toward an agency’s mission or neutrality to science, improperly editing scientific documents, and using the budget process to impede the implementation or formulation of science-based policies.”

Chatham House. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The Inclusive Governance Initiative, launched in 2020 as Chatham House marked its centenary, is exploring how global governance can be reshaped to meet the challenges of today’s world. The COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the urgent need for change in the structures and mechanisms of international cooperation. Greater inclusiveness must be a central ingredient, and must go beyond symbolism: the meaningful inclusion of a wider range of non-state actors and the more equitable participation of states are essential for progress on complex, interconnected global issues. The transformation of multilateral bodies and international governance structures into effective agents of change for today’s world is long overdue.”

Morrison, J. Stephen, Katherine E. Bliss, and Anna McCaffrey. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“It is in the United States’ strategic interests to ensure that the world mobilizes effectively to end the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. A proactive U.S. role is essential to secure the gains underway in the United States and ensure Americans’ health, safety, and prosperity into the future. Helping to secure the future of lower- and middle-income countries is also simply the right thing to do, on humanitarian, economic, and security grounds.”

Townsend, Jim, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2021).
“In the Arctic, Russia and China’s interests are converging around resource extraction projects, the expansion of the Northern Sea Route, and the enhancement of operational awareness and security cooperation. The increasing synergy in the Arctic will be most consequential for the United States on two fronts: First, Beijing is working with Moscow to improve its military capabilities. Second, Russia is increasing its economic reliance on China in the Arctic in ways that may raise Moscow’s willingness to back Beijing’s priorities in other regions and on other issues to avoid jeopardizing its economic ties with Beijing.”

National Intelligence Council. (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2021).
“Welcome to the 7th edition of the National Intelligence Council’s ‘Global Trends’ report. Published every four years since 1997, ‘Global Trends’ assesses the key trends and uncertainties that will shape the strategic environment for the United States during the next two decades. ‘Global Trends’ is designed to provide an analytic framework for policymakers early in each administration as they craft national security strategy and navigate an uncertain future. The goal is not to offer a specific prediction of the world in 2040; instead, our intent is to help policymakers and citizens see what may lie beyond the horizon and prepare for an array of possible futures…This edition of ‘Global Trends’ constructs its analysis of the future in several stages. First, we examine structural forces in demographics, environment, economics, and technology that shape the contours of our future world. Second, we analyze how these structural forces and other factors—combined with human responses—affect emerging dynamics in societies, states, and the international system. Third, we envision five plausible scenarios for the distant future in 2040. The key themes discussed above appear across these sections.”

Blinken, Antony J. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2021).
“The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – the Human Rights Reports – cover internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international agreements. The U.S. Department of State submits reports on all countries receiving assistance and all United Nations member states to the U.S. Congress in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Trade Act of 1974.”

Wong, Leonard, and Stephen J. Gerras. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2021).
“Previous studies analyzing disability compensation have decried its $76 billion annual budget or warned of its perverse ability to incentivize veterans not to work. This study focuses on the impact of this moral hazard on the US Army profession. If soldiers continue to capitalize on an extremely permissive disability system, the trust between society and the military may be threatened, and future Army readiness may be jeopardized should disability compensation be added to the marginal cost of a soldier. More importantly, many of today’s soldiers are rationalizing disability compensation as something owed to them—not for a debilitating injury, but for the hardships of service to the nation. This study uses US Army and Department of Veterans Affairs personnel files, soldier interviews, and discussions with senior leaders to support its conclusions. The intent of the study is to prompt the Army profession to act before the culture surrounding disability compensation becomes permanent. In the end, the essence of the entitlement—taking care of veterans—must remain sacrosanct. This call for reform is driven not by fiscal considerations, but by a desire for the Army to remain both an institution trusted by society and a profession marked by selfless service.”

Curtice, Scott. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2021).
“Major Curtice applies three theoretical models of nuclear proliferation and argues that they are more accurate when used in conjunction with each other than separately. Nuclear proliferation, Curtice states, occurs when Domestic Politics-Positive and Normative-Positive pressures are greater than their negative counterparts when a state is facing a security threat. By using India as a theoretical model, Major Curtice demonstrates how threats from neighboring countries, as well as internal political perspective shifts, changed the country from championing nuclear disarmament to conducting nuclear tests in just one decade.”

Caudill, Shannon W. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2021).
“This third and final volume in the AU Press monograph series Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency provides concise principles designed to assist Air Force and Space Force commanders in better understanding their role in base defense to better protect their people, resources, and war-fighting assets…This volume provides future wing, group, and squadron commanders and maturing Air Force and Space Force leaders some guiding principles through which they can better lead, protect, and secure their people, and air- and space power assets. Volume III outlines 10 base defense principles for commanders: (1) You Own It! (commander responsibilities for base defense); (2) Get Left of the Boom: Deter, Disrupt, Deceive; (3) Influence the Base Security Zone . . . or Someone Else Will; (4) Unity of Effort: Synchronize the Fight; (5) Everyone Must Have a Role in the Base Defense . . . and Play It!; (6) Intelligence Drives Maneuver: A Joint-Interagency Approach Is Critical; (7) Air-mindedness Includes Using Air Assets for Base Defense; (8) Law Enforcement Skills Are Critical to Base Defense and Irregular Warfare; (9) Manage the Risk: Commit Intellectual Capital to the Fight; and (10) Nowhere to Hide: Anticipate Future Threats and Develop Countermeasures.”

Chanlett-Avery, Emma, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 6. 2021).
“Japan is a significant partner of the United States in a number of foreign policy areas, including addressing regional security concerns, which range from hedging against Chinese military modernization to countering threats from North Korea. The U.S.-Japan military alliance, formed in 1952, grants the U.S. military the right to base U.S. troops—currently around 54,000 strong—and other military assets on Japanese territory, undergirding the ‘forward deployment’ of U.S. troops in East Asia. In return, the United States pledges to help defend Japan. The two countries collaborate through multiple bilateral and multilateral institutions on issues such as science and technology, global health, energy, and agriculture. With new leadership in both capitals since September 2020, the two countries have moved quickly to reaffirm their relationship and to embark on new initiatives, from utilizing the ‘Quad’ framework with Australia and India to expanding climate and energy cooperation.”

Bermudez, Joseph, and Victor Cha. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel – Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Key Findings
• The recent repositioning of the submersible missile test stand barge was not an isolated event, but the latest in a series of small naval movements at the shipyard during the past several weeks.
• It is unclear if these movements portend preparations for a forthcoming submarine launched ballistic missile test (potentially of a Pukkuksong-4 or -5), the need for maintenance, repairs, and/or installation of new equipment, or the launching of North Korea’s long-anticipate first true ballistic missile submarine (SSB).
• North Korea retains the capability and resources to launch the new SSB or conduct additional SLBM tests at any time of its choosing.
• No significant activity is observed at the static test stand and there are no indications of either a recent SLBM ‘pop-up’ test or preparations for an upcoming test. However, small construction activity is noted immediately north of the test stand.
• No significant activity is observed elsewhere at the shipyard.
• The launching of the new SSB or testing of an SLBM (at sea or from the static test stand) would present significant challenges to the new U.S. administration of President Biden.”

Doshi, Rush. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“This report is motivated by China’s growing influence in telecommunications and the growing controversy accompanying that influence. However, China’s telecommunications resources, ambitions, and strategic framing are intertwined with those around IT more broadly. For that reason, this report reviews Chinese government, commercial, and academic discussion of both IT generally and telecommunications specifically. This report also contextualizes its analysis in terms of Beijing’s program to become a ‘cyber great power,’ also translated as ‘network great power,’ the blueprint for China’ ambitions to leapfrog legacy industrial leaders and define the architecture of the digital revolution. A new technological landscape is taking shape. China works to define that landscape. More than ever, it is imperative that China’s ambitions be documented.”

Horrigan, John B., and Jorge Reina Schement. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
"Unequal access to broadband Internet threatens to undermine the ability of Americans to participate in their economy, their communities, and in their democracy. Without change in this regard, the country will have a difficult time rebuilding after the coronavirus pandemic.”

Runde, Daniel F., Linnea Sandin, and Amy Doring. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Since the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)—a cornerstone of U.S.-Caribbean economic engagement—was launched almost four decades ago, the United States has provided considerable foreign assistance to the region, which remains a source of reliable allies with security and economic ties. However, the United States often undervalues its relationship with the Caribbean. The United States–Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 sought to address this, increasing engagement with the governments, private sector, and civil society of the region. Yet it is necessary to further reimagine the U.S. approach to the Caribbean in order to emphasize its promising opportunities and identify diverse focal points for engagement.”

Hoehn, John R. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
“The Department of Defense (DOD) is in the process of a once-in-a-generation modernization of its approach to commanding military forces. Senior DOD leaders have stated that the department’s existing command and control architecture is insufficient to meet the demands of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is DOD’s concept to connect sensors from all of the military services—Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Space Force—into a single network. DOD points to ride-sharing service Uber as an analogy to describe its desired end state for JADC2. Uber combines two different apps—one for riders and a second for drivers. Using the respective users’ positions, the Uber algorithm determines the optimal match based on distance, travel time, and passengers (among other variables). In the case of JADC2, that logic would find the optimal platform to attack a given target, or the unit best able to address an emerging threat. For JADC2 to work effectively, DOD is pursuing two emerging technologies: automation and artificial intelligence, and new communications methods.”

Hoehn, John R., Kelley M. Sayler, and Jill C. Gallagher. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
“Communication using the electromagnetic spectrum (‘the spectrum’) enables a number of modern military capabilities. The Department of Defense (DOD) uses electromagnetic radiation to enable military communications, navigation, radar, nonintrusive inspection of aircraft, and other equipment. DOD also heavily relies on electromagnetic radiation for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) applications such as missile early warning and signals intelligence. Individual branches of the military (e.g., the Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Space Force) currently are allotted significant ranges of frequency bands to enable various equipment and applications that support military operations. Potential adversaries like China and Russia have observed how the United States wages war through conflicts ranging from Desert Storm to Allied Force, Iraqi Freedom, and Enduring Freedom over the past 30 years. These potential adversaries have identified the DOD’s use of the spectrum as a critical enabler, and, as a result, have developed weapon systems, particularly electronic warfare (EW) platforms, designed to challenge the DOD’s ability to effectively use the spectrum.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 18, 2021).
“China’s actions in the SCS [South China Sea] in recent years—including extensive island-building and base-construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.”

Marine Corps War College. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2021).
“The vision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for professional military education is clear: the Marine Corps War College (MCWAR) needs to help prepare Joint leaders, senior staff officers, and strategists to ‘execute and adapt strategy through campaigns and operations’ and ‘conduct joint warfighting at the operational to strategic levels.’ To achieve this, MCWAR students must first grapple with the fundamentals of national security strategy and grand strategy formulation before delving into the complexities of military strategy. This is the purpose of ‘The Marine Corps War College Strategy Primer.’ It not only provides students an overview of the elements of strategic logic but also introduces a cognitive model for developing and assessing strategy by leveraging innovative design methodologies and other critical and creative thinking approaches. In short, this primer aids in forging strategically minded warfighters who understand how the military instrument fits within a whole-of-government strategy. Only then can MCWAR’s historical case studies effectively teach the art and science of the ‘strategy bridge,’ nesting military options in support of policy ends in shared pursuit of a better peace.”

Stoltenberg, Jens. (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2021).
“On 16 March 2021, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg released his Annual Report for 2020. It covers NATO’s work and achievements throughout the year, including efforts to ensure the health crisis did not become a security crisis, and preparations under the NATO 2030 initiative to future-proof the Alliance. The Report includes the results of new polls on the public perception of the Alliance. These demonstrate that, in a year of upheaval, overall support for the NATO Alliance, the transatlantic bond and collective defence remains strong.”

Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. (Simi Valley, CA: Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute, 2021).
“The Reagan National Defense Survey is a public opinion poll that assists elected officials, policymakers, and key stakeholders with understanding how Americans view a wide array of defense, foreign policy, and national security matters.”

Davies, Andrew. (Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021).
“This report analyses the future impact that hypersonic weaponery will have on global affairs.”

Zhang, Albert, and Jacob Wallis. (Barton, Australian Capital Territory: Australian Strategic Policy Institute: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2021).
“As international media and researchers expose human rights abuses in China, including allegations of systematic sexual assault in Xinjiang’s internment camps, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is hitting back with a coordinated information campaign and propaganda targeting the UK public broadcaster, the BBC…The coordinated approach to counter and undermine the BBC highlights several features of the CCP’s increasingly agile propaganda and disinformation apparatus. There’s clear temporal and narrative alignment across diplomatic and state media messaging as well as among pro-CCP influencers and patriotic Twitter accounts, from which we can infer a level of coordination and a willingness to target international audiences.”

Army Talent Management Task Force. (Washington, DC: US Army, 2021).
“The Army Talent Management Task Force was founded in 2016 by then Lt. Gen. James McConville, chief of Army personnel. In 2019, as the 44th Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. McConville announced The Army People Strategy which provides the vision and mission for the Army to ‘acquire, develop, employ and retain the diversity of Soldier and Civilian talent needed to achieve Total Army readiness.’ In 2020, the Army implemented more than a dozen new initiatives that transform the Army from a data-poor personnel system to a datarich 21st Century Talent Management System.”

Hope, Gregory C. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021).
“The American Army’s mobilization for World War I was fraught with difficulties, resulting in a number of failings that produced a capable but flawed expeditionary force. The traditional interpretation of army training during that conflict was lackluster as it produced combat units that lacked critical capabilities. The experience of learning how to train and how to write training doctrine produced positive results that historians have largely overlooked. This study examines the status of training in the pre-war army to include both existing doctrine and institutional management organizations. It then chronicles the wartime experience and traces the evolution of training doctrine and practices during the war. It concludes by looking at the immediate post-war years to determine what lasting impacts the wartime experiences had on training doctrine and management. Overall, this study concludes that the training effort during World War I had significant long-term benefits for the army, producing the foundation of the army’s training practices through World War II.”

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. (Arlington, VA: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2021).
“The mandate of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence’s (NSCAI) is to make recommendations to the President and Congress to ‘advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated technologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United States.’ This Final Report presents the NSCAI’s strategy for winning the artificial intelligence era. The 16 chapters in the Main Report provide topline conclusions and recommendations. The accompanying Blueprints for Action outline more detailed steps that the U.S. Government should take to implement the recommendations.”

Engler, Alex. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“This year is poised to be a highly impactful period for the governance of artificial intelligence (AI). The Trump administration successfully pushed for hundreds of millions of dollars in AI research funding, while also encouraging the formalization of federal AI practices. President Joe Biden will start his new administration with federal agencies already working to comply with executive guidance on how to use and regulate AI. Beyond passing the AI spending increases, Congress also tasked the White House with creating a new National AI Initiative Office to orchestrate these developments. All this comes as the European Commission (EC) has put forth the Digital Services Act, which will create oversight for how internet platforms use AI. The EC is also poised to propose a comprehensive approach to AI safeguards in the spring. Taking all this into account, 2021 promises to be an important inflection point for AI policy.”

Yoshihara, Toshi, and Jack Bianchi. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2021).
“China’s military is going global. In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, beyond the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies and partners, who have enjoyed largely unobstructed access to the world’s oceans for the last three decades, will need to adjust to new military realities as the PLA makes its presence felt in faraway theaters.”

Business Executives for National Security. (Washington, DC: Business Executives for National Security, 2021).
“COVID-19 has exposed critical weaknesses in America’s planning and processes for responding to threats and emergencies. The components of an integrated national response capability are largely in place, but major roadblocks prevent the execution of quick, coordinated, and effective action during a prolonged crisis that simultaneously impacts every corner of the country. Unless these weaknesses are addressed, future pandemics, natural disasters, coordinated cyberattacks, or acts of terror will have enormous potential to imperil our citizens, cripple our infrastructure, threaten our economy, and put our national security at risk.”

Felbab-Brown, Vanda. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“The global public health and economic devastation caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) outbreak dramatically reinforces the urgent imperative to minimize the chances of another zoonotic pandemic. Reducing the likelihood of another viral spillover sweeping the world requires a fundamental change in how we interact with nature. It requires minimizing human interface with wild animals and wild spaces; eliminating transmission points where the likelihood of viral spillover to humans is high, such as unhygienic commercial markets in wild animal meat and live animals; better monitoring of the legal trade in wildlife; diligently suppressing illegal and unsustainable trade in wildlife; and conserving natural habitats. Conserving natural habitats in turn requires profound changes in human food production and human encroachment on remaining natural habitats. Decisionmaking about pandemic prevention and nature conservation must be elevated to the highest levels of governments on a permanent basis. Such changes will not be easy or cheap, but they are necessary.”

Hanchuk, Pavel. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“With the ongoing drastic transformation of the Euro­pean security environment, problems of national resilience against hybrid destructive activity occupy a major place in policymaking at the state and inter­national levels. This paper looks at how to foster the capacities of the security sectors of Eastern European countries to withstand the newly emerged combina­tion of threats emanating from Russia. Its assertive actions that have already led to territorial and human losses represent a serious challenge to state sovereignty and societal well-being. The issue is vital especially for the Eastern European countries that constitute the front line of resistance to Russia’s malign activity. This paper looks at two very close and yet consid­erably different countries—Belarus and Ukraine— to illustrate the challenges of adapting to a volatile geopolitical environment. It presents a comparative overview of transformations in their security sectors in response to Russia’s hybrid activities since 2014. It also reveals the main drawbacks in the security poli­cies of Belarus and Ukraine in response to the changed security landscape.”

Thompson, Jack, Danny Pronk, and Hugo van Manen. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2021).
“The purpose of this report is to analyze why, amidst profound transformations in the international system, the US-Dutch and US-European relationships have changed permanently and to offer recommendations for what the Netherlands and its European partners should do over the next ten years to preserve their interests and values. The report’s principal argument is that the election of Biden offers the European Union an opportunity to boost its nascent status as a global power, and that the Netherlands should play an active role in this effort. The report contends that the Netherlands and European Union should proactively seek a more equal relationship with Washington, one that empowers the Netherlands and Europe to accept more responsibility for their own security and for promoting peace and stability in their region. Among other tasks, this will require cultivating more flexible and adept coalition-building strategies and the development of more effective and robust military capabilities.”

Streamed live on Feb 19, 2021. Streaming video. 3:22:11.
“On February 19, 2021, the MSC Special Edition assembled some of the world’s most senior decision-makers. At the very time and place the MSC 2021 would have kicked-off normally, they discussed in a live broadcast how to rebuild and renew the transatlantic alliance and highlight the areas in which transatlantic and international cooperation are most urgently needed.”

Pérouse de Montclos, Marc-Antoine. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The dominant narrative of a global jihadi threat has overshadowed the key role played by military nepotism, prevarication and indiscipline in generating and perpetuating conflict in countries of the Western Sahel. This narrative has pushed the international community to intervene to regulate local conflicts that have little to do with global terrorism or religious indoctrination. Mali offers a clear example of how structural failings that long predate the ‘war on terror’ – evident in poor governance and weak state security mechanisms – have been the main driver of the growth of insurgent groups over the past decade. By contrast, the recent experience of Niger, which shares many of the structural and historical challenges faced by Mali, demonstrates that progress is possible where deliberate steps are taken to achieve more inclusive governance. External actors – national and multilateral – see engagement in the Sahel as critical, but a primary focus on insurgent groups as terrorists limits the policy options available to them to help promote regional stability and limit human suffering. Reframing responses away from ‘hard’ counterterrorism towards a more holistic view of human security, and an emphasis on tackling underlying challenges of governance, impunity and development, may offer a more durable route to peace and stability in the Sahel.”

Institute for Economics and Peace. (Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2021).
“This report by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) estimates the economic impact of violence and conflict on the global economy. In 2019, it was estimated to be $14.4 trillion in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This is equivalent to 10.5 per cent of the global gross domestic product (GDP) or $1,895 per person.”

Seah, S. et al. (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Centre ISEAS [Institute of Southeast Asian Studies] -Yusof Ishak Institute, 2021).
“‘The State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report’ presents the findings of a region-wide online survey conducted among the policy, research, business, civil society, and media communities. For the first time, three different language options were offered: English, Bahasa Indonesia and Vietnamese. A total of 1,032 respondents from ten ASEAN member states participated in the online survey.”

Mohan, Garima, and Dhruva Jaishankar. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“In this edited series, experts from the United States, Europe, and India provide ideas that can move U.S.-India and Europe-India cooperation forward, setting the agenda for 2021. Focusing on five policy areas—foreign policy toward allies and partners, global trade and economic cooperation, critical technologies, security in the Indo-Pacific, and global health—they recommend areas which the Biden administration, the Modi government, and the EU should prioritize, assess the usefulness of new arrangements like D10, the Summit for Democracy, and technology alliances, and outline the roadblocks and challenges the United States, India and Europe will have to navigate this year. This series is part of the India Trilateral Forum, conducted in partnership with the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation, and is edited by Garima Mohan (GMF) and Dhruva Jaishankar (ORF).”

Segal, Stephanie, and Dylan Gerstel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The CSIS Economics Program launched ‘Degrees of Separation’ to establish clearer objectives for U.S. engagement with China and to assess whether disengagement from specific economic activities can help in meeting such objectives. This interim report reviews the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship since President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. It takes stock of the current bilateral economic relationship, with particular focus on trade, investment, and innovation linkages. The report identifies six distinct areas that motivated U.S.-China engagement from 1972 through the end of the Trump administration: (1) geostrategy; (2) economics; (3) human rights and civil society; (4) global rules and norms; (5) global public goods; and (6) technology and innovation. While specific objectives in each area continue to evolve, these six areas remain relevant to guiding bilateral engagement today. A subsequent report, delivered later this year, will present a framework for assessing specific economic activities as candidates for targeted decoupling, along with case studies designed to test the framework.”

Kennedy, Scott, and Yilin Wang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which oversees the world’s largest financial system, struggles to effectively communicate with market actors, domestic and foreign. Yi Gang, the current governor of the PBOC, despite being more reticent than his counterparts around the world, has spoken on more public occasions than his predecessor. As a result of Yi’s personal interest as well as changes in the PBOC’s communications strategy, the bank has gained greater public visibility. However, this recent activism should not be mistaken as a sign of greater autonomy or authority. The PBOC has assumed a more important role in China’s overall financial governance, taking up a ‘dual-pillar’function that included both monetary policymaking and macro-prudential management; but it is still far from an independent central bank whose words convey great authority. U.S. policymakers and the financial community should pay close attention to how the PBOC speaks to markets to understand how Chinese economic policies are implemented, but everyone should recognize that on critical issues, higher authorities within the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still set the agenda and speak most authoritatively for the regime.”

Lehr, Amy K., and Henry C. Wu. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“This report is the fourth in a series that the CSIS Human Rights Initiative has produced identifying strategies for businesses, governments, nongovernmental organizations, and multilateral organizations to coordinate and address forced labor linked to China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). The XUAR produces around a fifth of the world’s cotton and is its largest exporter of textiles and apparel. Due to repressive government programs transferring hundreds of thousands of members of Muslim minority populations into jobs in the XUAR, production in China may introduce forced labor into global supply chains. To avoid these forced labor-affected inputs, multiple actors must work together to develop new sourcing opportunities. This report argues that to speed the development of alternate sourcing hubs that are free of XUAR-linked forced labor, public and private actors must coordinate to encourage long-term investment in new locations, and international human rights and environmental standards must form a fundamental element of the strategy. Preferential trade policy, infrastructure and development aid, import restrictions and sanctions, public apparel procurement, and investment incentives all offer opportunities to diversify supply chains and protect garment workers’ labor rights. Countries in Asia, Central America, and East and West Africa show potential for expanding their roles in the apparel, textile, and footwear sectors.”

Hill, Steven. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force on 22 January 2021. As part of a project examining NATO obligations and how they interact with nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament law and policy, this paper focuses on what the entry into force of the TPNW should mean for members of the NATO Alliance. NATO has long maintained a strong unified position in opposition to the new treaty, meaning that under current circumstances it is unlikely that any NATO member will join the TPNW. But the reality for NATO, its members and partners is that the TPNW is now here to stay. There is a risk that if the Alliance maintains an intense focus on opposing the TPNW, this may obscure NATO’s broader long-standing commitment to global nuclear disarmament, and may undermine the potential for NATO and supporters of the TPNW to work together to advance the common goal of nuclear disarmament.”

Africa Growth Initiative. (Washington, DC: Brookings 2021).
“With this and every iteration of Foresight Africa, we aim to capture the top priorities for the region in the coming year, offering recommendations for African and global stakeholders for creating and supporting a strong, sustainable, and successful Africa. In doing so, we hope that Foresight Africa 2021 will promote a dialogue on the key issues influencing development policy and practice in Africa during the upcoming year. Such ideas will ultimately provide sound strategies for sustaining and expanding the benefits of economic growth to all people of Africa in the years ahead.”

Meester, Jos. (The Hague, The Netherlands: Clingendael - the Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 2021).
“This policy brief provides an examination of China’s rise in relation to its African partners. It takes into account geopolitical concerns, but homes in on China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its means of expanding into Africa. It examines the role of the Digital Silk Road in the use of Chinese artificial intelligence and technology transfers on surveillance and the risks of repression. The brief aims to move beyond the politicised narratives surrounding Chinese involvement in Africa by testing them against practical initiatives on the ground. It examines Ethiopia, particularly its burgeoning tech hub known as the ‘Sheba Valley’, in order to understand China’s role in development in African countries. Ethiopia is a critical case because of:
• the country’s strong relations with China, leading Ethiopia to model its developmental state model on the Chinese one and incentivising civil servants to learn from the Chinese experience;
• Ethiopia’s attempt to develop its relatively advanced ICT hub (the Sheba Valley) in collaboration with China’s Shenzhen-based ICT hub;
• Ethiopia’s historically heavy surveillance and repressive practices, in part modelled on China’s practice of prioritising development over democratic reform.”

Schenkkan, Nate, and Isabel Linzer. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2021).
“What Is Transnational Repression? It is governments reaching across borders to silence dissent among diasporas and exiles, including through assassinations, illegal deportations, abductions, digital threats, Interpol abuse, and family intimidation. It is a daily assault on civilians everywhere — including in democracies like the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, and Australia.”

Bahar, Dany, and Selen Özdoğan. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2021).
“The productivity dynamics of Japan, in particular, are quite intriguing. Most developed nations have seen sharp slowdowns in their productivity growth since 2004, but the Japanese case is puzzling because productivity growth decelerated just as sharply there, even though productivity levels continue to lag well behind countries such as the U.S. and Germany.”

Runde, Dan, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Over the past two decades, the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala have undergone significant change and have faced a multitude of political, environmental, economic, and security challenges. Many of these challenges reinforce each other and include gang violence and insecurity, high levels of public debt, poverty, natural disaster vulnerability, corruption, weakened economic growth, and irregular migration issues. The Covid-19 pandemic has also greatly impacted the Northern Triangle and the larger global economy, for example in global supply chains and infrastructure development. Following the pandemic, there will be many opportunities for the United States to engage with development efforts in the Northern Triangle, including collaborating with allies to address the root causes of migration, bolster institutional capacity, fight corruption, protect human rights issues, and foster an enabling economic environment. The Biden administration has already committed to increasing U.S. foreign policy in the region, not to mention President Biden’s considerable experience working with the Northern Triangle countries. As vice president, he led the Alliance for Prosperity (A4P) initiative and made several trips to the region. An effective strategy in the region from the Biden administration can boost economic resiliency, stem migration to the United States, mitigate the impact of organized crime, and enhance citizen security.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated January 28, 2021).
“China’s actions in the SCS in recent years—including extensive island-building and base construction activities at sites that it occupies in the Spratly Islands, as well as actions by its maritime forces to assert China’s claims against competing claims by regional neighbors such as the Philippines and Vietnam—have heightened concerns among U.S. observers that China is gaining effective control of the SCS, an area of strategic, political, and economic importance to the United States and its allies and partners. Actions by China’s maritime forces at the Japan administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS) are another concern for U.S. observers. Chinese domination of China’s near-seas region—meaning the SCS and ECS, along with the Yellow Sea—could substantially affect U.S. strategic, political, and economic interests in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated January 27, 2021).
“In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for more than 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific. Some U.S. observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, particularly for building larger surface ships, and resulting trend lines regarding the relative sizes China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.”

Anonymous. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2021).
“Key Points
• The single most important challenge facing the United States and the democratic world in the twenty-first century is the rise of an increasingly authoritarian and aggressive China under Xi Jinping. China has long had an integrated, operational strategy for dealing with the United States. The United States has so far had no such strategy with regard to China. This is a dereliction of national responsibility.
• US strategy and policy toward China must be laser-focused on the fault lines among Xi and his inner circle–aimed at changing their objectives and behavior and thus their strategic course. Communist Party elites are much more divided about Xi’s leadership and vast ambitions than is widely appreciated.
• The foremost goal of US strategy should be to cause China’s ruling elites to conclude that it is in China’s best interests to continue operating within the US-led liberal international order rather than building a rival order, and that it is in the Chinese Communist Party’s best interests to not attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.”

Kania, Elsa B., and Lorand Laskai. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“In U.S. policy debates on China, military-civil fusion (MCF) has emerged as a frequent subject of debate and concern. Once a niche topic of study among only avid watchers of Chinese military modernization and defense technological development, Beijing’s drive to break down barriers and create stronger linkages between its civilian economy and defense industrial base has started to draw considerable attention in Washington. During Donald Trump’s administration, Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials across the State Department and Defense Department, and members of Congress all devoted time to MCF in speeches, using it to justify a broad range of policies. These included expanding investigations into intellectual property theft, banning Huawei from U.S. networks and critical infrastructure, urging companies like Microsoft and Google to stop working with Chinese counterparts, and even advocating for ‘decoupling’ from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as in supply chains and by limiting technological collaboration. MCF has emerged as a key analytic driver of the intensifying economic and technological competition between the United States and the PRC in recent years. While Joe Biden’s administration will have an opportunity to reset the tone of the U.S.-China relationship and recalibrate the use of instruments of U.S. policy, China’s model of MCF is likely to remain a major concern for U.S. policymakers.”

Mecklin, John (ed). (Chicago, IL: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2021).
“It is 100 seconds to midnight.”
“Founded in 1945 by Albert Einstein and University of Chicago scientists who helped develop the first atomic weapons in the Manhattan Project, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists created the Doomsday Clock two years later, using the imagery of apocalypse (midnight) and the contemporary idiom of nuclear explosion (countdown to zero) to convey threats to humanity and the planet. The Doomsday Clock is set every year by the Bulletin’s Science and Security Board in consultation with its Board of Sponsors, which includes 13 Nobel laureates. The Clock has become a universally recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to catastrophe from nuclear weapons, climate change, and disruptive technologies in other domains.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, Last Updated January 28, 2021).
“The Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States. The interactive covers nearly thirty conflicts with background information and resources on each conflict.”

Mutschler, Max, and Marius Bales. (Bonn, Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion, 2020).
“Every year, BICC’s Global Militarisation Index (GMI) presents the relative weight and importance of a country’s military apparatus in relation to its society as a whole. The GMI 2020 covers 151 states and is based on the latest available figures (in most cases data for 2019). The index project is financially supported by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“‘Global Forecast’ is an annual collection of essays by CSIS experts focused on the critical issues facing the United States and the world in the year ahead.”

ACAPS. (Geneva, Switzerland: ACAPS, 2021).
“Crisis In Sight is the new ACAPS analysis portfolio which enables you to compare the severity of crises globally as well as the level of humanitarian access, while providing trends analysis and a forward-looking scan for risks. In order to measure the severity of a crisis, we use the INFORM Severity Index which brings together 31 core indicators, organised in three dimensions: impact, conditions of affected people, and complexity.”

Shahbaz, Adrian, and Allie Funk. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2020).
“The coronavirus pandemic is accelerating a dramatic decline in global internet freedom. For the 10th consecutive year, users have experienced an overall deterioration in their rights, and the phenomenon is contributing to a broader crisis for democracy worldwide.”

Bunde, Tobias, et al. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2020).
“30 years after German unification, the Federal Republic is confronted with enormous challenges. Europe's security is threatened, Europe's democracies are on the defensive. The special edition of the Munich Security Report ‘Zeitenwende | Wendezeiten’ provides an overview of the state of German foreign and security policy six years after the ‘Munich consensus’.”

Eisentraut, Sophie, et al. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2020).
“In just a few short months, the coronavirus pandemic has become a polypandemic – a health crisis that is accompanied by various other pandemics, among them the pandemics of poverty and hunger, of nationalism and authoritarianism.”

Cancian, Mark F., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“With the shift of U.S. strategic focus to great power competition, interest in industrial mobilization for a long-term, high-intensity conflict has returned. However, the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not designed to meet this challenge. To gain insight into the ability of the defense industrial base to meet the demands of great power conflict, this project reviewed the history and literature on industrial mobilization and then analyzed the time needed to replace contemporary weapon systems’ inventory at peacetime and surge production rates. This analysis was based on an original database developed using production data found in the P-21 and P-40 exhibits in the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement justification books from 1999, 2008, and 2020. The study found that it would take many years to replace weapon inventories in the event of a long, high-intensity conflict, even at surge production rates. Further, the study found that the industrial base has become more brittle over time, as it takes longer to replace inventories at FY 2020 production rates than at FY 1999 production rates.”

Watling, Jack, and Sean MacFarland. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2021).
“The diminished expectation of large-scale warfighting in the wake of the Cold War, combined with the liberation from a rigid echelon system enabled by modern communications technology, has reduced the emphasis on the corps in Western militaries. The return of great power competition, however, has seen a renewed interest in corps-level command. But the corps’ tasks have evolved since 1991. The expanded range and precision of fires makes divisional headquarters and enablers increasingly vulnerable, requiring them to be lean tactical formations. This pushes a greater planning, sustainment and force protection burden on the corps, which is likely to also be the echelon at which tactical multi-domain deep effects are coordinated. This paper considers the capabilities that the future corps will require and the challenges in rationalising the corps echelon within NATO. It argues that overcoming interoperability challenges requires extensive exercising with subordinate formations, which necessitates a shift in NATO from ‘rapid reaction’ to being ‘long prepared’.”

German Transatlanticists Group. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“A new consensus must confirm shared goals and necessary implementing measures. Germany and the United States will need to accept their responsibility for the cohesion and creative power of the community of liberal democracies. In particular, they must agree that a new consensus must be reached, especially regarding the United States role and presence in Europe and Germany, aiming to fortify the alliance well beyond the new president’s term in office. Common solutions are urgently needed to combat the scourges on humanity caused by the coronavirus pandemic and global warming. This collaboration on the challenges of our time should attract a new generation and new civil society actors to the transatlantic relationship.”

Hersman, Rebecca, Eric Brewer, and Maxwell Simon. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Arctic is growing in geostrategic importance and potentially becoming yet another zone for strategic competition, as this previously impenetrable territory becomes increasingly accessible to navigation and exploitation. The region is resource rich: it is estimated to contain 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and 30 percent of its natural gas reserves. Diminishing sea ice coverage is opening travel routes that can significantly shorten travel times between Europe and Asia. Traditionally, the Arctic states have relied on cooperative governance to manage competing interests in the region. However, as Arctic temperatures increase, new economic, scientific, maritime, and political opportunities are raising the question of whether the region will become more militarized and further engage competitive dynamics between the United States, China, and Russia.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. Beyond the traditional military services, military forces include the new Space Force as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF, which functions as a quasi-service), Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (which perform many functions that military personnel perform in other countries), and contractors (which form a permanent element of the national security establishment, not only in the United States proper but also on overseas battlefields).”

Katz, Brian. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) stands at the dawn of a new era of technological innovation and transformation unprecedented in its history. In this final report, the CSIS Technology and Intelligence Task Force set out to understand the emerging technology landscape, identify the opportunities and challenges to applying technology to intelligence missions, and generate recommendations that will enable the IC to adapt, integrate technology, and maintain an advantage over sophisticated rivals.”

U.S. Naval War College YouTube page. Posted December 10, 2020. 3 videos.
“Join the USNWC and Stockton Center for the 'Disruptive Technologies and International Law' conference where experts in the field will explore international law and multi-domain warfare.”

McCurdy, Daphne, and Frances Z. Brown. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• For the United States, civilian stabilization assistance in fragile states represents a potentially significant tool in the context of geopolitical competition because supporting locally legitimate political actors helps them stand up against external meddling.
• In eastern Syria, U.S. policymakers have sought to leverage stabilization efforts to counter Iranian and Russian influence, which resulted in limited success and moral dilemmas.
• In order for stabilization aid to be an effective means of advancing U.S. interests amid geopolitical competition, the United States needs to develop a stabilization strategy tied to a viable political end state and commit to more reliable, longer-term engagement.”

Hundt, Reed. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2021).
“The United States can create jobs, better compete against China, and at the same time address major social challenges if it leverages the emerging combination of technologies that will constitute ‘distributed computing’ to enable new, democracy-enhancing 21st century infrastructure. Three technologies—the Internet of Things, 5G, and artificial intelligence (AI)—will increasingly come together to compose a new digital revolution. The resulting distributed computing will function as a hugely enhanced combination of the smartphone and the cloud, or as a computer network in a box. It can unlock massive opportunities if the United States invests at home and works with allies to protect democratic values. Distributed computing can solve some of the country’s long-term challenges in climate, healthcare, transportation, and energy.”

Livingston, Scott. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the ‘Party’) is currently strengthening the presence and powers of internal Party organizations located within Chinese companies to ensure greater oversight and influence over China’s commercial sector.
• In addition, as part of what it calls the ‘modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics,’ the CCP is requiring that companies codify a role for these Party organizations in their corporate charters.
• These new developments challenge traditional understandings of corporate autonomy, and by extension, how Chinese companies should be treated under existing international trade agreements and by the regulatory and investment review bodies of foreign governments. Because the CCP might well attempt to extend this push into foreign private companies operating in China, these new actions pose a very real threat to the operational independence of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).
• To formulate an effective response, companies and governments in market economies should increase their understanding of how the CCP operates at the grassroots level and work to ensure greater transparency and understanding of the overall level of Party influence within specific firms. To further this transparency, U.S. policymakers could consider requiring securities issuers in the United States provide enhanced disclosures relating to CCP activities within their firms. The U.S. government should also consider reviving open-source data collection initiatives to publish and translate key CCP regulations and Party documents in order to increase understanding and spur further analysis of the Party system.”

Huguet, Alice, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2021).
“‘Truth Decay’—the diminishing role that facts, data, and analysis play in political and civic discourse—has in part been fueled by a complex and rapidly evolving media and technology ecosystem. For those interested in countering Truth Decay, media literacy (ML)—the ability to access, analyze, evaluate, create, and act using all forms of communication—has emerged as a potentially powerful tool. But the lack of specificity regarding ML competencies can challenge teachers, policymakers, curriculum developers, advocates, and researchers hoping to understand what kinds of ML education work best and how ML education can be implemented effectively. There is also no shortage of ML-relevant standards. The large number of existing standards can be an additional challenge for stakeholders trying to understand how to define ML for themselves and to determine what competencies are most important to their work. This report, part of the Countering Truth Decay initiative, describes how the authors synthesized myriad existing standards using the lens of Truth Decay—drawing from standards in ML, digital literacy, information literacy, news literacy, social and emotional learning, and other areas—to identify a single, concise set of ML standards.”

Stares, Paul B. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2021).
“A crisis stemming from North Korea’s continued development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile testing is the top-ranked conflict concern for 2021, according to the Council on Foreign Relations’ (CFR) thirteenth annual Preventive Priorities Survey. The survey identifies potential violent overseas conflicts where U.S. troops might be deployed in the year ahead. Conducted by CFR’s Center for Preventive Action (CPA) last November, the survey asks foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring or escalating in the next year and their potential impact on U.S. national interests.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2021).
“The 16th edition of the World Economic Forum’s ‘Global Risks Report’ analyses the risks from societal fractures—manifested through persistent and emerging risks to human health, rising unemployment, widening digital divides, youth disillusionment, and geopolitical fragmentation. Businesses risk a disorderly shakeout which can exclude large cohorts of workers and companies from the markets of the future. Environmental degradation—still an existential threat to humanity—risks intersecting with societal fractures to bring about severe consequences. Yet, with the world more attuned to risk, lessons can be drawn to strengthen response and resilience. In 2020, the risk of a pandemic became reality. As governments, businesses, and societies grapple with COVID-19, societal cohesion is more important than ever.”

U.S. Naval War College. January 8, 2021. Streaming video. 6 videos. Conference videos and handouts available at the bottom of the website linked to.
“This conference explores the national security and economic implications of climate change on the current and future security landscape. Strategically and operationally, this affects both our ally’s and adversary’s behavior leading to the open-ended question—what does it mean if the Department of Defense (DoD) adopts a posture that focuses on the strategic implications of climate change? Not only does this impact where, when, and why the United States gets involved around the world, the economic implications are cross-cutting at home. This includes the increased use of military forces for domestic response, building resilience of defense infrastructure, and the corresponding impacts on training and readiness. The changing climate also affects national security and economic interests in the oceans. Advancing U.S. economic, technological, environmental, security and defense interests in this internationally competitive environment requires a deeper understanding of the blue' or ocean economy and how that connects to the U.S. naval and national security concerns. Our defense, and the defense of countries around the world, is built within the context of a stable climate. From now on a stable climate is no longer a valid planning consideration. In fact, the changing climate can be seen as a high-probability, high-impact security threat presenting new risks around the world. We are proud to be the first DoD academic institution to host an open event exploring the national security significance of a changing climate. Videos from this event include:
NSSCC: Risk and Resilience - Introduction
NSSCC: SECNAV, Hon. Alice Hill, & Panel 1 - How a Changing Climate Affects Global Power Competition
NSSCC: Panel 2 - The Impacts of the Changing Climate on Fragile States Around the World
NSSCC: Panel 3 - Domestic Security Implications: Operations within the Homeland
NSSCC: Panel 4 - Department of Defense Budget and Infrastructure Considerations
NSSCC: Panel 5 - Blue Competition: U.S. & International Efforts to Develop a Blue Economy”

Department of the Navy. (Washington, DC: Department of Navy, 2021).
“America’s interests, stretching from Maine in the North Atlantic across the Arctic Ocean through the Bering Strait and Alaska in the North Pacific to the southern tip of the Aleutian Island chain, are best served by fostering compliance with existing rules to assure a peaceful and prosperous Arctic Region.This forward looking regional blueprint describes how the Department will apply naval power as we continue to prepare for a more navigable Arctic Region over the next two decades. It stresses an approach that integrates American naval power with our joint forces, interagency teammates, allies, and partners to preserve peace and protect this northern maritime crossroads and gateway to our shores. This regional blueprint focuses on coop-eration, but ensures America is prepared to compete effectively and efficiently to maintain favorable regional balances of power.Our Department Team—Sailors, Marines, and Civilians—has taken steps throughout our history to protect American interests in our northern waters. We will build upon these efforts to maintain enhanced presence, strengthen cooperative partnerships, and build more capable naval forces for the Arctic Region. The time has come to write the next great chapter in the history of our Department, to prepare for an Alaskan Arctic and a Blue Arctic where America’s Navy-Marine Corps team, alongside our allies and partners, will be called to protect our interests and people and ensure this region remains peaceful and prosperous for future generations.”

United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. (Washington, DC: United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard, 2020).
“‘Advantage at Sea’ is a Tri-Service Maritime Strategy that focuses on China and Russia, the two most significant threats to this era of global peace and prosperity. We prioritize competition with China due to its growing economic and military strength, increasing aggressiveness, and demonstrated intent to dominate its regional waters and remake the international order in its favor. Until China chooses to act as a responsible stakeholder rather than brandish its power to further its authoritarian interests, it represents the most comprehensive threat to the United States, our allies, and all nations supporting a free and open system.
Other rivals, including Iran, North Korea, violent extremist organizations, and transnational criminal organizations, also continue to subvert the international rules-based order. We will address these challengers in a coordinated, multinational manner with forces developed to address more significant military threats.
The stakes of this competition are high. China’s aggressive actions are undermining the international rules-based order, while its growing military capacity and capabilities are eroding U.S. military advantages at an alarming rate. The Naval Service must act with urgency, clarity, and vision to take the bold steps required to reverse these trends.
‘Advantage at Sea’ provides guidance to the Naval Service for the next decade to prevail across a continuum of competition—composed of interactions with other nations from cooperation to conflict. This strategy emphasizes the following five themes. We must fully leverage the complementary authorities and capabilities of the Naval Service to generate Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. We must strengthen our alliances and partnerships— our key strategic advantage in this long-term strategic competition—and achieve unity of effort. We must operate more assertively to prevail in day-to-day competition as we uphold the rules-based order and deter our competitors from pursuing armed aggression. If our rivals escalate into conflict, becoming our adversaries, we must control the seas to deny their objectives, defeat their forces, protect our homeland, and defend our allies. And, we must boldly modernize the future naval force to maintain credible deterrence and preserve our advantage at sea.”

