General Officer Education and Generalship: Strategy and Decision Making

Hill, Andrew, and Stephen J. Gerras. Joint Force Quarterly, no. 96 (1st Quarter 2020): 37-41.

Ben-Haim. Parameters: U.S. Army War College 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 63-73.

Morton, Matthew. Parameters: U.S. Army War College 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 55-67.

McConnell, Richard A., and Jacob A. Mong. Military Review 101, no. 1 (January-February 2021): 58-67.

Houghton, David Patrick. Parameters: U.S. Army War College 45, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 75-85.

“U.S. competitors pursuing meaningful revision or rejection of the current U.S.-led status quo are employing a host of hybrid methods to advance and secure interests contrary to those of the United States. These challengers employ unique combinations of influence, intimidation, coercion, and aggression to incrementally crowd out effective resistance, establish local or regional advantage, and manipulate risk perceptions in their favor. So far, the United States has not come up with a coherent countervailing approach. It is in this ‘gray zone’—the awkward and uncomfortable space between traditional conceptions of war and peace—where the United States and its defense enterprise face systemic challenges to U.S. position and authority. Gray zone competition and conflict present fundamental challenges to U.S. and partner security and, consequently, should be important pacers for U.S. defense strategy.”

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Borer, Douglas A., and Stephen W Twing. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 24, no. 3 (2011): 493-512.

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Miller, Gregory D. Joint Force Quarterly, no. 98 (3rd Quarter 2020): 28-37.

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Fitzsimmons, Michael. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
"Scenario planning should be one of the Pentagon’s most important tools for developing strategy for an uncertain future. However, the formalized joint scenario planning process to support strategy and force development—Support for Strategic Analysis—has faced many challenges over the past 2 decades, and has ultimately proven less influential than intended on strategic decision-making. Explaining why is the main purpose of this monograph. It argues that scenario analysis has been most effective in supporting capability and program development, while it has fallen short in shaping strategy and force structure. The reasons for this are numerous and are rooted in intrinsic, structural characteristics of decision-making in large organizations. The monograph concludes with several recommendations for rejuvenating scenario planning in the Pentagon."

Kolenda, Christopher D. Journal of Strategic Studies 42, no. 7 (2019): 992-1014.

Sullivan, John. War on the Rocks (December 28, 2020).

Moore, Charles P. Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly 39, no. 4 (Winter 2009-2010): 5-19.