General Officer Education and Generalship: Economic Statecraft: International Environment

African Union website about the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)
"Accelerating intra-African trade and boosting Africa’s trading position in the global market by strengthening Africa’s common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations."

Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies China-Africa Research Initiative and Boston University Global Development Policy Center
“The Chinese Loans to Africa (CLA) Database is an interactive data project started by the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS-CARI). Since 2007, SAIS-CARI researchers have collected, cleaned and analyzed publicly-available data to create a database on Chinese lending to Africa. The data sources include official government documents, contractor websites, fieldwork, interviews, and media sources. Between 2000 and 2019, SAIS-CARI estimated Chinese financiers signed 1,141 loan commitments worth US$153 billion with African governments and their state owned enterprises. The figures are not equivalent to African government debt, as the database does not track disbursement or repayment. As of March 29, 2021, the Chinese Loans to Africa Database is managed by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center.”

U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2020).
“Topics this year include China's view of strategic competition with the United States; China's promotion of alternative global norms and standards; China's strategic aims in Africa; vulnerabilities in China's financial system and risks for the United States; U.S.-China links in healthcare and biotechnology; China's growing power projection and expeditionary capabilities; Taiwan; Hong Kong; and a review of economics, trade, security, political, and foreign affairs developments in 2020.”

Kennedy, Scott, and Yilin Wang. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), which oversees the world’s largest financial system, struggles to effectively communicate with market actors, domestic and foreign. Yi Gang, the current governor of the PBOC, despite being more reticent than his counterparts around the world, has spoken on more public occasions than his predecessor. As a result of Yi’s personal interest as well as changes in the PBOC’s communications strategy, the bank has gained greater public visibility. However, this recent activism should not be mistaken as a sign of greater autonomy or authority. The PBOC has assumed a more important role in China’s overall financial governance, taking up a ‘dual-pillar’function that included both monetary policymaking and macro-prudential management; but it is still far from an independent central bank whose words convey great authority. U.S. policymakers and the financial community should pay close attention to how the PBOC speaks to markets to understand how Chinese economic policies are implemented, but everyone should recognize that on critical issues, higher authorities within the central government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still set the agenda and speak most authoritatively for the regime.”

BluEarth
“Reliable data on China’s economy are notoriously difficult to come by. Official Chinese government figures exist, but lack transparency and credibility, while the few private indicators that exist are far too limited in size and scope for strategic planning.
We founded China Beige Book International in 2010 to help institutional investors and corporate CEOs navigate China’s notoriously black box economy. Today we operate the largest private in-country data-collection network ever developed to track the Chinese marketplace, gathering real-time economic data from thousands of firms across all of China’s regions, sectors, and 34 discrete industries.
Our flagship platform provides independent data and in-depth analysis on every key component of China’s diverse economy—from growth dynamics to labor market and inflation trends to the world’s only tracker of the credit environment and shadow banking.
These data are the principal drivers of our advisory work, allowing our globally-recognized team of experts to guide clients through the noise while staying ahead of critical market-moving trends in the world’s second-largest economy.”

Segal, Stephanie, and Dylan Gerstel. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The CSIS Economics Program launched ‘Degrees of Separation’ to establish clearer objectives for U.S. engagement with China and to assess whether disengagement from specific economic activities can help in meeting such objectives. This interim report reviews the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship since President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972. It takes stock of the current bilateral economic relationship, with particular focus on trade, investment, and innovation linkages. The report identifies six distinct areas that motivated U.S.-China engagement from 1972 through the end of the Trump administration: (1) geostrategy; (2) economics; (3) human rights and civil society; (4) global rules and norms; (5) global public goods; and (6) technology and innovation. While specific objectives in each area continue to evolve, these six areas remain relevant to guiding bilateral engagement today. A subsequent report, delivered later this year, will present a framework for assessing specific economic activities as candidates for targeted decoupling, along with case studies designed to test the framework.”

Kania, Elsa B., and Lorand Laskai. (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“In U.S. policy debates on China, military-civil fusion (MCF) has emerged as a frequent subject of debate and concern. Once a niche topic of study among only avid watchers of Chinese military modernization and defense technological development, Beijing’s drive to break down barriers and create stronger linkages between its civilian economy and defense industrial base has started to draw considerable attention in Washington. During Donald Trump’s administration, Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, senior officials across the State Department and Defense Department, and members of Congress all devoted time to MCF in speeches, using it to justify a broad range of policies. These included expanding investigations into intellectual property theft, banning Huawei from U.S. networks and critical infrastructure, urging companies like Microsoft and Google to stop working with Chinese counterparts, and even advocating for ‘decoupling’ from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such as in supply chains and by limiting technological collaboration. MCF has emerged as a key analytic driver of the intensifying economic and technological competition between the United States and the PRC in recent years. While Joe Biden’s administration will have an opportunity to reset the tone of the U.S.-China relationship and recalibrate the use of instruments of U.S. policy, China’s model of MCF is likely to remain a major concern for U.S. policymakers.”