Boswell, Alan, et al. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2021).
“From the COVID-19 pandemic to popular protests, civil unrest, and democratic backsliding, 2020 was quite the year! This year’s ‘Africa: Year in Review 2020’ is a special edition, marking the fifth year since the launch of the series. The Wilson Center Africa Program continued its annual tradition of asking policymakers, scholars, practitioners, and stakeholders to examine the top developments in Africa and in U.S.-Africa relations for 2020. Our contributors responded with the brief and insightful essays in this volume. We thank them for their contributions, which provide analysis on topics including the 2020 U.S. election results; COVID-19 diplomacy and mitigation; popular protests and the rise of African youth activists; Niger’s peaceful transfer of power; the military coup in Mali; the role of sovereign wealth funds in promoting sustainable development; and the importance of utilizing African knowledge and traditional medicine to combat COVID-19 and address the continent’s health needs, among other topics.”

Niblett, Robin. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2021).
“In this paper, Chatham House Director Robin Niblett sets out a proposed blueprint for Britain’s future foreign policy. Rather than reincarnate itself as a miniature great power, he argues that the country has the chance to remain internationally influential if it serves as the broker of solutions to global challenges. The paper lays out six international goals for the UK that offer the best points of connection between its interests, resources and credibility. These are: protecting liberal democracy; promoting international peace and security; tackling climate change; enabling greater global health resilience; championing global tax transparency and equitable economic growth; and defending cyberspace. In pursuit of these goals, the UK will need to invest in and leverage its unique combination of diplomatic reach, diverse security capabilities and prominence in international development. It should use these assets to link together liberal democracies and, where possible, engage alongside them with other countries that are willing to address shared international challenges constructively.”

Ellehuus, Rachel, and Donatienne Ruy. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Mediterranean basin sits strategically at the intersection of three continents, where events on one shore often shape those on the other. In recent years, geopolitical tensions have risen in this narrow region, along with instability caused by conflict, governance failures, and economic strife. The United States’ goal of maintaining favorable regional balances of power in Europe and the Middle East depends on developments around the Mediterranean. Traditionally a theater of U.S. and European activity, the Greater Mediterranean has seen a rise in Russian and Chinese influence. This risks jeopardizing the space for U.S. and NATO action. In addition to the recent influence activities, an increasing number of transnational threats emanate from NATO’s Southern Flank. Yet the U.S. government still lacks a comprehensive approach to the region that can overcome organizational silos and account for both influence and instability drivers. These silos create blind spots in which adversaries can grow their influence. This in turn blunts the United States’ ability to project power and influence in the Mediterranean.”

Devermont, Judd, and Marielle Harris. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The situation in the Sahel has never been more dire. As the crisis enters its tenth year, extremist violence is spreading, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is growing, and food insecurity is affecting more people than ever before.
• There are growing doubts about how the current diplomatic, development, and security approaches will facilitate a new peace. Indeed, there are several—not entirely congruent—working hypotheses underpinning foreign and regional government strategies.
• It is imperative to reassess and reset the strategy toward the Sahel, casting aside faulty assumptions. Specifically, the international community and its Sahelian partners should prioritize governance, press for an expanded peace process, cautiously dialogue with militants, and rework the division of labor between foreign and regional actors.”

Ellis, Evan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“As U.S. election challenges proceed toward resolution and President-elect Joseph Biden puts his transition team into place, Latin America and the Caribbean will demand his attention. The region—which most directly affects U.S. security and prosperity through ties of geography, commerce, and family—is in the early stages of potentially transformational economic, social, and political convulsions. They will affect the United States through heightened immigration, transnational criminal threats, and newly energized social movements and governments hostile to the United States. In addition, U.S. rivals such as China, Russia, and Iran will leverage the new dynamics to pursue their interests and expand their strategic position in the hemisphere at the expense of that of the United States. Compounding those challenges, the region’s expectations of the Biden administration, both good and bad, will affect each of these actors’ behaviors. In recent weeks, numerous articles have focused on what the region can expect from a Biden administration. The present work examines how perceptions and expectations in the region about a Biden presidency could interact with important dynamics in the region to create significant challenges and opportunities for the new administration.”

Goldenberg, Ilan, Michael Koplow, and Tamara Cofman Wittes. (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2020).
“Today’s realities demand that the United States change its approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its current focus is on high-profile diplomatic initiatives that aim for a permanent agreement in which the United States is the central mediator. Instead, the United States must focus on taking tangible steps, both on the ground and diplomatically, that will improve the freedom, prosperity, and security of all people living between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River, while also cultivating the conditions for a future two-state agreement negotiated between the parties.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2020).
“Topics this year include China's view of strategic competition with the United States; China's promotion of alternative global norms and standards; China's strategic aims in Africa; vulnerabilities in China's financial system and risks for the United States; U.S.-China links in healthcare and biotechnology; China's growing power projection and expeditionary capabilities; Taiwan; Hong Kong; and a review of economics, trade, security, political, and foreign affairs developments in 2020.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2020).
“On December 9, 2020, President Trump issued a National Space Policy directive providing direction for all United States space activities.
The National Space Policy sets out the nation’s commitment to leading in the responsible and constructive use of space, promoting a robust commercial space industry, returning Americans to the Moon and preparing for Mars, leading in exploration, and defending United States and allied interests in space.
The National Space Policy recognizes that a robust, innovative, and competitive commercial space sector is foundational to economic development, continued progress, and sustained American leadership in space. It commits the United States to facilitating growth of an American commercial space sector that supports the nation’s interests, is globally competitive, and advances American leadership in the generation of new markets and innovation-driven entrepreneurship.
The 2020 National Space Policy replaces the 2010 National Space Policy while retaining the other national level policies listed on our Space Policies page.”

Bates, Emma, Samuel J. Brannen, and Alexander Kaplan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The U.S.-led system of alliances is more important than ever. Global cooperation with U.S. leadership has long undertaken responsibility for economic stability, nonproliferation, counterterrorism, and prevention of large-scale violent conflict. In 2020, as the country prepares to transition from the Trump presidency to a new Joseph R. Biden, Jr. administration, that list of responsibilities now includes managing a global pandemic while reinvigorating the power of American values in competition with an increasingly coercive China. The United States will need allies, partners, and friends as it wrestles with a changing international order; more capable and numerous rivals; and mounting challenges to human security at home and abroad.
The 2020 Global Security Forum workshop convened a bipartisan group of 60 leading national security experts to examine how best to adapt the U.S.-led alliance system to meet this new era of complex challenges. Experts considered three distinct, difficult scenarios set in hypothetical futures between 2024 and 2030. They examined the relative alignment of U.S. and allied interests in these plausible ‘worlds’ and recommended steps that could be taken today to strengthen future alliance cohesion, capability, and capacity.”

Schwab, Klaus, and Saadia Zahidi. (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2020).
“The ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ series has since its first edition aimed to prompt policy-makers beyond short term growth and to aim for long-run prosperity. The 2020 special edition is dedicated to elaborating on the priorities for recovery and revival, and considering the building blocks of a transformation towards new economic systems that combine ‘productivity’, ‘people’ and ‘planet’ targets.”

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2021).
“The ‘NIDS China Security Report’ published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) was first released in March 2011. It is not difficult to find differences between this report—the 11th in this series—and the inaugural issue. Unlike the ‘East Asian Strategic Review’ which takes an annual, fixed-point observation style, the ‘NIDS China Security Report’ sets a particular theme each time and provides a detailed analysis related to China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. Initially, the report was written by several researchers studying China and Taiwan, and analyses focused on China’s diplomacy, maritime policy, and the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Beginning with the seventh issue, the report gradually broadened the scope of analysis, and has dealt with relations between China and countries/regions such as Taiwan, the United States, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Pacific Island countries, Russia, and Central Asia. Accordingly, the writing team was expanded to include not only members of the China Division but also experts on other regions as well as researchers of specific issues. Thus, the ‘NIDS China Security Report’ has evolved into a platform for analyzing China by many NIDS researchers, and has become one of the flagship publications of NIDS that attracts significant interest from research institutes and the media in various countries and regions.”

Armitage, Richard L., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“At this time of great uncertainty and rapid change, the United States and Japan face extraordinary challenges. These include an unrelenting pandemic, rising nationalism and populism, global economic turmoil, multiple technological revolutions, and renewed geopolitical competition. The U.S.-Japan alliance itself is one of the most important sources of stability and continuity in this period of great uncertainty, but there should be no doubt that together both countries must be prepared for a regional and world order under more stress than at any time in the last 70 years. This is the latest in a series of bipartisan ‘Armitage-Nye’ reports that have assessed the state of the U.S.-Japan alliance and suggested a new agenda for the challenges and opportunities on the horizon. This current iteration has special importance because of shifting power dynamics in Asia and new expectations of Japan. Indeed, for the first time in its history, Japan is taking an equal, if not leading, role in the alliance. Developing a more equal U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to addressing both regional and global challenges. This report has identified issues that both allies should prioritize to advance their relationship as well as global security and prosperity.”

Hornung, Jeffrey W. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
"In the Indo-Pacific region, the alliance the United States has with Japan is arguably its most important. If a high-end contingency erupts in the East China Sea and the United States becomes engaged in major conventional combat operations with China, what roles can and might Japan play? In this report, Jeffrey W. Hornung assesses the strengths and limitations of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF), as well as legal issues pertaining to the SDF use of force and U.S. base access in a contingency for combat operations that may not be directly tied to the defense of Japan. Hornung finds that, despite Japan's focus on self-defense, there are significant areas in which the SDF can assist the United States. He identifies strengths and weaknesses of the capabilities of each of the three SDF services — both current and expected over the next decade — and steps that could be taken to enhance these capabilities. Hornung also examines bilateral agreements and Japanese laws that govern how SDF capabilities may be employed and whether U.S. forces can expect to access their bases in Japan for combat operations. Hornung makes specific recommendations on how to ensure more effective and capable Japanese support in an East China Sea contingency involving China, including how Japan could better position itself to respond, both for its own defense and in support of the United States, and how the United States could better support Japan in these efforts.

Devermont, Judd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The national security pitch about why Africa matters to the United States tends to fall on deaf ears. Its recurrent themes—terrorism, migration, infectious diseases, and humanitarian crises—fail to resonate with most Americans. Only 1 percent of respondents believed Africa was the most important region for U.S. national security according to a survey by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in January 2020. Instead of just preaching to beltway insiders, U.S. policymakers need to craft a hometown argument about Africa’s significance. They have to showcase how the continent enriches Americans’ daily lives, along with the vibrant economic, political, social, and cultural ties that bind U.S. cities and Africa together. In the past year, the CSIS Africa Program researched the links between African countries and 15 U.S. cities. The resounding conclusion is that a U.S. city’s ties to the continent contribute to its local industries, foster political leadership, enrich cultural life, advance academic scholarship, and promote faith-based and philanthropic endeavors.”

McKillop, Matt, et al. (Washington, DC: Trust for America’s Health / Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Blooming School of Public Health, 2020).
“Given the size and diversity of the country, each state and its communities will experience climate change differently. State leaders must understand their particular risks and vulnerabilities in order to plan effectively. In areas of a state where vulnerability is higher, state leaders should invest more in adaptation and preparedness. Likewise, states that are more vulnerable overall should go to greater lengths to adapt to climate-related hazards. This report examines states’ readiness to protect residents from the health impacts of climate change in light of the nature and level of risks that they face. Researchers at Trust for America’s Health and the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health developed a set of quantitative indicators to assess each state and the District of Columbia, drawing from three domains of inquiry: (1) vulnerability; (2) public health preparedness; and (3) climate-related adaptation. American Indian and Alaska Native tribal nations and U.S. territories were not included in the assessment, owing to a lack of comparable data, a serious gap that this country must work to fill, given the acute threat that climate change poses to many of their residents.
The results provide a portrait of state-level preparedness for the health impacts of climate change in the United States. While researchers found that every state had engaged in at least some level of planning and preparation—the extent or effectiveness of plan implementation, critical to preventing adverse outcomes, was not part of the assessment—there was significant variation, and, in many places, a great deal of room for improvement. Of greatest concern, researchers found that states with the highest levels of vulnerability—predominantly located in the Southeast—tended to be among the least prepared.”

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (Silver Spring, MD: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2020).
“The sustained transformation to a warmer, less frozen and biologically changed Arctic remains clear. Extreme warm air temperatures in the Eurasian Arctic illustrate significant region-wide effects of year-to-year variability and connections across the Arctic environment.”

Blazich, Frank. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2020).
“On the eve of American entry into World War II, the Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) established the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), an organization of the nation’s private pilots and aviation personnel for national defense purposes. Beginning in February 1942 with tentative Navy Department approval, the Army Air Forces agreed to an experimental use of CAP aircraft and personnel for antisubmarine patrols along the Atlantic Coast. This use of civilian pilots and aircraft developed out of an urgent necessity to stem the tide of German submarine operations inflicting heavy losses on coastal shipping. For the Army, the CAP coastal patrol was essentially a subexperiment for a larger experiment to see if civilian aviation could be semimilitarized for national defense purposes.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Part of ‘U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021.’ The Air Force continues the development and procurement of next-generation aircraft to meet the demands of great power conflict. Fielding of new aircraft has been enough to arrest the increase in fleet age. However, the Air Force is not buying enough new aircraft to sustain its force structure, so it seeks to retire older aircraft.
Key Takeaways
• Air Force military personnel levels, active and reserve component, increase slightly in FY 2021 and over the five-year period but remain essentially level. The largest increases are among civilians.
• Like the other services, the Air Force faces high day-to-day operational tempo while at the same time preparing to meet the demands of great power conflict.
• Aircraft inventories and fleet aging have stabilized in the near term.
• However, the Air Force is not buying enough new aircraft to maintain the inventory over the long term. Increasing procurement to the levels needed to sustain the inventory will require historically high costs.
• Instead, the Air Force plans to close this gap by retiring older aircraft and shrinking the force, possibly substantially. However, Congress has been reluctant to do this in the past.
• Given these circumstances, the Air Force is backing away from its 25 percent expansion goal to reach 386 operational squadrons.
• The FY 2021 budget procures no unmanned aircraft, so the unmanned fleet has plateaued at 6 percent of the force.
• Nuclear forces require a greater share of the Air Force budget as Reagan-era systems reach the end of their service lives, and as a result, nuclear modernization generates some opposition.
• The Space Force continues to take shape, so far entirely from Air Force elements.”

Ibrahimov, Mahir J. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2020).
“The world is changing at an ever-increasing pace. Modern communication with worldwide connectivity has brought together a global community. In this environment, we must be globally astute. We must understand the geopolitical and sociocultural aspects of regional affairs in any region in which we may be called upon to serve. Understanding the operating environment and associated regional cultures of our partners and competitors is essential to making military decisions that directly affect outcomes locally, regionally, and globally. Agile leaders must be able to recognize the cultural and geopolitical realities of operations and be prepared to adjust appropriately to achieve our nation’s broader goals. The US Army’s culture, regional expertise, and language programs provide a mechanism to prep…The articles that make up this work explore the cultural and regional implications of Chinese and Russian power projection in Eurasia, the Americas, and Africa; the rise of sub-state actors in their regions; and military applications of culture, area expertise, and foreign language proficiency in the operational environment. As our Army refocuses to prepare for competition in complex future operating environments, the insights offered in this volume are important for all Army leaders. Future missions may vary, but all will include the need to understand the geopolitical and cultural foundations of regions in which we operate and the people we encounter around the globe.”

Ellehuus, Rachel, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy takes its point of departure in the growing political, economic, and military competition the United States is facing around the world, to include from Russia and China—and aims to prevent any region of the world from becoming dominated by a single power. While the Arctic has been characterized more by cooperation than competition, recent events indicate that the tides may be turning. As attention turns north and the Arctic reenters the strategic calculations of great powers, spaces that have been largely neglected are suddenly assuming a position of significance, forcing countries in the region to consider how to balance competing interests from outside powers.
The essays below illustrate how it looks when three such places—Svalbard, Norway; Greenland; and Iceland—find themselves caught between competing powers. While this attention has taken different forms, there are similarities between the cases. All three, for example, have received economic interest from China and are beginning to feel the pressure of Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic. All three are also part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and anchor their defense policies in that alliance.”
100 Years of Arctic Geopolitics: The Svalbard Headache
Denmark Walks a Tightrope in Greenland
Finding a Niche for Iceland in the Post-Cold War Era

Kornbluh, Karen, and Sam DuPont (eds). (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund for the United States, 2020).
“New technologies will bring enormous new opportunity we must seize to address our existing challenges—and new disruption to which we must respond. Fortunately, good ideas abound for how to ensure these innovations improve lives, increase national security, and strengthen democratic values. #Tech2021 offers strategic, turnkey reforms from experts for how the U.S. government can leverage technology to ensure individuals and society thrive in the midst of rapid change. Despite the diversity of these briefs, some themes emerge:
• Innovation is fundamentally a bottom-up phenomenon, so opportunity to participate must be broadly distributed.
• As Schroeder observes, while many may wish for the government to simply ‘get out of the way,’ governments and other institutions working from the top down are needed to spur physical infrastructure (especially broadband access), education and training, and smart rules of the road that unlock the technological potential of our society and economy.
• Privacy protections and positive corrections to systemic inequities must be built in to ensure democratic values are protected and strengthened.
• Innovation happens in a global context. Democratic allies should work together to ensure that new technologies support and strengthen democratic values.
The ideas offered up are varied and specific.”

Ellis, Evan. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Military engagement is an important and officially acknowledged part of the growing interactions between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Latin America and the Caribbean. The 2008 and 2016 Chinese policy white papers toward Latin America, as well as the 2015 China Defense Strategy White Paper, all define military and other security activities as an important, if not necessarily leading, component of China’s overall engagement with the region. PRC economic activities in Latin America arguably eclipse military activities, both in terms of the resources and people involved and in terms of the attention given through official government discourse and interaction. This economic focus, along with Chinese leaders’ general avoidance of threatening rhetoric or provocative military actions in Latin America, should not distract from the fact that security sector activities are an integral part of China’s multidimensional engagement in pursuit of its strategic objectives—both in the region and globally.”

Martin, Zachary. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“This paper explores the social climate and circumstances in Mexico that have led to increased cartel activity over the past twenty years. Analysis of these circumstances shows that both Mexico and the United States have failed in their efforts to eradicate cartels and curb violent crime and illicit drug trafficking on both sides of the border. An examination of the Mexican administrations over two decades highlights the efforts and missteps the governments have made that contribute to the rising violent crime rates throughout the country. This paper also discusses potential solutions to those problems and the difficulties both countries face in implementing them.”

Murphy, Kyle. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The humanitarian emergency in the Sahel is causing unprecedented suffering. Approximately 13 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger—the hardest hit countries in the region. The number of people facing acute hunger has tripled over the past year to reach 7.4 million, and the number of children requiring aid has jumped by two-thirds. A lethal combination of climate change, ethnic violence, and governance failures—exacerbated by jihadist attacks and bungled international responses—has caused a record number of people to flee their homes. The region has more than 1.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), a twentyfold increase over the past two years. These individuals are in dire need of humanitarian assistance including nutrition and food, health services, water and sanitation, shelter, education, protection, and support to survivors of gender-based violence.”

Bronk, Justin. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“This Whitehall Report examines Russian and Chinese combat air trends, and looks specifically at fast jets and their weapons systems and capabilities.”

Taylor, Trevor. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“The Tempest programme for a new combat aircraft is arguably the most ambitious in the Ministry of Defence’s portfolio, bringing significant risks and sizeable as yet unknown costs, but also extensive potential benefits. Only the Dreadnought programme might be seen as a rival in terms of difficulty. This paper shows how the Tempest programme can bring potential benefits and how its inherent risks are being managed with prudence.”

Kaushal, Sidharth. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“This Occasional Paper examines how the Royal Navy can leverage the potential of its Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers in the context of a strategic environment characterised by persistent competition.”

Wood, Dakota L. (ed.) (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2020).
“Each year, The Heritage Foundation’s ‘Index of U.S. Military Strength’ employs a standardized, consistent set of criteria, accessible both to government officials and to the American public, to gauge the U.S. military’s ability to perform its missions in today’s world. The inaugural 2015 edition established a baseline assessment on which each annual edition builds, assessing the state of affairs for its respective year and measuring how key factors have changed during the preceding year.
The Index is not an assessment of what might be, although the trends that it captures may well imply both concerns and opportunities that can guide decisions that are germane to America’s security. Rather, the Index should be seen as a report card for how well or poorly conditions, countries, and the U.S. military have evolved during the assessed year. The past cannot be changed, but it can inform, just as the future cannot be predicted but can be shaped.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. Unlike the other services, the Navy has sought to significantly expand its force structure. However, its previous plan to reach 355 ships collapsed because of high costs and the need to incorporate new technologies such as unmanned systems. A new plan incorporates smaller ships and large numbers of unmanned systems.
Key Takeaways
• In FY 2021, Navy active-duty personnel would increase by 5,300 to 347,800. Fleet size increases to 306 ships as previously ordered ships arrive, particularly the numerous littoral combat ships (LCS). The Navy continues to plan on significant expansion.
• The 355-ship goal was deemed infeasible because of its high cost. The structure was also criticized for focusing on large and expensive ships, particularly aircraft carriers, and not incorporating unmanned surface and undersea vessels/vehicles.
• When the Navy could not come up with a feasible new plan, Secretary of Defense Esper took over.
• On October 7, Secretary Esper outlined a ‘500+ ship’ future fleet described as 'an ever-present, resilient, and dominant fighting force.'
• Carriers and large surface combatants (LSCs) may be cut to pay for the unmanned vessels, additional submarines and small surface combatants, and a new class of small amphibious ships. However, many details remain unavailable, and to be real, the plan needs to be incorporated into the president’s FY 2022 budget proposal.
• The Navy and the secretary of defense seem to have different interpretations about the future fleet, as has been the case for many years.
• Affordability will be a challenge. The new fleet structure costs about the same as the 355-ship fleet. Esper wants the Navy to find the resources internally and may provide some resources from savings across the Department of Defense (DOD).
• Naval aviation, in contrast to the surface and subsurface fleets, remains focused on manned platforms.
• Ship numbers matter to the Navy because of the high demands for its forces in day-to-day operations for crisis response, allied and partner engagement, and ongoing regional conflicts.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. The Marine Corps begins a major restructuring to develop capabilities for great power conflict after two decades of conducting counterinsurgency ashore. The budget cuts units and personnel to pay for these new capabilities. However, many commentators worry that the restructuring will make the Marine Corps too narrowly focused.
Key Takeaways
• General Berger’s new guidance aims to restore the Marine Corps to its naval roots after two decades of operations ashore, invest in capabilities focused on great power conflict in the Pacific, and divest unneeded forces.
• To pay for this, the Marine Corps’ active-duty end strength begins a decline to about 172,000, the level before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• Despite a continuing high operational tempo, the Marine Corps is pursuing modernization over expanding force structure.
• Ground forces would gain long-range precision fires but give up three infantry battalions, tanks, and some counterinsurgency capabilities. Most artillery would convert from cannon to missile units
• UAVs would increase in number, but the Marine Corps is far behind the Air Force in this regard and the Marine Corps’ UAV development program is in disarray.
• The amphibious fleet will include large numbers of light amphibious warships (LAWs). These will provide more distributed capabilities that can implement the Marine Corps’ intention to be a ‘stand in’ force that can operate inside an adversary’s defensive bubble. The trade-off is that, because of the LAWs small size, they will not be able to support the customary level of global forward deployments, which may decline as a result.
The restructuring has been criticized for focusing too much on a maritime campaign in the Western Pacific, ignoring other global conflicts, and relying on unproven operational concepts.”

Gershaneck, Kerry K. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020).
“This book is a call to arms as well as a valuable study of the history and nature of the PRC political warfare threat. While the United States has recently begun to more seriously engage on the political warfare battlefield, much more work and investment of national resources lie ahead. Professor Gershaneck provides useful strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level recommendations to deter, confront, and defeat PRC political warfare operations, all of which are crucial to development of a coherent, successful national response.”

Scharre, Paul, and Ainikki Riikonen. (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, 2020).
“Summary
• The Department of Defense’s (DoD) ever-shifting technology priorities jeopardize its ability to win a long-term technology competition.
• The DoD needs a systematic approach—a technology strategy—for how to prioritize technology investments.
• The dominant global tech trend today is the information revolution, which is leading to exponential growth in digital capabilities.
• The top priority of the DoD’s technology strategy should be rapidly spinning in and militarizing digital technologies generated in the private sector.
• The DoD should invest in key military-specific technologies, such as hypersonics or directed energy weapons, when there is clear operational value but should expect advancements to be incremental.”

Office of the Secretary General Human Security Unit. (Brussels, Belgium: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2020).
“With the adoption of the Policy for the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in 2016, NATO has committed military means, including the use of deadly force, to prevent and respond to situations in NATO Operations where civilians suffer harm. At the same time, NATO is renewing its focus on collective defence. As NATO continues to develop when and how military force can be used to protect civilians, the conceptual thinking should consider scenarios relevant to all three of the Alliances core tasks. At the same time, the PoC framework provides NATO with an opportunity for evolving the meaning of ‘security’.”

Salmi, Derek. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2020).
“This study offers a theory of air mobility intended to assist practitioners and policy makers in analyzing the efficacy of air mobility operations. It begins by presenting a model of air mobility utility that incorporates the key airpower and logistical principles of velocity, capacity, attainability, and sustainability to graphically illustrate air mobility’s effects within a campaign. Additionally, the five critical factors of freedom of movement, command and control, integrated logistics, technology, and training emerge as essential elements that must be addressed to determine air mobility success. Next the study applies the theory’s model and factors to eight historical case studies, ranging from combat operations of the Second World War to recent humanitarian disaster relief efforts, which typify the broad air mobility mission set. To garner the greatest analytical insights, each case study examines the air mobility operation within the context of the larger military campaign it served as well as through the lens of the five critical mobility factors. The final chapter offers a summation of the theory’s key points as well as future applications within the air mobility discipline.”

Jones, Seth G, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“White supremacists and other like-minded extremists conducted two-thirds of the terrorist plots and attacks in the United States in 2020, according to new CSIS data. Anarchists, anti-fascists, and other like-minded extremists orchestrated 20 percent of the plots and attacks, though the number of incidents grew from previous years as these extremists targeted law enforcement, military, and government facilities and personnel. Despite these findings, however, the number of fatalities from domestic terrorism is relatively low compared to previous years.”

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2020).
“‘The State of Agricultural Commodity Markets 2020’ (SOCO 2020) aims to discuss policies and mechanisms that promote sustainable outcomes – economic, social and environmental – in agricultural and food markets, both global and domestic. The analysis is organized along the trends and challenges that lie at the heart of global discussions on trade and development. These include the evolution of trade and markets; the emergence of global value chains in food and agriculture; the extent to which smallholder farmers in developing countries participate in value chains and markets; and the transformative impacts of digital technology on markets.”

Yayboke, Erol, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Climate migration is poised to be one of the biggest human development and security challenges of the next several decades, yet policymakers and the research community are just now understanding the myriad impacts of climate change on human mobility. A new framework for addressing these challenges is needed—one defined by the United States taking action to slow the effects of climate change, reforming its own immigration policies, and leading multilateral efforts.”

Schmitt, Gary J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“With the United States facing two major revisionist powers, Russia and China, as well as additional security threats from North Korea, Iran, and jihadist terrorism, a critical advantage for the United States is its global network of alliances and strategic partners. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, ‘Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.’
The advantage of having military allies and partners is enhanced by the core capacity of the American military having remained largely the same over the past decade, though the global security environment grew more complex and difficult during that time. In short, the United States needs allies and security partners. But the United States needs allies and partners that can pull their weight militarily if the country is going to be able to maintain a favorable balance of power in critical regions of the world. The second edition of ‘A Hard Look at Hard Power’ provides an in-depth examination of the overall strategic perspective, defense plans, budgets, and capabilities of seven key European and Asian allies, three frontline strategic partners, and NATO.”

House Armed Services Committee. (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 2020).
“The gravity and complexity of threats emerging to challenge the United States is proliferating as technological advancements in artificial intelligence, quantum information science, and biotechnology transform society and weaponry at an exponential rate. This is occurring as adversarial capability is increasing to the point where the United States may soon lose the competitive military advantage it has enjoyed for decades.
The free world order the U.S. has led for more than 70 years is now in danger of becoming a historical outlier as an alternate form of authoritarianism, one that seeks to emulate capitalism and supplant western-style democracy as the governing standard, is on the rise.
To remain economically and militarily competitive, and to ensure American leadership into the next century, policy makers and the Pentagon must navigate a major course correction in how we invest in national security.
This will require a paradigm shift in our defense posture from heavy, expensive, and antiquated, to lean, adaptive, and integrated. This strategy will require a whole-of-nation approach, one that embraces emerging technologies, aggressively divests of aging and expensive platforms, and more effectively harnesses ingenuity and innovation from the private sector.
The Future of Defense Task Force was established to investigate and assess how to address these challenges. Our findings and recommendations are intended as a roadmap for the greater national security community, and whereas our report should be considered a white paper, it builds upon the extensive work of the House Armed Services Committee, Department of Defense, military services, private industry, think tanks, and academia.
This report is neither exhaustive nor conclusive; rather, it is the beginning of a difficult yet necessary conversation. Congress and the American people must recognize that we face a decisive moment as a nation and as the world’s leading democracy, both of which are in peril until we alter the future of our defense to ensure the future of our peace.”

U.S. Department of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
“The Nation has entered an age of warfighting wherein U.S. dominance in air, land, sea, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is challenged by peer and near peer adversaries. These challenges have exposed the cross-cutting reliance of U.S. Forces on the EMS, and are driving a change in how the DoD approaches activities in the EMS to maintain an all-domain advantage.
EMS challenges go well beyond the military battlespace. The EMS is being repurposed for commercial mobile broadband technologies to bolster economic growth and prosperity, which further restricts DoD’s freedom of action. These sophisticated technologies represent new opportunities for the Department and our national economy. However, they also present new challenges across the competition continuum as the electromagnetic operational environment becomes increasingly congested, contested, and constrained (i.e., complex).”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This is part of the CSIS series ‘U.S. Military Forces in FY2021.’ The U.S. Army plans slow expansion through FY 2025, but a constrained budget environment will force it to choose between maintaining the units it has and building new kinds of structures. With modernization, the Army has increased production of proven systems and shifted billions into development of high-priority programs to prepare the Army for great power conflict.
Key Takeaways
• After a dip in personnel strength in FY 2019, both regular and reserve components have recovered. FY 2021 targets include: regular Army, 485,900; Guard, 336,500; and Army Reserve, 189,800.
• The regular Army and Army Guard project small increases through FY 2025; the Army Reserve will stay essentially level. This represents a substantial reduction to earlier growth plans, but probably the most expansion that can be done in the current budget and security environment.
• New air and missile defense units are entering the force. Security Force Advisory Brigades continue despite their focus on stability operations. Other new kinds of units, such as the widely discussed multidomain brigades, remain mostly conceptual.
• The active-reserve mix has stabilized at 52 percent Guard/Reserve, 48 percent active. There is now less tension between regular Army and its reserve components as a result of closer consultations, higher overall budgets, and shared recruitment challenges.
• Army modernization, which forms the basis for future forces, is a mix of good and bad news: the good news is that the Army continues production of proven systems and has a well-modernized force as a result. More good news is a few new systems are coming out of the research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) ‘primordial soup.’ The bad news is that the Army is still several years away from having a new generation of systems in production to take it into the 2020s and beyond and set it up for potential combat against great power adversaries.
• In an environment of constrained resources, the Army will need to cut existing Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) if it wants to build new units and procure new systems. So far it has been unwilling to do this.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
CSIS Senior Adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of papers on U.S. military forces, including composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. The first white paper in this year’s series analyzes the strategy and budget context for building forces in FY 2021, criticisms of the strategy, budget and resulting force plans, and risks for sustaining force levels in the future.
Key Takeaways
- From FY 2017 to FY 2020, the administration increased the defense budget to fund its national defense strategy. However, that growth ended in FY 2021, requiring some trade-offs. The FY 2021 budget maintains the readiness gains of the last several years and expands force size modestly but squeezes modernization.
- Active component end strength is projected to increase from 1,346,000 in FY 2020 to 1,351,500 in FY 2021 and 1,361,000 by FY 2025. Congress has been supportive.
- In the long term, force structure faces four challenges and a wild card. The challenges include:
A. The need to respond to heavy day-to-day demands for crisis response, allied engagement, gray zone competition, and ongoing regional conflicts. One observer called this “a bear trap of current commitments,” and it works against reducing force size.
B. The opening of a resources-strategy gap as budgets are flat or reduced, but the strategy does not change. This increases risk as actions may not be able to back words.
C. The desire to move more aggressively toward a structure designed for great power conflict, increasing modernization, and trading off force structure if necessary. A major uncertainty is how the concept of “legacy” systems will be applied—does that means old systems or old types of systems?
D. Disagreements about strategy, as many libertarians and progressives support a foreign policy of “restraint” that would have the United States less involved militarily with nations overseas. Such a strategy would make large segments of existing force structure unnecessary
- The wild card is the long-term effect of the pandemic, and whether this would change the nature or size of the defense effort.
- The public will be the ultimate arbiter. Polling indicates public support for a U.S. role in the world but not increased spending.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Congressional Budget Office regularly provides a touch of reality regarding the trends in the U.S. federal budget and its impact on the U.S. economy. Its September 21st report on the 2020 Long-Term Budget Outlook is no exception.
It provides a clear warning about the problems in civil spending, and it projects a major rise in mandatory spending after the current peak for COVID-19 related spending has passed. These are all critical issues, but so are the trends in discretionary spending, as well as in the areas like defense and foreign affairs.”

Suzuki, Hiroyuki. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“No region will be more important to global peace and prosperity in the coming years than the Indo-Pacific, which has more geopolitical hotspots, emerging powers, overlapping political and economic partnerships, and risks of conflict than any other. Northeast Asia, especially North Korea and the East China Sea, continues to be the region’s epicenter of security risks. While Southeast Asia is an engine of regional and global economic growth, border disputes in the South China Sea likewise threaten regional stability. The expansion of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also increases the geopolitical importance of the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca as a sea lane for natural resources. From a security perspective, the deepening competition between the United States and China has further complicated these geopolitical and geo-economic tensions, a trend that has accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic.
As the U.S.–China strategic rivalry intensifies, there is a growing expectation in the Indo-Pacific region that, in addition to these two major players, middle power countries such as Japan, India, Australia, and Indonesia should play more active roles to ensure stability. This reflects the reality that the Indo-Pacific region is geographically extensive and culturally and politically diverse—and therefore should not be subject to unipolar or a bipolar hegemony. Among the middle power countries, there are high expectations for Japan to assume a comprehensive leadership role in the region, especially as it has multilayered relationships—economic, security, and cultural—with the countries of Southeast Asia. Under the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ vision introduced by former prime minister Shinzo Abe and embraced by the United States and other countries, Japan is well positioned to continue engaging with like-minded states on a range of issues in order to support regional stability and prosperity.”

Glaser, Bonnie S., Richard C. Bush, and Michael J. Green. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) established a bipartisan CSIS Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward Taiwan in January 2020 to prepare recommendations for the coming four years and beyond. The task force includes members who have held senior positions of responsibility on Taiwan policy in previous Democratic and Republic administrations as well as experts on national security, business, technology, law, society, the U.S. Congress, human rights, and Taiwan’s politics and society. The task force met monthly from January to August 2020 to consider U.S. strategic interests, diplomacy, defense, trade, and other issues and to receive background briefings from the governments of the United States and Taiwan.
This task force report explains why Taiwan matters to the United States, the framework for U.S. policy toward Taiwan, and the trends that affect economic, defense, and diplomatic aspects of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The report concludes with a set of specific recommendations to upgrade U.S. policy on Taiwan consistent with long-standing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region while also responding to the new and emerging challenges. The members of the task force participated in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of their respective organizations.”

Small, Andrew. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“The troubles faced by the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)—the flagship of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—are perhaps the most conclusive demonstration that the BRI model that has been in place for the last few years is no longer sustainable. Even before the coronavirus pandemic, CPEC had stalled. Not only are the figures commonly cited for the total package of projects under this framework since its launch in 2015—which run as high as $62 billion—no longer accurate, investments of that magnitude are not under consideration either. The projects that are already underway or that have been completed are far from negligible, however. CPEC represents a marked expansion of China’s economic presence in Pakistan, with approximately $25 billion in investments to date—but this is already pushing close to the framework’s limits rather than the foundations of a more ambitious plan.”

Yayboke, Erol, and Hareem F. Abdullah. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The Covid-19 pandemic is exacerbating conditions for women and girls around the world, especially in conflict and fragile settings. A shadow pandemic of gender-based violence is growing. Women are being excluded and marginalized from all areas of decisionmaking, including Covid-19 response and recovery efforts.
• Despite this, women are showing exemplary strength as they combat Covid-19 within their communities. Women peacebuilders and peacekeepers are educating local communities about containing and preventing the spread of Covid-19 and are providing lifesaving services to men, women, and children.
• Covid-19 further demonstrates and highlights women’s effective leadership in times of crisis. The United States should elevate women’s voices in Covid-19 response and recovery efforts and ensure their meaningful participation in peace processes and politics post-pandemic.
• This year marks the twentieth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action on gender equality and women’s rights. These milestones are the perfect opportunity for the United States to assert its leadership on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“Evidence shows that peace processes overlook a strategy that could reduce conflict and advance stability: the inclusion of women.”
“Women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution can improve outcomes before, during, and after conflict. But women are often excluded from formal peace processes. Between 1992 and 2019, women constituted, on average, 13 percent of negotiators, 6 percent of mediators, and 6 percent of signatories in major peace processes around the world. While there has been some progress in women’s participation, about seven out of every ten peace processes still did not include women mediators or women signatories—the latter indicating that few women participated in leadership roles as negotiators, guarantors, or witnesses.
Peace efforts in 2020 have similarly struggled to include women. For example, women represented only around 10 percent of negotiators in the Afghan talks, just 20 percent of negotiators in Libya’s political discussions, and 0 percent of negotiators in Libya’s military talks and Yemen’s recent process. One current peace process is led by a woman chief mediator (Stephanie Williams, acting head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya)—marking the first time in six years that a woman holds this role.”

Sanders, Gregory, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Researching and manufacturing fighters, ships, and tanks are only part of the picture for defense contracts. Contracting for services accounts for over 41 percent of DoD contract obligations in 2018. Services include maintaining equipment, moving people and things, creating software, providing server space, and construction. Service contracting is challenging as services can be difficult to define and measure. But services are increasingly central to the U.S. economy. The Department of Defense seeks to attract new firms that will increase its speed and agility—many of these firms are service providers, e.g., data analytics or cloud computing. CSIS looked at a million contracts to evaluate how three factors influence performance:
• service complexity
• contract-management capacity
• vendor’s history working with a DoD contracting office.
The existing data fails to explain large differences in contract office performance. More DoD transparency about contracting office capacity could help make a case for further investments.
The report also found that when vendors and contracting offices have a longer history, they tend to have better results. That means DoD needs to think not only about recruiting new partners, but also about helping them succeed.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. 2020.
“CSIS surveyed the American public and thought leaders in the United States, Asia, and Europe to map perspectives on China policy. The surveys covered a range of issues, including trade, security, human rights, and the trajectory for U.S.-China relations. The United States and U.S. allies generally converge on the need for a tougher stance toward China but not containment. The results point to possible contours of an enduring strategy around international coalition building on the China challenge.”

Smith, Julie, et al. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“Mounting competition between China and liberal democracies will shape the course of the 21st century. The gravity and scope of the challenges that China poses have permeated the transatlantic policy agenda and become a focal point in U.S.-Europe relations. Whereas China has long been a source of disagreement and even tension between the transatlantic partners, in the past two years views have converged. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) assertive actions—its ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy, aggressive influence operations, human rights violations at home, and elimination of fundamental freedoms in Hong Kong—have increased concerns in both the United States and Europe. There is now fertile ground for transatlantic cooperation on everything from reducing dependency on Chinese trade and investment to setting global norms and standards for the future. Yet, despite this convergence of views and interests, there is still no roadmap for how such cooperation should progress. This report outlines such an approach. It is based on the premise that the time is ripe for greater transatlantic cooperation on China. It also recognizes the comprehensive nature of the task at hand.”

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Subcommittee on Strategic Technologies and Advanced Research. (Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2020).
“From our nation’s founding moment, innovation has been an essential ingredient of American prosperity and national security. During World War II, the threat of a Nazi atomic bomb prompted a federal commitment to basic research that transformed every element of American life, including establishing American technological pre-eminence. Today, neither that preeminence, nor the commitment that fueled it, are unchallenged. We live in a dramatically changed world. Innovation is happening almost everywhere, including in the laboratories of our adversaries. Threats are dispersed; terrorism, cybercrime, even a radiological or biological attack do not require nation-state sponsorship. And just as nuclear technology emerged to change the world 75 years ago, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biosynthesis and other new technologies promise to reorder the global chessboard and change the lives of everyone on the planet. The question for U.S. policymakers, and the subject of this report, is whether the United States will lead in the development of these technologies or whether we will follow, and instead merely read about their unpredictable effects in the media. Our national security depends on choosing the former path, as does our economic prosperity and our traditional leadership role in the development of the global norms, rules and institutions that disperse technology’s benefits and constrain its destructive potential.”

Artificial Intelligence Working Group. (American Council for Technology and Industry Advisory Council, 2020).
“Artificial Intelligence (AI) is becoming an influential cornerstone of the digital future as we increasingly rely on it to support and inform our world. As organizations become more dependent upon the many technologies which comprise AI, there is a need to determine how much confidence and trust to place in them. To accomplish this ethically, a means to determine its performance and continually monitor for mission veracity or any adverse impacts is needed. This paper addresses the overall ethical framework through an index that evaluates five core parameters underpinning the impact of AI: Bias, Fairness, Transparency, Responsibility, and Interpretability. By addressing and incorporating these five components, the framework can be used to understand the ethical automation of solutions to meet desired mission outcomes.”

Reinsch, William, and Jack Caporal. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership was created in the summer of 2019 to develop a series of recommendations to cement U.S. global leadership in light of a multitude of twenty-first-century challenges, both at home and abroad. In a series of reports, the Commission lays out recommendations for the U.S. workforce, U.S. innovation policy, and U.S. engagement in the international trading system. This report, which is the second of four reports to be released from the commission, focuses on the U.S. workforce. This report recommends nine elements of a new approach to workforce development in the United States. Together, these recommendations would make the U.S. workforce more agile, adaptable, and competitive and put the United States in a position to pursue an am­bitious trade agenda.”

Bollyky, Thomas J., and Stewart M. Patrick. (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“The United States and the world were caught unprepared by the COVID-19 pandemic despite decades of warnings of the threat of global pandemics and years of international planning. The failure to adequately fund and execute these plans has exacted a heavy human and economic price. Hundreds of thousands of lives have already been lost, and the global economy is in the midst of a painful contraction. The crisis—the greatest international public health emergency in more than a century—is not over. It is not too early, however, to begin distilling lessons from this painful experience so that the United States and the world are better positioned to cope with potential future waves of the current pandemic and to avoid disaster when the next one strikes, which it surely will.
This CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report seeks to do just that, framing pandemic disease as a stark threat to global and national security that neither the United States nor the world can afford to ignore again. It argues that future pandemic threats are inevitable and possibly imminent; policymakers should prepare for them and identify what has gone wrong in the U.S. and multilateral response. One of the most important lessons of this pandemic is that preparation and early execution are essential for detecting, containing, and rapidly responding to and mitigating the spread of potentially dangerous emerging infectious diseases. As harmful as this coronavirus has been, a novel influenza could be even worse, transmitting even more easily, killing millions more people, and doing even more damage to societies and economies alike.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Sundar R. Ramanujam. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“At the time of publishing this document, the coronavirus pandemic (or Covid-19) has claimed nearly 900,000 lives and destroyed the livelihoods of several millions of people around the world. Given the contagious nature of this disease, it was not too long before the deadly public health crisis led to a devastating economic turmoil. The impending economic recession can be captured through a recent World Bank memo that forecasts a global economic contraction by 5.2 percent, with some regional markets taking a harder hit than others. As the world battles Covid-19’s challenges and constraints and given the national mandates for border closures and factory shutdowns, global supply chains now face unprecedented stress and its vulnerabilities are now more pronounced, bringing global manufacturing and shipping to a halt and creating vast global shortages and delays.
In large parts, the inherent vulnerabilities in global supply chains stem from a worldwide overreliance on China. China, which joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, began its path toward record economic growth in the early 1990s, with an average growth rate of just over 10 percent. By 2018, China contributed 13.45 percent in global exports and was responsible for 28 percent of global manufacturing output (a three-fold jump from 8 percent in 2004). Unsurprisingly, the world’s second-largest economy was also the top exporter and manufacturer of goods worldwide and the leading global trading partner, making any disruption to its manufacturing hubs tremendously consequential to global supply chains. To put it in perspective, the world’s seven most advanced economies (G7) alone rely heavily on China for imports, bringing in goods and services worth nearly U.S. $ 1 trillion (roughly 2 percent of their GDP). The devastating impacts of Covid-19 have already caused a 3 percent decline in global merchandise trade in the first economic quarter of 2020 while dropping 18.5 percent in the second quarter.”

