Virtual War: CYBER

In March of 2016, the Air Force released an operating concept for the Combat Cloud, defined as "...an overarching meshed network for data distribution and information sharing within a battlespace, where each authorized user, platform, or node transparently contributes and receives essential information and is able to utilize it across the full range of military operations." The Combat Cloud represents the intellectual construct necessary to unify Air Force and Department of Defense efforts in pursuit of decision superiority and Multi-Domain Command and Control (MDC2). To attain this however, the Combat Cloud and associated network must exhibit critical attributes such as the ability to be self-forming, self-healing, gracefully degradable and redundant. Under this construct, the ability to collect data and integrate it in an open, adaptive information system will significantly enhance C2 and operational agility for the U.S. and its allies across the range of military operations (ROMO). To illustrate this, specific mission concepts across the ROMO can be seen as enhanced by the Combat Cloud. These areas include the clouds ability to improve joint fires through improved use of fire support coordination measures, its potential to enhance the close air support and personnel recovery missions, interagency coordination considerations, and considerations for employment in coalition warfighting. While the inherent advantages of the Combat Cloud are many, the challenges that surround its successful development and incorporation into modern warfare are equally numerous, including interoperability and security issues, and ensuring decentralized execution at the tactical and operational levels. Despite these challenges, the ubiquitous nature of data will not allow arbitrary lines to be drawn between domains in the future and C2 must no longer be confined by such terms.

“Developing cyber norms and institutions has been problematic due to the competing interests of the major state actors in the multinational environment—especially among Russia, China, and the United States—concerning information freedom and access. The author establishes the genesis of this debate and argues that the United States should move beyond it to the issue of protecting critical infrastructure from cyber attack. Addressing the escalating threats to our nation’s infrastructure and networks, the author recommends pursuing an international agreement singularly focused on securing critical infrastructure combined with improving national regulatory and legislative measures for cyber defense.”

“In 2015, the Department of Defense (DoD) released the DoD Cyber Strategy which explicitly calls for a comprehensive strategy to provide credible deterrence in cyberspace against threats from key state and nonstate actors. To be effective, such activities must be coordinated with ongoing deterrence efforts in the physical realm, especially those of near-peers impacting critical global regions such as China in the Asia-Pacific region and Russia in Europe. It is important for the U.S. Army to identify and plan for any unique roles that they may provide to these endeavors. This study explores the evolving concept of deterrence in cyberspace in three major areas:
• First, the monograph addresses the question: What is the current U.S. deterrence posture for cyberspace? The discussion includes an assessment of relevant current national and DoD policies and concepts as well as an examination of key issues for cyber deterrence found in professional literature.
• Second, it examines the question: What are the Army’s roles in cyberspace deterrence? This section provides background information on how Army cyber forces operate and examines the potential contributions of these forces to the deterrence efforts in cyberspace as well as in the broader context of strategic deterrence. The section also addresses how the priority of these contributions may change with escalating levels of conflict.
• Third, the monograph provides recommendations for changing or adapting the DoD and Army responsibilities to better define and implement the evolving concepts and actions supporting deterrence in the dynamic domain of cyberspace.”

“The first 7 years of U.S. Cyber Command operations are paved with milestones that mark the steady operationalization of modern cyberspace as the newest domain of military conflict as well as a realm of international power. The creation of the Cyber Mission Force and Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber are significant steps toward improving the timeliness and effectiveness of cyberspace operations that directly support combatant commands and the whole-of-government responses to cyberspace threats. It focuses on the central question: “What is the context in which different military services approach cyberspace component operations internally as well as with the Department of Defense?”

“America’s prosperity and security depend on how we respond to the opportunities and challenges in cyberspace. Critical infrastructure, national defense, and the daily lives of Americans rely on computer-driven and interconnected information technologies. As all facets of American life have become more dependent on a secure cyberspace, new vulnerabilities have been revealed and new threats continue to emerge. Building on the National Security Strategy and the Administration’s progress over its first 18 months, the National Cyber Strategy outlines how the United States will ensure the American people continue to reap the benefits of a secure cyberspace that reflects our principles, protects our security, and promotes our prosperity.”

"A number of proposals for international cybersecurity negotiations share a common feature: they offer unworkable ideas. The reason for this is the discrepancy between theory and practice, particularly when proposals diverge from state practice, which we can define as how states will behave to maintain or advance their interests. Some proposals also seem to ignore a changed international environment, where the post-1945 ideals, institutions, and powers are in decline and the United States lacks the influence it once had. Proposals that run counter to state practice or that discount the weakening of Western influence face serious and perhaps insurmountable obstacles."

“The forward march of advanced technologies, especially information technologies, and their integration into all aspects of society are creating tremendous opportunities—and an associated set of vulnerabilities. Both 5G networks and the Internet of Things (IoT) are going to connect us further in ways only limited by our imaginations. While this growth has been forecasted over the past few decades, few saw the scope and breadth of the implications, both positive and negative, on our society. The Department of Defense has recognized that hardware, software, and data now connect in ways that have created a cyber domain, much like the land, sea, air, and space domains. The implications have manifested themselves in the relentless competition underway between those that defend and those that attack on a continuous basis. This evolution in our thinking on the cyber problem demands strategic analysis. Numerous reports have been generated over the past several years, with thousands of recommendations. Yet, the problem only continues to grow… Forecasting is extremely difficult; some say it is impossible. That said, crafting a set of potential alternate futures, with a series of waypoints or decision points that validates or invalidates a given path or assumptions, is possible now. This approach drives action forward, and the competitive environment forces the normal action-reaction-counteraction competitive framework for action. Some change may be gradual, and some may be dramatic. What is most important is the ability to modify, adapt, or even pivot at speed across concepts, technologies, structures, and frameworks on a continuous basis, which creates a competitive advantage over time. This report starts that effort.”

“While cybersecurity awareness in the federal government is improving, along with efforts to provide more secure architectures and managed security services for federal networks, these efforts are focused on systemic risks and vulnerabilities in core infrastructures. Few extend to the millions of endpoint devices connected to these systems, many of which have both limited security features and known vulnerabilities that can be exploited to steal data and serve as an entry point for more sophisticated attacks on the network. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) convened a group of experts from the federal government, key government agencies, and private industry to identify a path forward at a time when more secure technologies and services, such as cloud computing, often remain inaccessible due to dated federal system architectures, while the consumer space is flooded with new devices and potential threat vectors. The following report captures the major themes that emerged from the discussion.”

“The Department of Defense (DOD) faces mounting challenges in protecting its weapon systems from increasingly sophisticated cyber threats. This state is due to the computerized nature of weapon systems; DOD’s late start in prioritizing weapon systems cybersecurity; and DOD’s nascent understanding of how to develop more secure weapon systems. DOD weapon systems are more software dependent and more networked than ever before… Automation and connectivity are fundamental enablers of DOD’s modern military capabilities. However, they make weapon systems more vulnerable to cyber attacks. Although GAO and others have warned of cyber risks for decades, until recently, DOD did not prioritize weapon systems cybersecurity. Finally, DOD is still determining how best to address weapon systems cybersecurity.”