United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2020).
“In the period 2000 to 2019, there were 7,348 major recorded disaster events claiming 1.23 million lives, affecting 4.2 billion people (many on more than one occasion) resulting in approximately US$2.97 trillion in global economic losses.
This is a sharp increase over the previous twenty years. Between 1980 and 1999, 4,212 disasters were linked to natural hazards worldwide claiming approximately 1.19 million lives and affecting 3.25 billion people resulting in approximately US$1.63 trillion in economic losses.
Much of the difference is explained by a rise in climate-related disasters including extreme weather events: from 3,656 climate-related events (1980-1999) to 6,681 climate-related disasters in the period 2000-2019.
The last twenty years has seen the number of major floods more than double, from 1,389 to 3,254, while the incidence of storms grew from 1,457 to 2,034. Floods and storms were the most prevalent events.
The report ‘The Human Cost of Disasters 2000-2019’ also records major increases in other categories including drought, wildfires and extreme temperature events. There has also been a rise in geo-physical events including earthquakes and tsunamis which have killed more people than any of the other natural hazards under review in this report.”

Lohmeier, Matthew L. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“This paper explores space and space culture from two distinct perspectives. The traditional mind of space believes that air and space are indivisible and is limited from the surface of the Earth to geosynchronous Earth orbit. This mind, Maj Lohmeier argues, can limit the effectiveness of the Air Force and the now-formed US Space Force. The emergent mind of space is one that understands the delineation between air and space and views the domain of the military as reaching as far as the moon. This mind, the author says, should be adopted by all space professionals to aid the joint fight and establish the United States’ interests in an ever-expanding military and geopolitical landscape.”

Analysis and Research Team. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The main levers that Army leaders control to apply budget dollars to shape their force are organizational structure, modernization, and readiness. Obviously the size of the force has a major impact on its capabilities, but the greatest challenge for leaders has been to keep the force ready for all current threats while also incorporating new technology for the future. This is an ongoing process, but has become even more complex in the modern era with the increasing scope and impact of technological change. During the last century, the Army has experienced magnified transformational bursts of modernization about every 40 years. The first was during the mobilization for World War II in the1940s, and the second involved the fielding of the Big 5 and associated systems in the 1980s. Both were enabled by a significant amount of innovative thinking in times of tight budgets that could be funded by a later influx of money. These opportunities for mass modernization always put considerable strain on the development of corresponding training, doctrine, and organizations for their application, and in maintaining contemporary combat capability, especially in the 1940s when Army leaders were also trying to massively increase the size of the service.”

Esper, Mark. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2020).
“The DoD Data Strategy supports the National Defense Strategy and Digital Modernization by providing the overarching vision, focus areas, guiding principles, essential capabilities, and goals necessary to transform the Department into a data-centric enterprise. Success cannot be taken for granted…it is the responsibility of all DoD leaders to treat data as a weapon system and manage, secure, and use data for operational effect.”

Engstrom, David Freeman, et al. (Washington, DC: Administrative Conference of the United States, 2020).
“Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to transform how government agencies do their work. Rapid developments in AI have the potential to reduce the cost of core governance functions, improve the quality of decisions, and unleash the power of administrative data, thereby making government performance more efficient and effective. Agencies that use AI to realize these gains will also confront important questions about the proper design of algorithms and user interfaces, the respective scope of human and machine decision-making, the boundaries between public actions and private contracting, their own capacity to learn over time using AI, and whether the use of AI is even permitted.
These are important issues for public debate and academic inquiry. Yet little is known about how agencies are currently using AI systems beyond a few headline grabbing examples or surface-level descriptions. Moreover, even amidst growing public and scholarly discussion about how society might regulate government use of AI, little attention has been devoted to how agencies acquire such tools in the first place or oversee their use. In an effort to fill these gaps, the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) commissioned this report from researchers at Stanford University and New York University. The research team included a diverse set of lawyers, law students, computer scientists, and social scientists with the capacity to analyze these cutting-edge issues from technical, legal, and policy angles. The resulting report offers three cuts at federal agency use of AI:
• a rigorous canvass of AI use at the 142 most significant federal departments, agencies, and sub-agencies (Part I)
• a series of in-depth but accessible case studies of specific AI applications at seven leading agencies covering a range of governance tasks (Part II); and
• a set of cross-cutting analyses of the institutional, legal, and policy challenges raised by agency use of AI (Part III).”

Deni, John R. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US War College Press, 2020).
“In 2017, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, none of the capability targets identified in NATO’s quadrennial NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) were left on the negotiating table. Previously, capability targets were identified by the alliance’s secretariat, but they remained unfilled as allies failed to assume responsibility for them. This monograph examines the 2014–18 iteration of the NDPP, which represented a stunning turnaround in transatlantic burden sharing. The analysis reveals a combination of factors—the changed threat environment, political pressure from Washington, and the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ working within NATO—best explain the alliance’s success in achieving more equitable burden sharing.
To reach this conclusion, the monograph relies on an array of primary and secondary sources, including interviews with over two dozen officials directly involved in the 2014–18 NDPP. While incorporating available quantitative data on alliance defense spending, the monograph primarily focuses on process tracing as the most effective qualitative methodology for revealing the story behind the 2014–18 NDPP. Policy makers will find this monograph particularly useful because it draws key lessons from the 2014–18 NDPP to make several forward-leaning policy recommendations to strengthen and build upon NATO’s burden-sharing successes to date.”

Dobbins, James, Gabrielle Tarini, and Ali Wyne. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“The authors trace the decline of U.S. international influence over the past two decades, explore reasons for this decline, and suggest ways in which it might be reversed. They conclude that post–Cold War unipolarity bred hubris that, when provoked by the attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in overreach and consequent setbacks. These, in turn, led to geopolitical retrenchment. The 2008 Great Recession fed U.S. disenchantment with international economic policies that produced national and global growth but failed to raise living standards for many Americans. To regain the willing collaboration of international partners, U.S. leaders will need to once again align American interests with those of the rest of the world, practice competent statecraft, adopt prudent policies, pursue realistically achievable objectives, and demonstrate continuity of policy across successive administrations.”

Smeltz, Dina, et al. (Chicago, IL: Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2020).
“The worldwide spread of COVID-19 has reminded Americans that the United States is not immune to events that take place in other parts of the world. Far from feeding calls to retreat from international engagement, Americans remain supportive of an active US role in the world, with solid majorities supporting US security alliances and free trade as the best ways to maintain safety and prosperity. Most Americans also continue to believe that globalization is largely beneficial for the United States.
But there are profound differences between Democrats and Republicans on which foreign policy issues matter most today. And they are even more sharply divided on how the United States should deal with these issues and engage the rest of the world. Generally speaking, Democrats prefer an internationalist approach: cooperating with other countries, amplifying US participation in international organizations and agreements, and providing aid to other nations. In contrast, Republicans prefer a nationalist approach: putting US interests above those of other countries, creating economic self-sufficiency, and taking a unilateral approach to diplomacy and global engagement.”

CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership. Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 16, 2020.
“The CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership—co-chaired by Ambassador Charlene Barshefsky, Senator William E. Brock, and FedEx Chairman and CEO Frederick W. Smith—was created in the summer of 2019 to develop a series of recommendations to cement U.S. global leadership in light of a multitude of twenty-first-century challenges, both at home and abroad. For the United States to maintain its position as the global champion and chief influencer of the international economic environment and to continue to reap its benefits, it must take bold steps in three critical areas. Domestically, the United States will have to quickly strengthen two economic pillars that undergird its economy and its ability to lead abroad: an agile and better-prepared workforce and enhanced capacity for innovation. Abroad, the United States should embrace and build support for a more flexible, nimble, balanced, and responsive international system, with effective institutions and rule-of-law and market-based principles at its core. The commission’s statement outlines key recommendations from the commission in these three areas to revitalize and affirm U.S. global leadership. More detailed analysis and recommendations in these areas will be provided in three forthcoming reports.”

CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The CSIS Trade Commission on Affirming American Leadership was created in the summer of 2019 to develop a series of recommendations to cement U.S. global leadership in light of a multitude of twenty-first-century challenges, both at home and abroad. In a series of reports, the Commission lays out recommendations for the U.S. workforce, U.S. innovation policy, and U.S. engagement in the international trading system. This report, which is the first of four reports to be released from the Commission, sets the backdrop for those recommendations. For the U.S. to successfully lead in the next decade, we must first acknowledge the changes that are happening in the global economy and use that information to plan for U.S. leadership in a changing economic environment. This report outlines key trends in the global economy from now until 2030, including the rising importance of services and digital commerce, increased use of automation and AI in the workforce, a shift towards regional supply chains, and an aging workforce.”

Wright, Logan, Lauren Gloudeman, and Daniel H. Rosen. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“A Report of the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics.”
“Analyzing China’s economy can feel like an exercise in futility. The political system presents a certain version of economic reality via official data, while media reports and market prices provide another. A glowing macroeconomic picture of stable and high rates of GDP growth contrasts with micro-level stories of bankruptcy, defaults, and redundancies. Measures of economic performance in China are often not directly comparable to those in other countries. Many aspects of China’s economy look unsustainable in the long term, but it is difficult to identify any particular problem that Beijing authorities cannot manage effectively in the short term. The potential for economic crisis in China is always present, but a crisis is never quite there. That need for better diagnostic tools of meaningful financial stress in China drove the development of the China Economic Risk Matrix, similar to a threat matrix in security parlance. The risk matrix attempts to track developments within the key areas of financial risk in China where changes in Beijing’s credibility can have an outsized impact on financial stability. It is not a predictive tool but a diagnostic one—more like a flood warning system rather than a signal that a particular dam will break.”

“2020 has been a year of reckoning for the global food security community. Covid-19 is front and center: hunger is spiking in vulnerable communities hit hardest by the health and economic crises. But predating the pandemic are long-term trends that paint a bleak picture: we are losing the global fight against hunger and malnutrition.”

United States Coast Guard. (Washington, DC: United States Coast Guard, 2020).
“At-sea enforcement of the Nation’s living marine resource laws is an enduring U.S. Coast Guard mission. Working with our partners in the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, our enforcement efforts have upheld the biological and economic sustainability of our Nation’s marine fisheries. The benefits of this mission abound: fishermen’s livelihoods are protected, ports in which catch is distributed remain economically robust, and U.S. seafood consumers are able to support an industry dedicated to the long-term sustainability of U.S. fisheries.
Yet not all maritime nations have the capability to surveil their sovereign waters or the moral conscience to police their fleets; this lack of shared responsibility creates opportunities for exploitation in the form of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing. This exploitation erodes both regional and national security, undermines maritime rules-based order, jeopardizes food access and availability, and destroys legitimate economies.
IUU fishing has replaced piracy as the leading global maritime security threat. If IUU fishing continues unchecked, we can expect deterioration of fragile coastal States and increased tension among foreign-fishing Nations, threatening geo-political stability around the world.”

Balboni, Mark, et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
USAWC Integrated Research Project: “This research monograph explores the Army’s emerging concept of multi-domain operations and its implications on the mission command approach. The transition to multi-domain operations changes the traditional view of how Army commanders and staffs conduct operations in the physical environment to include simultaneously operations in the information environment within the competition continuum.
This monograph will utilize the introduction of the aircraft during World War I as a historical case study for the integration of new domains. The Army has integrated new domains in the past and this example provides the historical context for the challenges involving integration of new domains. An overview and analysis of what multi-domain operations are will provide a baseline understanding of how multi-domain operations are changing not only how we fight but also how the Army must change roles and responsibilities to allow the Joint force to compete across the competition continuum, especially below armed conflict.
The transition to multi-domain operations will require new processes. Changes will be required not only to the physical systems employed but also to Joint professional military education, Joint and Army doctrine and headquarters staff structures as leaders and their staffs will require different skills to operate in this new environment.”

Bunker, Robert J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph analyzes and provides policy response options for US national security and Army planners concerning the potential for postterritorial caliphate battlefield migration by the sizable contingent of battle-hardened Islamic State foreign fighters situated within various remaining enclaves that remain in Syria and Iraq.”

Schellenberger, Dominik Josef. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 2020).
“The current operational environment is characterized by the emergence of the information age and peer and near peer adversaries. The 2017 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations addresses those paradigm shifts by introducing the multi-domain extended battlefield and four Army strategic roles—shape, prevent, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. FM 3-0 officially implements consolidation of gains and the related consolidation area for the first time into US Army doctrine. The purpose of consolidation of gains is to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities. An analysis of the historical role the US Army played at the end of World War II for the transition in occupied Germany as well as of current doctrine and future-oriented concepts leads to eighteen suggested doctrinal changes concerning consolidation of gains across US Army operations, leadership, and mission command doctrine. Four of those suggested doctrinal changes are the introduction of a comprehensive multi-domain consolidation area, the emphasis of intent-guided procedural control, the codification of virtual and cognitive consolidation of gains, and the doctrinal recognition of the possible need for temporary military government.”

Brewer, Eric, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The United States has been remarkably successful at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but there are new reasons to question whether this track record will last into the future.
Working with partners, the United States has steadily built a framework of disincentives and barriers to prevent proliferation. These include: (1) international treaties and agreements that have erected legal, political, and normative barriers to the bomb; (2) U.S. security commitments to allies that dampen their own need for nuclear weapons; and (3) a set of tough penalties (e.g., sanctions) for those who get caught trying to build the bomb. In other words, the barriers to entry to the nuclear club are high, and those countries that want the ultimate weapon need to be willing to accept significant risks. This helps explain why, although many countries have explored or pursued nuclear weapons, only nine states have them today.
But several trends are eroding the foundation on which this formidable set of barriers rests. These trends are rooted in, and being shaped by, changes to the nature and structure of the international system: namely, the decline of U.S. influence and its gradual withdrawal from the international order that it helped create and lead for more than 70 years, and the concurrent rise of a more competitive security environment, particularly among great powers. These trends (detailed in the report) will have three broad implications for proliferation and U.S. policy. First, they stand to increase pressures on countries to seek nuclear weapons or related capabilities as a hedge. Second, they will almost certainly challenge the United States’ ability to effectively wield the traditional “carrots and sticks” of nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy and dilute the effectiveness of those tools. Finally, they could increasingly pit U.S. nonproliferation goals against other policy objectives, forcing harder tradeoffs.
U.S. policy must adapt unless the United States wants to be faced with a more nuclear-capable landscape in the future.”

Gerstel, Dylan, and Matthew P. Goodman. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In response to today’s economic challenges—particularly managing the Covid-19 pandemic and the rise of China—prominent U.S. policymakers and political figures on both sides of the aisle, as well as business leaders, have called for more active government efforts to boost domestic production and innovation. However, there is significant disagreement about how to do so.
This report focuses on the role of government in supporting innovation in critical technologies, although there are other challenges—notably Covid-19—where greater federal intervention could be appropriate. To help further the discussion, we reviewed historical approaches to industrial policy in three advanced democracies: Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. Reflecting on those experiences, we present in this report a set of ten ‘first principles’ intended to guide a more active U.S. innovation strategy to reaffirm the country’s leadership in critical technologies.”

Ewing, Aaron R. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“The United States Air Force is struggling to cope with a worldwide pilot shortage that has left the service over 2,000 pilots short of what is needed to man its squadrons fully. With pilot retention declining in a time of unprecedented airline hiring, the service is desperately trying to find ways to increase pilot production. To recover from the current shortage, the Air Force has determined it needs to increase annual production from 1,200 to 1,600 pilots per year. Despite identifying a need for increased production, the service has yet to pinpoint an exact method to accomplish this task. A 33 percent increase of students will necessitate an increase of undergraduate pilot training (UPT) instructors, where the Air Force intends to find additional instructors given the current pilot shortage is unclear. This research paper seeks to fill this gap in knowledge by answering the question, are warrant officers the best solution to increase UPT instructor manning to achieve the overarching goal of producing 1,600 pilots per year?”

Bedard, Alexander F. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“America’s success in space and the continuation of escalating military missions in this security domain necessitates a perpetual and potent medical support apparatus both in space and on land. This research sought to answer the question: How will medical support for manned military space missions need to be organized, trained, and equipped to meet the National Security Strategy (NSS) objective of advancing space as a security domain? The hypothesis was that a dedicated medical support structure specifically for DOD space operations would be necessary.”

Kandrík, Matej. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“In recent years paramilitarism has resurfaced with new vitality in several countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The appearance of this war-related phenomenon in a predominantly peaceful and stable region might seem paradoxical. Yet a closer look at the historical roots of statehood there (many organizations are building on a heritage of pre-war predecessors), the sociocultural context (insecurity and a lack of alternatives for interested individuals to engage in military and related activities aside from professional service), and major changes in the security environment (the war in Ukraine and the migration crisis) provides some explanations.”

Sheppard, Lindsey, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Encryption is a critical tool to protect sensitive information, prevent cybercrime and digital fraud, and authenticate digital transactions. However, the global encryption policy landscape is fracturing, with different countries pursuing different approaches to encryption through both legal and technical means. With authoritarianism on the rise around the world, encryption policy debates are about more than securing data. How different countries address the question of access to encryption will shape how global companies build their products, which will have significant implications for the tools and choices available to a wide range of users around the world. For vulnerable groups, both recoverable and unrecoverable encryption can be an essential means to protect communications and activities from repressive regimes, criminals, hate groups, and other bad actors. But malicious actors can also utilize encryption to hide their activities from law enforcement and security agencies. While average, everyday users have interests and needs in using encryption, the CSIS research team focused on a subset of user communities that, taken together, illuminate the trade-offs inherent in encryption policy choices. This study explores these issues through the lens of key encryption user groups (independent voices; at-risk groups; businesses and organizations; foreign policy; and terrorists, extremists, and hate groups), their governments, and U.S. values and interests. Its findings illuminate the central trade-offs policymakers face and demonstrate that decisions surrounding when, where, how, and by whom encryption is used should be more nuanced than an all-or-nothing approach.”

Frederick, Kara. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating global trends in digital surveillance. Public health imperatives, combined with opportunism by autocratic regimes and authoritarian-leaning leaders, are expanding personal data collection and surveillance. This tendency toward increased surveillance is taking shape differently in repressive regimes, open societies, and the nation-states in between.
China, run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), is leading the world in using technology to enforce social control, monitor populations, and influence behavior. Part of maximizing this control depends on data aggregation and a growing capacity to link the digital and physical world in real time, where online offenses result in brisk repercussions. Further, China is increasing investments in surveillance technology and attempting to influence the patterns of technology’s global use through the export of authoritarian norms, values, and governance practices. For example, China champions its own technology standards to the rest of the world, while simultaneously peddling legislative models abroad that facilitate access to personal data by the state. Today, the COVID-19 pandemic offers China and other authoritarian nations the opportunity to test and expand their existing surveillance powers internally, as well as make these more extensive measures permanent.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
“The PLA’s objective is to become a ‘world-class’military by the end of 2049 - a goal first announced by General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2017. Although the CCP has not defined what a ‘world-class’ military means, within the context of the PRC’s national strategy it is likely that Beijing will seek to develop a military by mid-century that is equal to—or in some cases superior to—the U.S. military, or that of any other great power that the PRC views as a threat. As this year’s report details, the PRC has marshalled the resources, technology, and political will over the past two decades to strengthen and modernize the PLA in nearly every respect. Indeed, as this report shows, China is already ahead of the United States in certain areas such as:
Shipbuilding…Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles…Integrated air defense systems…
More striking than the PLA’s staggering amounts of new military hardware are the recent sweeping efforts taken by CCP leaders that include completely restructuring the PLA into a force better suited for joint operations, improving the PLA’s overall combat readiness, encouraging the PLA to embrace new operational concepts, and expanding the PRC’s overseas military footprint.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“For more than two millennia, monarchs who ruled China proper saw their country as one of the dominant actors in the world. The concept of zhongguo - the Middle Kingdom, as China calls itself - is not simply geographic. It implies that China is the cultural, political, and economic center of the world. This Sino-centrist worldview has in many ways shaped China’s outlook on global governance - the rules, norms, and institutions that regulate international cooperation. The decline and collapse of imperial China in the 1800s and early 1900s, however, diminished Chinese influence on the global stage for more than a century.”

Sayler, Kelley M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 27, 2020).
“The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons - maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 - as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable ‘responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.’ Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.”

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 7. February 20, 2020.
“The purpose of this publication is to describe the Marine Corps’ learning philosophy and explain why learning is critically important to the profession of arms. While many of the concepts in this publication have been passed on by Marine leaders throughout our history, this publication seeks to formalize them and provide aspirational goals. Learning is an institutional priority and a professional expectation for all Marines. This mentality is key to the Marine Corps becoming a more effective learning organization.
The most important factor in this philosophy is the importance of continuous learning throughout our careers for warfighting. Continuous learning is essential to maneuver warfare because it enables Marines to quickly recognize changing conditions in the battlespace, adapt, and make timely decisions against a thinking enemy. These skills required in war must be learned, developed, and honed over time—if neglected, they quickly atrophy. Marines leverage the art and science of learning, technologies, and learning environments that reflect the changing operational environment to tailor learning and provide each other with constructive feedback. Leaders hold Marines to high professional standards of performance, conduct, and discipline—to include learning. As Marines rise in rank and position, continuous learning and developing our professional skills are a professional expectation. We must make the most of every learning opportunity, fostering our subordinates’ learning while continuing our own.
Continuous learning is important to Marines because of the fundamental nature of war and its ever-changing character. The nature of war carries a combination of fear, uncertainty, ambiguity, chance, horror and, above all, friction that Marines must prepare to counter. Marines must seek out education and training opportunities that simulate these conditions. We must train how we fight. As Marines, we must understand how important learning is and be committed to the principles laid out in this publication. Our professional responsibility—as Marines— is to engage in continuous learning so that we may best support our fellow Marines, our Corps, and our Nation.”

World Economic Forum. (Cologny, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, June 2020).
“The AI Procurement in a Box project is a series of reports.”
• Project Overview
• AI Government Procurement Guidelines
• Workbook
• Challenges and Opportunities during Implementation
• Pilot Case Studies from the United Kingdom

Rossow, Richard M., Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Kriti Upadhyaya. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The United States has changed rules and created novel programs to strengthen defense ties with India. However, to many Western analysts, India remains largely absent from key conflicts the United States considers globally significant. This report contends that Washington must use a different lens in judging India’s involvement: looking beyond the periphery of the United States and its allies, it should instead consider India’s growing role as a regional security provider in Asia. One region where India’s influence is strongly felt is the Himalayas, where the territorial integrity and security of smaller nations across China’s western border hangs in the balance. Through satellite imagery analysis, this report presents how India is on the front line of China’s expansionist territorial ambitions.”

Patalano, Alessio. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“Chinese activities in the waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands have undergone a significant change over the past few months. This is a potentially dangerous development for Sino–Japanese relations.”
“Whilst international security analysts continue to focus on the troubled waters of the South China Sea, a storm is gathering in the adjacent and much less reported East China Sea. The eye of this storm is the small group of islands under Japanese administrative control known as Senkaku. The islands are claimed by China under the name Diaoyu, and by Taiwan as Diaoyutai. In July, Japan’s newly released Defence White Paper stressed that Chinese authorities are ‘relentlessly’ pressing their claims to the islands with ever-increasing levels of maritime activities seeking to change the ‘status quo’. In particular, the document sought to draw attention to the possibility of enhanced competition in international security, notably – but not exclusively – between China and the US in the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis.”

Jones, Lee, and Shahar Hameiri. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“Critics of the BRI accuse China of pursuing a policy of ‘debt-trap diplomacy’: luring poor, developing countries into agreeing unsustainable loans to pursue infrastructure projects so that, when they experience financial difficulty, Beijing can seize the asset, thereby extending its strategic or military reach. This paper demonstrates that the evidence for such views is limited.”

United Nations Environment Programme. (Nairobi, Kenya: United Nations Environment Programme, 2020).
“A Scientific Assessment with Key Messages for Policy-Makers A Special Volume of UNEP’s Frontiers Report Series.”
“This evidence-based scientific assessment has identified the following ten key messages for decision-makers:
• De-Risking Food Systems
• Urgency
• Report Audience
• Scope of the Problem
• Outbreak Frequency and Predictability
• Connectivity and Complexity
• Disease Drivers
• Impact and Cost
• Policy Options
• One Health”

Colwell, Darrin Lee. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2020).
“The United States Army is in the midst of an identity crisis. One of the difficulties that George Washington faced more than 240 years ago is still a challenge today: inspiring young people to aspire to a greater calling. The United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) failed to achieve its Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 mission, missing the mark by around 6,500 recruits; the U.S. Navy, Marines and Air Force all reached their FY 2018 goals.1 This prompted Secretary of the Army Mark Esper to make this declaration to current and former members of the U.S. Army: tell your Army Story.2 If USAREC continues to fail to fill the ranks, there will be rippling national security implications. In order to correct this, the Army Marketing Research Group (AMRG) must find the words, images and sense of calling that connect with America’s youth.”

Jackson, Kimberly, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“This report presents findings to assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in understanding what professional experiences and other characteristics the general and flag officers in each of the military services tend to share as a result of each service’s approach to personnel management and other related factors, and how these approaches might influence the ways in which general and flag officers lead, manage, and advise."

Finney, Nathan K. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2020).
“‘On Strategy’ is tailored for mid-career professionals working at the strategic level for the first time, including civilians entering the national security profession and military officers transitioning into strategy from jobs at the tactical level.”

Jurkowsky, Tom. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“Admiral Jurkowsky's distinguished military career culminated in service as the Navy's Chief of Information, and he worked on a variety of events, from the Tailhook Scandal to various incidents at the Naval Academy. His book highlights the importance of honesty, clear messaging, and a positive relationship with the press in order to effectively manage strategic communications. The goal of ‘The Secret Sauce for Organizational Success’ is for both communication practitioners and their leaders to learn from the author’s experiences and motivate both, in tandem, so that they always do the ‘right thing.’”

Bipartisan Policy Center and the Center for a New American Security. (Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2020).
“Greater investments in artificial intelligence research and development are essential to maintaining American leadership in AI. Throughout the 20th century, the federal government played a critical role in fueling technological innovation by funding pivotal basic research. Government funding was essential to developing the transistor, GPS, and the internet—inventions that transformed the world economy. Yet over the past several decades, federal government spending on R&D as a percentage of GDP declined from about 1.2% in 1976 to around 0.7% in 2018. This is a worrisome trend as the federal government remains the main funder of basic research. Government support again could be pivotal both in fostering new AI breakthroughs and ensuring that the U.S. government has access to those breakthroughs.
Beyond AI, overall R&D spending trends are troubling. Other countries are outpacing the United States with faster growth of their national R&D budgets. Total U.S. national (public and private) R&D expenditures as a share of GDP have been mostly stagnant since 1996. China quadrupled its R&D expenses as a share of GDP over the same time frame, and countries like Israel and South Korea also significantly ramped up spending.”

Vahle, Mark W. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 2020).
“This paper examines the implications of a technological convergence of biotechnology and cyber technology and how best to prepare for the exponential change triggered by this emerging field. This convergence, specifically brain-computer interface (BCI) technology, is enabling bidirectional communication between the brain and a computer. Clinical applications are significant, offering treatments for epilepsy, dementia, nervous system disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, as well as advanced prosthetics. In some cases, BCIs may be able to not just restore functionality but also augment it. New noninvasive techniques are now showing benefits to the point where healthy individuals may opt to have BCIs installed to augment their abilities. This paper will explore the opportunities this technology creates for the United States Air Force (USAF) to enhance combat capability, particularly in high-workload career fields, and the policy choices needed to prepare for the next 20 years. It concludes that in order to seize these opportunities, the USAF needs to act now on currently available technologies to foster a culture of increased experimentation and calculated risk-taking.”

Ellehuus, Rachel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The United Kingdom’s 2020 Integrated Security and Defense Review is an opportunity for the country to reposition itself in a post-Brexit world and to restore a sense of coherence to British foreign and security policy. However, the success of the Integrated Review hinges on the ability of the British government to set strategic priorities and manage the economic strains of both Brexit and the Covid-19 crisis.”

Ibrahim, Azeem. (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph places events in Libya since 2011 into their historical and social context and argues a form of radical Islamism, linked to long-standing national defiance of outside control, remains a factor even after the defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This entrenched radicalism means extremist Islamist groups may still make a renewed bid for power until the current civil war is resolved. At the time of this writing, the military campaign by the Libyan National Army has stalled outside Tripoli. Now is the time for the United States and the wider international community to step up and help Libya transition to a unitary government with conventional elections. If this fails to happen and ISIS is able to exploit the current chaos, the hard-won victory over the group in Libya may yet turn out to have been illusory.”

Devermont, Judd. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
- U.S. policy toward Africa is in need of a facelift—in both substance and strategic vision—to keep up with the continent’s shifting demographics and growing influence on the world stage. Africans will be integral to addressing some of the world’s thorniest problems. The continent holds three nonpermanent seats at the UN Security Council, and it represents the largest and most unified bloc at the UN General Assembly.
- A revitalized relationship with African countries must prioritize engagement with African counterparts because there are strategic issues on the table. It has to levy real carrots and sticks, not just deploy moralistic arguments about a policy outcome.
- The United States should expand its diplomatic partners and repertoire, investing in cities, deepening its ties with regional bodies, elevating its private sector, and working alongside other external actors.
- The United States should revamp its public diplomacy and communication with both African and U.S. audiences. By reimagining its soft power, as well as tapping behavioral economists, advertising professionals, and pollsters, the United States has a real opportunity to connect with the next generation of African leaders and advance its objectives in the region and the wider world.”

Howard, Julie, and Emmy Simmons. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“‘Agriculture Under Pressure’ examines the evolving role of agricultural development in today’s U.S. foreign assistance strategy and programming. The numbers of hungry people are rising again, with hunger concentrated in fragile, conflict-, and climate-affected regions where production and trade are disrupted. Concerns are growing that the environmental costs and health impacts associated with the prevailing model of agricultural production are unacceptably high. The spread of the global coronavirus pandemic in 2020 has revealed shocking vulnerabilities in food and agricultural systems at all levels.
Feed the Future, the U.S. Government’s global hunger and food security initiative, which is managed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), is mandated to lead U.S. support for the development of food and agricultural systems of low- and middle-income countries. This report:
• summarizes the evolution of Feed the Future;
• reviews the key pressures affecting agriculture today;
• discusses opportunities to strengthen resilience and move toward a more sustainable, inclusive and healthy food and agriculture system; and
• proposes recommendations for U.S. foreign assistance.”

Ellis, Evan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In late June and early July, three separate events highlighted the growing risk that the political, health, economic, and security crisis in Venezuela could come to a head in the coming months, which would have grave consequences for its neighbors in the region. First, two figures affiliated with the regime, Diosdado Cabello and Tarek El-Aissami, tested positive for Covid-19, with the prospect that Nicolás Maduro himself—with whom El-Aissami met—could be next. Second, the Maduro regime excluded three of the four political parties opposing him—Popular Will, Justice First, and Democratic Action—from National Assembly elections to be held in December; it also replaced their leaders with regime loyalists, decisively closing one of the few remaining possibilities for a democratic exit to the political crisis in the country. And finally, a report by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on illegal mining in Venezuela highlighted the degree to which the national territory is controlled not by Nicolás Maduro or Juan Guaidó, but by criminal organizations. Beyond the greater Caracas area, Venezuela has devolved into a series of criminal fiefdoms bound not by an allegiance to Maduro or Guaidó but rather by a shared interest in the continued absence of effective governance; this enables those with guns to persist in their criminal enterprises, from narcotics and illegal mining to extorting desperate Venezuelans seeking to cross the border or to send remittances to their loved ones.”

Braun, William G., III, et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“The United States faces a hypercompetitive geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific region, arguably the most consequential theater for US national interests over the coming decades. Although the United States has created exquisite military capabilities to counter insurgencies and fight terrorists, rivals like China have developed a whole-of-government toolkit focused on expanding their span of control and freedom of action, separating the United States from its allies, and deterring US leaders from greater engagement in East Asia.
China is actively transforming its military forces, with an eye toward defeating the United States in the event of armed hostilities. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is also creatively employing its military and paramilitary assets strategically to outmaneuver the United States and partners in meaningful gray zone approaches. The PRC enjoys strategic depth and increasingly operates on internal or heavily protected lines of communication while demonstrating the ability to threaten American interests with a variety of multi-domain capabilities and forces.
Meeting this challenge will require joint transformation to a more hypercompetitive theater design. Army adoption of the four transformational roles of grid, enabler, multi-domain warfighter, and capability and capacity generator will be essential to realizing this more hypercompetitive Joint theater approach.”

Butow, Steven J., et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2020).
“The world stands at the threshold of a new era in space. Much of the foundation of this exciting era is American made, and much of the innovation powering it is born of American creativity and ingenuity. Other nations, however, are challenging the US for leadership of this next space age. Success in this long-term strategic competition requires that the US seamlessly integrate multiple elements of national power. This report provides US policymakers and industry leaders comprehensive recommendations on the path forward to address the growing threats to US space power and how to ensure a strong US space industrial base as a foundation to US space leadership. Going beyond ‘admiring the problem,’ this report documents the next higher level of analysis of the challenge, focusing on specific actions the US must undertake to maintain security in space. The report clearly delineates the state of the space industrial base, its challenges and issues, and provides six overarching recommendations to US policymakers and four overarching recommendations to space industry leaders. It further provides detailed analysis of sub-areas of the space industrial base and areas affecting the base, specifying 39 actions as to what must be done, who must do them, and the timeframe in which they must be accomplished.”

Rasser, Martijn, and Ainikki Riikonen. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The United States has the opportunity to regain momentum by taking a fresh approach to 5G in the aftermath of the pandemic. In addition to the broader appreciation for the criticality of reliable communication networks, Beijing’s coronavirus cover-up and clunky attempts at soft power have hardened public opinion toward China around the world. The economic fallout of the pandemic will likely slow 5G deployments globally, curtailing the urgency with which many operators approached the issue. At the same time, the first commercial projects centered on technological alternatives to the predominant 5G approach are being deployed. This confluence of events presents the United States and like-minded countries an opening to promote an alternative approach that could lead to a paradigm shift in the industry: wireless infrastructure built on a modular architecture with open interfaces…A restructured industry based on open interfaces would directly address the prevailing concerns over untrusted vendors such as Huawei and the broader inefficiencies of the industry. There are distinct advantages to be gained in security and interoperability, supply chain resiliency, probable cost savings, and the opportunity to stimulate much-needed competition in the sector. Taken together, these advantages do much to blunt Beijing’s industrial policies that have enabled Huawei’s predatory anti-competitive practices.
There are three distinct but related lines of effort the U.S. executive and legislative branches should take to promote open standards for 5G as a viable alternative to the status quo, and as a foundation for a secure 5G future:
• Signal U.S. government (congressional and executive) support for modular 5G equipment with open interfaces.
• Promote development and deployment of modular telecommunications infrastructure based on open interfaces.
• Collaborate with allies and partners.”

Goldenberg, Ilan, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Kaleigh Thomas. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“A U.S. diplomatic strategy should focus on the following key objectives with regard to Iran policy:
1. Prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.
2. Contain the impact of Iranian regional policies that are damaging to U.S. interests.
3. De-escalate regional tensions that perpetuate instability and proxy-fueled competition in the Middle East.
Based on these objectives, the United States should pursue the following phased approach starting in early 2021. Critically, from the start such an approach must take into account both regional and nuclear issues and be clear it values and will include both in its diplomatic efforts in a simultaneous, rather than sequential approach.
Phase 1: De-escalation. The United States should move early to de-escalate regional conflict and freeze or roll back Iran’s nuclear program.
Phase 2: Consultation. The United States should engage, simultaneously, in an internal review and consultative process with international partners and Congress on the objectives and strategy on addressing long-term nuclear concerns and regional dynamics with Iran.
Phase 3: Dual Track Negotiation. The United States should implement a strategy that includes activity on two parallel tracks—one focused on a “more for more” deal on the nuclear program and the other on regional de-escalation.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies website.
“The CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security aims to chart a bold vision for the future of U.S. leadership in global health security, at home and abroad. Recent events demonstrate the growing linkages between global health challenges and U.S. national security interests. We see an emerging recognition of the need for a stronger, more coherent, better integrated, and more reliably sustained U.S. approach to health security. The Commission offers the opportunity to build a pragmatic, actionable consensus.”

Association of American Medical Colleges. (Washington, DC: Association of American Medical Colleges, 2020).
“‘The Way Forward on COVID-19: A Road Map to Reset the Nation’s Approach to the Pandemic’ includes 11 evidence-based actions — both immediate and long-term — set forth as a comprehensive, coordinated plan based on AAMC experts’ understanding of the pandemic as doctors, scientists, and medical educators, as well as the work the AAMC has done to help its member medical schools, teaching hospitals, and health systems respond to the pandemic on the front lines.”

United Nations Coordinated Appeal. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2020).
“The pandemic and associated global recession are about to wreak havoc in fragile and low income countries. Unless we act now, we should be prepared for a series of human tragedies more brutal and destructive than any direct health impacts of the virus… We face a massive problem. But it can be addressed with relatively little money and a modicum of imagination. Exceptional circumstances require exceptional measures, discarding some of the previous rules and approaches, just as many rich countries have done in their own countries to protect their own citizens. This crisis – and the prospect of cascading crises down the road – forces us all to think out of our comfort zone. The stakes are high, and what we need to do has fundamentally changed.”

Lehr, Amy. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The forced labor of ethnic and religious minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), as part of a broader pattern of severe human rights abuses, is a significant and growing concern that demands the attention of governments and private-sector actors across the world. Products entering the United States, Europe, and other democracies are at risk of being affected by these forced labor practices, which often occur several steps away from global brands in supply chains. Companies cannot currently easily ensure that their products are not affected by XUAR-linked forced labor because brands often cannot trace their products to origin, and the XUAR’s important role in a number of sectors may require significant changes in sourcing practices. Moreover, global brands seeking to exert leverage on their Chinese suppliers with regard to XUAR sourcing are reportedly seen to intervene with internal political affairs. This brief explores what the XUAR produces, the sectors that are implicated, the resulting sourcing challenges, and the opportunities for collective action to be explored in further research.”

Note: screen down the page. Episodes are at the bottom.
The Civil Affairs Association
“The One CA podcast aims to broadcast the valuable insights and lessons CA operators learned from challenging assignments. One CA is a way to ensure the regiment continues to be a learning organization. The podcast includes thinkers and leaders from the military, academia, industry, and interagency.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2020).
“The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective on the modern battlefield. Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV may be subject to a high degree of congressional interest.”

de Hoop Scheffer, Alexandra, et al. (Washington, DC: German Marshal Fund of the United States, 2020).
“The 2020 edition of Transatlantic Trends is a comparative study of French, German, and American perspectives on the major issues facing the transatlantic relationship: cooperation in security and defense, China’s influence on the global stage, international trade, and the digital transition. Polling before and after the coronavirus crisis provides, for several questions, a unique tool to better understand the impact of the pandemic on public opinion. The report thus serves as a comprehensive overview of the major trends shaping transatlantic relations, compares public policies with public perceptions in all three countries, and strengthens trilateral French-German-U.S. dialogue on issues where public opinion is in favor of closer cooperation.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2020).
“Russia’s nuclear forces consist of both long-range, strategic systems—including intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers—and shorter- and medium-range delivery systems. Russia is modernizing its nuclear forces, replacing Soviet-era systems with new missiles, submarines and aircraft while developing new types of delivery systems. Although Russia’s number of nuclear weapons has declined sharply since the end of Cold War, it retains a stockpile of thousands of warheads, with more than 1,500 warheads deployed on missiles and bombers capable of reaching U.S. territory.”

Bowen, Andrew S. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 20, 2020).
“Since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia has undertaken extensive efforts to modernize and upgrade its armed forces. In the years ahead, these efforts are expected to continue focusing on modernizing military equipment, as well as improving combat readiness and coordination across service branches. Command and control, electronic warfare, recruitment of professional soldiers, force structure changes, and logistics also are likely to be priorities for development. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in understanding the extent of Russia’s military modernization and reform efforts as they assess the nature of Russian threats to the United States and its allies and partners in Europe and other regions.”

Afina, Yasmin, Calum Inverarity, and Beyza Unal. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“This paper will identify, raise awareness of, and help reduce risks to NATO’s nuclear weapon systems arising from cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It aims to respond to the need for more public information on cyber risks in NATO’s nuclear mission, and to provide policy-driven research to shape and inform nuclear policy at member-state level.”

Conley, Heather A., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Moscow and Beijing’s toolkit for influencing democratic societies has evolved. Using Germany, the UK, Japan, and Australia as case studies, CSIS explores what traits made these democracies vulnerable to foreign influence as well as the sources of their resiliency.”

Ellehuus, Rachel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report is the United Kingdom case study of an ambitious year-long CSIS initiative to analyze Russian influence activities in the United Kingdom and Germany and Chinese influence activities in Japan and Australia. For the past 15 years, Russia has sought to weaken the United Kingdom internally and diminish its position in the world by exploiting minority grievances, encouraging separatist movements, amplifying anti-EU sentiments, and trying to inflict reputational damage upon the United Kingdom’s role in NATO and the value of its relationship with the United States. Rachel Ellehuus examines what democratic traits have made the UK vulnerable and resilient to these malign influence activities, which Russian efforts have and have not worked, and what the UK policy response has been.”

Jackson, James K., et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated July 21, 2020).
“Since the COVID-19 outbreak was first diagnosed, it has spread to over 200 countries and all U.S. states. The pandemic is negatively affecting global economic growth beyond anything experienced in nearly a century. Estimates so far indicate the virus could trim global economic growth by 3.0% to 6.0% in 2020, with a partial recovery in 2021, assuming there is not a second wave of infections. The economic fallout from the pandemic raises the risks of a global economic recession with levels of unemployment not experienced since the Great Depression of the 1930s. The human costs in terms of lives lost will permanently affect global economic growth in addition to the cost of rising levels of poverty, lives upended, careers derailed, and increased social unrest. Global trade could also fall by 13% to 32%, depending on the depth and extent of the global economic downturn, exacting an especially heavy economic toll on trade-dependent developing and emerging economies. The full impact will not be known until the effects of the pandemic peak. This report provides an overview of the global economic costs to date and the response by governments and international institutions to address these effects.”

Hillman, Jonathan E. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report examines four dimensions of China-Russia connectivity and reveals a growing partnership that faces structural constraints. Trade is highly concentrated in natural resources, where Chinese and Russian interests most strongly overlap. Investment is constrained by corruption and poor infrastructure in Russia. People-to-people ties have been improving but mistrust remains, as the Covid-19 pandemic has revealed. Even as China and Russia cooperate in building digital infrastructure, each side imposes restrictions that limit data flows. Standing in the way of deeper connections are Russia’s development challenges and both governments’ obsessions with maintaining control. After assessing each of these areas, a final section considers the future trajectory of China-Russia economic relations and its implications for U.S. interests. There is room for growth, but as China and Russia’s economic connections strengthen, their partnership will become even more unequal. Russia’s junior status will become more of a liability, and Russian officials could be incentivized to reduce the risk of greater reliance on China. China’s sheer mass, proximity, and willingness to economically coerce its partners could eventually compel Russia to look again to the West, where most of its trade remains despite its growing ties with China.”

Hayashi, Mitsuko. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Covid-19 pandemic is unlike any other in modern history. It is not just a global health crisis. If the virus continues to disrupt the social environment, it could put a serious strain on international peace and security. On April 9, 2020, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned the world of an ever-increasing number of security risks that have emerged as a result of the virus. They include social unrest, violence, and resurgent terrorism due to rising unemployment and the economic downturn. The situation hinders regional and international efforts to resolve conflict. It provides some actors with incentives to create division as the main players in peace and security focus their efforts on combating the virus… Building up capabilities, maintaining constant awareness of the security situation, and harmonizing regional effort are essential if we are to forge resilience against the pandemic. What kind of contribution can an individual country make for that purpose in the era of Covid-19? Take Japan, for example, which can provide a unique contribution in response to the global health pandemic. Since the end of the Cold War, Japan has a track record of upholding regional resilience through its defense diplomacy and capacity building cooperation…Japan seems well equipped to provide a unique and important security contribution to the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s expertise in humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/ DR), regional engagement and partnerships, and multilayered defense relationships can be leveraged to bolster the resilience of the Indo-Pacific region as a whole.”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The Defense Production Act emerged from the need to rapidly accelerate industrial mobilization for the Korean War. Over the last 70 years, the DPA's prominence in the national consciousness declined and then only reentered the national dialogue with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, it has remained an important tool for the executive branch and helped to ensure national security, whether it was stockpiling needed metals and minerals, prioritizing the production of weapons systems, developing energy security, or providing emergency relief from natural disasters. In meeting all of these requirements, the DPA has evolved into a flexible piece of legislation that is able to aid in the development and acquisition of military weapons and technology as well as the procurement and distribution of emergency relief materials.”

Clark, J.P., and C. A. Pfaff (Principal Investigators). (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“Within the context of Europe, the US Army must develop a force posture that best navigates the tensions between deterring or defeating armed conflict at an acceptable cost, successfully competing below armed conflict, and maintaining global responsiveness and institutional flexibility through the global operating model and dynamic force employment. While Russia’s economy, and consequently military capability will likely shrink over the next 10 years, which can make them more dangerous as the Kremlin continues to try to punch above its weight. The ideal force posture needs to accomplish a range of on-going and contingency missions and also be adaptive enough to remain viable despite any number of potential swings in resources, military balance, or the domestic politics of allies. This study recommends five possible strategic approaches and specifies what conditions and priorities optimize each. The principal investigators recommend investing in a multidomain alliance. This strategic approach enables the joint force and multinational partners to get the most of their capabilities and makes the best use of the Army’s top modernization priorities, such as long-range fires in a way that alters the strategic balance of a theater to avert a potentially catastrophic, albeit low probability, scenario of armed conflict. More importantly, this strategic approach is far more stable in a crisis, as it does not place policymakers in having to rush this critical, escalatory capability into theater at a moment of high tension. Moreover, invest in a multidomain alliance has the flexibility to allow a later build-up of heavy forces if conditions still warrant.”

Watling, Jack. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“The foremost mission of UK Defence is the protection of the UK’s interests, and few interests are as significant as the avoidance of warfighting at scale. This must be ensured through the maintenance of credible deterrence, which aims to convince potential adversaries that they cannot achieve favourable outcomes through recourse to force. The resurgence of great power rivalry, however, ensures that UK interests will be threatened by state actors around the world, below the threshold of war, meaning that deterrence must also be pursued to constrain adversaries in competition. Russia represents the most serious threat in both conflict and competition. Not only is it willing to use direct military force to advance its interests when it perceives the conditions to be right, but it is also developing global reach, and acts internationally to build up leverage with great powers through coercive issue linkage. Because deterrence is primarily cognitive – aiming to convince an adversary not to do something – any analysis of effective deterrence must be based on an assessment of the target’s policy and outlook.”

Blume, Susanna V., and Molly Parrish. (Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“This report asks whether the 2021 U.S. defense budget request is aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in selecting priority capability investments while taking risk in less urgent areas.1 We conclude that the Department of Defense (DoD) is making progress in NDS implementation in select sectors—for example, in pursuing new command and control and strike architectures. However, we also conclude that DoD continues to underinvest in some critical enablers that will make these emerging command and strike complexes work.”

Green, Michael Jonathan, and Amy K. Lehr. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Indo-Pacific region is emerging as the epicenter of a new debate over how states should be organized. CSIS partnered with the National Endowment for Democracy and the Annenberg Foundation Trust at Sunnylands to convene leading thinkers on democracy from across the Indo-Pacific for a discussion of strategies to advance democratic governance and human rights in the region. This report includes a statement of principles endorsed by participants in a dialogue at Sunnylands, as well as a background paper by CSIS scholars examining global trend lines, regional dynamics within the Indo-Pacific, and recommendations for policymakers to consider.”

Farwell, James P. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020).
“A sophisticated, actionable approach to information warfare is vital in carrying out the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). The NDS acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations. The NDS adopts the view that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea pose competitive challenges to U.S. prosperity and security in an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield combined across domains, and that they do so with increasing speed and reach. In meeting the new challenges, the U.S. military must build capacity and expertise to conduct information warfare. This book examines how to forge strategies, operations, and tactics using strategic communication as a tool of information warfare to exert influence and gain advantage in this competitive threat environment.”

Paul, Christopher, Yuna Huh Wong, and Elizabeth M. Bartels. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“The U.S. Marine Corps and joint concepts and thinking increasingly emphasize the role of information in military operations—from maintaining situational awareness to influencing adversary decisionmaking and understanding the behaviors of noncombatant populations. At the same time, wargaming is enjoying renewed prominence in the defense community as a tool to explore potential future conflicts and shape strategy. Yet, the information environment (IE) remains underdeveloped and underrepresented in wargames, both in the Marine Corps and across the U.S. Department of Defense. An examination of requirements, principles from military theory, current doctrine, and commercial gaming practices points to solutions and changes to game mechanics to better incorporate information considerations into wargame planning, development, and play in ways that can be customized according to available resources, capabilities, and goals. Recommendations target wargame sponsors, wargame designers, and those who are responsible for procuring new tools and recruiting personnel to support wargaming.”

Braw, Elisabeth (ed). (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“This report emerges from the ‘Revamping Crisis Resilience and Security in the Post-Pandemic World’ conference held on 19 May 2020. Our intention is for it to be used as a resource and source of ideas for resilience and crisis planning officials not just in Sweden but in other countries as well. The report is structured in two sections. The first addresses the major themes of the conference and provides additional context on how these fit into broader debates about resilience. While not presenting new research, this section highlights the key issues that are often absent from the current discussion on the coronavirus pandemic. It further suggests the major lessons that policymakers should take from the pandemic and indicates policy areas that require specific attention so that future crises will be more effectively addressed. The second section delves specifically into some of these policy areas. It features shorter contributions from some of the speakers at the conference. In these, the authors distil the key messages presented at the conference relating to each speaker’s area of expertise. In doing so, many of the authors offer novel ideas that merit further consideration. This work will, it is hoped, generate new discussions among those involved in contingencies planning – both in the public and private sectors – and encourage them to consider solutions that go beyond their traditional remits. In turn, this should lead to more-resilient societies, capable of facing a range of contingencies.”

Williams, Paul D. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“This paper summarizes the US mission in Somalia, analyses how it is being implemented, and assesses whether US policy in Somalia is working. It also outlines three scenarios for future US engagement.”

Wellesley, Laura, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“Malnutrition acts as a brake on the development of individuals, communities and economies around the world. This report is the first of its kind to reveal the hidden costs of malnutrition for business, and the extent to which these costs are recognized and addressed by multinational companies (MNCs).”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“After the 9/11 attacks, Americans yearned for a ‘return to normal.’ The normal they longed for was the world as it was on September 10th, or status quo ante. That was impossible, however, because the events of that day irrevocably changed the world. The new normal, the status quo post, was the world as it was after 9/11. The same must be said for COVID-19. We cannot return to the world before we understood the terms ‘social distance,’ ‘herd immunity,’ or ‘flatten the curve.’ The Army was not prepared for the COVID-19 pandemic, but neither was the nation nor the world. Given the information now known about the virus and the expert predictions that a second wave might occur soon, the Army is better prepared to plan for potentially operating under pandemic conditions. Experts warn that a true second wave arriving in the fall or winter could be much worse than the first. If the coronavirus behaves as the Spanish flu virus did in 1918-1919, then a third wave might be expected as well.
With these events in mind, the Army may expect momentous changes in the coming years. Initially, the Army will be called upon for its vast resources, labor, and specific rapidly deployable capabilities, as has been demonstrated during the initial wave of the pandemic. The Army will also be viewed as an income generator by providing economic support to small contractors that will support both their local economies and the larger defense industry. But the pandemic's long-term effect on the world economy will be devastating and possibly catastrophic. The next administration will face the challenge of using military resources to support communities while reducing defense budgets. Though the defense budget is only a small part of the US budget, it forms a large part of the discretionary spending. The budget cuts, when they come, will fall, as always, disproportionately on the Army. Reducing the Army budget is, and always has been, quicker, easier, and less visibly economically damaging than cutting the budgets of the other services. This is because cuts to the other services’ budgets means cancelling large multiyear contracts that employ thousands of workers while reducing the Army budget inevitably means reducing manpower. This study examines the Army’s necessary steps over the next two years.”

Gentile, Gian, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors show that there is no such thing as a 'traditional' U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. The authors document this in a series of four volumes, collected here in an easily searchable digital tool. Volume I traces the history of U.S. military policy from the colonial era through the Spanish-American War; this period is critical for understanding the genesis of the basic structure of today's Army and the various factors that informed that structure. Volume II focuses on the major laws enacted in the early 20th century that changed the federal government's relationship with the National Guard, established what would become today's Army Reserve, and improved the Army's ability to expand and develop trained specialists. Volume III covers the period from 1940 to 1970 and the development of Total Force Policy. Volume IV covers the period from 1970 to 2015, from changes to U.S. military policy that resulted from the Vietnam War through years of persistent conflict following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 22, 2020).
“This report provides background information and issues for Congress regarding the U.S. role in the world, meaning the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 23, 2020).
“In an international security environment described as one of renewed great power competition, the South China Sea (SCS) has emerged as an arena of U.S.-China strategic competition…Potential general U.S. goals for U.S.-China strategic competition in the SCS and ECS include but are not necessarily limited to the following: fulfilling U.S. security commitments in the Western Pacific, including treaty commitments to Japan and the Philippines; maintaining and enhancing the U.S.-led security architecture in the Western Pacific, including U.S. security relationships with treaty allies and partner states; maintaining a regional balance of power favorable to the United States and its allies and partners; defending the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes and resisting the emergence of an alternative ‘might-makes-right’ approach to international affairs; defending the principle of freedom of the seas, also sometimes called freedom of navigation; preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon in East Asia; and pursing these goals as part of a larger U.S. strategy for competing strategically and managing relations with China.”

Green, Michael, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Situated at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, Southeast Asia has, in recent years, become the bellwether for the region, including the future of democratic governance. External powers, including the United States and China, have ramped up engagement with Southeast Asia and now compete for influence in the region. Amid these geopolitical shifts, Southeast Asian perspectives on dynamics that will shape the future of the region more than ever before. In late 2019, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a survey of strategic elites in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand as well as Fiji to understand how the region views trends related to power, norms, and institutions. In early 2020, CSIS conducted extensive analysis of the survey data and convened a workshop in Sydney, Australia, to further examine the results with leading experts from the countries surveyed, as well as Australia and the United States. This report presents key findings from the survey and workshop on the strategic landscape in Southeast Asia and the future of power and influence and challenges faced by the region.”

Reynolds, Nick. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2020).
“Information has always been critical to warfare. Today, however, changes to the information domain are forcing militaries to adapt how they operate. With the boundary between peace and conflict becoming increasingly blurred, and with the collapse of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs due to connectivity and globalisation, the British Army is now called upon to persistently compete against a diversified array of threats both above and below the threshold of warfighting.”

Baklitskiy, Andrey. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In this new report, former CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program visiting fellow Andrey Baklitskiy examines the future prospects for U.S.-Russia arms control. The report considers the current state of arms control agreements between the two nations; evaluates potential alternatives, including a new trilateral process with China; and examines potential areas that could be on the negotiating table, should the two capitals again choose to pursue arms control agreements.”

Belkin, Paul, and Hibbah Kaileh. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 16, 2020).
“The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is a Department of Defense (DOD) effort to ‘enhance the U.S. deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolster the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners,’ according to the DOD European Deterrence Initiative Fact Sheet…Today, EDI is a key funding source for U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) posture adjustments in response to the evolving European security environment. EDI has enabled the first increase in U.S. military forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This includes the rotational deployment of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT), mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Two BCTs, one Stryker-equipped and one airborne infantry, are permanently stationed in Europe—in Germany and Italy, respectively. A prominent objective of EDI has been to enable rapid military mobilization to Central and Eastern Europe in order to respond quickly to military aggression in the region.”

Bergsen, Pepijn, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
“The COVID-19 crisis could lead to a wider rethink of Europe’s political economy. This paper explores what such a model might look like, and what it would mean for the governance of the European Union.”

Jones, Seth G., Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas Harrington. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“The United States faces a growing terrorism problem that will likely worsen over the next year. Based on a CSIS data set of terrorist incidents, the most significant threat likely comes from white supremacists, though anarchists and religious extremists inspired by the Islamic State and al-Qaeda could present a potential threat as well. Over the rest of 2020, the terrorist threat in the United States will likely rise based on several factors, including the November 2020 presidential election.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2020).
“The Administration’s approach to the PRC reflects a fundamental reevaluation of how the United States understands and responds to the leaders of the world’s most populous country and second largest national economy. The United States recognizes the long-term strategic competition between our two systems. Through a whole-of-government approach and guided by a return to principled realism, as articulated by the NSS, the United States Government will continue to protect American interests and advance American influence. At the same time, we remain open to constructive, results-oriented engagement.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2020). “On March 23, 2020, the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) announced a major force design initiative planned to occur over the next 10 years. The Marine Corps aims to redesign the force for naval expeditionary warfare and to better align itself with the National Defense Strategy, in particular, its focus on strategically competing with China and Russia. The Marines intend to eliminate or reduce certain types of units and eliminate some military occupational specialties (MOS). The Marines also plan to reorganize higher echelon Marine formations and get smaller—reducing forces by 12,000 personnel by 2030. Congress in its regulatory, oversight, and authorization and appropriations roles could take interest in this major proposed force design initiative.”

Hoehn, John R., and Kelley M. Sayler. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 5, 2020). “The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. 5G for the military could additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control (C2); and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency, among other uses. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations.”

Dalton, Melissa, and Hijab Shah. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). "The United States, Canada, and their allies are grappling with how best to build security partner capacity in hybrid warfare environments. In a resurgence of competition between states, actors such as China, Russia, and Iran increasingly use tools ranging from disinformation and cyberattacks to economic coercion and proxy warfare to further their interests. They conduct activities that incur low costs and suffer little reputational or accountability blowback while doing so. In this environment, there is a broad spectrum of threats with which the United States and its allies must contend, often with significant ambiguity. Policy and legal frameworks have not kept pace with the evolving threats. This poses challenges for how allies engage and sustain security partnerships."

Francis, E. Taylor. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2020). “The US armed forces today acknowledge the necessity of air superiority, at a minimum, before operations can begin. The ultimate goal is to achieve air supremacy to facilitate freedom of maneuver for US ground and naval forces. Given the importance of the control of the air, this author’s research goal was to determine the degree to which the history, theory, and doctrine of the US Air Force prepare it to obtain air supremacy against a peer or near-peer adversary in a present or near-future conflict. Research results suggest that air supremacy, in this case, should not be anticipated or expected. The Air Force is highly proficient at the tactical level but lacks the historical, theoretical, and doctrinal foundation on which to construct a campaign that guarantees success.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Draft Major Revision: June 3, 2020). “The Burke Chair at CSIS has completed a new analysis entitled ‘Afghanistan: The Prospects for a Real Peace,’ which provides a comprehensive analysis of the course of the fighting; the role U.S. forces play in Afghanistan’s security; and how developments in Afghan politics, governance, military forces, and economics affect the prospects for a real peace.”

Givens, Austen D. (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2020). “‘Disaster Labs: How American States Use Partnerships to Manage the Unthinkable’ examines the promise and potential drawbacks of public-private disaster response frameworks during the course of six chapters. After the introduction, the author introduces a series of case studies and then provides a detailed discussion of public-private collaboration in California, Florida, New York, and Virginia. A concluding chapter then comparatively assesses the value of these partnerships. The cases discussed in ‘Disaster Labs’ range from informal, ad hoc collaborations to formalized initiatives with detailed structures defined in contracts and memoranda, setting expectations for performance and accountability for both the government and private actors. Such accountability is desirable as it can limit fraud and corruption. But it is important to emphasize that not all solutions work in all situations, either.”

Stares, Paul B., et al. (New York: NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). “Although the world seems destined to grow more competitive, congested, and contested in the coming years, the logic of major power cooperation remains inescapable. Any effort to shape a new international order that is stable, inclusive, and beneficial to all must be a collaborative undertaking.”

Bernes, Tom, et al. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020). “The novel coronavirus has infected millions, killed hundreds of thousands, and affected the well-being of billions more. The COVID-19 pandemic is a transnational threat that requires a global response, but the outbreak has laid bare divergent national approaches to managing global epidemiological interdependence and exposed broader structural weaknesses in the global governance system. Nationalist and inward-looking policies could lead to the loss of millions of lives and global economic disaster. The world needs national governments, regional organizations, and international institutions to act in the same cooperative spirit to effectively mitigate the COVID-19 outbreak. ‘The Challenges of Global Governance Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic’ paper series includes contributions from thirteen Council of Councils institutes. Eight of these papers consider the broader implications of the pandemic for international cooperation and the trajectory of the global system. The remaining five papers examine major gaps in the international management of global public health emergencies and propose reforms to increase the capacity of the multilateral system and national governments to better prevent and anticipate, detect, and respond to future pandemics.”

McCarten-Gibbs, Maggie, and Sara M. Allinder.(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020). “This is an important year for the global HIV response. The first milestones toward the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) Fast Track goals toward controlling the global epidemic come due at the end of 2020. The world is off-track to meet them. Concerted, well-financed, and targeted action is needed now to sustain progress against HIV, mitigate the threats posed by Covid-19, and get on track to end HIV as a public health threat by 2030.”

“SSI research professors and faculty consider the COVID-19 pandemic and its long-term, strategic implications for the U.S. Army and national security. Each essay provides an independent, specialized view on a particular aspect of the challenges posed by COVID-19 and includes recommendations on how the Army and DoD should address those issues.”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, 2014).
Note: this product is from 2014, but it is shared in this Library Alert to provide historical context to current challenges relating to the COVID-19 pandemic. “As the Ebola crisis unfolded in 2014, USAHEC-HSD completed a study of how the Army has dealt with epidemics and pandemics. This study examines the Army's efforts to eradicate yellow fever in Central America during the early 20th century during the building of the Panama Canal, and the 1919 flu epidemic which began in the Army and spread worldwide.”

Shrank, Bryan, Scott Emmel, and Jacob Miller. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2020).
“U.S. national strategy documents highlight the increasing significance of the space domain for today’s warfighters and the importance of working with our international allies and partners in that realm. In this issue, we outline and propose an Army course focused on integrating space operations into land warfare. The proposed Combined Space Officer Course (CSOC) will strengthen alliances and partnerships, increase lethality, and build greater deterrence.”
Note: this research is published as part of the May 2020 “Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research.” “‘Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research’ is produced under the purview of the Applied Communication and Learning Lab and the United States Army War College. Each issue reports the findings of a major collaborative student or student-faculty research initiative on a topic of strategic importance to the Army, the Department of Defense, and/or the larger community of strategic leaders. The ideas and viewpoints advanced in Carlisle Compendia of Collaborative Research are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Applied Communication and Learning Lab, the United States Army War College, the Department of Defense, or any other department or agency of the United States Government.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with the assistance of Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Study, 2020).
“The new National Security Strategy (NSS) issued on December 18, 2017, called for the United States to focus on competition with China and Russia in order to focus on the potential military threat they posed to the United States. This call to look beyond the current U.S. emphasis on counterterrorism was all too valid, but its implementation has since focused far too narrowly on the military dimension and on providing each military service all of the U.S. military forces that are needed to fight ‘worst case’ wars… This ‘worst case’ war approach to U.S. strategy also ignores the fact that China and Russia have already found ways to compete effectively using gray area and hybrid operations, which rely on non-military political and economic competition – or that can involve both military and civil forms of ‘warfare.’… China and Russia have not only benefited from the fact that the U.S. has not focused on such forms of competition, they have also benefited from their state-driven systems that allow them to shape their economies to serve their strategic objectives just as well as their military forces. While there are many areas where China and Russia do not directly compete with the United States, there are many other cases where their strategy for such competition now applies to ongoing civil and military competition on a global level.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with the assistance of Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Study, 2020).
“There is no simple or reliable way to define Chinese gray area or hybrid civil and military operations that affect U.S. strategic interests. Many Chinese demonstrative or low-level operations, claims, and political acts can have such an effect, but they are only reported as serving commercial interests, reflecting local claims or interests, or supporting China’s internal security needs. Their impact on China’s strategic competition with the United States may be highly indirect, and the motives behind Chinese actions may be highly uncertain. Many activities are described, in terms of their impact on U.S. strategic partners, other states, and non-state actors, to not have an impact on competition with the United States. Other activities may not be reported in open source literature or may not be described accurately at all. Even when some Chinese actions clearly involve gray area or hybrid operations, the motives behind such actions might actually be very different.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with the assistance of Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Study, 2020).
“There is no simple or reliable way to define Russian gray area or hybrid civil and military operations that affect U.S. strategic interests. Many Russian low-level operations, claims, and political acts can have such an effect, but they are only reported as serving commercial interests, reflecting local claims or interests, or supporting Russia’s broader security needs. The impact of gray zone operations on Russia’s strategic competition with the United States may be highly indirect, and the motives behind Russian actions may be highly uncertain. Many activities are described, in terms of their impact on U.S. strategic partners, other states, and non-state actors, to not have an impact on competition with the United States. Other activities may not be reported in open source literature or may not be described accurately. Even when some Russian actions clearly involve gray area or hybrid operations, the motives behind such actions might be very different.”

Jones, Seth G. (ed). (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"This report examines Russia’s military and diplomatic campaign in Syria, the largest and most significant Russian out-of-area operation since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s experience in Syria will shape its military thinking, influence promotion and personnel decisions, impact research and development for its arms industry, and expand its influence in the Middle East and beyond for the foreseeable future. Yet despite the importance of Russia’s involvement in Syria—especially as the United States competes with countries such as Russia and China—there has been little systematic analysis of Russia’s campaign in Syria. This research aims to help fill the gap and provides some new analysis and data. It conducts a broad assessment of the Russian campaign—including political objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and civilian targeting—which places the military campaign in a wider context. In addition, it compiles a data set of Russia’s civilian targeting and analyzes satellite imagery of Russian activity."

Kurtzer, Jacob. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"Nigeria represents one of the United States’ most important relationships in Africa. Despite U.S. security sector and humanitarian assistance programs, ten years of violent insurgency in northeast Nigeria have led to massive humanitarian needs for more than seven million people, and the crisis shows no signs of abating. Ongoing restrictions by the government of Nigeria on humanitarian action threaten U.S. policy goals of improved humanitarian outcomes and a reduction in the presence of violent terrorist organizations. This report unpacks the challenges for humanitarian actors, the role of the United States and other donor institutions in meeting humanitarian needs, and the effectiveness of the Nigerian government’s response. Jacob Kurtzer provides concrete recommendations for mitigating the civilian impact of the conflict in northeast Nigeria."

Naimoli, Stephen J., and Sarah Ladislaw. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"In 2018, the power sector emitted 13.6 billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere, 41 percent of total global emissions. To have a chance of holding global temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius relative to its preindustrial level, global emissions from all economic sectors, including the power sector, must be reduced to net-zero around 2050. One of the challenges of decarbonizing the power sector is sufficiently reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions while guaranteeing reliability, security, and affordability. Solar and wind power are zero-carbon technologies, but their variability could challenge grid stability if they are not properly balanced by sufficient storage and firm power. Jesse Jenkins, a Princeton professor and one of the speakers at CSIS’s March 30 event on power sector decarbonization, likens the power system to a balanced diet: directly comparing the costs of variable renewable energy to those of firm power sources is like comparing the cost of a banana to the cost of a hamburger. Both can be evaluated on cost alone, but doing so misses the different roles they play in a balanced electric power system."

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Historical Services Division - U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center, n.d., ca. 2020).
“Of all the areas of research and writing concerning World War II, there is none filled with more contention and controversy than that concerning the end of the war in the Pacific. This was clearly demonstrated during the intense debate over the content of the Smithsonian’s 1995 Enola Gay exhibit commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. As we move farther away from the atmosphere of 1945 described above, the actions taken by the Allied Powers to force Japanese surrender appear more extreme, and the victors are more easily portrayed as villains by the vanquished or questioned by a newer generation about the motivations leading to the obliteration of enemy cities.”

O’Rourke, Ronald, Michael Moodie, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated May 8, 2020).
“Some observers argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be a world-changing event with potentially profound and long-lasting implications for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world. Other observers are more skeptical that the COVID-19 pandemic will have such effects.
Observers who argue the COVID-19 pandemic could be world-changing for the international security environment and the U.S. role in the world have focused on several areas of potential change, including the following, which are listed here separately but overlap in some cases and can interact with one another
• world order, international institutions, and global governance;
• U.S. global leadership and the U.S. role in the world;
• China’s potential role as a global leader;
• U.S. relations and great power competition with China and Russia, including the use of the COVID-19 pandemic as a theme or tool for conducting ideological competition;
• the relative prevalence of democratic and authoritarian or autocratic forms of government;
• societal tension, reform, transformation, and governmental stability in various countries;
• the world economy, globalization, and U.S. trade policy;
• the characteristics and conduct of conflict;
• allied defense budgets and U.S. alliances;
• the cohesion of the European Union;
• the definition of, and budgeting for, U.S. national security;
• U.S. defense strategy, defense budgets, and military operations;
• U.S. foreign assistance programs and international debt relief;
• activities of non-state actors;
• the amount of U.S. attention devoted to ongoing international issues other than the COVID-19 pandemic; and
• the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy.
Issues for Congress may include whether and how the COVID-19 pandemic could change the international security environment, whether the Trump Administration’s actions for responding to such change are appropriate and sufficient, and what implications such change could have for the role of Congress in setting and overseeing the execution of U.S. foreign and defense policy.
Congress’s decisions regarding these issues could have significant and even profound implications for U.S. foreign and defense policy, and for the status of Congress as a co-equal branch relative to the executive branch in setting and overseeing the implementation of U.S. foreign and defense policy.”

Todman, Will. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The Syrian government has restricted international humanitarian access to opposition-controlled areas of Syria as part of its efforts to regain control of the entire country
• In 2014, the United Nations designated four border crossings humanitarians could use to deliver aid to those in need without government approval.
• Russia and China blocked the United Nations from using two border crossings in January, and the mandate for the remaining two crossings will expire on July 10, 2020.
• Cutting off UN humanitarian agencies’ cross-border access to northwest Syria as the country faces the Covid-19 pandemic would be a catastrophe for Syria, the Middle East, the broader international community, and U.S. interests.
• The U.S. government should maximize its leverage in negotiations by focusing on the imperative to maintain UN agencies’ cross-border access to northwest Syria.
• The United States should push for a separate agreement to allow cross-border medical access to northeast Syria through the Yaroubiyah crossing.”

Davis, Lisa, et al. (Alexandria, VA: Office of People Analytics, 2020).
“The ‘2019 Military Service Gender Relations Focus Groups’ (2019 MSGR) report reflects the overall perceptions and findings gleaned from active duty Service members and Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR)/Sexual Harassment/Assault Response & Prevention (SHARP) SAPR/SHARP responders who participated in focus groups in eight locations around the continental United States (CONUS). Participants in these focus groups were asked about the culture of their installation and who influences the culture for Service members, the influence of gender discrimination and sexual harassment on work culture and morale, and how leadership and the SAPR/SHARP responder can better prevent and respond to incidents of sexual assault and sexual harassment reported by Service members. The goal of this report is to provide an overview and summary of key themes that arose from the discussions with Service members and SAPR/SHARP responders.”

Rosenberg, Elizabeth, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng. (Washington, DC: Center for a New America Century, 2020).
“The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other.”

Chhabra, Tarun, et al. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2020).
“This installment of papers for the Brookings Foreign Policy project ‘Global China: Assessing China’s Growing Role in the World’ assesses China’s growing technological reach in the world by focusing on both thematic and technology-specific topics.”
• Chhabra, Tarun, et al. “Executive Summary.”
• Brown, Michael, Eric Chewning, and Pavneet Singh. “Preparing the United States for the Superpower Marathon with China.”
• Wheeler, Tom. “Digital Competition with China Starts with Competition at Home.”
• Kania, Elsa B. “’AI Weapons’ in China’s Military Innovation.”
• Turner Lee, Nicol. “Navigating the US-China 5G Competition.”
• Klein, Aaron. “China’s Digital Payments Revolution.”
• Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. “Dealing with Demand for China’s Global Surveillance Exports.”
• Zwetsloot, Remco. “China’s Approach to Tech Talent Competition.”
• Imbrie, Andrew, and Ryan Fedasiuk. “Untangling the Web: Why the US Needs Allies to Defend Against Chinese Technology Transfer.”
• Moore, Scott. “China’s Role in the Global Biotechnology Sector and Implications for US Policy.”
• Rose, Frank A. “Managing China’s Rise in Outer Space.”
• Stefanick, Tom. “Secure Power: Gigawatts, Geopolitics, and China’s Energy Internet.”
• Khan, Saif M., and Carrick Flynn. “Maintaining China’s Dependence on Democracies for Advanced Computer Chips.”

Kliman, Daniel, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“The 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2018 and 2020 Taiwanese local and presidential elections crystallized that Russia and China are using digital interference to shape the contest between democracies and autocracies. While foreign information operations are time-tested methods of authoritarian influence, the digital space has increased the scope and speed with which these operations can be waged. Although there is no concrete evidence to suggest that Beijing and Moscow explicitly coordinate their information operations, the two countries are increasingly finding common cause as their interests align on a number of issues and in strategic regions.”

Mankoff, Jeffrey (ed.) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“As the U.S. military pivots back to a world shaped by great power competition, it faces the need of coming to grips with the evolving capabilities and doctrines of its principal rivals, China and Russia. The Russian military, in particular, is rapidly updating its tools and techniques in ways that challenge traditional thinking about great power competition. To promote a better understanding of the Russian military’s evolving capabilities and doctrines, the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program (REP), with support from United States European Command (EUCOM) has undertaken to gather this series of papers designed to give planners and executors a clear sense of just where the Russian military is headed.”

Katzman, Kenneth, Clayton Thomas, and Kathleen J. McInnis. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 8, 2020).
“The U.S.-Iran tensions still have the potential to escalate into all-out conflict. Iran’s materiel support for armed factions throughout the region, including its provision of short-range ballistic missiles to these factions, and Iran’s network of agents in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, give Iran the potential to expand confrontation into areas where U.S. response options might be limited. Iran has continued all its operations in the region despite wrestling with the COVID-19 pandemic that has affected Iran significantly. United States military has the capability to undertake a range of options against Iran, both against Iran directly and against its regional allies and proxies. A September 14, 2019, attack on critical energy infrastructure in Saudi Arabia demonstrated that Iran and/or its allies have the capability to cause significant damage to U.S. allies and to U.S. regional and global economic and strategic interests, and raised questions about the effectiveness of U.S. defense relations with the Gulf states.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 28, 2020).
“The geopolitical environment for the Arctic has been substantially affected by the renewal of great power competition. Although there continues to be significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly viewed as an arena for geopolitical competition among the United States, Russia, and China. Russia in recent years has enhanced its military presence and operations in the Arctic. China’s growing activities in the Arctic have become a matter of increasing curiosity or concern among observers. U.S. military forces have begun to pay more attention to the Arctic in their planning and operations. The Department of Defense (DOD), the Navy, and the Coast Guard have all issued Arctic strategy documents in recent years. Whether DOD and the military services are adequately resourcing these strategies and taking appropriate and adequate actions for defending U.S. interests in the Arctic has emerged as a topic of debate and congressional oversight. The Coast Guard has two operational polar icebreakers and has received funding for the procurement of the first of three planned new polar icebreakers. The diminishment of Arctic ice could lead in coming years to increased commercial shipping on two trans-Arctic sea routes—the Northern Sea Route close to Russia, and the Northwest Passage close to Alaska and through the Canadian archipelago—though the rate of increase in the use of these routes might not be as great as sometimes anticipated in press accounts. International guidelines for ships operating in Arctic waters have been recently updated.”

Food Security Information Network. (Rome, Italy: Food Security Information Network, 2020).
“The 2020 edition of ‘The Global Report on Food Crises’ describes the scale of acute hunger in the world. It provides an analysis of the drivers that are contributing to food crises across the globe, and examines how the COVID-19 pandemic might contribute to their perpetuation or deterioration. The report is produced by the Global Network against Food Crises, an international alliance working to address the root causes of extreme hunger.”

O'Rourke, Ronald, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 14, 2020).
“The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights.”

Lawfare. April 8, 2020, streaming audio, 01:25:55.
"March 11 marked the launch of the official report of the Cyberspace Solarium Commission. The commission is a bicameral, bipartisan, intergovernmental body created by the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, and charged with developing and articulating a comprehensive strategic approach to defending the United States in cyberspace. For the last month, Lawfare has published a series of commentaries on various highlights from the report, some by analysts involved with the commission. In this episode of the Lawfare Podcast, we hear a lively discussion from some of the commission's members, including the co-chair, Representative Mike Gallagher, on a part of that project focusing on China, technology and global supply chains. Special thanks to the Center for New American Security for providing this audio."

Schwarzenberg, Andres B. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2020).
“The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has significantly increased its overseas investments since launching its ‘Go Global Strategy’ in 1999 in an effort to support the overseas expansion of Chinese firms and make them more globally competitive. Since then, these firms— many of which are closely tied to the Chinese government—have acquired foreign assets and capabilities and pledged billions of dollars to develop infrastructure abroad. As a result, many in Congress and the Trump Administration are focusing on the critical implications of China’s growing global economic reach for U.S. economic and geopolitical strategic interests."

Sutter, Karen M., Michael D. Sutherland, and Andres B. Schwarzenberg. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 6, 2020).
“The crisis that has emerged for the U.S. economy is defined, in large part, by a collapse of critical supply, as well as a sharp downturn in demand, first in China and now in the United States and globally. As China’s manufacturing sector recovers, while the United States and other major global markets are grappling with COVID-19, some fear China could overwhelm overseas markets, as it ramps up export-led growth to compensate for the sharp downturn of exports in the first quarter of 2020, secure hard currency, and boost economic growth. China may also seek to make gains in strategic sectors—such as telecommunications, microelectronics, and semiconductors—in which the government undertook extraordinary measures to sustain research and development and manufacturing during the COVID-19 outbreak in China.”

United Nations. (New York, NY: United Nations, 2020).
“We are facing a global health crisis unlike any in the 75-year history of the United Nations — one that is killing people, spreading human suffering, and upending people’s lives. But this is much more than a health crisis. It is a human crisis. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is attacking societies at their core. The IMF has just reassessed the prospect for growth for 2020 and 2021, declaring that we have entered a recession – as bad as or worse than in 2009. The IMF projects recovery in 2021 only if the world succeeds in containing the virus and take the necessary economic measures. In the face of such an unprecedented situation in recent history, the creativity of the response must match the unique nature of the crisis – and the magnitude of the response must match its scale. No country will be able to exit this crisis alone. This report is a call to action, for the immediate health response required to suppress transmission of the virus to end the pandemic; and to tackle the many social and economic dimensions of this crisis. It is, above all, a call to focus on people – women, youth, low-wage workers, small and medium enterprises, the informal sector and on vulnerable groups who are already at risk.”

Kühn, Ulrich (ed.) (Hamburg, Germany: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, 2020).
"With the end of the INF Treaty in 2019, trilateral arms control – meaning arms control between the United States, Russia, and China – has gained center stage. Only shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. President Trump declared that he wants a new nuclear pact to be signed by both Russia and China. Other U.S. administration officials have set the goal of including China in a future follow-on framework to the New START agreement, which expires in February 2021. However, could trilateral arms control be possible at all, and what would be necessary conditions? In this IFSH Research Report, internationally renowned experts Alexey Arbatov (Russia), David Santoro (United States), and Tong Zhao (China) discuss what is possible and what is not. Edited by Ulrich Kühn (IFSH), the report includes a number of very specific proposals, including from China, on how to move forward on trilateral arms control."

National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. (Arlington, VA: National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, 2020).
“SUMMARY OF QUARTER 1 RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1: Recommendations to Increase AI R&D Investments
Recommendation 2: Accelerate AI Application in DoD
Recommendation 3: Strengthen AI Workforce
Recommendation 4: Promote U.S. Leadership in AI Hardware & 5G
Recommendation 5: Improve AI Cooperation among Key Allies and Partners
Recommendation 6: Advance Ethical and Responsible AI
Recommendation 7: Threat Analysis and Recommended Actions”

Wass de Czege, Huba. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2020).
“Countering the aggression of Russian or Chinese ‘hegemonic’ behavior will require a rapid, ready, and appropriate reaction along anticipated lines of operations to deter rather than accelerate crisis escalation, and to defend the status quo when challenged. Do the central ideas in the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, provide logical counters to hegemonic behavior from Russia or China? This monograph offers a critique of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 to avoid the foundational flaws from its predecessor concepts, AirSea Battle and Multi-Domain Battle, and to reinforce the foundation for continued discussion, analysis, and development to evolving Army and Joint doctrine. Today the United States and its Allies must cooperate to keep our advantageous peace. By keeping the peace between the United States, Russia, and China, and by the logic of our theory of victory, we are all more likely to manage other lesser anticipated and unanticipated dangers ahead.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Christopher Metzger. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“Corruption plagues governments, economies, and societies around the world. According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), the amount of money lost to corruption globally is $2 trillion a year. This money could go a long way toward filling the financing gap for the United Nation’s 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and preparing countries for global pandemics such as Covid-19. The United States should recapture its leadership on global anti-corruption efforts for a number of reasons, but most critically for economic ones. U.S. global competitors, such as China and Russia, offer an alternative development model that largely ignores issues of transparency, rule of law, and good governance. If all companies had to abide by the same anti-corruption legislation and there was more transparency in procurement processes, then U.S. companies would have a better chance of winning contracts. Economic growth in developing countries reduces unemployment, increases stability, and supports U.S. national security interests in the process as well.”

Goldenberg, Ilan, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and especially since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran has become highly proficient in using its surrogates and proxies across the Middle East as a tool to achieve its interests while avoiding direct conflict with the United States. Successive U.S. presidents have sought options for pushing back against this Iranian strategy but have struggled to find approaches that could deter Iran’s actions or degrade its capabilities. In most cases U.S. administrations have been hesitant to respond at all, for fear of starting a larger conflict. The recent killing of Qassim Soleimani represents the opposite problem, in which the United States and Iran came unnecessarily close to a much larger war. In contrast, Israel’s ‘campaign between the wars’ (the Hebrew acronym is mabam) against Iran and Iranian-backed groups in Syria has been one of the most successful military efforts to push back against Iran in the 'gray zone.' Since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011, and especially since early 2017, Israel has conducted more than 200 airstrikes inside Syria against more than 1,000 targets linked to Iran and it’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force (IRGCQF), and against IRGC-QF backed groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. This campaign has slowed Iran’s military buildup in Syria while avoiding a broader regional conflagration that would have been damaging to Israel’s interests. This study examines Israel’s mabam campaign and asks what lessons the United States can draw and how they may be applied to future U.S. actions in gray zone conflicts, both against Iran and more broadly.”

Berger, David H. (Washington, DC: United States Marine Corps, 2020).
“BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT: This report describes the progress of the Marine Corps on my watch in preparing for the sweeping changes needed to meet the principal challenges facing the institution: effectively playing our role as the nation’s naval expeditionary force-in-readiness, while simultaneously modernizing the force in accordance with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) – and doing both within the fiscal resources we are provided. A certain degree of institutional change is inevitable when confronting modernization on this scale, and that type of change is hard. As such, I want to be clear up front: our force design effort is a work in progress. Thanks to the dedication and effort of a great many Marines, Sailors, and civilians over the last six months, we have come to a clearer understanding of some force design changes we can confidently make today, while identifying other areas that require additional analysis. This reports explains, at length and in some detail, my argument for change, our force design methodology and organization, my personal assessment of the work to date, and the steps we are taking to move the force design effort into the next phase.”

War on the Rocks. April 6, 2020, streaming audio, 36:35.
“As listeners of this podcast know, the Marine Corps is taking a new direction. The latest document to lay out this vision is Force Design 2030. The commandant, Gen. David H. Berger, aims to cut the size of the Marine Corps and let go of some legacy systems (most notably tanks) in order to — in the words of a recent article in the Economist — turn the Corps into ‘a commando-like infantry force with nimbler weapons: drone squadrons will double in number and rocket batteries will triple.’ In Berger’s view, the Marine Corps must make these changes in order to work with the other armed services to deter the People’s Republic of China, if necessary, or win a war against it. Ryan spoke with Berger to get the inside story of these reforms, which he describes as being in their earliest phase. ‘This is not the end of the journey’ he said, ‘but rather the beginning.’ And he calls upon more voices to chime in with criticism to ensure the Marine Corps is ready for the future of war.”

Cook, Chaveso, and Alison Aman. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2020).
“The military needs a common framework across all domains, experiences and personnel structures from which to operate. As values-based organizations, this common language must be derived from core professional attributes. This paper seeks to outline the current state of affairs regarding professional development. As such, this work focuses on principle development as a specific subset of professional development. Principles are fundamental truths that are foundational to the ever-evolving set of characteristics that become the system of beliefs and patterns of behavior that codify our professional persona. The Army’s doctrine—specifically the ‘three Cs’ of character, competence and commitment—is used as a frame for understanding how one component of the armed forces currently codifies professionalism doctrinally and where it falls short. This lens is also used to help show why the key scientific principles of adult personality development, specifically moral/ethical development, should be considered for developmental strategy. Finally, this paper introduces a framework for implementing a strategy for principle development.”

Harrison, Todd, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“Space Threat Assessment 2020 reviews the open-source information available on the counterspace capabilities that can threaten U.S. space systems and which countries are developing such systems. The report is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus their attention. This report focuses on five specific countries that are either avidly pursuing counterspace capabilities or that present the greatest risk to the United States' National Security: China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and India. A sixth section analyzes the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, including some allies and partners of the United States, and some non-state actors. This report is not a comprehensive assessment of all known threats to U.S. space systems because much of the information on what other countries are doing to advance their counterspace systems is not publicly available. Instead, it serves as an unclassified assessment that aggregates and highlights open-source information on counterspace capabilities for policymakers and the general public.”

Karako, Tom, and Wes Rumbaugh. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Issue
• The 2021 budget submission represents an inflection point for missile defense programs, the relationship between active defenses and other forms of missile defeat, and the institutional makeup of the missile defense enterprise.
• This is the first Trump administration budget submission to make major programmatic changes to missile defense, but these changes carry uncertainty about the future.
• Despite congressional opposition, the administration’s budget again tries to transfer space sensor development from the Missile Defense Agency to the Space Development Agency.
• Army and Navy investments in air and missile defenses are beginning to transition from research and development to procurement.
• Despite one program cancellation, hypersonic strike development efforts continue to advance.”

Engelke, Peter. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“After decades of largely unfulfilled promises, artificial intelligence (AI) has finally—and only recently—begun to demonstrate its massive power to reshape the marketplace, the public sector, the national security arena, and society more broadly. The technical developments that have occurred over the past decade, including new machine learning breakthroughs based on vast improvements in computational power and enormous increases in the quantity of data that can be used to ‘train’ AI systems, have enabled the application of AI to an ever-wider range of sectors and activities. AI’s increasing range of applications are having real-world consequences, both positive and negative. Those consequences, in turn, have animated spirited and at times emotional debates about how governments can craft policies to come to grips with a world increasingly shaped by AI.”

Wright, Nicholas D. (ed). (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 2019).
“A wide variety of perspectives on the different uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Russia and China and the impact this will have on the Global Order. Essays are from leading defense professionals, academics, think tanks, and policy developers. A comprehensive primer for those concerned with how emerging technologies will influence the west's near-peer competitors.”

Cahill, Jim. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2020).
“The 2018 ‘National Defense Strategy’ (NDS) prioritizes strategic competition with China and Russia. Consequently, defense practitioners have devoted increasing attention to contemplating future conflict with great-power competitors. Underlying issues that require more attention include the impact that future high-intensity warfare will have on civilians, the roles that international organizations (IOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) will undertake in conflict settings and the implications to the U.S. joint force’s efforts in pursuing future military objectives. This paper addresses these topics by describing relevant issues in humanitarian affairs. It also identifies useful ways for defense practitioners to think about the relationship between military and humanitarian affairs.”

Kornbluh, Karen, Ellen P. Goodman, and Eli Weiner. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020).
“Even before a global pandemic hit, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists announced that the Doomsday Clock had advanced for the first time ever to 100 seconds before midnight. The Bulletin cited ‘information warfare’ as a ‘threat multiplier’ that is reducing trust and corrupting the information ecosystem needed for democratic debate. Now the World Health Organization is warning of an ‘infodemic’ of widespread conspiracy theories about the coronavirus, and disinformation has already been evident in the lead-up to the 2020 presidential election. Despite a clear and present danger, it is evident that our institutions are not nearly ready—neither for foreign nor domestic disinformation campaigns.”

Conley, Heather A. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In July 2018, CSIS embarked on a major analytical assessment that centered on the following research question: What will be the strategic consequences for the United States by 2050 if America’s two near-peer military competitors, China and Russia, continue to develop their long-term economic and security interests in the Arctic, but the United States does not? Russia’s growing economic and military ambitions in the Arctic, as well as China’s increased physical presence in the region, underscore that both nations have long-term strategic designs for the Arctic region. Data analysis, satellite imagery, and scenario development all demonstrate the continued growth of Russian and Chinese presence in the Arctic and heighten the sense of stasis in the U.S. military and economic presence. Unless the United States wishes to lose access to portions of the Arctic and have increasingly diminished capabilities to defend and deter attack against the homeland, the United States must return to the Arctic."

Melino, Matthew, Heather A. Conley, and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"The Kola Peninsula is the crux of Russia’s military establishment in the western Arctic, and its air and maritime capabilities are essential to Russia’s homeland defense, Arctic dominance, and global power projection capabilities. Russia’s modernization and expansion efforts at Severomorsk-1 air base, Gadzhiyevo submarine base, and Okolnaya submarine support base have significantly improved Russia’s operational readiness and its ability to control the surrounding maritime space in the Arctic. The Kola Peninsula is also home to systems such as the RS-24 YARS, located at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome, which pose a significant challenge to U.S. and allied defense systems. Russia’s willingness to use its arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles to defend its position in the Arctic was on display during the Grom-2019 exercise. The expansion of Russia’s military presence in the Arctic is far from over—Russia will continue to deepen its military presence in the Arctic to protect Russian strategic interests well into the future."

Hruby, Aubrey. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“Global powers are jockeying for access to opportunities in African markets. In recent years, through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, the Tokyo International Conference of African Development, the Russia-Africa Summit, and many others, the world’s largest economies have sought to make headway in what are seen as fast-growing and lucrative new markets. In this environment, effective United States (US)-Africa policy requires greater focus on areas of American competitiveness and concerted efforts to educate, mobilize, and support US commercial success in African markets. In this update of her 2017 issue brief ‘Escaping China’s Shadow: Finding America’s Competitive Edge in Africa,’ Senior Fellow Aubrey Hruby outlines recommendations for how to best utilize Prosper Africa and leverage American private sector competitiveness by focusing efforts on sectors in which the United States already leads.”

King, Angus, and Mike Gallagher (Co-Chairmen). (Washington, DC: U.S. Cyberspace Solarium Commission, 2020).
Note: Contains a brief introductory section by Peter Singer and August Cole entitled "A Warning from Tomorrow."
"After conducting an extensive study including over 300 interviews, a competitive strategy event modeled after the original Project Solarium in the Eisenhower administration, and stress tests by external red teams, the Commission advocates a new strategic approach to cybersecurity: layered cyber deterrence. The desired end state of layered cyber deterrence is a reduced probability and impact of cyberattacks of significant consequence. The strategy outlines three ways to achieve this end state:
• Shape behavior. The United States must work with allies and partners to promote responsible behavior in cyberspace.
• Deny benefits. The United States must deny benefits to adversaries who have long exploited cyberspace to their advantage, to American disadvantage, and at little cost to themselves. This new approach requires securing critical networks in collaboration with the private sector to promote national resilience and increase the security of the cyber ecosystem.
• Impose costs. The United States must maintain the capability, capacity, and credibility needed to retaliate against actors who target America in and through cyberspace.
Each of the three ways described above involves a deterrent layer that increases American public- and private-sector security by altering how adversaries perceive the costs and benefits of using cyberspace to attack American interests. These three deterrent layers are supported by six policy pillars that organize more than 75 recommendations. These pillars represent the means to implement layered cyber deterrence.”

Hersman, Rebecca, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"Informed by research and eight tabletop exercises conducted with nearly 150 participants overall, this two-year study examines implications of the emerging strategic situational awareness ecosystem and its impact on crisis decisionmaking…Improvements to strategic situational awareness (SA)—the ability to characterize the operating environment, detect and respond to threats, and discern actual attacks from false alarms across the spectrum of conflict—have long been assumed to reduce the risk of conflict and help manage crises more successfully when they occur. However, with the development of increasingly capable strategic SA-related technology, growing comingling of conventional and nuclear SA requirements and capabilities, and the increasing risk of conventional conflict between nuclear-armed adversaries, this may no longer be the case."

Miller, Paul D. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“At the outset of some of the most impactful wars in history, policymakers have assumed that the duration of conflict would be brief. Unfortunately, their assumptions were often wrong, as may wars like those in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan only grew more complicated with the passage of time. However, at least in these three cases, the reality of prolonged stalemate did not stop policymakers from setting withdrawal deadlines to assuage public anxieties and improve military performance. The pressures contributing to these consistent decisions across time are still relevant now. Therefore, as the United States currently seeks to deter great-power rivals and rogue regimes while combating terrorism, it is as important as ever to understand the roles and potential outcomes of withdrawal deadlines in war. In this new Atlantic Council report, ‘Withdrawal Deadlines in War: Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan,’ Dr. Paul D. Miller examines the effect of withdrawal timetables on public opinion, military success, and policymakers’ goals across the three titular case studies. He finds that ‘Withdrawal timelines do not achieve the political benefits that policymakers desire, but they do incur the risks policymakers rightly fear.’ In the face of prolonged and difficult military challenges, withdrawal deadlines can exacerbate outcomes at crucial moments, and thus policymakers must tread carefully.”

Daniels, Seamus P., and Todd Harrison. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report from the CSIS Defense Budget Analysis program seeks to enhance understanding of the formulation and accuracy of Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) projected obligation rates in the defense acquisition sector. These projections are published annually for each appropriation account in the Financial Summary Tables released by the office of the DoD Comptroller. This paper compares the Comptroller projected obligation rates for procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts with actual obligation rates, as well as budget execution benchmarks compiled by the Comptroller’s office. This analysis assesses the reliability of the projections and their consistency with other DoD targets, identifies trends in the accuracy of obligation rates across different accounts, and attempts to isolate factors that may influence the formulation and accuracy of the projections.”

Nakano, Jane. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The nuclear industry of advanced industrialized countries is under significant pressure to remain competitive as the market landscape for new nuclear power opportunities changes. The relative decline of U.S. nuclear export competitiveness comes at a time when Russia is boosting its dominance in new nuclear sales, and China is doubling down on its effort to become a leader in global nuclear commerce. This report illuminates how the changing market competition among the United States, Russia, and China will affect their future relations with nuclear commerce recipient countries, and discusses why Russia and China promote nuclear commerce, as well as which factors may alter their market competitiveness. The report further provides recommendations regarding the U.S. approach to continued commercial competitiveness in nuclear energy.”

Brannen, Samuel J., Christian S. Haig, and Katherine Schmidt. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“We are living in an age of global mass protests that are historically unprecedented in frequency, scope, and size. Our analysis finds that the mass political protests that have captured media attention over the past year, such as those in Hong Kong and Santiago, are in fact part of a decade-long trend line affecting every major populated region of the world, the frequency of which have increased by an annual average of 11.5 percent between 2009 and 2019. The size and frequency of recent protests eclipse historical examples of eras of mass protest, such as the late-1960s, late-1980s, and early-1990s. Viewed in this broader context, the events of the Arab Spring were not an isolated phenomenon but rather an especially acute manifestation of a broadly increasing global trend. Analysis of the root causes of these global protests suggests they will continue and could increase in 2020 and beyond. While each protest has a unique context, common grievances overwhelmingly center on perceptions of ineffective governance and corruption.”

Naimoli, Stephen, and Sarah Ladislaw. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"This brief is the first in a series on achieving net-zero global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. The CSIS Energy Security and Climate Change Program is hosting six events that will be followed by resource briefs related to each event.
Reducing emissions to lessen the long-term impacts of a warming climate has been a shared objective of the international community for decades. To date, progress toward this goal has not kept pace with pathways necessary to deliver a stabilized climate by the end of the century. The result is that the emissions pathways necessary to achieve this target relative to current activity are necessarily steeper and the energy and land-use system changes required are more abrupt. The current scientific consensus indicates that to stabilize the climate and prevent the most catastrophic effects of climate change, we must reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to net-zero by or soon after 2050. In 2010, GHG emissions reached 49 gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO2)-equivalent per year. To reach net-zero, the world must reduce emissions through a combination of replacing GHG-emitting resources with zero-emissions sources and capturing emissions from the remaining sources that cannot be replaced. This resource brief explores how to understand the pathways to net-zero emissions and some of the ways to achieve this goal."

Goldwyn, David L.(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2020).
“As Secretary of Energy, I have a strong appreciation for the strategic importance of the Western Hemisphere to US prosperity, energy, and national security. As our closest neighbors and strongest trading partners, the energy and economic security of the hemisphere is critically linked to our own. The Americas are full of potential. With the leadership of the US Department of Energy (DOE) in partnership with our interagency colleagues, the US private sector, and our regional partners, we can galvanize the Western Hemisphere into an energy powerhouse. Achieving the full potential of our hemisphere’s energy resources will boost the economy of the United States and our neighbors while also serving as a counterweight to foreign adversaries. To help achieve this vision, DOE commissioned the Atlantic Council to conduct independent analysis and develop recommendations on how the Department can most effectively catalyze the development and expansion of energy projects across North America, Central America, South America, and the Caribbean.”

Ichikowitz Family Foundation. (Sandton, South Africa: Ichikowitz Family Foundation, 2020).
"The most comprehensive survey of Africa’s youth to date – the African Youth Survey 2020 – reveals a rising Afro-Optimism among the continent’s youth driven by a strong sense of individual responsibility, a post-colonial mindset, entrepreneurialism, and confidence in a shared African identity. Africa’s youth believe they can solve problems collaboratively, and are hopeful of fighting corruption, achieving peace and improving their personal living conditions."

“The Stanford Internet Observatory is a cross-disciplinary program of research, teaching and policy engagement for the study of abuse in current information technologies, with a focus on social media. Under the program direction of computer security expert Alex Stamos, the Observatory was created to learn about the abuse of the internet in real time, to develop a novel curriculum on trust and safety that is a first in computer science, and to translate our research discoveries into training and policy innovations for the public good. By providing researchers across Stanford with cutting edge data analytics and machine learning resources we will unlock completely unforeseen fields of research. We envision a world where researchers do not limit themselves to the data that is easy to access, but instead dive into the toughest and most important questions by leveraging the capabilities of the Stanford Internet Observatory.”

Babcock-Lumish, Terry, et al. (eds.) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“‘Senior Conference 55—The Emerging Environment in the Indo-Pacific Region: Drivers, Directions, and Decisions,’ explores the possibilities and challenges that exist in this critical and dynamic region. This monograph captures three days of panels, keynotes, and discussions among a diverse group of distinguished experts. Focus areas included shifting economic realities, political dynamics, technological trends, and forms of conflict and competition that could shape the region’s future. Senior Conference 55 assembled a range of experts taking a broad approach to the entire Indo-Pacific region to explore complex and varied relationships. This monograph begins by summarizing the consensus recommendations that emerged during the event, followed by the substance of the keynote addresses and panels, all while maintaining a nonattributional approach that allowed conversations to tackle hard questions. This monograph presents those discussions, including disagreements and dissenting viewpoints, and serves as a foundation for future debate on possible policy. The Indo-Pacific region is—and will continue to be—crucial for both the United States and the global community. The United States needs to increase its capacity for decision-making amid risk and uncertainty in the coming decades. This monograph offers key findings for confronting these challenges and broadens the conversation about future US policy in the Indo-Pacific.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., with Grace Hwang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
Analysis of the recent deal signed between the United States and the Taliban.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 18, 2020, streaming video, 3:32:38.
"For most of the nuclear age, enhanced strategic situational awareness has been viewed as a benefit for strategic stability. In conventional conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries, the United States has long-enjoyed information dominance in this arena. But can there be too much of a good thing? In today’s increasingly competitive security environment, the risk of conflict between nuclear-armed states is on the rise: capabilities designed to provide situational awareness for conventional conflict are increasingly comingled with nuclear weapons systems and emerging technologies promise to provide enhanced insight into adversary actions and activities. The increased speed and precision of these technologies may have a profound impact on the strategic landscape as miscalculation and unintended escalation risk transforming conventional crises into major conflicts between nuclear powers. Please join the Project on Nuclear Issues at CSIS on February 18th for a half-day conference, 'Decision-making and Technology Under the Nuclear Shadow,' that will explore how decision-makers think about strategic situational awareness, emerging technologies, and risk in crises between nuclear-armed states. Featured experts will include Dr. Robert Jervis, Dr. Peter W. Singer, Avril Haines, and Dr. Kathleen Hicks and the discussion will cover both the theoretical aspect of decision-making in nuclear crises as well as the policy implications and recommendations for improving international security.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 24, 2020, streaming video, 3:41:37.
"The killing of Gen. Qassem Suleimani in January 2020 sent conflicting signals about the depth of U.S. engagement in the Gulf. The United States seems intent to diminish its presence while keeping an active hand in regional affairs. Meanwhile, Russia and China are exploring ways to reshape their own presence in the region. Please join the CSIS Middle East Program for a conference to examine the Gulf region in the wake of General Qassem Suleimani's death. Two expert panels will explore security threats and new opportunities for diplomacy in the region. General Joseph L. Votel will then deliver a keynote address on Great Power competition in the Gulf, followed by a Q&A moderated by Jon B. Alterman, senior vice president, Zbigniew Brzezinski chair in global security and geostrategy, and director of the Middle East Program."
• Panel: New Security Challenges in the Gulf
• Panel: New Openings for Regional Diplomacy
• Keynote Address: Great Power Competition in the Gulf

Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy. February 11, 2020, streaming video, 4:29:36.
“Join us for an event hosted by the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Duke University's Program in American Grand Strategy. The 2020 Conference on Civil-Military Relations will:
• Educate the audience on the history of civil-military relations, particularly the legacies of leadership, cultural change, and policy shifts during wartime;
• Present various dimensions of current civil-military relations debates;
• Engage the audience on questions of who serves, who is expected to serve, and who should serve in U.S. defense and national security, to include debates on the concepts of national service and the ethos of service; and
• Continue to raise questions of leadership, ethics, and morals within military and civilian command, and national service more broadly.”

Dunigan, Molly, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“This report reviews and analyzes assessments of the practices that U.S. federal agencies use to reintegrate civilians following domestic or overseas deployments to high-threat environments. The researchers aim to determine the extent to which such activities vary across the interagency community, and also identify promising practices for such agencies to pursue in the future. The authors leverage interview insights from federal agencies and a review of U.S. military post-deployment reintegration to accomplish these tasks. The authors also draw on U.S. military and Department of Defense civilian policy, programs, and experiences with redeployment to inform future reintegration efforts.”

Government Accountability Office. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, Publicly Released Feb 25, 2020).
"The State Department has expressed a commitment to building a workforce that reflects the diverse composition of the United States. Though State's workforce has grown more diverse, racial or ethnic minorities are still underrepresented, particularly in the senior ranks. Racial or ethnic minorities in State’s Civil Service were 4% to 29% less likely to be promoted than their white coworkers with similar education, occupation, or years of federal service. State should look at the longstanding issues contributing to its diversity problems and do a better job of addressing barriers to equal opportunity in its workforce."

Bliss, Katherine E. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"In June 2020, the United Kingdom will host a pledging conference at which Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, will seek funding to support an ambitious work plan for 2021-2025. Gavi is seeking at least $7.4 billion to reach its goal of delivering more than 3.2 billion doses of routine immunizations to children and families while continuing to fund emergency vaccine stockpiles and support the delivery of the inactivated polio vaccine in eligible countries. The United States, one of the top donors to Gavi, has supported the alliance’s efforts since its inception 20 years ago and made annual commitments of $290 million in FY 2018 and 2019. In promoting health security, contributing to economic development, and engaging implementing countries and the private sector in the move toward fully self-financed immunization programs, Gavi’s work is closely aligned with U.S. interests.
The United States has recently announced a commitment of $1.16 billion to Gavi over four years, essentially sustaining the annual commitments of $290 million through FY 2023. This sends a strong message to other donors, as well as eligible countries, that the United States remains confident in Gavi’s ability to deliver results. To reinforce its support, the United States should also: (1) encourage other donor countries to sustain or even increase their support for Gavi over a multi-year period; (2) identify opportunities to strengthen bilateral engagement on immunization programs, advocacy activities, and the mobilization of domestic resources for vaccines in priority countries; and (3) continue to support Gavi as it navigates the challenges to immunization programs posed by demographic change, urbanization, conflict, and migration over the 2021-2025 period and beyond."

McAuliffe, Marie, and Binod Khadri (eds). (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2019).
"The long-term and growing body of evidence on migration and mobility shows that migration is in large part related to the broader global economic, social, political and technological transformations that are affecting a wide range of high-priority policy issues. As the processes of globalization deepen, these transformations increasingly shape our lives – in our workplaces, in our homes, in our social and spiritual lives – as we go about our daily routines. Increasing numbers of people are able to access information, goods and services from around the world because of the ongoing expansion in distance-shrinking technologies. There is also a sense that we are in the midst of a period of considerable uncertainty. Many commentators have called into question the solidity of aspects of the global political order forged in the immediate aftermath of the two world wars, including as they relate to alliances and common interests. Others are calling this time the 'age of anger', tracing back the current sense of geopolitical uncertainty and discontent to a dominant and relentless focus on 'logic' and 'liberal rationalism' at the expense of emotional responsiveness. It is within this context that this world migration report focuses on developments in migration over the last two-year period, with an emphasis on providing analysis that takes into account historical and contemporary factors. Historical in recognition that migration and displacement occur within broader long-term social, security, political and economic contexts. Contemporary in recognition that we are in the midst of profound global transformations, and that the resultant changes to our daily lives are impacting the current environment in which migration occurs and is discussed."

"Join Kathleen Hicks, senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, as she speaks with experts on the most important defense debates in the 2020 U.S. election cycle."

Munich Security Conference Foundation. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2020).
“Is the world becoming less Western? Is the West itself becoming less Western, too? What does it mean for the world if the West leaves the stage to others? What could a joint Western strategy for an era of great power competition look like? The ‘Munich Security Report 2020’ sheds light on the phenomenon that it refers to as ‘Westlessness’ – a widespread feeling of uneasiness and restlessness in the face of increasing uncertainty about the enduring purpose of the West. A multitude of security challenges seem to have become inseparable from what some describe as the decay of the Western project. What is more, Western societies and governments appear to have lost a common understanding of what it even means to be part of the West. Although perhaps the most important strategic challenge for the transatlantic partners, it appears uncertain whether the West can come up with a joint strategy for a new era of great-power competition.”

"The 56th Munich Security Conference took place at Hotel Bayerischer Hof in Munich from February 14 to 16. For three days, Munich was once again at the center of international diplomacy and welcomed world leaders from politics, academia, and civil society."

Samaan, Jean-Loup. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph explores the emerging challenge of nonstate actors’ anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategies and their implications for the United States and its allies by looking at two regions, the Middle East and Eastern Europe, with case studies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthis in Yemen, and separatist groups in Ukraine. The historical monopoly of states over precision-guided munitions has eroded, and this evolution eventually challenges the ability of the most advanced militaries to operate in specific environments. As they gain greater access to advanced military technology, some nonstate actors increasingly lean toward A2/AD strategies. The study underlines three key parameters to assess these emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies: a political shift toward the preservation of status quo vis-à-vis opponents; a focus of military resources dedicated to A2/AD capabilities—primarily missiles and rockets; and the adaptation of military units responsible for the implementation of this new strategy. The development of nonstate A2/AD postures currently remains dependent on the ability of the nonstate actors to attract state sponsorship. Without state sponsorship, these emerging nonstate A2/AD strategies would hardly constitute a major threat. Bearing this precondition in mind, if a scenario of multiple nonstate A2/AD ‘bubbles’ were to unfold, the United States and its allies could face unprecedented challenges, especially in the field of counterterrorism campaigns.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020).
“Members of Congress and Pentagon officials have placed a growing emphasis on U.S. programs to develop hypersonic weapons as a part of an effort to acquire the capability for the United States to launch attacks against targets around the world in under an hour. Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) weapons may bolster U.S. efforts to deter and defeat adversaries by allowing the United States to attack high-value targets or ‘fleeting targets’ at the start of or during a conflict. Congress has generally supported the PGS mission, but restricted funding for several years. Recently, efforts to develop a long-range prompt strike capability, along with other efforts to develop extremely fast hypersonic weapons, have garnered increased support. CPGS weapons would not substitute for nuclear weapons, but would supplement U.S. conventional capabilities. Officials have argued that the long-range systems would provide a ‘niche’ capability, with a small number of weapons directed against select, critical targets. Some analysts, however, have raised concerns about the possibility that U.S. adversaries might misinterpret the launch of a missile with conventional warheads and conclude that the missiles carry nuclear weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is considering a number of systems that might provide the United States with long-range strike capabilities.”

Feickert, Andrew. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 14, 2020).
“The Army’s Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) is the Army’s third attempt to replace the M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV) which has been in service since the early 1980s. Despite numerous upgrades since its introduction, the Army contends the M-2 is near the end of its useful life and can no longer accommodate the types of upgrades needed for it to be effective on the modern battlefield. Because the OMFV would be an important weapon system in the Army’s Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCTs), Congress may be concerned with how the OMFV would impact the effectiveness of ground forces over the full spectrum of military operations. Moreover, Congress might also be concerned with how much more capable the OMFV is projected to be over the M-2 Bradley to ensure that it is not just a costly marginal improvement over the current system. A number of past unsuccessful Army acquisition programs have served to heighten congressional oversight of Army programs, and the OMFV maybe subject to a high degree of congressional interest.”

McKay, Shawn, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
"This report examines how the U.S. Army can move ahead with the development and integration of automated driving technology for its convoy operations in the near future. Robotic ground vehicles are quickly maturing in the commercial sphere and could potentially save lives and increase efficiency if utilized in Army convoys. However, it may be many years until fully unmanned convoy vehicles are able to operate in rough terrain or manage adversarial attacks. In response, the authors of this report examine different employment concepts of automated trucks in Army convoys that appear viable in the next one to five years and would still reduce soldier casualties. The authors investigate technical and tactical benefits and risks of these concepts. A bridging option, the minimally manned employment concept, leading to the eventual use of a mix of manned and unmanned trucks in a convoy, is developed in this report to address the current technical and tactical risks of concepts requiring use of unmanned, automated trucks in Army convoys."

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The President’s defense budget request for FY2021 does have some important virtues. It does contain a wide variety of important initiatives to improve the readiness and effectiveness of important elements pertaining to each military service, invest in force modernization, and support military personnel. At the same time, however, the Defense Budget Overview begins with the statement that the FY2021 request is a ‘Strategy Driven Budget’ – but few things could be further from the truth. The only ‘strategy’ that is clearly reflected in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) FY2021 request is an effort to provide a justification for the separate spending goals of each military service. The end result turns the budget request into little more than an ‘Oliver Twist Strategy,’ in which each military service asks for more money – a major component of the DoD’s defense-wide efforts – without meaningfully addressing the major strategic problems and challenges that the United States will face over the coming decade. The DoD’s FY2021 budget request abandons virtually all of the past efforts to create an effective planning, programming, and budgeting system. It has devolved into a classic ‘input’-driven budget that focuses on meeting the spending goals of each military service without addressing the net assessments of threats, the role of strategic partners and allies, or the resulting levels of deterrence and war fighting capability.”

Pezard, Stephanie, and Ashley L. Rhoades. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“Deterrence presents an inherent dilemma: While it seeks to prevent aggression, a deterrent effort that is too heavy-handed or appears to represent an existential threat to the potential aggressor might prompt that precise response. In the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)–Russia relations, deterring without provoking requires an understanding of what Russia considers to be ‘redlines,’ defined as those triggers that Russian leadership claims cannot be crossed without provoking a major or hostile response on their part. The authors of this Perspective provide a better understanding of what provokes Putin's Russia. They identify Russia's claimed redlines before examining those developments that prompted Russia to escalate a dispute in the past and comparing them with the identified redlines. Next, they analyze how current and future deterrence efforts on the part of the United States and NATO might collide with Russian stated interests and cross these redlines. The authors find that predicting Russian reactions to U.S. and NATO movements is a challenging exercise, as some claimed redlines have proven not to be redlines at all, while in other cases, actions taken by the United States and its allies have triggered unexpectedly strong Russian responses. Overall, changes in force posture seem to hold the most potential for effective deterrence if carefully calibrated to minimize the risks of provoking Russia.”

Charap, Samuel, et al. (eds). (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“Disputes over the regional order in post-Soviet Europe and Eurasia are at the core of the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West and have created major security and economic challenges for the states caught in between: first and foremost Ukraine, but also Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Current policy approaches toward the regional order — i.e., the set of rules, norms, and institutions that govern the region — have exacerbated today's disorder and instability. The authors of this volume offer a comprehensive proposal for revising the regional order. The proposal, which addresses the security architecture, economic integration, and regional conflicts, was devised by three groups of experts convened by the RAND Corporation and the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung's Regional Office for Cooperation and Peace in Europe. Each group included representatives from the West, Russia, and the states in between them. The approach proposed by the authors would boost regional security, facilitate increased prosperity, and better manage the long-standing conflicts in the region while increasing the chances of settling them. The revised order would thus limit the major-power confrontation in the region, stabilizing the overall competition between Russia and the West. Most importantly, the proposal would not cross any state's declared red lines, and thus might plausibly be acceptable to all of them. This vision for an alternative future would represent a significant improvement over the status quo.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. February 6, 2020, streaming video, 3:53:50
“In November 2018, the Department of Justice unveiled the China Initiative, which was established to fulfill the Department’s strategic priority of confronting national security threats presented by the People’s Republic of China, with a particular emphasis placed on the policies and practices that seek to challenge U.S. technological and scientific leadership. This half-day event brings together high-level officials from the U.S. government, private industry and academia, to discuss the most timely and relevant issues regarding the Department of Justice’s efforts to counter this economic malfeasance.”

Pfaff, C. Anthony. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“The United States has spent—and continues to spend—billions of dollars building Iraq’s military capabilities. Despite that fact, Iraq’s military performance, even after wresting control of its territory from the Islamic State, remains inconsistent at best. A survey of Iraqi military history suggests a pattern of strengths, weaknesses, and performance that includes courageous soldiers, cohesive units, incompetent leaders, divided loyalties, poor combat support, and weak institutions that have, on occasion, risen to the defense challenge. If the United States is going to be more successful in developing Iraqi military capabilities, it will need to change its approach to better account for the Iraqi Army’s culture, history, and political environment.
The United States will also have to be clear regarding the purpose of this cooperation. Security cooperation with Iraq is not just about defeating the Islamic State or other terrorist groups. The United States stands to gain when Iraq can play a constructive security role as an accepted member of the broader regional and international community. Iran cannot get the Iraqi military to that point, but the United States can. Thus, the long-term goal of US security cooperation with Iraq should be to establish its military as a valuable security partner, capable of participating in regional security arrangements, much in the same way Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Oman does. Of course, getting to that point depends on political developments the United States has limited ability to influence, much less control. Having said that, continued, steady engagement emphasizing the critical areas of development should serve to set conditions for meaningful improvement when political and social conditions permit. While no single measure is going to improve the Iraqi Army, taken together, the right combination give the Iraqi Army a chance to achieve a ‘tipping point’ that enables the kind of reform that can allow it to get beyond its historic limitations.”

Frederick, Bryan, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“In the aftermath of Russian military aggression against Ukraine in 2014, and with increasing tensions in the U.S.-China strategic competition, the question of whether U.S. overseas military presence can enhance deterrence remains central. At the same time, U.S. overseas military commitments are increasingly coming under question at home, both among the public at large and among many foreign- and defense-policy elites. This report provides empirical evidence on the deterrent effects of U.S. overseas military forces. It investigates how these effects might vary by the type, size, and location of these forces. The analyses provide the clearest evidence in support of the deterrent effect of heavy ground forces, particularly when deployed near but not directly bordering potential adversaries. The analyses show that the more mobile forces are, the less evidence there is of a deterrent effect. The report also assesses the effects of the deployment of U.S. forces during crises, finding that, although they can help avoid escalation and maintain the status quo, they are not necessarily well suited to altering the long-term strategic dynamics between states.”

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2019).
“The NIDS China Security Report is published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) to provide analysis conducted by its researchers on China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. The report is widely disseminated both in Japan and overseas. Since March 2011 it has been published annually in Japanese, Chinese, and English editions. The NIDS China Security Report has attracted significant interest from research institutions and the media in Japan and abroad, and the analysis offered in these reports has allowed NIDS to promote exchange and dialogue with research institutions and interested parties in a number of countries, including China.”

Bitounis, Leah, and Jonathon Price (eds).
“Between China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei’s expansion of 5G network capabilities around the world, the opportunity for the United States to maintain its preeminent role in the fields of global infrastructure development, technology, and the economy is being challenged. The U.S. and China are competing for military power and positioning in the Indo-Pacific, on trade, for technological power, and in an ongoing debate about democracy versus authoritarianism. At the same time, the countries need to work with each other on climate change, stabilizing the global economy, and other issues. Can we learn simultaneously to compete and cooperate? Our goal over the summer was to begin a process of addressing these complicated questions and to help define a new policy with respect to the U.S. relationship with China. We began our conversations in Aspen with the central query: How do we get a clear-sighted view of China that doesn’t underestimate or overestimate it and allows us to develop a strategy without potentially disastrous historical aftereffects? This compilation captures our resulting conversations and policy recommendations. We hope your assumptions will be challenged and your understandings broadened through your reading of these papers, as ours were.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“This is the second CSIS Brief in a series called ‘Getting to Less,’ which explores different philosophies and motivations that could lead to a decreased emphasis on U.S. defense ends, ways, or means. In this brief, the authors discuss a strategy they have labeled the Innovation Superiority Strategy. The strategy is guided by a focus on achieving enduring American military advantage in the U.S.-China security competition. In orienting Department of Defense investments toward this goal, the strategy bets big on innovation efforts to create a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The authors explore likely changes that such a strategy might entail. The brief concludes by exploring the risks and opportunities associated with the Innovation Superiority Strategy.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Studies, 2020).
“This is the third CSIS Brief in a series called ‘Getting to Less,’ which explores different philosophies and motivations that could lead to a decreased emphasis on U.S. defense ends, ways, or means. In this brief, the authors explore a defense approach they have labeled the Progressive Values Strategy. The strategy is grounded in a view that the military instrument is not well suited to meeting many of the security challenges facing the United States. Rather than seek military primacy, which only diverts resources and attention from more constructive statecraft solutions, the United States should strive for a level of military sufficiency that deters adventurism by others—as well as itself. The authors explore likely changes that such a strategy might entail. The brief concludes by exploring the risks and opportunities associated with the Progressive Values Strategy.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
"This is the final CSIS Brief in a series called 'Getting to Less.' The series explores different philosophies and motivations that could lead to a decreased emphasis on U.S. defense ends, ways, or means. In this brief, the authors discuss a strategy that they have labeled the Minimal Exposure Strategy. The strategy’s core premise is that the United States is largely secure from military threats due to continental U.S. geography and the deterrent quality of its nuclear and other strategic capabilities. Moreover, the strategy holds that U.S. military adventurism abroad creates signif icant costs and risks. Accordingly, the Minimal Exposure Strategy attempts to scale down the size and operational scope of the U.S. military. The CSIS authors explore likely changes that such a strategy might entail. The brief concludes by exploring the risks and opportunities associated with the Minimal Exposure Strategy. "

Brannen, Samuel J., et al.
“In an era of global technological competition and diffusion of innovation, the United States must uphold the twin pillars of national security and national innovation. The overall success of the U.S. federal government in emerging technologies governance is at best a mixed case and is overall inadequate to the scale and stakes of the challenges and opportunities ahead. This report assesses the current effectiveness of the U.S. federal government approach to emerging technologies with recommended actions to enhance governance in domestic and international contexts.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies
January 24, 2020, streaming video, 1:55:30
"In an era of global technological competition and diffusion of innovation, the United States must uphold the twin pillars of national security and national innovation. There is a clear need for greater cooperation and engagement on the challenge set within government; between federal, state, and local levels; between governments; and between the public and private sectors. By recognizing its comparative strengths and weaknesses, the United States federal government can take measured steps that increase its chances of success and guard against risks.
CSIS’s Global Security Forum focuses on the challenges that emerging technologies pose to U.S. security and the policy priorities needed. The event will feature a keynote address from Secretary of Defense Mark Esper and the launch of a new report highlighting insights from the 2019 GSF Experts’ Workshop and actionable recommendations to inform a more effective U.S. federal government approach to emerging technologies."

Chatham House, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2020).
"Council of Councils global perspectives roundups gather opinions from experts on major international developments. In this edition, members of four leading global think tanks offer their perspectives on the regional and global impact of the United Kingdom’s January 31 departure from the European Union.
When the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU), few expected that the ensuing negotiations would take over three years and trigger two general elections. Disagreement over the extent of and timeline for the UK’s separation from the bloc continued through the end of 2019. Only after the UK Conservative Party’s landslide victory in December did the path forward become clear. While the UK will formally leave the EU on January 31, 2020, it now enters a transition period during which it will remain in the EU’s customs union and single market until their future relationship is hashed out. Still, the Friday exit undoubtedly marks a new chapter in the Brexit saga."

Center for Strategic & International Studies
February 3, 2020, streaming video, 57:51
"At 11:00 PM on January 31st, the UK will formally withdraw from the European Union. How will the UK's foreign and security policy change? What security challenges will it prioritize? And will leaving the European Union bring the UK closer to the United States?
Please join us for a conversation with former UK Secretary of State for Defense (2010-2011), former Secretary of State for International Trade (2016-2019), and Conservative MP from North Somerset Dr. Liam Fox. Dr. Fox will offer his reflections on the vitally important role NATO must play in the future, the role of values in national security, the security challenges that Russia and China pose to the UK, the impact of cyber warfare, and the role of non-state actors and proxy groups in fueling future conflicts."

O'Rourke, Ronald, and Michael Moodie. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated January 22, 2020).
“The U.S. role in the world refers to the overall character, purpose, or direction of U.S. participation in international affairs and the country’s overall relationship to the rest of the world. The U.S. role in the world can be viewed as establishing the overall context or framework for U.S. policymakers for developing, implementing, and measuring the success of U.S. policies and actions on specific international issues, and for foreign countries or other observers for interpreting and understanding U.S. actions on the world stage. While descriptions of the U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II vary in their specifics, it can be described in general terms as consisting of four key elements: global leadership; defense and promotion of the liberal international order; defense and promotion of freedom, democracy, and human rights; and prevention of the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia. The issue for Congress is whether the U.S. role in the world is changing, and if so, what implications this might have for the United States and the world. A change in the U.S. role could have significant and even profound effects on U.S. security, freedom, and prosperity. It could significantly affect U.S. policy in areas such as relations with allies and other countries, defense plans and programs, trade and international finance, foreign assistance, and human rights… Congress’s decisions regarding the U.S. role in the world could have significant implications for numerous policies, plans, programs, and budgets, and for the role of Congress relative to that of the executive branch in U.S. foreign policymaking.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., and Joseph P. Federici. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This CSIS Brief is the first in a series that explores the contours and implications of strategies that might reduce the U.S. military’s mission space through greater constraints on its ends, ways, or means. Some analysts argue that America’s post-Cold War foreign policy has not made the country any safer, has needlessly cost lives, and has been too expensive. They argue instead for a more restrained approach. This first brief explores seven intellectual strains that argue for lessened objectives, more efficient ways, or decreased resources for the U.S. defense enterprise. The brief’s purpose is to inform active debates over the role of the United States in the world and over the role of the military in U.S. national security policy.”

Defense Intelligence Agency. (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019.)
“In 2017, DIA began to produce a series of unclassified Defense Intelligence overviews of the major foreign military challenges facing the United States. This volume provides details on Iran’s defense and military goals, strategy, plans, and intentions; the organization, structure, and capability of its military supporting those goals; and the enabling infrastructure and industrial base. This product and other reports in the series are intended to inform our public, our leaders, the national security community, and partner nations about the challenges we face in the 21st century.”

Blackwill, Robert D. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
“The Trump administration recognizes the China challenge, but it needs a grand strategy. Blackwill recommends decisive action, sustained diplomacy, collaboration among branches of the U.S. government, and working with allies in Asia and Europe, among other approaches.”

“Panel I: Politics and Leadership
Panel II: Security
Panel III: Economics and Trade”

Tang, Siew Mun, et al. (Singapore: ASEAN Studies Centre at the ISEAS [Institute of Southeast Asian Studies]-Yusof Ishak Institute, 2020).
“For the second year running, the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute conducted ‘The State of Southeast Asia’ survey from 12 November to 1 December 2019. A total of 1,308 respondents from the ten ASEAN member states participated in the 2020 edition of the survey, which seeks to understand the perceptions of Southeast Asians on regional affairs and ASEAN’s engagements with its Dialogue Partners, especially the major powers…The survey has eight sections: (1) background of respondents, (2) regional security outlook, (3) major powers’ regional influence and leadership, (4) geo- economics and regional integration, (5) geopolitics and regional architecture, (6) China and US’ engagements with the region, (7) perceptions of trust, and (8) soft power. The survey contains 58 questions, of which 18 touch on ‘baseline’ issues which were included in last year’s survey. The remaining 40 questions, which are highlighted in the report with an asterisk (*), address new issues for the regional discourse in 2020. The findings for the ‘baseline’ questions for the preceding and current years are presented side-by-side to facilitate comparative analysis. We have also taken the liberty to rearrange the ordering of the questions and organise them under new headings to improve the report’s clarity and cohesion. For the purpose of readability, the figures in this report are rounded up or down to the nearest one decimal point.”

Mecklin, John (ed.) (Chicago, IL: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2020).
“Humanity continues to face two simultaneous existential dangers—nuclear war and climate change—that are compounded by a threat multiplier, cyber-enabled information warfare, that undercuts society’s ability to respond…The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board today [January 23, 2020] moves the Doomsday Clock 20 seconds closer to midnight—closer to apocalypse than ever. In so doing, board members are explicitly warning leaders and citizens around the world that the international security situation is now more dangerous than it has ever been, even at the height of the Cold War.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2020).
“The 15th edition of the ‘World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report’ is published as critical risks are manifesting. The global economy is facing an increased risk of stagnation, climate change is striking harder and more rapidly than expected, and fragmented cyberspace threatens the full potential of next-generation technologies — all while citizens worldwide protest political and economic conditions and voice concerns about systems that exacerbate inequality. The challenges before us demand immediate collective action, but fractures within the global community appear to only be widening. Stakeholders need to act quickly and with purpose within an unsettled global landscape.”

Llewellyn, Viola, et al. (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2020).
“As 2020 begins, it is important to reflect on the top developments that occurred in Africa, in U.S.-Africa relations, and in Africa's role in the global arena over the past year. The Wilson Center Africa Program continued its annual tradition of asking practitioners, experts, and policymakers to weigh in on the most important and impactful developments of 2019 for the continent, and their implications for U.S.-Africa relations. They responded with the brief and insightful essays in this volume.”

Atlantic Council's YouTube channel, 21 videos.
"The Atlantic Council’s Global Energy Forum has become the go-to conference on the geopolitics of the energy transformation, where energy and foreign policy leaders come together to set the energy agenda for the year and examine the longer-term geopolitical and geo-economic implications of the changing energy system. The 2020 iteration of the forum will focus on three key themes: the role of the oil and gas industry in the energy transition, financing the future of energy, and interconnections in a new era of geopolitics. The forum’s regional footprint will also expand to emphasize increasing energy demand in South and Southeast Asia."

McInnis, Kathleen J. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020).

Katzman, Kenneth, Kathleen J. McInnis, and Clayton Thomas. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 6, 2020).

Jones, Seth G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).

McCall, Stephen M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020).

Beyoghlow, Kamal A. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020).
“This monograph analyzes the current political tensions between the United States and Turkey and suggests ways to manage them. The two countries have been strategic allies since at least the end of World War II—Turkey became a North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and participated with its military forces in the Korea War, and during the Cold War protected NATO’s southern flank against Soviet communism, and Turkey’s military and intelligence services maintained close relationships with their Western and Israeli counterparts. These relationships were not without problems, due mostly to differences over minority and civil rights in Turkey and over Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1973 and continued tensions with Greece. The special relationship with the United States was put to the final test after the Islamic conservative populist political party, Justice and Development, and its current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, came to power in 2002. Turkey opposed the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the NATO-backed regime change in Libya in 2011. Most recently, Turkey has had strained relations with Cyprus, Greece, and Israel—all key US allies—and has alienated the US Congress and select NATO members further by its October 2019 invasion of Syria against Kurdish forces aligned with the US military against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, all against a background of a military rapprochement with Russia. This monograph highlights differences between US agencies concerning Turkey and ways to reconcile them, and offers several policy recommendations for new directions.”

Missile Defense Project. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 14, 2018, last modified January 7, 2020).
“The People’s Republic of China is in the process of building and deploying a sophisticated and modern missile arsenal, though one shrouded in secrecy due to intentional ambiguity and unwillingness to enter arms control or other transparency agreements. Beijing features its missiles most prominently in its developing anti-access/area denial doctrines, which use a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles launched from air, land and sea to target U.S. and U.S. allied military assets in the Asia-Pacific theater. China is also developing a number of advanced capabilities such as maneuverable anti-ship ballistic missiles, MIRVs, and hypersonic glide vehicles. The combination of these trends degrade the survivability of foundational elements of American power projection like the aircraft carrier and forward air bases. China also has a relatively small but developing contingent of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. homeland, as well as a growing fleet of nuclear ballistic missile submarines.”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2020).
“The Trump Administration outlined its desire to produce a low-yield version of the W76 warhead in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). It cited the need for additional ‘tailored’ and ‘flexible’ capabilities to address the danger of coercive nuclear use, a concept described below, by Russia and North Korea. The NPR stated that this warhead would supplement existing U.S. strategic nuclear capabilities to ‘enhance deterrence by denying potential adversaries any mistaken confidence that limited nuclear employment can provide a useful advantage over the United States and its allies,’ and that low-yield warheads would not add to the number of deployed SLBM warheads, but would replace some ‘higher-yield [SLBM warheads] currently deployed.’ The NPR report, and its argument in favor of a low-yield SLBM warhead, launched a debate among U.S. experts about the rationale for the development of such a warhead and the benefits and risks that might accrue from its deployment. While some argue that this warhead is a response to Russia’s so-called ‘escalate to de-escalate’ strategy that will strengthen deterrence and raise the nuclear threshold, others contend that it will lower the threshold for U.S. use and increase the risk of nuclear war.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference. January 8, 2020, streaming video, 1:52:53.
“Strategic Japan draws on the newest research from Japanese scholars to inform the policy debate in Washington. This year, the CSIS Japan Chair has invited four scholars to examine Japan’s leadership role in international and regional institutions and avenues for U.S.-Japan cooperation in the future.”
Panel I: Japan’s Leadership Role in Regional Institutions
Panel II: Japan’s Leadership Role in Global Institutions

“Working papers by Japanese experts on potential areas for enhanced cooperation between the United States and Japan.”

Mix, Derek E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 9, 2020).
“Beyond trade, negotiations on the future UK-EU relationship are expected to seek a comprehensive partnership covering issues including security, foreign policy, energy, and data sharing. Negotiations are also expected to address the numerous other areas related to the broader economic relationship, such as financial services regulation, environmental and social standards, transportation, and aviation. Officials and analysts have expressed doubts that such comprehensive negotiations can be concluded within 11 months. The two sides could temporarily address some areas, such as road transportation and aviation, through side deals granting interim provisions. The revised protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland would come into effect with ratification of the withdrawal agreement, and its provisions would begin to apply at the end of the transition period. Observers have questioned how exactly the revised protocol will be implemented, including where and how customs checks will take place. Such issues are to be decided by the Joint Committee (of UK and EU officials) during the transition period. Implementation is likely to remain a work in progress. Both parties seek to protect the Good Friday Agreement, while the EU seeks to safeguard its single market and the UK seeks to preserve its constitutional integrity.”

Stares, Paul B. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“Each year since 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action (CPA) asks foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on how likely they are to occur or escalate in the next year, and their possible impact on U.S. interests. This year, ‘perhaps as an indication of rising concern about the state of the world, respondents rated more threats as likely to require a U.S. military response for 2020 than in any other Preventive Priorities Survey (PPS) from the last eleven years,’ notes Paul B. Stares, CPA director and General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention. ‘Of the thirty conflicts in this year’s survey, only two were judged as having a low likelihood of occurring in 2020.’”

Alden, Edward, et al. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“In 2019, a number of significant patterns emerged or continued across the world. The editors asked seven CFR scholars to share the charts, graphs, and maps that offer a window into the future, looking at issues such as Asia’s aging societies and Africa’s housing crunch.”

Reagan Foundation YouTube Playlist.
“RNDF [Reagan National Defense Forum] is a bipartisan annual event held at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. Key stakeholders come together to address the health of our national defense and to promote policies to strengthen the U.S. military”
Panel 1 — What Americans Think: Public Opinion on Defense & National Security Going Into 2020
Fireside 1 Chat — Training and Equipping the Joint Force to Execute the National Defense Strategy
Fireside 2 Chat — Conversation with Jeff Bezos Founder, Amazon, & Blue Origin
Panel 2 — Understanding and Leveraging the National Security Innovation Base
Panel 3 — Defense Transformation: Evolution or Revolution?
Keynote Address — The Honorable Mark Esper, U.S. Secretary Of Defense
Panel 4 —Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence: Modernizing the Triad and Sustaining Arms Control In a Post-INF World
Panel 5 — Harnessing and Securing American Innovation: How Venture Capital Impacts Defense
Panel 6 — U.S.-China Relations after the Trade War: Impacts for National Security and Defense
Panel 7 — Next Steps In Space: Launching America’s Sixth Military Branch
Panel 8 — The Technological Cold War? How Open and Closed Societies Compete In the 21st Century
Panel 9 — Advancing U.S. National Defense: Working with Allies and Partners
Panel 10 — From Syria to China: The Role of Freedom and Democracy in Defense Policy
Closing Session — The Honorable Robert O’Brien, U.S. National Security Advisor
Peace through Strength Award Dinner - 2019 Reagan National Defense Forum

December 04, 2019, streaming video, 2:45:00.
“The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. ChinaPower's annual conference features leading experts from both China and the U.S. to debate core issues underpinning the nature of Chinese power.”
Proposition: If Beijing and Taipei do not come to an agreement on unification by 2035, China will use military force to invade Taiwan.
Proposition: Beijing is seeking to export the Chinese development model.
Proposition: A technology Cold War between the United States and China will lead to separate spheres of technology influence.
Proposition: The US economy is better positioned than China’s to weather a long-term trade conflict.
Proposition: Xi Jinping will face a leadership challenge by 2025.

Glaser, Bonnie S., Matthew P. Funaiole, and Hunter Marston. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Ongoing geopolitical shifts are placing increased pressure on the rules-based international order that has facilitated decades of growth and development across the Indo-Pacific. The United States and Taiwan have responded by redoubling their respective commitments to the region. Leaders in both Washington and Taipei recognize that securing freedom and openness across this vast geographic space is essential for maintaining peace and promoting prosperity across the region. The United States has advanced its vision for the region through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, which is founded on—and aims to protect—common principles that have benefitted all countries in the region. Taiwan upholds the same principles and has a similar vision for the Indo-Pacific. To this end, Taipei is implementing the New Southbound Policy (NSP), which seeks to leverage its cultural, educational, technological, agricultural, and economic assets to strengthen Taiwan’s relations across the Indo-Pacific.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Shannon McKeown. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is the most important development institution in the Asia-Pacific region, addressing regional development problems using financing in the form of grants, loans, and advisory services. The ADB is one of two Asian regional development banks, the other being the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Both banks occupy the same space, have cofinanced numerous projects, and are subject to the economic volatility of the U.S.-Chinese trade war…The ADB’s vision for the Asia-Pacific seeks to address the region’s growing needs with efforts to make it more prosperous, inclusive, resilient, and sustainable. The key areas of operational focus include tackling social and gender inequalities, developing sustainable and quality infrastructure, mitigating and adapting to climate change, improving institutional capacity of governments, and furthering regional integration. The vision also seeks to improve and expand the ADB’s existing capabilities, as the creation of the AIIB has spurred the ADB to revamp its relevance and protocols and was among the developments that contributed to Strategy 2030. This policy brief discusses the ADB’s current role in the region and makes recommendations to shape the institution’s future operations.”

Balfour, Rosa. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The United Kingdom is holding elections in which polarized political leaders claim to represent the people against the elite. As British-based Turkish novelist Elif Shafak recently noted, this inflammatory language has been the soundtrack accompanying the deterioration of democracy around Europe, Brexit is emblematic of a generalized complacency about the strength of European democracies, and not just the product of the United Kingdom’s politics. It is also symptomatic of a new European fissiparousness that is likely to accelerate further fragmentation across the continent, also as a consequence of Brexit. Improving the health of its democracies will be critical if Europe wants to offer an alternative to the global disorder, power politics, and illiberalism that are taking hold.”

Conley, Heather A., Allie Renison, and Kati Suominen. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The United States and the United Kingdom are the world’s leading exporters of digitally-delivered services, and much of their trade is with each other. Both countries have increasingly been using foundational technologies, from blockchain to artificial intelligence, to perfect new applications and transform old processes. The potential for a vibrant and vast digital trade relationship is very exciting. What would a positive and far-reaching policy roadmap to facilitate and expand digital trade between the United States and the United Kingdom look like? This report offers a policy roadmap for a future digital trade agenda, tailored to two like-minded technology heavyweights who are massive users of e-commerce, data, and digital services. We conclude that the United States and the United Kingdom should be ambitious in furthering their bilateral digital trade agenda. To this end, they should use bilateral dialogues and any future free trade agreement to significantly expand digital trade volumes between the United States and the United Kingdom; establish new cooperation to accelerate the development of new technologies and the formation of new technology companies; and fuel the use of crucial technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, which have the potential to transform countless industries.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Christopher Metzger. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"Many countries around the world have large populations of impoverished people and high unemployment rates. In order to improve conditions in these countries, national governments must develop effective economic growth strategies with strengthening the creative industries at the forefront. The international community is only just beginning to recognize the socioeconomic potential of creative and cultural industries (CCIs), such as film, fashion, and music. The creative economy represents the trade of creative goods and services and grew at an average rate of 14 percent between 2002 and 2008, even during the 2008 global financial crisis. CCIs are more resilient to economic shocks and were not damaged by the 12 percent drop in global trade to the same degree as other sectors, such as manufacturing. Creative industries also produce non-rival goods that can be consumed locally or exported. Developing and developed countries around the world should invest further in creative industries to diversify their economies, reduce poverty, and create jobs for young people."

(Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019).
“Since 2000, the OECD has been evaluating the knowledge and skills of the world’s 15-year-olds through its Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey. Around 600,000 students in 79 countries and economies completed the test in 2018, representing about 32 million 15-year-olds…PISA 2018 covered reading, science and mathematics - with the main focus on reading. PISA results reveal what is possible in education by showing what students in the highest-performing and most rapidly improving education systems can do.”

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2019).

Belkin, Paul. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2019).
“Heads of state and government from NATO’s 29 member states are scheduled to meet in London, United Kingdom (UK) on December 3-4, 2019; they last met in Brussels, Belgium, in July2018. Two key goals for the meeting will be to commemorate the alliance’s past achievements—2019 marks NATO’s 70th anniversary—and to advance efforts to address new and emerging security challenges, including renewed Russian aggression, terrorism, and cyber and hybrid threats. The meeting also could expose heightened political tension within the alliance and divergent views on a range of issues, including U.S. policy toward NATO and Europe, relations with NATO member Turkey, and relations with Russia. NATO and U.S. officials have said they expect the following key deliverables from the London Leaders’ Meeting:
• Completion of a new Readiness Initiative, under which the alliance would have at its disposal 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 naval combat vessels ready to use within 30 days.
• Declaration of space as a new operational domain for NATO and advances in combatting cyber and hybrid threats, including establishing new baseline requirements for telecommunications infrastructure.
• Increased defense spending by European allies and Canada.
• Renewed commitment to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa.
• Agreement to assess China’s impact on NATO and transatlantic security.
• Progress on finalizing North Macedonia’s accession to NATO.”

Cordesman, Anthony H., and Max Molot. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“NATO’s current burden sharing goals totally ignore military needs and effectiveness, and merely call for spending 2% of GDP on total defense spending levels, and at least 20% of annual defense expenditure on major new equipment. Such goals may seem simple, and it may seem hard to argue that more spending does not have benefits. This only begins to make sense, however, if one ignores any concern with what the added money buys. There are no serious aspects of life, however, where spending more is a substitute for spending wisely. The Burke Chair at CSIS has prepared a new report that examines the practical and mathematical weaknesses of these goals in detail…The analysis shows that NATO heads of state, Ministers, and parliaments/legislatures do not properly examine the priorities that would emerge from net assessments of the balance or on improving NATO’s capability to deter and fight. They fail to focus effectively on its many individual national problems and issues in strength and readiness, and they have failed to create coherent force and modernization plans for the future. Worse, this report presents considerable quantitative evidence that NATO’s current burdensharing goals actually focus the Alliance on the wrong objectives, and do so in ways that encourage pointless burden–sharing debates over the wrong objectives.”

Simón, Luis. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“Over the past two decades, discussions on EU-NATO relations have been closely associated with crisis-management operations and transnational threats. But that is yesterday’s world. The return of great-power competition is eliciting a shift in European security and transatlantic relations toward deterrence and defense. As such the conceptual framework that has so far underpinned debates on EU-NATO relations has been, by and large, rendered obsolete. The return of great-power competition and growing uncertainty about the United States' commitment to Europe have led to renewed calls to turn the EU into an autonomous pole in global politics. Some even toy with the notion of European equidistance in a global context that is increasingly defined by Sino-American competition. At the same time, the EU’s need to give its global role security and a transatlantic anchor underlines the potential of a more structured EU-NATO dialogue.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 21, 2019, streaming video, 6:07:25. Program begins about 8:19.
"In partnership with the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Understanding (CPRDU), CSIS is pleased to invite you to the eighth annual Transatlantic Forum on Russia. This year's conference will examine transatlantic policy towards Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova five years after Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and military incursion into eastern Ukraine. The Transatlantic Forum on Russia is part of a broader effort to formulate an enduring transatlantic policy framework towards Russia, with an examination of regional security, political, and economic developments."

O'Rourke, Ronald, et al. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2019).
“The diminishment of Arctic sea ice has led to increased human activities in the Arctic, and has heightened interest in, and concerns about, the region’s future. The United States, by virtue of Alaska, is an Arctic country and has substantial interests in the region. Record low extents of Arctic sea ice over the past decade have focused scientific and policy attention on links to global climate change and projected ice-free seasons in the Arctic within decades. These changes have potential consequences for weather in the United States, access to mineral and biological resources in the Arctic, the economies and cultures of peoples in the region, and national security. Although there is significant international cooperation on Arctic issues, the Arctic is increasingly being viewed by some observers as a potential emerging security issue. Some of the Arctic coastal states, particularly Russia, have taken actions to enhance their military presences in the high north. U.S. military forces, particularly the Navy and Coast Guard, have begun to pay more attention to the region in their planning and operations.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 18, 2019, streaming video, 3:29:36.
“The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA) cordially invite you to ‘China’s Maritime Ambitions in the First Island Chain and Beyond.’
Agenda:
• East China Sea
• South China Sea
• Pacific Islands
• Implications for Regional Policy Coordination”

Gnanarajah, Raj. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 27, 2019).
“DOD completed its first-ever agency-wide financial audit in FY2018and recently completed its FY2019 audit. As expected, DOD received an agency-wide disclaimer of opinion from the DOD IG in both audits—meaning auditors could not express an opinion on the department’s financial statements because the financial information was not sufficiently reliable. DOD has stated it could take up to 10 years to receive a clean audit opinion. Some reasons for a disclaimer of opinion can include inadequate internal controls (i.e., a series of integrated actions that management uses to guide operations), financial statements not conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), insufficient property and inventory records, and financial management systems that do not provide sufficient evidence for the auditor to express an opinion…After describing what a financial audit entails, this report examines the FY2018 audit in detail and addresses several issues for Congress, including the audit’s cost (approximately $413 million in FY2018) and the challenges the material weaknesses identified in the FY2018 audit may create for congressional oversight of DOD.”

Morrison, J. Stephen, Kelly Ayotte, and Julie Gerberding. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“When health crises strike—measles, MERS, Zika, dengue, Ebola, pandemic flu—and the American people grow alarmed, the U.S. government springs into action. But all too often, when the crisis fades and fear subsides, urgency morphs into complacency. Investments dry up, attention shifts, and a false sense of security takes hold. The CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security urges the U.S. government to replace the cycle of crisis and complacency that has long plagued health security preparedness with a doctrine of continuous prevention, protection, and resilience. Such a strategic approach can restore U.S. leadership, strengthen financing and the speed of response, foster resilient health systems abroad, enhance the U.S. government’s ability to operate in disordered settings, and accelerate select technological innovations to secure the future.”

Runde, Daniel F., and Christopher Metzger. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Issue
• Providing clean water and sanitation will be one of the greatest global challenges over the next decade due to population growth and urbanization. Today, 785 million people lack access to clean drinking water, and over 2 billion lack access to a toilet.
• Additional sources of finance are needed in order to reduce the investment gap for water and sanitation programs. The World Bank estimates that current investment levels will need to at least triple in order to meet Sustainable Development Goal 6, which aims to ensure that people in all countries have access to sustainable water and sanitation.
• Through development agencies like USAID and OPIC, the United States can leverage additional private capital and increase the efficiency of existing water and sanitation programs. Reducing conflicts over water and ensuring stability in developing countries benefits U.S. development, security, and economic interests abroad.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).
“The relationship between the United States and China has seen its ups and downs over the years. This year, 2019, has been one of the most tumultuous. Early in the year, many had hopes that negotiators would successfully conclude a trade deal that would address longstanding concerns about China’s unfair trade practices and industrial policy, and set the trajectory of bilateral relations for years to come. Instead, the year was dominated by a breakdown in talks, followed by escalations and setbacks. The year looks set to conclude with the clash over China’s trade-distorting practices mostly unresolved and the broader political, technological, and security differences between the two sides solidifying into prolonged strategic competition.
The U.S.-China trade tensions have come at a bad time for Beijing. General Secretary of the CCP Xi Jinping and other senior CCP leaders face multiple internal and external challenges. On the economic front, Beijing is struggling to deliver economic growth—a key pillar of its legitimacy… Beijing’s concerns are not limited to the economic domain… In the Commission’s first hearing for 2019, we looked specifically at ‘Beijing’s Internal and External Challenges,’ where expert witnesses attested to the CCP’s growing unease over perceptions of its weakening political authority and legitimacy at home, China’s geopolitical setbacks abroad, and military shortfalls.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).
“Comprehensive list of the Commission’s recommendations.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019).
The full report.

Schneider-Petsinger, Marianne, et al. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2019).
“The current dispute between the US and China goes far beyond trade tariffs and tit-for-tat reprisals: the underlying driver is a race for global technological supremacy. This paper examines the risks of greater strategic competition as well as potential solutions for mitigating the impacts of the US–China economic confrontation.”

Chatham House. (London, UK: Chatham House, 2019).
“At a time of geopolitical uncertainty and with multilateralism under pressure, this conference brought together diverse actors to explore the evolving role of international law on critical security and economic issues in the Asia-Pacific. From trade agreements to deep-sea mining, cyberwarfare to territorial disputes, the breadth of the discussion illustrated the growing reach of international law in the region. Hosted by the International Law Programme and the Asia-Pacific Programme at Chatham House on 27 March 2019, the conference focused on three themes: trade and investment, maritime security and governance, and emerging security challenges. What trends are emerging in terms of engagement with international law in the region, and how can international standards play a greater role in encouraging collaboration and reducing tensions? And, with the eastward shift in geopolitical power, how will Asia-Pacific states shape the future of international law?”

Small, Andrew. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“Transatlantic cooperation on Asia, and on China in particular, is still characterized by missed opportunities and self-imposed obstacles. Yet it would be a mistake to underplay the constructive developments that have occurred during the Trump administration. At the working level, a great deal of groundwork has now been laid for the joint efforts that will be necessary on a range of Asia policy issues.”

Black, David. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The global prospects for democratization and democracy assistance are worse than at any time in several decades due to the culmination of six trends: a backlash against democracy assistance, disillusionment with the Western model of liberal democracy, increasingly resilient authoritarianism, efforts by Russia to undermine democratic institutions and development, China’s alternative development model, and the spread of ‘digital authoritarian’ technology. Democracy assistance has been adapting to these trends, but proponents of democracy are being outpaced by those who seek to undermine democracy or promote alternative models that are less sustainable, just, or equitable.”

Katzman, Kenneth. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, November 15, 2019).
“Successive Administrations have used economic sanctions to try to change Iran’s behavior. U.S. sanctions, including ‘secondary sanctions’ on firms that conduct certain transactions with Iran, have adversely affected Iran’s economy but have had little observable effect on Iran’s pursuit of core strategic objectives such as its support for regional armed factions and its development of ballistic and cruise missiles.”

McCormick, Rhys, Gregory Sanders, and Andrew P. Hunter. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Future Vertical Lift, the Army’s effort to develop a new generation of vertical lift systems, is one of its top modernization priorities. As part of this effort, the Army is pioneering the use of a combination of acquisition approaches that depart from the traditional defense acquisition system. Given the novelty of this approach, there are significant questions about the long-term affordability, sustainability, and industry dynamics of the Army’s approach. This report characterizes and assess the Army’s approach to vertical lift modernization; identifies long-term issues relating to programmatic, sustainment, and portfolio costs; and clarifies the long-term affordability implications of the Army’s portfolio approach to vertical lift modernization.”

Hersman, Rebecca, and Suzanne Claeys. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Chemical weapons are back. Today, old actors are employing new forms of chemical weapons, and new chemical weapons (CW) states are employing them in new ways. Meanwhile crude forms of chemical weapons have fallen within the reach of non-state actors. The willingness of some state and non-state actors to use or acquire chemical weapons appears to have increased, and the potential for state or non-state actors to field CW capabilities is growing rapidly. Unless the international nonproliferation regime can adapt to address the threat of chemical weapons, these concerning trends will almost certainly intensify in the foreseeable future as proliferation networks and emerging technologies with CW implications mature. This study examines the evolving and changing nature of chemical weapons and how the system of restraint—comprised of norms, taboos, deterrence, and denial of benefit—must adapt to ensure that the proliferation and use of chemical weapons do not reemerge as endemic features of the global security landscape. The study provides a framework for structuring the problem, identifies gaps and challenges, and puts forward options for improving the global effort to prevent the proliferation and use of these weapons.”

Wood, Dakota L. (ed.) (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2019).
“Each year, The Heritage Foundation’s ‘Index of U.S. Military Strength’ employs a standardized, consistent set of criteria, accessible both to government officials and to the American public, to gauge the U.S. military’s ability to perform its missions in today’s world. The inaugural 2015 edition established a baseline assessment on which each annual edition builds, assessing the state of affairs for its respective year and measuring how key factors have changed from the previous year. The ‘Index of U.S. Military Strength’ assesses the ease or difficulty of operating in key regions based on existing alliances, regional political stability, the presence of U.S. military forces, and the condition of key infrastructure. Threats are assessed based on the behavior and physical capabilities of actors that pose challenges to U.S. vital national interests. The condition of America’s military power is measured in terms of its capability or modernity, capacity for operations, and readiness to handle assigned missions successfully. This framework provides a single-source reference for policymakers and other Americans who seek to know whether our military power is up to the task of defending our national interests.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Many observers have concluded that the post-Cold War era of international relations—an era that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and that was sometimes also referred to as the unipolar moment, with the United States as the unipolar power—began to fade in 2006-2008, and that by 2014, the international environment had shifted to a fundamentally different situation of renewed great power competition with China and Russia and challenges by these two countries and others to elements of the U.S.-led international order that has operated since World War II. The shift to renewed great power competition was acknowledged in the Obama Administration’s June 2015 National Military Strategy, and more fully in the Trump Administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and January 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS), which formally reoriented U.S. national security strategy and U.S. defense strategy toward an explicit primary focus on great power competition with China and Russia. DOD officials have identified countering China’s military capabilities as DOD’s top priority. The shift to renewed great power competition has profoundly changed the conversation about U.S. defense issues from what it was prior to 2014, leading to a reduced relative emphasis in the conversation on counterterrorist operations (although such operations continue),and to anew or renewed emphasis in the conversation on
• grand strategy and geopolitics as part of the context for discussing U.S. defense issues;
• nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence;
• new U.S. military service operational concepts;
• U.S. and NATO military capabilities in Europe;
• capabilities for conducting so-called high-end conventional warfare (i.e., large-scale, high-intensity, technologically sophisticated warfare) against countries such as China and Russia;
• maintaining U.S. technological superiority in conventional weapons;
• innovation and speed of weapon system development and deployment as a measure of merit in defense acquisition policy;
• mobilization capabilities for an extended-length large-scale conflict against an adversary such as China or Russia;•supply chain security, meaning awareness and minimization of reliance in U.S. military systems on components, subcomponents, materials, and software from Russia and China; and
• capabilities for countering so-called hybrid warfare and gray-zone tactics employed by countries such as Russia and China.
The issue for Congress is how U.S. defense funding levels, strategy, plans, and programs should respond to the shift in the international environment from the post-Cold War era to the era of renewed great power competition. Congress’s decisions on these issues could have significant or even profound implications for U.S. defense capabilities and funding requirements.”

“This Saturday, November 9, marks the thirtieth anniversary of the day that a divided Europe was reunited. A barrier came down that had been, for nearly three decades, a physical representation of the oppression of millions of Europeans. This week the Atlantic Council gathered to reflect on the personal impact that the Berlin Wall had on them and the continued influence that its fall has had on the organization’s vision for a Europe whole and free.”

Jones, Seth G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Since 9/11, al-Qaeda and the Islamic State have suffered multiple setbacks, from the 2006 death of al-Qaeda in Iraq chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden. Now comes the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. While significant in the short term, al-Baghdadi’s demise is unlikely to have a long-term impact. The persistence of jihadist movements has largely been a result of structural conditions like local grievances and weak governance. These conditions remain prevalent in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, raising the possibility of a new wave of violence.”

Rendon, Moises, Mark Schneider, and Jaime Vazquez. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Despite stiff sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and internal civil protests, Nicolas Maduro and his inner circle have resisted the pressures to negotiate an exit. Three internationally-sponsored dialogue processes and two efforts at mediated negotiations within the last five years have failed, with Maduro using the time to intensify his hold on power. Different factors are impeding a transition in Venezuela. This brief investigates challenges and opportunities to help support a transition toward democracy. It describes the possible role of a Track II diplomacy initiative to produce a feasible exit ramp for Maduro—essentially the achievement of significant progress outside of the formal negotiation process. The brief also discusses potential roles for chavistas in today’s struggle and for ‘day after’ challenges, the required elements for a transitional justice process, and the basic conditions necessary for holding free and fair elections to elect a new president.”

Shahbaz, Adrian, and Allie Funk. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2019).
“Internet freedom is increasingly imperiled by the tools and tactics of digital authoritarianism, which have spread rapidly around the globe. Repressive regimes, elected incumbents with authoritarian ambitions, and unscrupulous partisan operatives have exploited the unregulated spaces of social media platforms, converting them into instruments for political distortion and societal control. While social media have at times served as a level playing field for civic discussion, they are now tilting dangerously toward illiberalism, exposing citizens to an unprecedented crackdown on their fundamental freedoms. Moreover, a startling variety of governments are deploying advanced tools to identify and monitor users on an immense scale. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom declined for the ninth consecutive year in 2019.”

Ripple, William J., et al. "BioScience” (November 5, 2019).
“Scientists have a moral obligation to clearly warn humanity of any catastrophic threat and to ‘tell it like it is.’ On the basis of this obligation and the graphical indicators presented below, we declare, with more than 11,000 scientist signatories from around the world, clearly and unequivocally that planet Earth is facing a climate emergency.”

UN Environment Programme. (Nairobi, Kenya: UN Environment Programme, 2018).
“To mark ten years of the 'Emissions Gap Report,' and inform the Climate Action Summit, UNEP released Lessons from a decade of emissions gap assessments. The report finds that the last ten years have, in some ways, been a lost decade of climate action. Greenhouse gas emissions have only grown, and faster and deeper cuts are now urgently needed. Climate ambition needs to rise at least fivefold to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement. However, it also finds that the last decade has seen huge advances in political and societal support for climate action, and technological and economic options to take this action. The world may be currently be heading for a temperature rise of over 3°C, it says, but there have never more opportunities for nations to increase action to the levels needed to ward off the worst impacts of climate change.”

World Bank Group. (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / World Bank, 2020).
“Global value chains (GVCs) powered the surge of international trade after 1990 and now account for almost half of all trade. This shift enabled an unprecedented economic convergence: poor countries grew rapidly and began to catch up with richer countries. Since the 2008 global financial crisis, however, the growth of trade has been sluggish and the expansion of GVCs has stalled. Meanwhile, serious threats have emerged to the model of trade-led growth. New technologies could draw production closer to the consumer and reduce the demand for labor. And conflicts among large countries could lead to a retrenchment or a segmentation of GVCs. The ‘World Development Report (WDR) 2020: Trading for Development in the Age of Global Value Chains’ examines whether there is still a path to development through GVCs and trade. It concludes that technological change is at this stage more a boon than a curse. GVCs can continue to boost growth, create better jobs, and reduce poverty provided that developing countries implement deeper reforms to promote GVC participation, industrial countries pursue open, predictable policies, and all countries revive multilateral cooperation.”

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2019).
“Reducing food loss and waste is widely seen as an important way to reduce production costs and increase the efficiency of the food system, improve food security and nutrition, and contribute towards environmental sustainability. Growing attention to food loss and waste is reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG Target 12.3 calls for halving per capita global food waste at the retail and consumer levels and reducing food loss along production and supply chains (including post-harvest losses) by 2030. Reducing food loss and waste also has the potential to contribute to other SDGs, including the Zero Hunger goal (SDG 2), which calls for an end to hunger, the achievement of food security and improved nutrition, and the promotion of sustainable agriculture. The expected positive environmental impacts from reducing food loss and waste would also affect, among others, SDG 6 (sustainable water management), SDG 13 (climate change), SDG 14 (marine resources), SDG 15 (terrestrial ecosystems, forestry, biodiversity), and many other SDGs.”

Irwin, Lew. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“Since its inception in 1908, the US Army Reserve has made important, diverse, and cost-effective contributions to our nation while demonstrating the ability to adapt to meet emerging requirements. The emerging complex threats in today’s strategic and operational environments require the Army Reserve to adapt again.”

“Stung by Kremlin interference in elections in the United States and throughout Europe, governments have made progress in investigating past intrusions, counteracting ongoing influence, and preparing for future malign operations. However, even as Western democracies work to construct responses and build resilience, the Kremlin and other state and non-state actors continue to develop new tools to spread false narratives and manipulate the political discourse. Additionally, major questions remain surrounding the role and responsibility of news and social media platforms in this challenge. As the tactics of malign actors evolve, it is critical to continue to provide a forum for experts to learn best practices, share innovations, and engage with the policy community in order to counter bad actors seeking to influence and destabilize democratic institutions through disinformation.”

Institute for Economics and Peace. (Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2019).
“This report is a continuation of the prior work from the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and includes updated results for the annual Positive Peace Index (PPI). It also provides analysis of countries that are improving or deteriorating in Positive Peace, as well as the developmental factors that improve or deteriorate with changes in Positive Peace. The research incorporates systems thinking to understand how nations operate and societies develop over time. The introductory section of the report describes the fundamental concepts associated with systems thinking. In doing so, IEP provides a new interdependent framework and holistic approach to understanding peace and development. ‘The 2019 Positive Peace’ report outlines a new approach to societal development through the application of Positive Peace and systems thinking. Positive Peace is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. The same factors that create peace also lead to many other positive outcomes that societies aspire to, such as thriving economies, better inclusion, high levels of resilience and societies that are more capable of adapting to change. Other factors positively associated with Positive Peace are better performance on handling ecological challenges, wellbeing and happiness. Therefore, Positive Peace creates the optimal environment in which human potential can flourish.”

Schwab, Klaus (ed). (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2019).
“The 2019 edition of ‘The Global Competitiveness Report’ series, first launched in 1979, features the Global Competitiveness Index 4.0 (GCI 4.0). As the decade concludes and we look towards the dawn of the 2020s, the GCI 4.0 offers insights into the economic prospects of 141 economies. Drawing on these results, the report provides leads to unlock economic growth, which remains crucial for improving living standards. In addition, in a special thematic chapter, the report explores the relationship between competitiveness, shared prosperity and environmental sustainability, showing that there is no inherent trade-off between building competitiveness, creating more equitable societies that provide opportunity for all and transitioning to environmentally sustainable systems. However, for a new inclusive and sustainable system, bold leadership and proactive policy-making will be needed, often in areas where economists and public policy professionals cannot provide evidence from the past. The report reviews emerging and promising ‘win-win’ policy options to achieve the three objectives of growth, inclusion and sustainability.”

Gwartney, James, et al. (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019).
“The index published in ‘Economic Freedom of the World’ measures the degree to which the policies and institutions of countries are supportive of economic freedom. The cornerstones of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to enter markets and compete, and security of the person and privately owned property. Forty-two data points are used to construct a summary index and to measure the degree of economic freedom in five broad areas. Area 1: Size of Government… Area 2: Legal System and Property Rights… Area 3: Sound Money…Area 4: Freedom to Trade Internationally…Area 5: Regulation…Gender Disparity Index: The index published in ‘Economic Freedom of the World’ now includes an adjustment for gender disparity to take into account the fact that in any nations women are not legally accorded the same level of economic freedom as men.”

Bill and Melina Gates Foundation. (Seattle, WA: Bill and Melina Gates Foundation, 2019).
“‘Goalkeepers’ is our annual report card on the world’s progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 17 ambitious goals the member states of the United Nations committed to reaching by 2030. As we write, billions of people are projected to miss the targets that we all agreed represent a decent life. If we hope to accelerate progress, we must address the inequality that separates the lucky from the unlucky.”

World Economic Forum. (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2019).
“Cyberattacks are one of the top 10 global risks of highest concern in the next decade, with an estimated price tag of $90 trillion if cybersecurity efforts do not keep pace with technological change. While there is abundant guidance in the cybersecurity community, the application of prescribed action continues to fall short of what is required to ensure effective defence against cyberattacks. The challenges created by accelerating technological innovation have reached new levels of complexity and scale – today responsibility for cybersecurity in organizations is no longer one Chief Security Officer’s job, it involves everyone.”

Sutherland, Michael D. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“China’s construction of a nationwide ‘social credit system’ has been identified as a major concern by both the executive branch and some Members of Congress because of the broad controls such a system is likely to give the Chinese government over U.S. citizens and companies operating in China. Recent reports of Chinese officials invoking the social credit system to pressure U.S. firms to take positions that align with Beijing’s interests raise questions for Congress about how to respond to the potential threat the system may pose to U.S. commercial actors in China.”

Blank, Stephen J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“Wherever one looks, Russia is carrying out aggressive military and informational attacks against the West in Europe, North and South America, the Arctic, and the Middle East. This ‘war against the West’ actually began over a decade ago, but its most jarring and shocking event, the one that started to focus Western minds on Russia, was the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Given this pattern, the National Security Council (NSC) in 2014 invited Stephen Blank to organize a conference on the Russian military. We were able to launch the conference in 2016 and bring together a distinguished international group of experts on the Russian military to produce the papers that were then subsequently updated for presentation here.
The results presented here are sobering, to say the least. Ray Finch and Aleksandr Golts high-light the domestic program of military mobilization of Russian society that began before 2014 and has only intensified since then. It aims to engender a positive, heroic image for the military and the idea that Russia is under siege from the West. This campaign has also gone hand in hand with signs of greatly enhanced defense spending, although there have been cuts in 2017-2018 due to sanctions. However, despite the fact that Paul Schwartz rightly points out that Russia’s science and technology sectors are wounded and suffer from excessive militarization, he and Steven Rosefielde undermine the complacent and excessively comfortable notion that Russian economic weak-ness? which is real—will lead to the collapse of the system or its retreat from its current posture.”

Mix, Derek E., Kristin Archick, and Shayerah Ilias Akhtar. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 4, 2019).
“The dynamics of Brexit are likely to evolve in relation to pivotal events and deadlines in October 2019. Possible scenarios include a new withdrawal agreement, another extension, a no-deal Brexit, and an early general election in the UK.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Navy in FY 2020 reflects the priorities of the department as a whole. It sustains the level of readiness built in the FY 2017-FY 2019 budgets and modernizes by increasing the production of existing ships, aircraft, and munition programs. Unlike the other services, the Navy is significantly expanding its force structure.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
• The Navy feels the capacity/capability tension acutely due to the high demands of day-to-day operations, long lead times, and high capital costs for weapons systems.
• In the face of this tension, the Navy is actively implementing force structure expansion plans, aiming to reach its 355-ship goal by FY 2034 through a mix of service life extensions and new construction.
• The Navy is also procuring unmanned surface and undersea vessels, with potentially revolutionary long-term force structure implications.
• Naval aviation inventories are stable and most modernization programs are operating smoothly; however, it is dogged by high costs to maintain its inventory and has been slow to field unmanned aerial vehicles.”

McCall, Stephen M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 2, 2019).
“At a National Space Council meeting on June 18, 2018, President Donald Trump said, ‘I am hereby directing the Department of Defense and Pentagon to immediately begin the process necessary to establish a space force as the sixth branch of the armed forces.’ One of the purposes for creating a separate military service for space is to protect American interest in outer space. On February 19, 2019, the President signed Space Policy Directive-4 (SPD-4) directing the Secretary of Defense to submit a legislative proposal that would establish a U.S. Space Force, if enacted by Congress. In alignment with the President’s National Security Strategy and the National Strategy for Space, the Space Force is intended to secure the vital interest of unfettered access to and freedom to operate in space while expanding American dominance in the space domain. Subsequently, on February 28, 2019, the Department of Defense (DOD) submitted a legislative proposal to Congress to create the U.S. Space Force.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The current crisis in Iraq is partly the result of the failures by its current leadership and political figures, the legacy of the fighting against ISIS, and the result of short-term policy decisions. It is also driven, however, by a range of civil forces that are the result of long-term structural problems that have led to major political upheavals and conflicts throughout the region, that lead to the rise of extremism and terrorism, and that affect every aspect of Iraq’s present and future. Iraq is scarcely the only case in point. The same long-term civil challenges have limited U.S. success in its other ‘long wars’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria — as well as in more limited involvements in nations like Libya and Yemen. The Burke Chair at CSIS is issuing an analysis that focuses on the fact that all five states have deep structural problems that make them 'failed states' in many similar areas of governance, major social changes, and development. It shows that these failures are so serious that they make the ‘host country’ or national government a key cause of civil unrest and conflict and – in many ways – as much of a threat as the extremist and terrorist movements the U.S. is seeking to defeat.”

Greenley, Heather L., Christopher M. Blanchard, and Michael Ratner. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 1, 2019).
“September 14, 2019, saw an attack on Saudi Aramco’s,Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, Abqaiq oil processing facility and Khurais oil field and processing plant. The attack, which used both missiles and drones, temporarily disrupted 5.7 million barrels per day (mb/d) of oil production, over half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production and about 5% of global supply. For context, U.S. crude oil production is approximately 12 mb/d.”

Meyer, Peter J. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 3, 2019).
“On September 11, 2019, the United States and 11other Western Hemisphere countries invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty) to facilitate a regional response to the crisis in Venezuela. As a first step, on September 23, the countries that have ratified the treaty (“states parties”) agreed to impose targeted sanctions on individuals and entities associated with the government of Nicolás Maduro. They also pledged to meet again within two months to discuss additional measures. Congress may closely track the deliberations, given their potential implications for U.S. policy.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 4, 2019).
“The Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program is a program to acquire three new heavy polar icebreakers, to be followed years from now by the acquisition of up to three new medium polar icebreakers…The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Administration’s FY2020 procurement funding request for the PSC program, and, more generally, whether to approve, reject, or modify the Coast Guard’s overall plan for procuring new polar icebreakers. Congress’s decisions on this issue could affect Coast Guard funding requirements, the Coast Guard’s ability to perform its polar missions, and the U.S. shipbuilding industrial base.”

Pavel, Barry, Peter Engelke, and Alex Ward. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2016).
“Strategy should be the framework that gets a state, in this case the United States, from where it is to where it wants to go. Instead of merely responding to global events, the United States, with a sound strategy, could make progress over time to try to get ahead of them, and even to try to shape them for our national advantage as well as for that of our allies and friends. Without question, among the challenges facing the United States today in regard to its foreign and security policy is an inadequate amount of strategic thinking. For a variety of reasons, not least because the world appears to be spinning faster, actionable strategic thinking appears to be in short supply. This report, and future papers in this series, aim to help remedy this gap in strategy.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Burke Chair at CSIS has updated and expanded a report that uses official reports, maps, and graphics to examine Afghan military and civil progress, or the lack of it, in full detail. It draws on official reporting by the Resolute Support Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (1225 Report), the Lead Inspector General for Overseas Contingency Operations (LIG-OCO), the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), and the United Nations. At the same time, it draws upon a variety of outside sources that raise serious questions about the accuracy of some of this official reporting.”

Daniels, Seamus P. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“On August 2, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Norquist issued a memo calling for a ‘comprehensive zero-based review of all defense-wide (DW) functions and activities’ in the Department of Defense (DoD). The goal of this ongoing effort, led by the deputy secretary, is to ensure the alignment of resources with the National Defense Strategy (NDS) through the FY 2021 program review cycle and to ‘support a longer-term focus on structural reform” that generates future savings. In line with Norquist’s call to ‘begin immediately and move forward aggressively,’ the review kicked off on Saturday, August 10, only eight days after the memo was issued. This brief explains what the review entails, which defense-wide organizations are subject to it, and previous efforts at driving efficiencies in the ‘Fourth Estate.’”

Woolf, Amy F. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Recent debates about U.S. nuclear weapons have questioned what role weapons with shorter ranges and lower yields can play in addressing emerging threats in Europe and Asia. These weapons, often referred to as nonstrategic nuclear weapons, have not been limited by past U.S.-Russian arms control agreements, although some analysts argue such limits would be of value, particularly in addressing Russia’s greater numbers of these types of weapons. Others have argued that the United States should expand its deployments of these weapons, in both Europe and Asia, to address new risks of war conducted under a nuclear shadow. The Trump Administration addressed these questions in the ‘Nuclear Posture Review’ released in February 2018, and determined that the United States should acquire two new types of nonstrategic nuclear weapons: a new low-yield warhead for submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a new sea-launched cruise missile.”

Wheeler, Tom, and David Simpson. (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2019).
“5G will be a physical overhaul of our essential networks that will have decades-long impact. Because 5G is the conversion to a mostly all-software network, future upgrades will be software updates much like the current upgrades to your smartphone. Because of the cyber vulnerabilities of software, the tougher part of the real 5G 'race' is to retool how we secure the most important network of the 21st century and the ecosystem of devices and applications that sprout from that network. Never have the essential networks and services that define our lives, our economy, and our national security had so many participants, each reliant on the other—and none of which have the final responsibility for cybersecurity. The adage 'what’s everybody’s business is nobody’s business' has never been more appropriate—and dangerous—than in the quest for 5G cybersecurity. The new capabilities made possible by new applications riding 5G networks hold tremendous promise. As we pursue the connected future, however, we must place equivalent—if not greater—focus on the security of those connections, devices, and applications. To build 5G on top of a weak cybersecurity foundation is to build on sand. This is not just a matter of the safety of network users, it is a matter of national security.”

Lété, Bruno. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The United Nations remains the best platform to shape global norms on state behavior in cyberspace. But, despite its achievements, the UN’s intergovernmental process struggles to make progress, not least because of deep divisions within the international community about which rules should apply in cyberspace. There is a need to reevaluate cyber governance efforts and to think of new practices that adopt a multi-stakeholder model, instead of relying solely on the current rigid intergovernmental approach. There may be renewed energy for such discussion now that the UN’s First Committee has endorsed two parallel processes on cyber norms—the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) and a sixth round of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (UNGGE). Other international organizations have already successfully institutionalized multi-stakeholder models involving NGOs or business in their policymaking processes. Their best practices and lessons learned for stakeholder input could be adapted and used at the UN level. This paper looks at the experience of several intergovernmental organizations active in various non-cyber domains…Based on these findings, this paper makes six recommendations on how to include non-governmental stakeholders in the UNGGE and OEWG process so as to make progress toward an open cyber governance model.”

Herbst, John E., and Jason Marczak. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“Venezuela presents an opportunity for Russia to play the role of spoiler—in some capacity—in a crisis near the United States, and to promote its own commercial interests, and preferred image as a growing power. It’s an opportunity to plant the flag, foster instability, and have leverage over key energy resources at the same time. It is imperative that the current dynamics are reversed so that Moscow’s foray into Venezuela comes at a higher cost and is seen as a public relations disaster for Putin back home. Continued meddling will only help to prolong the suffering of the Venezuelan people.”

Global Center on Adaptation. (Rotterdam, The Netherlands: Global Center on Adaptation, 2019).
“This report focuses on making the case for climate adaptation, providing specific insights and recommendations in key sectors: food security, the natural environment, water, cities and urban areas, infrastructure, disaster risk management, and finance. It is designed to inspire action among decision-makers, including heads of state and government officials, mayors, business executives, investors, and community leaders.”

Jaffe, Amy Myers, et al. (New York City, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“Climate change affects virtually every aspect of the U.S. energy system. As climatic effects such as rising seas and extreme weather continue to appear across many geographies, U.S. energy infrastructure is increasingly at risk. The U.S. Gulf Coast—which is home to 44 percent of total U.S. oil refining capacity and several major ports—is highly vulnerable to flooding events and dangerous ocean surges during severe storms and hurricanes. The link between water availability and energy and electricity production creates another layer of risk to U.S. energy security.”

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019).
"The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Special Report highlights the urgency of prioritizing timely, ambitious and coordinated action to address unprecedented and enduring changes in the ocean and cryosphere. The report reveals the benefits of ambitious and effective adaptation for sustainable development and, conversely, the escalating costs and risks of delayed action. The ocean and the cryosphere – the frozen parts of the planet – play a critical role for life on Earth. A total of 670 million people in high mountain regions and 680 million people in low-lying coastal zones depend directly on these systems. Four million people live permanently in the Arctic region, and small island developing states are home to 65 million people. Global warming has already reached 1°C above the pre-industrial level, due to past and current greenhouse gas emissions. There is overwhelming evidence that this is resulting in profound consequences for ecosystems and people. The ocean is warmer, more acidic and less productive. Melting glaciers and ice sheets are causing sea level rise, and coastal extreme events are becoming more severe."

Lehr, Amy K., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Human Rights are part of the American DNA. Congress has long advocated for human rights to play an integral role in U.S. foreign policy, with significant success. However, rising authoritarianism and the gross human rights violations taking place around the world call for immediate and stronger U.S. leadership and Congressional action. To that end, the Human Rights Initiative of CSIS worked with CSIS scholars, who developed recommendations relevant to their expertise that identify how Congress can build on its past human rights leadership to meet today’s challenges.”

Kurtzer, Jacob. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Principled humanitarian action is under attack around the world. Globally, 70.8 million people are considered forcibly displaced by armed conflict and nearly 132 million people need emergency humanitarian assistance. At the same time, there has been a steep escalation in the deliberate, willful obstruction of humanitarian access, impeding the ability of humanitarian aid to reach the most vulnerable people and vice versa. As humanitarian emergencies become increasingly complex and protracted, blocked humanitarian access will only increase without urgent action. To ensure the ability of aid to reach those who need it most and to uphold the principles of international humanitarian law, the United States should elevate humanitarian access as a foreign policy priority and work to reconcile tensions between critical national security measures and the growing needs of vulnerable populations in fragile, conflict-affected states. This report is the result of the CSIS Task Force on Humanitarian Access.”

Townshend, Ashley, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Matilda Steward. (Sydney, Australia: United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, 2019).
“America no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific and its capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power is increasingly uncertain…Over the next decade, the US defence budget is unlikely to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy owing to a combination of political, fiscal and internal pressures…America has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific — a challenge it is working hard to address…A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”

O'Rourke, Ronald. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“In an international security environment characterized as one of renewed great power competition, China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s navy, which China has been steadily modernizing for roughly 25 years, since the early to mid-1990s, has become a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe. China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has faced since the end of the Cold War—and forms a key element of a Chinese challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military power in the Western Pacific.”

Asia Maritime and Transparency Initiative. (Washington, DC: Asia Maritime and Transparency Initiative, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Explore the maritime claims of nearly 40 countries across the Indo-Pacific. All claims are shown based on states’ domestic legislation, treaties, and submissions to international bodies. The map is an unbiased depiction of claims; it does not judge their legality or guess at future delimitations. Click on any claim line for its source, including links to original documents where available.”

Bermudez, Joseph, and Victor Cha. (Washington, DC: Beyond Parallel, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
• “Located 1,100 kilometers west of Tokyo and 165 kilometers northeast of Seoul the Kumchon-ni undeclared ballistic missile operating base houses a battalion- or regiment-sized unit equipped with Hwasong-9 (Scud-ER) medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM).
• Media reports suggest that during wartime the 1,000-kilometer-range Hwasong-9 unit based at Kumchon-ni is tasked with striking targets in the southern half of Japan and, to a lesser degree, throughout South Korea.
• Should the missile unit based at Kumchon-ni be equipped with more recently emerging MRBMs (e.g., Pukkuksong-2/KN-15, etc.) the threat envelop could include all of Japan, including U.S. military bases on Okinawa, and beyond.
• This base is one of approximately 20 undeclared ballistic missile operating bases and one that is reported to be tasked with not only strikes against the southern half of Japan, but is also capable of striking all of South Korea.
• This is the first comprehensive public report detailing the development, organization, and threat posed by the Kumchon-ni missile operating base.
• North Korean missile operating bases would presumably have to be subject to declaration, verification, and dismantlement in any future final and fully verifiable denuclearization deal.”

Lewis, James Andrew. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“There are deep interconnections between the U.S. and Chinese economies, and China has built its technology base on what it has acquired from the West. China’s government and some Chinese companies will use any means, legal or illegal, to acquire technology. The United States’ relationship with China cannot continue unchanged, but given the interconnections, change must be managed carefully. New restrictions are needed, but counterintuitively, these should be shaped by recognizing that being open makes the United States stronger than being closed. The best approach is an incremental and flexible approach to technology transfer centered on the need to avoid harm to the U.S economy. This report outlines the policy tools that the United States can use to mitigate risk while maintaining the openness that is a hallmark of the U.S. economy.”

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Djibouti is pursuing an ambitious agenda to transform itself into a commercial trade hub for the Horn of Africa region. This effort is being financed largely by the People’s Republic of China(PRC), which is playing a growing role in the tiny country. China’s engagement is multifaceted, ranging from major infrastructure investments to the establishment of its first overseas military base in the country. China considers Djibouti part of its Belt and Road Initiative; in late 2017 the two countries declared that they had established a ‘strategic partnership.’ U.S. policymakers have raised concern about China’s role in Djibouti, given U.S. strategic interests in the region and the proximity of China’s base to U.S. military facilities there.”

Watts, John, et al. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“The forward march of advanced technologies, especially information technologies, and their integration into all aspects of society are creating tremendous opportunities—and an associated set of vulnerabilities. Both 5G networks and the Internet of Things (IoT) are going to connect us further in ways only limited by our imaginations. While this growth has been forecasted over the past few decades, few saw the scope and breadth of the implications, both positive and negative, on our society. The Department of Defense has recognized that hardware, software, and data now connect in ways that have created a cyber domain, much like the land, sea, air, and space domains. The implications have manifested themselves in the relentless competition underway between those that defend and those that attack on a continuous basis. This evolution in our thinking on the cyber problem demands strategic analysis. Numerous reports have been generated over the past several years, with thousands of recommendations. Yet, the problem only continues to grow… Forecasting is extremely difficult; some say it is impossible. That said, crafting a set of potential alternate futures, with a series of waypoints or decision points that validates or invalidates a given path or assumptions, is possible now. This approach drives action forward, and the competitive environment forces the normal action-reaction-counteraction competitive framework for action. Some change may be gradual, and some may be dramatic. What is most important is the ability to modify, adapt, or even pivot at speed across concepts, technologies, structures, and frameworks on a continuous basis, which creates a competitive advantage over time. This report starts that effort.”

Schiffrin, Anya. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“On both sides of the Atlantic, governments, foundations, and companies are looking at how to solve the problem of online dis/misinformation. Some emphasize the demand side of the problem, believing it important to focus on consumer behavior and the use of media literacy and fact-checking. Some focus on legal remedies such as platform-liability and hate-speech laws as well as privacy protections. Meanwhile, others try to raise the quality of journalism and support local news in the hope that creating more reliable content will be a counterweight to the dis/misinformation found online. In short, there are myriad solutions aimed at addressing the problem of online dis/misinformation. This study looks at one kind of fix: the small companies in the information ecosystem that use natural language processing as well as human intelligence to identify and, in some cases, block false or inflammatory content online. There are impediments to the success of this entrepreneurial approach, including the fact that disinformation detection by algorithms is complicated, it is hard to scale, and that it is unclear whether the platforms have an incentive to adopt such technology. It is very likely that platforms such as Facebook or Twitter—which already screen, block, and remove fake accounts and content—will copy the technology or will buy out the small firms for the skills of their staff and for their products in order to gain access to the AI needed for further screening.”

Stein, Aaron, and Emily Burchfield. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“The future of northeast Syria is unsettled after eight years of civil war and the US intervention to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). It also faces the various divergent interests of powerful external actors, including Russia and Turkey. In mid-April 2019, the Atlantic Council, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, and the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened a group of scholars, intermediaries, and civil-society members from the United States, Europe, and the Middle East to discuss Syria’s northeast at the granular level. The group focused on the building of local security and governance infrastructure, how these efforts interact with the interests of outside parties, and whether a broader power-sharing arrangement can be reached to manage, or help end, the conflict. Over the course of the two-day dialogue, a general consensus emerged that any solution in Syria will require a clear US position on the future of Syria and what Washington is prepared to accept in any post-conflict scenario. The same is true for Russia, the second-most-powerful external actor involved in the conflict, and the guarantor of security, locally and internationally, for the Bashar al-Assad government in Damascus. A third actor, Turkey, has also managed to carve out a contiguous zone of control, stretching roughly from just west of the Euphrates river to a semicircular front line just north of Hama, which is patrolled by Russian and Turkish troops.”

Congressional Research Service. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“While suicide remains a low incidence event, military suicide rates grew substantially in the early 2000s, peaking for the active component in 2012. For the past few years of reported data, suicide rates in the Army active and reserve components have been consistently higher than the other services. In addition, the Army National Guard suicide rate has been consistently higher than the other components. There is some evidence of an upward trend in suicide rates for the Air Force and Air Force Reserve. Rates for the other services and components have not exhibited any discernable trends.”

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Geopolitical competition is increasingly playing out in the space beyond diplomacy and short of conventional war, sometimes referred to as the gray zone. The nature of this compe¬tition is forcing the United States to confront the liabilities of its strengths. This report assesses current U.S. government actions to deter, campaign through, and respond to competitors’ gray zone tactics. Using the campaign planning framework established in ‘By Other Means Part I,’ the report provides recommendations aimed at ameliorating U.S. liabilities and building on its asymmetries to improve U.S. national security in the presence of rivals’ gray zone approaches.”

Sheppard, Lindsey R., and Matthew Conklin. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“This paper will discuss how intelligence, and particularly geospatial intelligence, can be collected, analyzed, and applied to better identify and enable the United States to anticipate and respond to gray zone challenges. It details past examples in which the United States effectively applied tools to monitor and respond to gray zone challenges. Key examples highlighted include China’s reef dredging in the South China Sea and Russia’s use of non-uniformed combatants in Ukraine. Interviews with representatives from the private sector, government agencies, and nonprofit organizations contextualize these examples.”

Stuckenberg, David; R. James Woolsey, and Douglas DeMaio. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
“In spring 2019 Air University hosted subject matter experts from across the country to expand on the accomplishments of the inaugural Electromagnetic Defense Task Force (EDTF). Building on the 2018 summit, the 2019 EDTF summit advanced and amplified recommendations to leaders nationwide, ensuring the call for awareness, preparation, defense, and mitigation is sounded far and wide. Using extensive research and expertise, EDTF 2.0 participants have contributed to understanding, preparedness, and resilience for communities throughout the United States.”

Crane, Conrad C. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
"The mission of US Army Cyber Command now reads that it 'integrates and conducts full-spectrum cyberspace operations, electronic warfare, and information operations, ensuring freedom of action for friendly forces in and through the cyber domain and the information environment, while denying the same to our adversaries.' This appears to be a time of opportunity for that command to reestablish Army dominance in all aspects of information warfare. That may require a change in name, new doctrine, and regaining control of relevant organizations. Joint and national reform is also necessary. But considering the displayed competence and unity of effort of potential adversaries in information warfare, an aggressive and innovative response is required."

Bruscino, Thomas. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
"Military reform efforts, including reform in professional military education, all too often ignore experiences of the past, seeing them as outdated and irrelevant. At the same time, observers revere historical strategic leaders who grew up in these supposedly outdated systems. The great leaders of the past were rarely, if ever, natural strategic geniuses. They had to learn something along the way, which is why professional militaries have a school system in the first place. In order to gain greater clarity on the preparation of strategic leaders, this paper, which features extensive use of the rich USAHEC archives by a member of the US Army War College (USAWC) faculty, takes a closer look at the USAWC in the period between World War I and World War II, with a focus on Dwight D. Eisenhower's tenure as a student in the 1927-1928 school year. "

Flowers, Kimberly, and Sarah Ladislaw. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"Last week, a United Nations (UN) report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sounded the alarm that the world is moving toward irreversible damage by climate change that could place the future of food and the livelihood of millions in serious peril. The report comes amid growing public recognition of the frequency and severity of extreme weather phenomena such as droughts, floods, forest fires, heat waves, and stronger storms impacting communities across the globe. Based on research from over 100 scientists from 52 countries, the UN report highlights unsustainable land use and surging resource demands as key drivers behind a warming planet. Unless collective action is taken to dramatically reduce emissions, the global food system, including food prices, could face sweeping instability."

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (Geneva, Switzerland: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2019).
"An IPCC [Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change] special report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems."

Berger, David. (Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps, 2019).
“The Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) provides the 38th Commandant’s strategic direction for the Marine Corps and mirrors the function of the Secretary of Defense’s Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). It serves as the authoritative document for Service-level planning and provides a common direction to the Marine Corps Total Force. It also serves as a road map describing where the Marine Corps is going and why; what the Marine Corps force development priorities are and are not; and, in some instances, how and when prescribed actions will be implemented. This CPG serves as my Commandant’s Intent for the next four years.”

Mason, M. Chris (ed). (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
USAWC Integrated Research Project: “This monograph is the result of an integrated research project conducted by a group of eight officers at the U.S. Army War College during the 2017-2018 academic year…The group identified the four most important and challenging issues which the Resolute Support mission grapples with on a daily basis: (1) maintaining the equilibrium of power and control between the Government of Afghanistan and the Taliban at its current level; (2) bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table to begin peace talks with the Afghan Government; (3) getting Pakistan to curb its 17-year support to the Taliban; and, (4) start to roll back the pernicious dominance of opium production in the Afghan economy and its corrosive influence on national governance and state-building. Everyone involved in this project was keenly aware that thousands of dedicated U.S., Afghan, and international personnel from the military, diplomatic, and academic spheres have been struggling with these same four issues for almost two decades. The group’s intention was to enhance that ongoing effort through academic research and the application of the members’ experience in order to develop specific, implementable solutions for each of the four problems. The faculty tasked the group with avoiding both long history lessons and the kind of vague bromides (i.e., ‘so-and-so must do more such-and-such’) which tend to dominate external reviews of the challenges facing Afghanistan but which are too nebulous to implement."

U.S. Army War College YouTube page. 7 videos.
"The U.S. Army War College hosted the National Security Seminar (NSS), June 3-6, 2019. Selected representatives from across the United States were invited to join the graduate-level seminar and exchange thoughts about national security topics in the capstone phase of the USAWC graduate program."

U.S. Army War College YouTube page. July 16, 2019, streaming video, 58:52.
“The Army has faced many challenges since World War II has it has tried to reform and transform itself for changing warfare. It was very successful with the shift to AirLand Battle in the 1980s, but less so with the Pentomic Army of the 1950s, and its technological misdirection after DESERT STORM made the adjustment for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq even more difficult. Today it is turning once more to large-scale combat operations, along with the complexity of Multi-Domain Operations. Insights from the past can be useful as the service again wrestles with its future.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“This report is an experimental net assessment that addresses China's emergence as a global superpower, and its competition with the United States.”

Center for Strategic & International Studies Conference. July 24, 2019, streaming video, 2:35:41.
“This full-day conference will provide opportunities for in-depth discussion and analysis of developments in the South China Sea over the past year and potential paths forward. Panels will address the state of play in the South China Sea, the history and historiography of disputes in the South China Sea, pathways for dispute management, and the global stakes related to the South China Sea.
• State of Play in the South China Sea
• How Did We Get Here? History and Historiography
• Pathways for Dispute Management
• Global Stakes”

Atlantic Council YouTube page. 11 videos.
“In 2019 we mark several anniversaries that helped us build a Europe whole and free with Central European nations an integral part of it, including: one hundred years of relations between the United States and the countries of Central Europe that emerged from the horror of the First World War; thirty years since the overthrow of communism and the fall of the Iron Curtain; twenty years since the first NATO enlargement beyond the Iron Curtain; and fifteen years since the EU enlargement beyond the Iron Curtain and NATO's ‘Big Bang’ expansion. Our achievements must be celebrated but many challenges lie ahead. The conference will celebrate US-Central European relations while also galvanizing a community of leaders to strengthen these ties for the future. Furthermore, we will use this opportunity to launch a flagship report on US-Central European relations co-authored by the Atlantic Council and GLOBSEC.”

Fried, Daniel, et al. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“The year 2019 marks one hundred and one years of relations between the United States and the countries of Central Europe that emerged from the wreckage of the First World War. After a century of work together, of tragedy and achievement, Central Europe and the United States have much to celebrate and defend, but also much to do. After accessions to NATO and the European Union, Central Europeans may have thought that their long road to the institutions of the West, and to the security and prosperity associated with them, was finished. The United States began to think so as well, concluding that its work and special role in Central Europe were complete. Now, Central Europe, the United States, and the entire transatlantic community face new internal and external challenges. As a result, the transatlantic world has seen a rise of extremist politics and forms of nationalism that many thought had been banished forever after 1989. The great achievement of a Europe whole, free, and at peace, with Central Europe an integral part of it, is again in play. The Atlantic Council and GLOBSEC’s new report ‘The United States and Central Europe: Tasks for a Second Century Together’ examines a century of relations between the United States and Central Europe: what went right, what went wrong, and what needs to be done about it.”

Katzman, Kenneth. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership:
• Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime.
• Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes.
• Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of ‘greatness’ reminiscent of ancient Persian empires.
• Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s ‘oppressed’ and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs.
• Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif have supported Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy.
• Supports acts of international terrorism, as the ‘leading’ or ‘most active’ state sponsor of terrorism, according to each annual State Department report on international terrorism since the early 1990s.
The Administration insists that an end to Iran’s malign activities is a requirement of any revised JCPOA and normalization of relations with the United States.”

Meter, Peter J. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“Central America has received renewed attention from U.S. policymakers over the past few years as the region has remained a major transit corridor for illicit drugs and has surpassed Mexico as the largest source of irregular migration to the United States. These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several countries in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. The U.S. government and partners in the region have begun to implement new initiatives intended to address those challenges, but living conditions in Central America have yet to improve significantly.”

Carson, Charles, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“In the United States, there is currently a dichotomy: employers are unable to fill manufacturing jobs, and yet there are hundreds of thousands of manufacturing workers looking for jobs. How can this be? Many point to a skills deficit across the U.S. workforce. Much like other aspects of daily life and the economy, technology is changing the way U.S. based companies manufacture goods for the global market. As technology permeates and alters the manufacturing industry, it has created a massive boost in manufacturing productivity, while simultaneously requiring fewer workers to maintain and increase production. For those still employed in the manufacturing sector, they also need to be better equipped with the skills to handle the new demands such advanced technology and techniques impose. This report analyzes different workforce development programs for advanced manufacturing across the nation, seeking to better understand what is required to educate and retrain the worker of the future.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies Microsite
“‘On the Radar’ provides analysis on emerging technologies that are expected to reshape situational awareness across the spectrum of conflict, and examines the implications of these technologies for nuclear strategic stability. It is a product of a two-year research collaboration between the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and the Nuclear Policy Working Group (NPWG) at the University California Berkeley, funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.”

Goodman, Matthew P. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The liberal international order set up under U.S. leadership at the end of World War II has produced enormous economic benefits for both the United States and the rest of the world. But recently, the order has been under severe strain, the result of shifting economic forces at home and challenges from new powers abroad. U.S. leadership remains critical to an international order that delivers broad-based prosperity for Americans and stability abroad. In a new essay collection, CSIS experts on economics, trade, energy, technology, and development share their thoughts on how the United States can reaffirm its leadership through smart policies both at home and abroad.”

Jones, Seth G., Nicholas Harrington, and Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the Middle East, Russia is engaged in covert and overt cooperation with Iran in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. This analysis of commercial satellite imagery at Tiyas Airbase in Syria indicates the scope and proximity of Russian and Iranian military ties. If Washington wants to contain Tehran and prevent further Iranian expansion, U.S. policymakers will need to increase pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s activities in countries like Syria.”

Huguet, Alice, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019).
“Truth Decay — the diminishing role that facts, data, and analysis play in political and civil discourse — appears to result, in part, from an increasingly complex information ecosystem. Technology, in particular, offers continual access to information of varying quality and credibility, information that can blur the line between fact-based evidence and opinion. Not everyone is equipped with the skills necessary to navigate such uncertain terrain. The purpose of this report is to describe the field of media literacy (ML) education and the ways in which ML education can counter Truth Decay by changing how participants consume, create, and share information. One limitation of this research base arises from the variety of ways that literature defines and measures ML outcomes; while a multiplicity of viewpoints can be beneficial, it also presents challenges in terms of aggregating findings across studies. Despite this, the authors describe existing evidence that ML could be a useful tool for combating Truth Decay. They also provide an inventory of ML offerings available to the public. Finally, the authors make suggestions for moving forward, with the specific recommendation that professionals in ML and related fields strengthen their communication and collaboration, considering where there are opportunities for a common approach to researching ML. The authors recommend that policymakers and practitioners increase participation from diverse constituencies in scaling ML efforts.”

Markovich, Steven J., and Andrew Chatzky. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“U.S. space exploration inspired a generation of students and innovators, but NASA’s role has diminished, and the number of global space competitors is growing.”

Sayler, Kelley. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons - maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5 - as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable ‘responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.’ Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence.”

Sayler, Kelley, and Daniel Hoadley S. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“AI technologies present unique challenges for military integration, particularly because the bulk of AI development is happening in the commercial sector. Although AI is not unique in this regard, the defense acquisition process may need to be adapted for acquiring emerging technologies like AI. In addition, many commercial AI applications must undergo significant modification prior to being functional for the military. A number of cultural issues also challenge AI acquisition, as some commercial AI companies are averse to partnering with DOD due to ethical concerns, and even within the department, there can be resistance to incorporating AI technology into existing weapons systems and processes.
Potential international rivals in the AI market are creating pressure for the United States to compete for innovative military AI applications. China is a leading competitor in this regard, releasing a plan in 2017 to capture the global lead in AI development by 2030. Currently, China is primarily focused on using AI to make faster and more well-informed decisions, as well as on developing a variety of autonomous military vehicles. Russia is also active in military AI development, with a primary focus on robotics.
Although AI has the potential to impart a number of advantages in the military context, it may also introduce distinct challenges. AI technology could, for example, facilitate autonomous operations, lead to more informed military decision making, and increase the speed and scale of military action. However, it may also be unpredictable or vulnerable to unique forms of manipulation. As a result of these factors, analysts hold a broad range of opinions on how influential AI will be in future combat operations. While a small number of analysts believe that the technology will have minimal impact, most believe that AI will have at least an evolutionary—if not revolutionary—effect.”

Hoehn, John R., and Kelley M. Sayler. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019).
“The fifth generation (5G) of mobile technologies will increase the speed of data transfer and improve bandwidth over existing fourth generation (4G) technologies, in turn enabling new military and commercial applications. 5G technologies are expected to support interconnected or autonomous devices, such as smart homes, self-driving vehicles, precision agriculture systems, industrial machinery, and advanced robotics. According to a Defense Innovation Board (DIB) report, in the military realm, 5G will additionally improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems and processing; enable new methods of command and control; and streamline logistics systems for increased efficiency. As 5G technologies are developed and deployed, Congress may consider policies for spectrum management and national security, as well as implications for U.S. military operations.”

Linscott, Mark, Trevor Cloen, and Nidhi Upadhyaya. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“‘Trade at a Crossroads: A Vision for the US-India Trade Relationship,’ a joint report with the Atlantic Council's South Asia Center and the U.S. India Strategic Partnership Forum, provides an expert analysis of the current state of the relationship, including recent negotiations, and recommendations for the path forward in the short-, medium-, and long-term. This report urges both countries to prioritize efforts to manage current tensions, reach an early agreement and build on successes to initiate a series of cooperative projects in areas such as intellectual property rights, digital trade and regulatory coherence, mirroring previous successes on the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Finally, the report provides a sober assessment of future prospects for a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). While highlighting many compelling reasons to avoid rushing into exploration of an FTA in the near future, it concludes with a vision of this ultimate form of economic integration through trade negotiations.”

Pompeo, Michael R. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2019).
“The U.S. Department of State’s Investment Climate Statements provide country-specific information on the business climates of more than 170 countries and are prepared by economic officers stationed in embassies and posts around the world. They analyze a variety of economies that are or could be markets for U.S. businesses of all sizes.”

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
"The 2019 Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy updates the previous 2016 DoD Arctic Strategy as requested by Section 1071 of the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year (FY) 2019. This update includes a classified annex. Specifically, the 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy updates DoD’s strategic objectives for the Arctic region, in light of DoD’s renewed assessment of the evolving Arctic security environment and the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS). Anchored in NDS goals and priorities, this updated Arctic strategy outlines DoD’s strategic approach for protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic in an era of strategic competition. DoD’s desired end-state for the Arctic is a secure and stable region in which U.S. national security interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooperatively to address shared challenges. Protecting U.S. national security interests in the Arctic will require the Joint Force to sustain its competitive military advantages in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, identified in the NDS as key regions of strategic competition, and to maintain a credible deterrent for the Arctic region. DoD must be able to quickly identify threats in the Arctic, respond promptly and effectively to those threats, and shape the security environment to mitigate the prospect of those threats in the future. The 2019 DoD Arctic strategy outlines three strategic ways in support of the desired Arctic end-state:
•Building Arctic awareness;
•Enhancing Arctic operations; and,
•Strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic."

Hicks, Kathleen H., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"The United States is being confronted by the liabilities of its strength. Competitors are contesting the rules of the international system and U.S. leadership. With the significant costs of engaging the United States in combat, and the growing range of indirect and non-military tools at their disposal, rivals are finding avenues for threatening U.S. interests without triggering escalation. Their approaches lie in the contested arena between routine statecraft and open warfare--the "gray zone." The United States has yet to articulate a comprehensive approach to deterring competitors in the gray zone. A concrete and actionable campaign plan is needed to deal with the gray zone challenge; in order to do so, the United States must identify and employ a broad spectrum of tools and concepts to deter, and if needed, to compete and win contestations in the gray zone."

German Marshall Fund of the United States. 21 videos of sessions from Brussels Forum 2019, held June 27-29, 2019.

Khalil, Lydia. (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute, 2019).
"• Women will be important to the resurgence and transformation of the Islamic State from governance project to global terrorist insurgency.
• Islamic State has expanded both the potential and the scope of the roles and functions women can play, providing additional avenues for their participation in jihad in both kinetic and non-kinetic roles.
• The cohort of former caliphate members of mostly women and children now held in camps pose a key challenge for counterterrorism efforts around the world. Assumptions about women and violence can obstruct an accurate assessment of the threat female IS supporters pose and an accurate understanding of their agency."

Johnson, Kaitlyn. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"In 2018, President Trump requested that the U.S. military restructure its space offices and personnel to create a U.S. Space Force. Since then three competing visions for how the Department of Defense (DoD) should be restructured to better support its national security space enterprise have been crafted: one from the DoD itself and two from either chamber of Congress. This brief compares these three legislative proposals to create a new military service for space."

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. (Geneva, Switzerland: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019).
"A UN human rights report published today urges the Government of Venezuela to take immediate, concrete measures to halt and remedy the grave violations of economic, social, civil, political and cultural rights documented in the country. The report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights warns that if the situation does not improve, the unprecedented outflow of Venezuelan migrants and refugees will continue, and the living conditions of those who remain will worsen."

Lafakis, Chris, et al. (West Chester, PA: Moody's Analytics, 2019).
"In the absence of global pollution mitigation, anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide into the Earth’s atmosphere will raise global temperatures. Rising temperatures and shifting precipitation patterns will affect agricultural production and universally hurt worker health and productivity. More frequent and intense extreme weather events will increasingly disrupt and damage critical infrastructure and property. And sea-level rise will threaten coastal communities and island nations."

Network for Greening the Financial System. (Paris, France: Network for Greening the Financial System, 2019).
“Climate change is one of many sources of structural change affecting the financial system. However, it has distinctive characteristics that mean it needs to be considered and managed differently. These include:
• Far-reaching impact in breadth and magnitude: climate change will affect all agents in the economy (households, businesses, governments), across all sectors and geographies. The risks will likely be correlated with and potentially aggravated by tipping points, in a non-linear fashion. This means the impacts could be much larger, and more widespread and diverse than those of other structural changes.
• Foreseeable nature: while the exact outcomes, time horizon and future pathway are uncertain, there is a high degree of certainty that some combination of physical and transition risks will materialise in the future.
•Irreversibility: the impact of climate change is determined by the concentration of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere and there is currently no mature technology to reverse the process. Above a certain threshold, scientists have shown with a high degree of confidence that climate change will have irreversible consequences on our planet, though uncertainty remains about the exact severity and time horizon.
•Dependency on short-term actions: the magnitude and nature of the future impacts will be determined by actions taken today, which thus need to follow a credible and forward-looking policy path. This includes actions by governments, central banks and supervisors, financial market participants, firms and households.
While today’s macroeconomic models may not be able to accurately predict the economic and financial impact of climate change, climate science leaves little doubt: action to mitigate and adapt to climate change is needed now. The NGFS recognises that there is a strong risk that climate-related financial risks are not fully reflected in asset valuations. There is a need for collective leadership and globally coordinated action and, therefore, the role of international organisations and platforms is critical."

Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures. (Basel, Switzerland: Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, 2019).
"In June 2017, the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (Task Force or TCFD)
released its final recommendations(2017 report), which provide a framework for companies and other organizations to develop more effective climate-related financial disclosures through their existing reporting processes. In its 2017 report, the Task Force emphasized the importance of transparency in pricing risk—including risk related to climate change—to support informed, efficient capital-allocation decisions. The large-scale and complex nature of climate change makes it uniquely challenging, especially in the context of economic decision making. Furthermore, many companies incorrectly view the implications of climate change to be relevant only in the long term and, therefore, not necessarily relevant to decisions made today. Those views, however, have begun to change...As part of its efforts to promote adoption of the recommendations, the Task Force prepared this status report to provide an overview of current disclosure practices as they relate to the Task Force’s recommendations, highlight key challenges associated with implementing the recommendations, and outline some of the efforts the Task Force will consider undertaking in coming months to help address some of the implementation challenges."

HM Treasury. (London, UK: HM Treasury, 2019).
"A comprehensive approach to greening financial systems, mobilising finance for clean and resilient growth, and capturing the resulting opportunities for UK firms."

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
The “‘2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report’ (IPSR) affirms the enduring U.S. commitment to stability and prosperity in the region through the pursuit of preparedness, partnerships, and the promotion of a networked region.
• Preparedness – Achieving peace through strength and employing effective deterrence requires a Joint Force that is prepared to win any conflict from its onset. The Department, alongside our Allies and partners, will ensure our combat-credible forces are forward-postured in the region. Furthermore, the Joint Force will prioritize investments that ensure lethality against high-end adversaries.
• Partnerships – Our unique network of Allies and partners is a force multiplier to achieve peace, deterrence, and interoperable warfighting capability. The Department is reinforcing its commitment to established Alliances and Partnerships, while also expanding and deepening relationships with new partners who share our respect for sovereignty, fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law.
• Promotion of a Networked Region – The Department is strengthening and evolving U.S. Alliances and Partnerships into a networked security architecture to uphold the international rules-based order. The Department also continues to cultivate intra-Asian security relationships capable of deterring aggression, maintaining stability, and ensuring free access to common domains.
Advancing this Indo-Pacific vision requires an integrated effort that recognizes the critical linkages between economics, governance, and security – all fundamental components that shape the region’s competitive landscape. The Department of Defense, in partnership with other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies, regional institutions, and regional Allies and partners, will continue to diligently uphold a rules-based order that ensures peace and prosperity for all.”

Center for Strategic and International Studies. June 18, 2019, streaming video, 1:54:21.
“In July 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced $113 million for new economic and energy initiatives to flesh out the administration’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. These announcements included nearly $50 million for Asia EDGE, an initiative to promote energy security and develop energy markets, and $30 million for an initiative to boost infrastructure investment through financial and technical assistance to partner countries. Secretary Pompeo also voiced strong support for the BUILD Act, which is set to double the U.S. government’s development-finance capacity to $60 billion to support U.S. private investment in strategic opportunities abroad. Nearly one year later, what impact have these initiatives had for U.S. engagement in Southeast Asia?”

June 19, 2019, streaming video, 3:59:58.
“The annual CSIS-JETRO [Center for Strategic and International Studies-Japan External Trade Organization] conference, available for streaming.”

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2019).
“The global population of forcibly displaced increased by 2.3 million people in 2018. By the end of the year, almost 70.8 million individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict, violence, or human rights violations. As a result, the world’s forcibly displaced population remained yet again at a record high.”

Institute for Economics & Peace. (Sydney, Australia, Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019).
“This is the thirteenth edition of the ‘Global Peace Index’ (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace
(IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on peace, its economic value, trends, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace using three thematic domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to presenting the findings from the 2019 GPI, this year’s report includes analysis of trends in Positive Peace: the attitudes, institutions, and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. It looks at the relationship between the actual peace of a country, as measured by the GPI, and Positive Peace, and how a deficit of Positive Peace is often a predictor of future increases in violent conflict. It also looks at the dynamic relationship between changes in Positive Peace and changes in the economy."

Owen, Robert C. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
“This study is an assessment of whether the US Air Force (USAF) should anticipate modernizing its core theater airlift fleet with aircraft designed for super-short takeoffs or landings under rough-field conditions (SSTOL-RF) or aircraft designs focused on vertical takeoffs or landings (VTOL) with secondary SSTOL-RF capabilities (V/SSTOL-RF). Several considerations speak to the timeliness of this issue. Most importantly, the ongoing evolution of USAF and Army (USA) war-fighting concepts increase their demand for mobility and sustainment support in quantities and places that the aircraft in the present airlift fleet cannot provide. Also, the present mainstay of the theater airlift fleet, the C-130, has been an inadequate platform for vital missions for decades. It is too small to link effectively and efficiently with large intertheater airlifters, such as the C-5, C-17, and civil reserve air fleet (CRAF) jumbo cargo aircraft at intermediate staging bases. Also, the C-130’s runway requirements limit its ability to connect to battlefield airlift helicopters or deliver forces and sustainment at forward-most points of need and effect (PON/E) themselves. Intratheater airlift, consequently, is the weak link in the USAF’s ability to provide a smooth flow of air and land combat forces and their sustainment in the early stages of conflicts and crises. Finally, although the USAF has not published a formal plan for theater airlift modernization, most officials interviewed for this study suggested sometime in the 2040s as the window for the next aircraft to appear. Given the experience of the C-17 program, which took 19 years to move from development contract to the first squadron reaching initial operational capability, a program aimed at putting a squadron of future theater airlifters on line by the middle 2040s should begin sometime in the early 2020s. As a contribution to conceptualizing the best path to a modern theater airlift fleet, then, this study will assess the SSTOL-RF and V/SSTOL-RF design approaches in terms of their ability to fulfill critical USA and USAF requirements and their operational risk profiles.”

Weeden, Brian, and Victoria Samson. (Washington, DC: Secure World Foundation, 2019).
"SWF launched a project in the summer of 2017 to develop an open source assessment of global counterspace capabilities. The purpose of the project was to provide a public assessment of counterspace capabilities being developed by countries based on unclassified information. We hope doing so will increase public knowledge of these issues, the willingness of policymakers to discuss these issues openly, and involvement of other stakeholders in the debate. We convened a group of international experts to work with our staff to compile publicly-available information for various countries developing counterspace capabilities across several categories: direct ascent, co-orbital, directed energy, electronic warfare, and cyber. For each of these categories, we assessed what the current and near-term capabilities might be for the countries examined in the report, based on the open source information. We also assessed the potential military utility for each capability, which includes both the advantages and disadvantages of the capabilities. Finally, when possible, we also examined each country’s policy, doctrine, and budget to support the offensive counterspace capabilities being developed. Taken together, the analysis is intended to provide a more holistic picture of what each country is working on, and how these capabilities may be used."

Harrison, Todd, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Studies Aerospace Security Project, 2019).
“While the vulnerabilities of U.S. national security space systems are often discussed publicly, the progress other nations are making in counterspace systems is not as readily accessible. The purpose of this report is to review the open-source information available on the counterspace capabilities that can threaten U.S. space systems. It is intended to raise awareness and understanding of the threats, debunk myths and misinformation, and highlight areas in which senior leaders and policymakers should focus their attention. The report focuses on four specific countries that pose the greatest risk for the United States: China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. A fifth section analyzes the counterspace capabilities of select other countries, including some allies and partners of the United States, and some non-state actors.”

Harrison, Todd, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Studies Aerospace Security Project, 2019).

Podcast of the Office of Denmark’s Tech Ambassador. “TechPlomacy is an acknowledgement of the key role that technology and digitalisation plays and will increasingly play in the future for individuals and societies alike. It is also a recognition of the political and global influence that the tech-industry has in the 21st Century. Technology will contribute to solving some of the most acute global challenges and bring about a positive transformation with enormous potential for people around the world…Yet rapid developments in areas such as Artificial Intelligence, machine learning, Internet of Things and cyber security also raise fundamental issues as to the future of public policy, regulation and global governance. We need a stronger multi-stakeholder discussion on how we want these new technologies to shape our societies in the future. This requires us to rethink the relationship between governments, civil society and the private sector.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019).
“The Trump Administration is committed to advancing women’s equality, seeking to protect the rights of women and girls, and promoting women and youth empowerment programs. The United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS Strategy) responds to the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017, which President Donald J. Trump signed into law on October 6, 2017. This is the first legislation of its kind globally, which makes the United States the first country in the world with a comprehensive law on WPS, and de facto, the first with a whole-of-government strategy that responds to such a domestic law. The WPS Strategy recognizes the diverse roles women play as agents of change in preventing and resolving conflict, countering terrorism and violent extremism, and building post conflict peace and stability. The WPS Strategy seeks to increase women’s meaningful leadership in political and civic life by helping to ensure they are empowered to lead and contribute, equipped with the necessary skills and support to succeed, and supported to participate through access to opportunities and resources.”

Keene, Shima D. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“This monograph provides an assessment of the emerging threat posed by foreign jihadist fighters following the reduction in territory controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and recommends ways that the U.S. Army should address the issues highlighted.”

Ganguly, Samit, and M. Chris Mason. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“As global competition with an increasingly assertive Chinese Government expands, the strategic relationship between India and the United States is assuming ever-greater importance. From a superficial perspective, a strategic partnership seems to make a great deal of sense for both countries. Yet, enormous political, cultural, and structural obstacles remain between them, which continue to slow the progress in security cooperation to a crawl, relative to China’s economic and military advances. The authors explore these impediments frankly and suggest practical ways to build trust and establish confidence.”

Pyykönen, Juha, and Stefan Forss. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“With enhanced cooperation from the U.S. Army, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Nordic partner nations could combine efforts with each other and with the Alliance to deliver effective and visible regional deterrence against a resurgent Russia in the Nordic-Baltic region. This monograph by two leading Finnish defense academics explores the regional defense environment and optimum roles for the United States.”

Flanagan, Stephen J., et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“The authors of this report assess how unconventional defense plans and capabilities — to include total and comprehensive defense, societal resilience, and resistance strategies — being pursued by the governments of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (referred to as the Baltic states) can deter and counteract Russian hybrid aggression and military attacks in the Baltic region. They advance a framework for evaluating the utility of unconventional and total defense efforts at various phases of conflict for strengthening deterrence and defense. They identify military and civilian technologies that could enhance the effectiveness of these efforts, the cost of procuring those technologies, and possible tradeoffs with the development of conventional defense capabilities.”

Fox, Amos C. (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army, 2019).
“The fight for the Donetsk airport, hammered out through two distinct battles between May 2014 and January 2015, illustrates that violent battles of attrition still loom large in the modern wars of the Information Age. Additionally, the contest illustrates the lengths to which the Russian Federation is willing to go to maintain its strategic and operational interests in Ukraine. The battles serve as the sinew between Russia’s summer and winter offensives; these offensives were initiated to preserve Russia’s proxy forces—the Donetsk People’s Army and the Luhansk People’s Army—and to destroy Ukrainian offensive capabilities. Consequently, these battles were catalysts for the winter offensive’s decisiveness in the campaign. The struggle for the Donetsk airport illustrates Russia’s effectiveness in deploying forces from every corner of the Federation, rapidly training those forces and feeding them into battle. The conflict also served as excellent training ground for Russian tank, infantry and artillery formations, and, as part of a larger campaign, provided the opportunity for 47 percent of Russian land forces to gain indispensable combat experience—a point that must not be taken for granted. In the end, these battles resulted in a pulverized airport, in the Ukrainian army being blunted and defeated and in Russia being able to maintain access and influence in eastern Ukraine.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“This presentation presents a survey of open source metrics and data on the situation in Afghanistan in the spring of 2019. It focuses on the areas where it is possible to map and quantify current developments – recognizing that such indicators can only cover part of the complex issues involved. It does, however, present material that helps address three key challenges shaping Afghanistan’s future:
• The need to address all of the key threats involved in the war – including those generated by the Afghan government and U.S. actions.
• The fact that the U.S. now seems to be on the edge of making hard choices about staying, seeking a peace, or finding ways to withdraw even if a peace is not reached.
• A long list of critical uncertainties, only some of which can be addressed with any confidence.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Burke Chair at CSIS is issuing the first report in a three-part survey of metrics that address the fighting in Iraq and Syria, the ongoing challenge of extremism…Part One – ‘Daesh, Syria and Iraq’ – contained some 60 different metrics covering the trends in war on Daesh in Syria and Iraq, the outcome of the fighting, and the remaining threats to stability in Syria and Iraq.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Part Two…surveys the broader trends in Islam, and in Islamic extremism. It then focuses on these trends in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the scale of the continuing threat they pose to the stability of the MENA region.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Part Three…provides a series of metrics that measure the extent of civil unrest and instability by region and by country. The break-outs by country are critical to understanding the forces at work. The MENA region is often described as Arab – despite the existence of Israel – and as Muslim despite the presence of large Christian and other minorities in many states and the diverse nature of sects within Islam. As the maps in this section show, however, it consists of highly a diverse mix of nations with different neighbors, populations, political and economic conditions, and often major ethnic, regional, tribal, and sectarian differences. In practice, this makes national vulnerability to extremism and terrorism highly case specific, and involves intangibles that cannot be easily quantified, if at all. At the same time, there are many problems and issues in the civil structure of MENA states and other heavily Islamic states that can lead to political upheavals, extremism and terrorism, and civil conflict. The UN’s Arab Development Reports have long warned about these problems, and so have a wide variety of outside intelligence reports, and academic and think tanks studies.”

Council of Councils. (New York, NY: Council of Councils, an initiative of the Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
"Global think tank leaders grade the world's performance and prospects for 2019."

National Institute for Defense Studies. (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2019).
"The 'NIDS China Security Report' is published by the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS) to provide analysis conducted by its researchers on China’s military affairs and security from a mid- to long-term perspective. The report is widely disseminated both in Japan and overseas. Since March 2011 it has been published annually in Japanese, Chinese, and English editions. The 'NIDS China Security Report' has attracted significant interest from research institutions and the media in Japan and abroad, and the analysis offered in these reports has allowed NIDS to promote exchange and dialogue with research institutions and interested parties in a number of countries, including China. The 'China Security Report 2019,' the ninth in this series and subtitled 'China’s Strategy for Reshaping the Asian Order and Its Ramifications,' analyzes the content and outlook of China’s strategy for the international order. This report further analyzes the country’s strategy for a new international order in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific island countries, detailing the sort of influence that it exerts on each of those areas. In writing this report, the authors have endeavored to present an objective analysis while taking note of suggestions gained by exchanging opinions with researchers and stake-holders in Japan and abroad. The primary and secondary sources of information referred to for this report are listed in the endnotes."

Golley, Jane, et al. (eds.) (Canberra, Australia: Australian Centre on China in the World, Australian Centre on China in the World, 2019).
"In 2018, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was, by most measures, more powerful than at any other time in its history and had become one of the most powerful countries in the world. Its economy faced serious challenges, including from the ongoing ‘trade war’ with the U.S., but still ranked as the world’s second largest. Its Belt and Road Initiative, meanwhile, continued to carve paths of influence and economic integration across several continents. A deft combination of policy, investment, and entrepreneurship has also turned the PRC into a global ‘techno-power’. It aims, with a good chance of success, at becoming a global science and technology leader by 2049 – one hundred years from the founding of the PRC. In surveying the various ways in which the Party-state wields its hard, soft, and sharp power, the ‘China Story Yearbook: Power’ offers readers a sense of the diversity of power at work both in China and abroad. Citizens of the PRC have long negotiated the state’s influence; increasingly diaspora communities and other actors are now being subject to its might. As with previous editions in the series, we place important developments in historical context, and adopt a cross-disciplinary approach: it is our view that economy and politics cannot be divorced from culture, history, and society. The Yearbook provides accessible analysis of the main events and trends of the year and is an essential tool for understanding China’s growing power and influence around the world."

Engelke, Peter, and David Michel. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
"Himalayan Asia is a shorthand term referring to the Asian countries that depend on river water from the high mountain ranges of the Tibetan Plateau. As the rivers produced by the Himalayas and other mountain ranges on the Plateau are under increasingly serious pressure, water insecurity threatens much of the continent’s peace and security. Himalayan Asia’s transboundary water dynamics threaten to erode interstate cooperation, including among the continent’s major powers, risk worsening geopolitical competition, and heighten the odds of domestic and interstate conflict. Yet there are viable pathways for avoiding such outcomes, the most important of which treat water as a shared resource to be managed cooperatively. This report focuses on the intersection between Himalayan Asia’s changing ecology and the dynamic competition for geopolitical leadership among its major powers. It seeks to better inform U.S. strategies and policies to preclude the degradation of societal cohesion across Asia and prevent the outbreak of major-power conflict over shared water resources. The goal is to facilitate cooperative, positive-sum solutions to resource use in this critical region of the world."

Milevski, Lukas. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“In this monograph, Dr. Lukas Milevski examines the logic of grand strategy in practice, defined by its most basic building block—combining military and non-military power in war. He lays out competing visions of how to define grand strategy and why the aforementioned building block is the most fundamental. The monograph establishes the essential logic of military power through annihilation and exhaustion or attrition as well as through control of the opponent’s freedom of action. This baseline understanding of strategic action and effect in war allows an exploration of how the utility and meaning of non-military instruments change between peacetime and wartime and how they may contribute to the strategic effort and includes discussion of specific examples such as the U.S. interwar war plans and the Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear facilities. The author also links this combination to present-day Russian and Chinese attempts at mixing military and non-military power.”

Galvin, Thomas P., and Dale E. Watson (eds.) (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
"With a Foreword from MG John Kem, 51st Commandant of the U.S. Army War College. The 4th edition of the Strategic Leadership Primer represents a major change in direction from previous editions. In the past, one could assume most U.S. Army War College students had little prior experience at the strategic level. In 2019, this is no longer the case, as some War College students have already served in enterprise-level assignments or performed duties at the strategic level in operational environments. The new Primer includes chapters on defining strategic leadership; understanding competitive environments both external and internal to the organization, competitive strategy; the evolving roles, competencies, and character required of leaders at the strategic level; and the need for continuous and lifelong development. The Primer is applicable for all senior service college students and graduates--whether military or senior civilian, US or international."

Giles, Keir. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).
“Big data amplifies a classical problem of military leadership, namely, making critical decisions based on limited and often unreliable information. This monograph considers three leadership models that provide an alternative to an overreliance on technological solutions to address new challenges emerging at the various stages of the intelligence process.”

Hwang, Tim. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).
“How should the defense community best organize to combat modern campaigns of propaganda and disinformation? Without a broader strategic concept of the nature of the challenge posed by these techniques, current efforts and investments run the risk of simply chasing the latest tactics without establishing enduring security. This monograph offers a way forward, proposing a cohesive strategic framework for thinking about modern information warfare and its effective conduct.”

Troeder, Elizabeth G. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2019).
“This monograph provides an assessment of gray zone tactics used by the most active U.S. adversaries and builds the case for requiring U.S. Federal agencies to request that the Deputy National Security Advisor convene a National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) meeting whenever any Federal agency deems a gray zone approach to an international issue is appropriate. It also recommends that the United States should pursue the development of a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for gray zone solutions, with sub-NSC/PCCs for each component of the 4+1 (Russia, China, Iraq, North Korea, and violent extremist organizations) so that experts can be quickly assembled in times of crisis.”

Mienie, Edward, and C. A. Pfaff. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019).
“In August of 2017, Blackwater founder Erik Prince offered a plan for privatizing the war in Afghanistan, where he would replace the approximately 23,000 multinational forces (of which 15,000 are U.S. troops) and 27,000 contractors with 2,000 special forces and 6,000 security contractors who would embed with the Afghan National Army. Though the administration apparently rejected the plan at the time, multiple media outlets report there may be renewed interest, especially given the United States remains unable to resolve the conflict despite adopting a new, more aggressive strategy. Predictably, and justifiably, this interest has sparked a great deal of concern. Both former Secretary of Defense James Mattis and Chief of Staff John Kelly, in addition to a host of others, are reportedly opposed to the plan. With their departure, another opportunity to reconsider Prince’s proposal may arise.”

Task Force on Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
“At the request of Senator Martha McSally during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on March 14, 2019, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan pledged to form a team of experts to take a fresh look at specific issues involving sexual assault, with a focus on the investigative and accountability processes. To this end, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Sexual Assault Accountability and Investigation Task Force (SAAITF) to identify, evaluate, and recommend immediate and significant actions to improve the accountability process, specific to the investigation and disposition of cases in which members of the Armed Forces are either victims or alleged offenders of sexual assault, while ensuring due process for both. The SAAITF recognizes the significant military justice reform the Department has gone through since 2006 and, most recently, with the Military Justice Act of 2016 (MJA 16), fully implemented earlier this year… In light of recent reforms, the charge of the SAAITF was to develop bold recommendations for improvements to the military justice system in the areas of accountability, in particular commander and military justice practitioner responsibilities and authorities, comprehensive support to victims, and protection of rights for both the victim and the accused. The end result is specific and significant recommendations to help Commanders set command/organizational climate, enhance victim support, and ensure fair and just support for the accused, to include:
• Improving the ability of the commander to set appropriate command climate by identifying sexual harassment as a ‘stand alone’ military crime vice being addressed under broader charges that do not highlight the severity of these behaviors
• Improving support to the victim by providing additional information and assistance throughout the process, including more consistent and regular updates and notifications
• Providing a dedicated investigation capability for defense counsel to help them defend accused Service members.”

Office of the Secretary of Defense. (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2019).
“China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a ‘period of strategic opportunity’ during the initial two decades of the 21st century to develop domestically and expand China’s ‘comprehensive national power.’ Over the coming decades, they are focused on realizing a powerful and prosperous China that is equipped with a ‘world-class’ military, securing China’s status as a great power with the aim of emerging as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. In 2018, China continued harnessing an array of economic, foreign policy, and security tools to realize this vision. Ongoing state-led efforts, which China implements both at home and abroad and which often feature economic and diplomatic initiatives, also support China’s security and military objectives.”

Chatzky, Andrew, and James McBride. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious infrastructure investment effort in history. But is it also a plan to remake the global balance of power?”

United States Institute of Peace. April 25, 2019, streaming video, 3:10:57.
“China hosted its second Belt and Road Forum in Beijing on April 26-27, two years after hosting its inaugural forum that was attended by dozens of world leaders and put a spotlight on Beijing’s massive signature initiative and its global leadership ambitions. Now in its sixth year, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—which Chinese President Xi Jinping has called the 'project of the century'—has been welcomed by countries seeking Chinese investment and loans. But it has also raised significant concerns about the sustainability of and intentions behind the initiative. Join the U.S. Institute of Peace for a conference that will look at the impact of China’s signature connectivity initiative on peace and security."

Feng Yujun, et al. (Beijing: Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy, 2019).
“Despite the BRI’s prevalence in discussions of China’s global engagement, many experts are divided on how to interpret it. Is it a global strategy or just an interregional initiative? How can countries and international companies participate in its growth and development?”

"Dollar and Sense" podcast from Brookings. April 29, 2019, streaming audio, 0:25:08.
"Deborah Brautigam, director of the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, joins Senior Fellow David Dollar to discuss China's Belt and Road Initiative and its implications for Africa. Brautigam and Dollar address the scale of Chinese financing in Africa and around the world, debt-trap diplomacy, labor issues, and much more."

"Promoting research, conducting evidence-based analysis, fostering collaboration, and training future leaders to better understand the economic and political dimensions of China-Africa relations and their implications for human security and global development."

Center for Strategic and International Studies Global Infrastructure Task Force. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"Over the next 15 years, more hard infrastructure is projected to be built around the world than currently exists. This global build-out is already underway, and the changes it brings will only accelerate. Infrastructure projects, especially in the transport, energy, information and communications technology (ICT), and water sectors, have long been recognized as the backbone of modern economies. Going forward, emerging digital infrastructure, including fifth-generation (5G) networks, remote sensing, and other advanced technologies, will be especially critical. As our infrastructure is transformed, so will be the economies it fuels, the regions it connects, and the global commons it underpins. These trends are too powerful and potentially beneficial for the United States to stop, and too consequential to ignore."

Dasewicz, Agnes, et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
"The launch of the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (USDFC) in October 2019 is an extraordinary opportunity to accelerate capital flows into emerging and frontier markets in support of U.S. national security, development, and commercial objectives. The new agency is inheriting a fundamentally solid foundation to build upon from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). However, it would represent a tremendous missed opportunity if the USDFC merely replicated OPIC’s activities at a higher volume. This is especially the case for infrastructure finance, the sector where USDFC has the greatest potential to have impact. To help ensure success at scale, we recommend the USDFC:
A. Focus on fast-growing emerging market urban clusters by organizing investment opportunities around building Smart Cities.
B. Respond to unmet power needs by investing aggressively in both hard and soft energy infrastructure and technology.
C. Help close the digital divide with soft infrastructure investments."

Parton, Charles. (London, UK: Royal United Services Institute, 2019).
"This Occasional Paper seeks to outline the likely extent of the Chinese Communist Party's interference activities in the UK and to make some recommendations on what needs to be done to counter them."

Singer, Peter Warren. (Washington, DC: New America, 2019).
"Robots, artificial intelligence, cyberwar, 3D printing, bio-enhancements, and a new geopolitical competition; the 21st century is being shaped by a range of exciting, and scary, new trends and technologies. We should also expect them to shape the worlds of insurgency and terrorism. The following report will first explore the technologic changes that loom in the years leading toward 2030 and beyond, and then propose a series of their potential implications for conflict."

This Library Alert focuses on Europe, for two reasons. First, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization recently had its seventh anniversary. Second, the recent Brexit extension. Brexit is a major geopolitical and geoeconomic event. As such, a succinct selection of resources from American and British think tanks is provided. Brexit is also a very fluid event. As such, some resources included may be slightly but not wholly dated by the fast pace of events.

Schroeder, Wayne A. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019).
“As NATO reaches its seventieth anniversary in 2019, the Alliance is facing new challenges both externally and internally. The reemergence of Russia as a strategic threat has led to the reexamination of NATO’s warfighting capabilities and the gaps that exist to adequately defend and deter. At the same time, both renewed US focus and the emergence of new security threats have placed increased pressure on member states to reach established spending targets. The need to outfit and equip NATO for great power competition, as well as increased pressure to invest more in defense, provides an opportunity to strengthen NATO for the future. Yet the path forward is still unclear. What investments should be prioritized in the land, air, maritime, space and cyber domains? And how should the Alliance’s nuclear deterrent be modernized? In ‘NATO at Seventy: Filling NATO’s Critical Defense-Capability Gaps’ Atlantic Council nonresident senior fellow Dr. Wayne A. Schroeder offers a comprehensive menu of options for the Alliance to shape its investments in these critical areas and ensure that NATO retains its fighting mindset well past its seventieth anniversary in 2019. The report features a foreword by Air Marshall Sir Chris Harper KBE, former director general of the International Military staff at NATO (2013-16)."

The German Marshall Fund of the United States YouTube page, 18 videos
"On April 3-4, NATO’s founding date, Allied foreign ministers convened in Washington, DC to commemorate achievements over the last seven decades, address the challenges facing the Alliance today, and highlight its enduring value and mission going forward."

Atlantic Council. April 12, 2019, streaming video, 1:02:25. Program begins about 09:11.
“Much uncertainty remains regarding Brexit and the future relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom. At the same time, European citizens and businesses need clarity and expect vision. In this light, Vice President Dombrovskis will join the Atlantic Council for a very timely discussion on the future of the European Union. More specifically, he will explain the EU’s preparedness for different Brexit scenarios, including in the area of financial services. He will share his views about regulatory cooperation for global financial markets, sustainable finance, and will reflect on the international role of the Euro. Furthermore, he will preview what’s at stake at the European elections in May, possible foreign influence on the elections - and how they might be affected by populist discourse.”

Wemer, David A. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 12, 2019).

Roberts, John M. (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, April 11, 2019).

Chatham House. April 4, 2019, streaming audio, 1:07:47.
“The panellists assess the future of the Atlantic alliance with a particular focus on Britain’s relationship with NATO. To what extent, if any, will Brexit reshape the power dynamics between NATO member states? With 80 per cent of the alliance’s defence spending expected to come from non-EU members, is the EU at risk of getting sidelined in meaningful strategic conversations moving forward? And how should Britain – which played a leading role in creating NATO in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War – respond to uncertainty about NATO’s future?”

Chatham House. February 14, 2019, streaming audio, 22:35.
“Debating the challenges of a new international economic order including the de-liberalization of international trade and the potential impacts of Brexit on the Japan-UK partnership.”

Chatham House. January 30, 2019, streaming audio, 59:25.
“Considering the recent divergence of UK and US policies in international affairs, our panel assesses the present state of the US-UK relationship and its future trajectory.”

Conley, Heather A., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The Kremlin has developed a pattern of malign influence across Europe. It does so through the cultivation of ‘an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making.’ This network of political and economic connections—an ‘unvirtuous’ cycle of influence—thrives on corruption and the exploitation of governance gaps in key markets and institutions. Ultimately, the aim is to weaken and destroy democratic systems from within. There has been a visible political awakening to the national security threat posed by this widespread and insidious Russian malign influence since 2016. From the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 to strengthened anti-money laundering rules in the European Union, the transatlantic community has taken some steps to address this threat. But to truly eradicate this threat, Western democracies must acknowledge their enablement of malign economic influence and uproot it from their financial systems.”

McCarthy, Michael C., Matthew A. Moyer, and Brett H. Venable. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The United States lacks a cohesive strategy to deter Russian aggression. Despite being militarily and economically inferior, Russia has undermined the United States and its allies by exploiting the ‘gray zone,’ or the conceptual space between war and peace where nations compete to advance their national interests. In dealing with Russia, the United States must shift its strategic framework from a predominantly military-centric model to one that comprises a whole-of-government approach. The holistic approach must leverage a combination of diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) measures. In this timely and prescient monograph, three active duty military officers and national security fellows from the Harvard Kennedy School look to address this contemporary and complex problem. Through extensive research and consultation with some of the nation’s and academia’s foremost experts, the authors offer policymakers a menu of strategic options to deter Russia in the gray zone and protect vital U.S. national security interests.”

Hunzeker, Michael A., and Alexander Lanoszka. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) face daunting challenges in the Baltic region. Russia is behaving aggressively. Its military is more capable than it has been at any point since the end of the Cold War. More importantly, Russia is finding creative ways to subvert the status quo and to sow discord without triggering Article 5 of NATO, which declares that an attack against one member is an attack against all. These problems are formidable, but we have reason to be optimistic. Far from shattering NATO’s cohesion and undermining its resolve, Russian aggression has reinvigorated the alliance. Nor is Russia an unstoppable adversary. It has many weaknesses. Indeed, Russian fears over those vulnerabilities might be driving its aggressive foreign policy. Even if this is not the case and Russia is indeed a relentless predator, it is nevertheless a vulnerable one. The United States and its NATO allies can take advantage of these vulnerabilities. After assessing Russian intentions, capabilities, and limitation, this monograph recommends a hedging strategy to improve early detection capabilities, enhance deterrence in unprovocative ways, and improve regional defenses against a hybrid threat. Achieving these goals should help the United States deter Russia and reassure regional allies more effectively while managing our own worst fears.”

Caton, Jeffrey L. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“In 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the DoD Cyber Strategy which explicitly calls for a comprehensive strategy to provide credible deterrence in cyberspace against threats from key state and nonstate actors. To be effective, such activities must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence efforts in the physical realm, especially those of near-peers impacting critical global regions such as China in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia in Europe. It is important for the U.S. Army to identify and plan for any unique roles that they may provide to these endeavors. This study explores the evolving concept of deterrence in cyberspace in three major areas:
• First, the monograph addresses the question: What is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace? The discussion includes an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence found in professional literature.
• Second, it examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in cyberspace deterrence? This section provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the deterrence efforts in cyberspace as well as in the broader context of strategic deterrence. The section also addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict.
• Third, the monograph provides recommendations for changing or adapting the DoD and Army responsibilities to better define and implement the evolving concepts and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic domain of cyberspace.”

Zacharias, Greg. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
"In 'Autonomous Horizons,' Dr. Greg Zacharias, Chief Scientist of the United States Air Force 2015–18, explores next steps in autonomous systems (AS) development, fielding, and training. Rapid advances in AS development and artificial intelligence (AI) research will change how we think about machines, whether they are individual vehicle platforms or networked enterprises. The payoff will be considerable, affording us significant protection for our Airmen, greater effectiveness in employment, and unlimited opportunities for novel and disruptive concepts of operations. Autonomous Horizons identifies issues and makes recommendations for the Air Force to take full advantage of this transformational technology."

Caudill, Shannon W. (ed.) (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2019).
“Defending air bases from attack remains a major operational challenge in every theater and every conflict. Airfields are strategic targets; they allow for the generation and projection of crucial military power and are usually a key joint and/or coalition command and control node. The growing problem of adversary antiaccess and area-denial strategies only adds to the necessity of studying integrated base defense, with special emphasis on ground-based threats. Since the Vietnam War, ground-based threats have been our biggest challenge as adversaries have sought to counter US airpower from the ground rather than in the air. Future conflicts will continue to see enemy strategies designed to inhibit air operations from a distance through not only growing missile technologies but also traditional methods like indirect fire, special operations, and sapper attacks…Since AU Press released ‘Defending Air Bases in an Age of Insurgency’ in May 2014, there has been a groundswell of support for a second project designed to add more depth and fill gaps in the literature. The first volume essentially bridged the gap in the literature that existed since the last publication on this subject in 1995. This second project examines more current topics like base defense in AirSea Battle (renamed the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons), modern air support for base defense, counter-intelligence enablers, and commander responsibilities for air base defense. Further, it offers a more focused assessment of base defense in the Afghanistan theater of operation, projected technological advances in base defense, and unique air base defense challenges found in the beginning (getting in) and ending of conflicts (getting out). This volume also presents new research based on Colonel Caudill’s Air Command and Staff College base defense research elective, featuring a research partnership with the Air Force Historical Research Agency.”

Pompeo, Michael R. (Washington, DC: US State Department, 2018).
“The Department of State prepared this report using information from U.S. embassies and consulates abroad, foreign government officials, nongovernmental and international organizations, jurists and legal experts, journalists, academics, labor activists, and published reports. U.S. diplomatic missions abroad prepared the initial drafts of the individual country reports. Once the initial drafts of the individual country reports were completed by U.S. missions abroad, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), in cooperation with other Department of State offices with the relevant country and regional expertise, reviewed and edited the reports, drawing on its own sources of information and the Department of Labor. Bureau officers also consulted experts in the Department of State and elsewhere on worker rights, refugee issues, police and security issues, women’s issues, and legal matters, among many others. The guiding principles were that all information be reported objectively, thoroughly, and fairly. DRL, working with other Department offices as necessary, also ensured that all reports followed the same methodology and conformed to standard format and structure.”

Runde, Daniel F., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“The fourth industrial revolution is underway, and technological changes will disrupt economic systems, displace workers, concentrate power and wealth, and erode trust in public institutions and the democratic political process. Up until now, the focus has largely been on how technology itself will impact society, with little attention being paid to the role of institutions. The relationship between societies and their institutions is changing, and countries will have to strengthen their capacities to avoid heightened social divisions. They must build resilience through gradual and intentional interventions designed for long-term, sustainable development. It is also essential that institutions work hard to build credibility and use available development tools, such as development finance institutions and foreign aid, to mitigate the risks of disruption. Countries and other stakeholders must pioneer these initiatives to successfully navigate the disruptions stemming from the fourth industrial revolution. The revision of existing models of education, skill development and investment and the integration of different stakeholders into the conversation will be critical in helping institutions play a productive role in rebooting the innovation agenda. This new report, ‘Rebooting the Innovation Agenda,’ analyzes the need for resilient institution and the role they are expected to play in the fourth industrial revolution.”

Roberts, Thomas G. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
“Over 60 years ago, the Soviet Union used a derivative of its R-7 rocket—often called the world's first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)—to launch an artificial satellite into orbit, marking the first orbital space launch from the spaceport now known as the Baikonur Cosmodrome. Since then, launch vehicles have reached orbit from 27 spaceports around the world. With the rate of space launches projected to grow exponentially in the coming years, spaceports will become an increasingly important and potentially limiting factor in the global space industry. This report analyzes ground-based space launches from 1957 to 2018, including brief histories of all active and inactive orbital spaceports, 10 year launch records for the 22 spaceports still in use today, and the current status of several proposals to create new facilities capable of supporting orbital space launches. Ground-based spaceports are typically built in geopolitically favorable locations. Many spaceports are located in the most physically optimal regions available to operators, with geographic characteristics that include close proximity to the equator, opportunities for eastward or near-eastward launch, and favorable environmental factors. Historically, orbital space launch operations have been closely tied with ballistic missile research, leading several ICBM development and testing centers to later become spaceports. Due to the political risk associated with both missile development and orbital space launch testing, several spaceports were originally created such that their precise positions could remain ambiguous. In at least one case, a spaceport was created with the intention of being entirely secret—with its operator denying its existence for more than 15 years.”

Parello-Plesner, Jonas. (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2019).
“The EU’s current policy toward China needs to be updated to reflect the country’s continued authoritarian turn and to better secure European interests. China is no longer, as it still claims, a developing country; it has a clear plan for a strong global leadership role. It impacts the EU and its member states in many areas, from trade to technology to military matters. Reflecting that reality, there are important ways in which EU policy can be improved. On economic relations, the EU has moved toward demanding reciprocity but it needs enforcement on China’s subsidies and technology transfers. On technology and the issue of 5G, a standard that will become the backbone of the EU’s digital economy and democracy, a joint European approach is needed to avoid dependence on authoritarian China. More broadly, the EU’s policy needs a health check in many areas, including science cooperation that can benefit China’s military advancement and surveillance repression at home; academic, media and cultural relations where China can affect freedoms in the EU; and Chinese interference in European politics. For the EU, it is no longer only a question of trying to promote human rights in China, but of defending its values at home. And, ultimately, a stronger EU policy depends on the difficult task of getting buy-in by all member states.”

Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“This report analyzes the current character of competition between the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and examines how culture impacts the ways the services posture themselves to gain resources, authorities, access, and influence.
The report identifies cultural characteristics, primary goals, and competitive strategies exhibited by the military services and USSOCOM. Further, it explores the current modalities of competition and tactics of competition employed by each service. The authors evaluate whether the cultures of the services have changed substantively over time and whether the services wield as much influence as they did before the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Finally, the authors assess how each service might adapt and respond if it faced major policy shifts in the future, focusing specifically on contingencies in China and North Korea. The authors make three essential arguments: First, service personalities are alive and well. They endure, but they also evolve slowly to allow adaptation to the present environment. Second, post–Goldwater-Nichols, services remain the most powerful organizational actors in national defense. However, their relative edge over the Office of the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands, and the Joint Staff has decreased, leading to a more complex field of competition. Third, this complexity introduced by Goldwater-Nichols has created changes to the character of competition in the national security arena. The relevant actors have expanded to include elevated roles for the Marine Corps and USSOCOM, and the tactics and arenas of competition have changed.”

Zimmerman, S. Rebecca, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2019).
“Army enlisted service is an enduring American tradition. Men and women, often recent high school graduates, leave home to serve their country and experience the challenges of Basic Combat Training and the camaraderie of life on a military base. But there is much more to Army service than the outlines with which most Americans are familiar. A separate RAND Arroyo Center report details the service experiences of 81 junior enlisted soldiers across many similar topics. The objective of this report is to provide deeper insight into the junior enlisted experience in a way that is accessible to policymakers and senior Army leaders, junior leaders, recruiters, and individuals considering an Army career. This volume goes beyond the archetypes and bumper stickers to tell the stories of six soldiers in their own words. In these chapters, readers learn about their decisions to join the Army, the joys and frustrations of their jobs, and their considerations for the future. The narratives identify some leadership behaviors that support soldier success and others that make soldiers' lives more difficult. The interviews have been edited for clarity and readability, and some details changed to protect soldiers' confidentiality; otherwise, these words are theirs alone, with a few opening and concluding thoughts from the authors to capture key lessons.”

Galvin, Thomas P. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Strategic communication has come to be a popular term to describe the process by which U.S. military organizations managed and unified their planned communications efforts. Unfortunately, joint doctrine leaves many of the words associated with strategic communication undefined, including themes and messages, and "strategic communication" has long suffered from definitional problems. While many commentators and experts have criticized the shortcomings of U.S. communication efforts, especially in operational environments, very little attention has been given to documenting success stories that suggest tools that leaders can use to design and implement campaigns. This book details two case studies of successful strategic communication campaigns—the Multi-Year Roadmap in Stabilization Force-Bosnia and the creation of the U.S. Africa Command. Both campaigns began in environments unfavorable to the commanders and their organizations but, in both cases, the campaign helped turn perceptions of the command into a more favorable light. The book concludes by drawing on the facts of the two cases to present a general architecture for communication campaigns applicable in both enterprise and operational contexts.”

Giles, Keir. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, alarmed not only Western-leaning states in Central Europe and the Baltic but also Moscow’s traditional allies. These events signaled that Moscow is now willing and capable of using direct military force against perceived strategic threats in its self-proclaimed region of vested interests. With the exception of Ukraine and the Baltic States, this Letort Paper examines how Russia’s front-line states have adjusted their foreign policy posture since 2014. Belarus, Moldova, the states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus calculate the benefits and risks in their relationship with Moscow and either make concessions or strengthen their defenses accordingly to avoid triggering a Russian reaction. This Letort Paper provides a range of policy recommendations intended to maximize the opportunities of a new alignment with the West for these states while minimizing the risk of Russia, using again, those capabilities it has demonstrated in Ukraine and Syria.”

Crane, Conrad C., Michael E Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“The establishment of Army Futures Command (AFC) in August 2018 was the most significant change to the Institutional Army in a generation, and it signaled the value the Army placed on studying the future. While the establishment of a new four star headquarters might be seen as a bold move, it was in reality the culmination of 30 years of future development in the Army. Those three decades saw the development of numerous structures designed to examine the potential for future concepts and technology, with uneven success. The processes were good, but technological overreach, and over 20 years of war in the Middle East, doomed most efforts to put useful concepts into practice. Army visionaries such as Generals William E. DePuy and Donn A. Starry had planned for the future as early as the 1970s with an eye on the past, and initiated the programs and doctrine necessary to transform and modernize the Army following Vietnam.”

Crane, Conrad C., Michael E Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,’ provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. ‘Riding the Hydra,’ however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war. When President George W. Bush made the decision to launch the war in Iraq, the Army faced a two-front war for the first time since World War II. Though the Army in 2002 was much better trained, equipped, and ready than its predecessor sixty years before, it still showed the effects of declining budgets and lack of strategic focus. The modern, professional Army requires bureaucratic processes in order to coordinate a complex and highly sophisticated system. The defense budgets have declined over the years, but they remain as much as 14 percent of the total federal budget. Managing those funds properly and legally requires a system of firm controls.”

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“This study analyzes the initial entry training programs for Army inductees for the last 100 years, to identify the patterns that have shaped that training. Technology has changed over the years, and training has adapted, but technological change has been a less important factor than the oscillation between wartime and peacetime methodologies. Changes in technology have not changed the core functions in which the Army trains its new Soldiers: lethality and survivability. The unvarying trend for the last century shows an increase in lethality and survivability skills after the nation enters combat, often learning harsh lessons. As soon as the conflict ends, however, the training emphasis reflexively moves back toward garrison-type activities. The length of initial entry or Basic Combat Training (BCT) has also waxed and waned over the years, ranging from as long as 17 weeks (1943) (not including OSUT) to as short as 8 weeks (1980). There were always external factors that affected the amount of training time available, such as budgets, force structure, institutional infrastructure, and end strength. This study focuses largely, however, on how the Army used the time allotted. The analysis focuses primarily on infantry skills, but also examines other training where necessary for clarity. (Non-infantry, especially sustainment MOSs, have traditionally received less marksmanship training.) The unifying concept is that all initial entry-training categories have remained the same for Soldiers throughout the period, while time spent on each category has fluctuated. Soldiers received different training in specialties.”

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). This case study examines the political, economic, military, and strategic environment in the years between 1945 and 1950 to illustrate the complexity of the readiness issue. Readiness in the strategic context concerned many more issues than simply personnel status or equipment availability.”

Smith, Dan, et al. (The Hague: Clingendael - Netherlands Institute of International Relations and SIPRI [Stockholm International Peace Research Institute], 2019).
“Climate-related events left no region unaffected in 2018. These events demonstrate how climate change impacts are worsening. Despite increased geopolitical tensions that seem to undermine the Agenda 2030 or the Paris Agreement, global and regional organisations have been able to achieve some progress in addressing and mitigating climate-related security risks. This report, prepared for the Planetary Security Conference taking place in The Hague on 19-20 February 2019, feeds into the conversation by sketching the past year’s trends in relation to climate and security.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019).
“Continued American leadership in Artificial Intelligence is of paramount importance to maintaining the economic and national security of the United States.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2019).

Rayburn, Joel D., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War’ is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to ‘surge’ additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the ‘surge’ and its aftermath in the second volume.
This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of hand-picked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,’ represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.”

Rayburn, Joel D., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).

Fitzsimmons, Michael. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
"Scenario planning should be one of the Pentagon’s most important tools for developing strategy for an uncertain future. However, the formalized joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development—Support for Strategic Analysis—has faced many challenges over the past 2 decades, and has ultimately proven less influential than intended on strategic decision-making. Explaining why is the main purpose of this monograph. It argues that scenario analysis has been most effective in supporting capability and program development, while it has fallen short in shaping strategy and force structure. The reasons for this are numerous and are rooted in intrinsic, structural characteristics of decision-making in large organizations. The monograph concludes with several recommendations for rejuvenating scenario planning in the Pentagon."

Galvin, Thomas P. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Traditional approaches to strategic communication have focused on a single leader's ability to influence stakeholders and other audiences through exceptional communication skills. But there is much more to it. What about the content of the message? How well does the message permeate the organization, allowing it to speak and act as one with the leader? Is it necessary to change minds, or is it sufficient to discredit opposing messages? Using a broad base of literature from organizational studies and the author's experiences, this monograph offers a thought process for building communication campaigns that focus both internally and externally to the organization. Includes a Foreword by Mari K. Eder, U.S. Army Major General Retired and author of ‘Leading the Narrative: The Case for Strategic Communication.’”

Caton, Jeffrey L. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“Cyberspace operations have become pervasive in the United States, and they enable many aspects of modern life for the average citizen, such as entertainment, communication, education, transportation, banking, and voting. The continuing development of the U.S. Army and Department of Defense (DoD) Reserve component cyberspace units can leverage the capabilities and experience of industry and academia to help protect critical information infrastructure and enhance national security. What opportunities and challenges surround the integration of these forces into a still-evolving joint cyberspace force?”

Caton, Jeffrey L. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The first 7 years of U.S. Cyber Command operations are paved with milestones that mark the steady operationalization of modern cyberspace as the newest domain of military conflict as well as a realm of international power. The creation of the Cyber Mission Force and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber are significant steps toward improving the timeliness and effectiveness of cyberspace operations that directly support combatant commands and the whole-of-government responses to cyberspace threats. It focuses on the central question: “What is the context in which different military services approach cyberspace component operations internally as well as with the Department of Defense?”

Bunker, Robert J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“This monograph focuses on an understudied, but yet a critically important and timely component of land warfare, related to the battlefield use of chemical weapons by contemporary threat forces. It will do so by focusing on two case studies related to chemical weapons use in Syria and Iraq by the Assad regime and the Islamic State. Initially, the monograph provides an overview of the chemical warfare capabilities of these two entities; discusses selected incidents of chemical weapons use each has perpetrated; provides analysis and lessons learned concerning these chemical weapons incidents, their programs, and the capabilities of the Assad regime and the Islamic State; and then presents U.S. Army policy and planning considerations on this topical areas of focus. Ultimately, such considerations must be considered vis-à-vis U.S. Army support of Joint Force implementation of National Command Authority guidance.”

Munich Security Conference Foundation. (Munich, Germany: Munich Security Conference Foundation, 2019).
“Looking at the current state of international affairs it is difficult to escape the feeling that the world is not just witnessing a series of smaller and bigger crises. Rather, the entire liberal international order appears to be falling apart – nothing will we be as it once was. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the global security landscape has never been more dangerous. We are experiencing an epochal shift, as one era is coming to an end, and for now only rough outlines of a new geopolitical age are visible. Although some states are committed to maintaining the liberal international order, it is questionable whether they – often distracted by other domestic and foreign policy challenges – are able to assume this role…This year's report analyses the reshuffling of core pieces of the international order. Besides looking at major powers like the United States, China and Russia, the report also highlights actors of the 'second row': liberal democracies such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. In addition, the report assesses current security policy developments in selected regions such as in the Western Balkans, in the Sahel region and in the Middle East. It examines the global challenge to arms control against the background of the recently suspended INF Treaty and emerging technologies such as hypersonic weapons. Other global issues covered are the security policy implications of current developments in the areas of international trade, transnational organized crime and artificial intelligence.”

Trump, Donald J. (Washington, DC: The White House, 2018).
“The growth in terrorists’ capabilities and aspirations and the spread of dual-use technology have made the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism progressively more acute, requiring a comprehensive strategy to defend the United States and its interests…The National Strategy for Countering WMD Terrorism is designed to achieve a set of strategic objectives whose common purpose is to greatly reduce the probability that extremist groups and individuals will conduct attacks using WMD. These objectives consist of the following:
- The agents, precursors, and materials needed to acquire WMD are placed beyond the reach of terrorists and other malicious non-state actors, and the global quantity of WMD and related materials is reduced.
- States and individuals are deterred from providing support to would-be WMD terrorists.
- An effective architecture is in place to detect and defeat terrorist WMD networks.
- United States defenses against WMD terrorism are strengthened, and state, local, tribal, and territorial preparedness to contend with WMD threats is enhanced.
- The United States is able to identify and respond to technological trends that may enable terrorist development, acquisition, or use of WMD.”

Defense Intelligence Agency. (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019).
“Chinese leaders characterize China’s long-term military modernization program as essential to achieving great power status. Indeed, China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, which at times may be antithetical to U.S. interests. With a deeper understanding of the military might behind Chinese economic and diplomatic efforts, we can provide our own national political, economic, and military leaders the widest range of options for choosing when to counter, when to encourage, and when to join with China in actions around the world. This report offers insights into the modernization of Chinese military power as it reforms from a defensive, inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security responsibilities to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary, and power-projecting arm of Chinese foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe.”

Stares, Paul B. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“Each year since 2008, the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action (CPA) has asked foreign policy experts to rank thirty ongoing or potential conflicts based on their likelihood of occurring or escalating in the next year and their potential impact on U.S. national interests. ‘The annual Preventive Priorities Survey is unique in providing a regular, forward-looking assessment of conflict and instability around the world in a way that helps policymakers focus attention on the most important risks,’ explains Paul B. Stares, General John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and CPA director.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2019).
“The Center for Preventive Action's (CPA) Global Conflict Tracker is an interactive guide to ongoing conflicts around the world of concern to the United States. The interactive covers nearly thirty conflicts with background information and resources on each conflict.”

World Economic Forum. (Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2019).
“‘The Global Risks Report 2019’ is published against a backdrop of worrying geopolitical and geo-economic tensions. If unresolved, these tensions will hinder the world’s ability to deal with a growing range of collective challenges, from the mounting evidence of environmental degradation to the increasing disruptions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. The report presents the results of our latest Global Risks Perception Survey, in which nearly 1,000 decision-makers from the public sector, private sector, academia and civil society assess the risks facing the world. Nine out of 10 respondents expect worsening economic and political confrontations between major powers this year. Over a ten-year horizon, extreme weather and climate-change policy failures are seen as the gravest threats. This year’s report includes another series of ‘what-if’ Future Shocks that examine quantum computing, weather manipulation, monetary populism, emotionally responsive artificial intelligence and other potential risks. The theme of emotions is also addressed in a chapter on the human causes and effects of global risks; the chapter calls for greater action around rising levels of psychological strain across the world.”

Poling, Gregory B. (Washington: DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019)
“Unseen fishing activity. Maritime militias in the Spratlys. Fishers have often been overlooked in the South China Sea disputes. CSIS, in cooperation with Vulcan, Inc., unveils a worrying narrative about the impact fishers and their fleets have in the region.”

Lamb, Zachary. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
"In the seven years since protesters in Syria first demonstrated against the four-decade rule of the Assad family, hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and some twelve million people—more than half the country’s pre-war population—have been displaced. The country has descended into an ever-more-complex civil war: Jihadis promoting a Sunni theocracy eclipsed many opposition forces fighting for a democratic and pluralistic Syria. Regional powers backed various local forces to advance their geopolitical interests on Syrian battlefields. The United States has been at the fore of a coalition conducting air strikes on the self-proclaimed Islamic State, while Turkey, a U.S. ally, has invaded in part to prevent Kurdish forces, the United States’ main local partner in the fight against the Islamic State, from linking up their autonomous cantons. Russia too has carried out air strikes in Syria, coming to the Assad regime’s defense, while Iranian forces and their Hezbollah allies have done the same on the ground. After a long stalemate, regime forces and their foreign backers have turned the tide in Assad’s favor, capturing two of the last major rebel enclaves, in east Aleppo and the Damascus suburbs. But Syria likely faces years of instability to come. Assad has never been willing to negotiate his way out of power, but his continued rule is unacceptable to millions of Syrians, particularly given the barbarity civilians have faced. Meanwhile, the foreign forces on which he relies will continue to wield power. In the north, Kurds will be unlikely to cede their hard-won autonomy, and the near defeat of the Islamic State has led to a scramble for territory liberated in the country’s east."

McBride, James, and Sabine Baumgartner. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“The world in 2018 experienced many extreme weather events, from debilitating blizzards to raging wildfires to powerful hurricanes. They underscore the mounting costs and disruptions of changing climate patterns, experts say. While climate researchers agree that human-produced greenhouse gases have driven the increase in global temperatures, they say climate change is likely to impact specific regions in different ways. However, the global scientific consensus is that climbing temperatures, rising sea levels, and shifting atmospheric dynamics are already raising the probability that extreme weather events will be more frequent, more severe, and more deadly. Four notable trends made themselves felt in 2018.
I. Wide Temperature Swings and a Changing Jet Stream
II. Prolonged Heatwaves and Intensifying Wildfires
III. Rising Ocean Temperatures, Intensifying Storms
IV. Drought, Crop Failure, and Famine”

“This BAMS special report presents assessments of how human-caused climate change may have affected the strength and likelihood of individual extreme events. The U.S. Northern Plains and East Africa droughts of 2017, floods in South America, China and Bangladesh, and heatwaves in China and the Mediterranean were all made more likely by human-caused climate change, according to new research published today in the ‘Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society’ (BAMS). The seventh edition of the report, ‘Explaining Extreme Events in 2017 from a Climate Perspective,’ also included analyses of ocean heat events, including intense marine heatwaves in the Tasman Sea off of Australia in 2017 and 2018 that were ‘virtually impossible’ without human-caused climate change. Also included are analyses of Australian fires and Uruguay flooding. This is the second year that scientists have identified extreme weather events that they said could not have happened without warming of the climate through human-induced climate change.”

Council on Foreign Relations. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2018).
“For two decades, the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have been the epicenter of the deadliest conflict since World War II. Part of a vast country straddling the heart of Central Africa, the eastern Congo continues to defy efforts at pacification. As the conflict has morphed from a regional war to a series of tenacious local insurgencies, the civilians caught in the middle have paid the steepest price. In addition to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, continued instability in sub-Saharan Africa’s largest country by area has strategic implications for the entire region. The DRC’s vast natural resources hold great potential but also complicate efforts at peace. The eastern Congo’s minerals power the world’s consumer electronics, and the country’s largely untapped farmlands have the potential to feed the rest of Africa. Yet disputes over these resources drive the conflict, and rebel groups seek to control them to fund their own campaigns. Subject to foreign interference since the colonial era, the eastern Congo poses difficult questions about the role of international intervention. The UN mission—the largest peacekeeping deployment in the world until the one in South Sudan surpassed it in 2018—has provided crucial support for the DRC’s peace process, but many observers argue that it lacks a clear strategy for sustaining the peace and eradicating the plethora of armed groups that remain. With presidential elections originally scheduled for late 2016 delayed by two years, the Congolese government, Western policymakers, and regional leaders all face pivotal decisions that will determine whether the country can consolidate its democratic progress.”

Lewis, James A. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“The fifth generation of mobile network technologies, known as ‘5G,’ promises greater speed, security, and capacity. 5G will underpin the digital economy and will provide the backbone for the next generation of digital technologies. So, it is unsurprising that there is intense demand for 5G networks and intense competition among companies and countries to meet that demand. The 5G contest is about networks, data, the direction the internet will take, how economies will grow, and where nations will face new risks and vulnerabilities. Part of this involves investing in and deploying 5G networks. But who makes 5G technologies, who sets the standards, and who owns the intellectual property (IP) has implications for security, innovation, and employment in an increasingly competitive technological environment. Decisions made today about 5G will affect national security and economic performance for decades. American companies have been strong performers in developing and preparing to deploy 5G technologies, but the United States and its allies face a fundamental challenge from China. There are no longer any U.S. manufacturers for core telecommunications network equipment. Four companies dominate the market for the core network technologies needed for 5G networks. None of these companies are American. The choices for core network equipment are between European security partners (Ericsson and Nokia) and China (Huawei and ZTE). Samsung, with its substantial chipmaking and equipment-making capabilities, has also entered the 5G race but still has a relatively small share of the market. Telecoms are a strategic industry and having two companies with close ties to a hostile power creates risk for the United States and its allies. The outcomes in the 5G race will help determine national competitiveness and technological capabilities. 5G will affect the many industries that will be built on top of it, just like the app economy was built on top of 4G. Countries and companies that do better in making and deploying 5G will be richer and have an inside track in building a world where computing and connectivity are embedded in every device.”

Ellis, Evan. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018).
“There are numerous analyses about China and its future, as well as about Chinese engagement with Latin America. This report examines, in detail, how the growth of China, with its power and role in the global economy, is likely to transform Latin America and the Caribbean through economic, political, and other forms of engagement with the region. The report considers multiple scenarios regarding the future of China, the resolution of its security challenges, and possible departures from its current trajectory. It focuses primarily on the question of what Latin America and the Caribbean will look like if China succeeds in its ongoing economic and political engagement in the region.”

Crane, Conrad C. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Americans have always been uniquely attracted to airpower, a fact that has been successfully exploited by generations of U.S. Air Force leaders in information campaigns. But as a result, the nation has often entered conflicts with exorbitant expectations about what airpower could actually accomplish, creating unique challenges in strategic communications when promises did not match reality, especially in recent conflicts. Adaptive enemies have also become very adept at using their own carefully crafted information campaigns to counter what is America’s greatest asymmetric advantage on the battlefield.”

Keene, Shima D. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“The U.S. Army increasingly faces adversaries that are difficult to define. The threat landscape is further complicated by the silent partnership between criminal organizations, irregular groups, and nation-states. This collaboration, whatever its exact nature, is problematic, because it confounds understanding of the adversary, making existing countermeasures less effective, and thus directly challenging U.S. national security interests. Military action taken without full appreciation of the dynamics of the nature of these relationships is likely to be ineffective at best or suffer unintended consequences. This monograph provides a comprehensive assessment of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the silent partners, as well as how the vulnerabilities of the relationships could be exploited to the advantage of the U.S. Army.”

Aftandilian, Gregory. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“This monograph examines the conflicts in the Middle East region between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the so-called proxy wars that are being fought between them, and discusses ways that the United States needs to maneuver carefully in this struggle to preserve its long-term interests in the area. Although Washington has political, economic, and strategic equities with Riyadh, it needs to think carefully about being perceived as engaging in sectarian strife that would alienate Shia allies in Iraq, show bias in its human rights policy, and anger millions of Iranian young people who want better relations with the United States.”

Weitz, Richard. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2018).
“Russia has strengthened its military position in Central Asia and the South Caucasus through a combination of bilateral and multilateral initiatives. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has become the most important multilateral defense structure in the former Soviet Union and is an essential instrument in Russia’s resurgence. The CSTO has expanded its missions, authorities, and capabilities. However, it faces both internal and external challenges, especially debilitating divisions among its members.”

Brantly, Aaron, and Liam Collins. (Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, 2018)
“On the front lines in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine—an area known as the Joint Forces Operation, formerly the Anti-Terrorist Operation zone—ground combat operations are evolving and incorporating new features. Previous installments of this column have examined information operations and electronic warfare in this context. But increasingly, cyber is also playing an impactful role, presenting a potential vision of future cyber-enabled conflict.”

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. (Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2018).
“Few issues attract as much attention or are subject to as much controversy in international and domestic policy debates today as migration. Growing concerns over the increasingly large numbers of migrants and refugees moving across borders has directed most of this attention towards international migration, which has made it to the top of the international policy agenda. The United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) it embraces clearly recognize the importance of migration, the challenges it poses and the opportunities it provides.”

Shahbaz, Adrian. (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2018).
“Disinformation and propaganda disseminated online have poisoned the public sphere. The unbridled collection of personal data has broken down traditional notions of privacy. And a cohort of countries is moving toward digital authoritarianism by embracing the Chinese model of extensive censorship and automated surveillance systems. As a result of these trends, global internet freedom declined for the eighth consecutive year in 2018.”

Hope, Ian. (Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, 2018).
“On 11 November commemorations occurred throughout North West Europe and the British Commonwealth, marking the hundredth anniversary of the Armistice that ended the First World War. A significant commemoration was held in the city of Mons, Belgium, location of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and another in Brussels, location of NATO Headquarters. Many attending these commemorations will have had little knowledge of the direct link between the events of 11 November 1918 and the structure and workings of the Alliance today."