Livingston, Scott. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“The Issue
• The Chinese Communist Party (CCP or the ‘Party’) is currently strengthening the presence and powers of internal Party organizations located within Chinese companies to ensure greater oversight and influence over China’s commercial sector.
• In addition, as part of what it calls the ‘modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics,’ the CCP is requiring that companies codify a role for these Party organizations in their corporate charters.
• These new developments challenge traditional understandings of corporate autonomy, and by extension, how Chinese companies should be treated under existing international trade agreements and by the regulatory and investment review bodies of foreign governments. Because the CCP might well attempt to extend this push into foreign private companies operating in China, these new actions pose a very real threat to the operational independence of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs).
• To formulate an effective response, companies and governments in market economies should increase their understanding of how the CCP operates at the grassroots level and work to ensure greater transparency and understanding of the overall level of Party influence within specific firms. To further this transparency, U.S. policymakers could consider requiring securities issuers in the United States provide enhanced disclosures relating to CCP activities within their firms. The U.S. government should also consider reviving open-source data collection initiatives to publish and translate key CCP regulations and Party documents in order to increase understanding and spur further analysis of the Party system.”

Malik, Ammar A., et al. (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William and Mary, 2021).
"Our new report, 'Banking on the Belt and Road: Insights' from a new global dataset of 13,427 Chinese development projects, offers a bird’s-eye view of China’s geo-economic strategy before and after the introduction of the BRI in 2013. It details how spending patterns, debt levels, and project implementation problems have changed over time, leveraging insights from a uniquely granular dataset that captures 13,427 projects across 165 countries worth $843 billion. These projects were financed by more than 300 Chinese government institutions and state-owned entities. The new dataset covers projects approved between 2000 and 2017 and implemented between 2000 and 2021. It is the most comprehensive dataset of its kind."

Orlander, Eric. China in Africa Project. (January 11, 2021).

Boston University - Center for Global Policy Development.
“Welcome to China’s Global Power Database, a new interactive created by Boston University's Global Development Policy Center. China’s Global Power Database tracks all the world's power plants financed by Chinese foreign direct investment and/or China's two global policy banks, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. At the end of 2018, Chinese capital is involved in upwards of 777 power plants overseas, providing a total of 186.5 GW of power generation capacity. Among these power plants, Chinese participation includes foreign direct investment (FDI), mergers and acquisitions (M&A), greenfield investments, and debt finance. The database also tracks and displays the deal types, Chinese investors/financiers, percentage of ownership by investor, amount of capacity (in MW), type of technology, operating status, and the estimated annual CO2 emissions of the power plants.”

Boston University - Center for Global Policy Development.
“This dataset is the first global, harmonized, validated, and geolocated record of Chinese development finance. It covers the years 2008 through 2019, to include equal time before and after the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. It includes all loans from the China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China to governments, inter-governmental bodies, and state-owned entities.
This interactive database includes 858 loans, detailing each project's lender, year, amount, sector, and length in kilometers, where applicable. Among those 858 projects, 615 have specific geographic footprints, and these 615 projects are shown in the visual map. The remaining 243 projects are included in the full list of projects, below the map.
We aim to give context to China’s development finance by showing projects in relation to several types of socially and ecologically sensitive territories:
Indigenous Peoples’ Lands
National Protected Areas
Critical Habitat”

Center for Strategic and International Studies
“Reconnecting Asia maps new linkages—roads, railways, and other infrastructure—that are reshaping economic and geopolitical realities across the continent. Through data curation and objective analysis, the project aims to fill Asia’s infrastructure-information gap, squaring lofty ambitions with facts on the ground. Our methodology explains the science and art behind these efforts. Reconnecting Asia is made possible by a start-up grant from the Brzezinski Institute on Geostrategy and the expertise of the leadership, research, advisory, and development teams below, and the valuable insights of our partners.”

Fanusie, Yaya J. Lawfare (December 14, 2020).

Myers, Adam, et al. War on the Rocks (December 9, 2020).

Ewing, Jack, and Steven Lee Myers. New York Times. Published 30, 2020.
"The agreement, which would roll back restrictions on investment, faces some opposition in Europe and objections from the Biden camp."

Lewis, James Andrew. Center for Strategic and International Studies (January 5, 2021).

Schwab, Klaus, and Saadia Zahidi. (Cologny/Geneva, Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2020).
“The ‘Global Competitiveness Report’ series has since its first edition aimed to prompt policy-makers beyond short term growth and to aim for long-run prosperity. The 2020 special edition is dedicated to elaborating on the priorities for recovery and revival, and considering the building blocks of a transformation towards new economic systems that combine ‘productivity’, ‘people’ and ‘planet’ targets.”

BBC News (November 16, 2020).
“Fifteen countries have formed the world's largest trading bloc, covering nearly a third of the global economy.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is made up of 10 Southeast Asian countries, as well as South Korea, China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand.
The pact is seen as an extension of China's influence in the region.
The deal excludes the US, which withdrew from a rival Asia-Pacific trade pact in 2017.”

Episode of the podcast “The Trade Guys” from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. November 20, 2020. Streaming audio, 25:16.
“In this episode, Andrew and the Trade Guys breakdown what RCEP – a new mega trade deal in Asia – means for the U.S. economically and strategically. Plus, they’ll analyze what’s happening on Biden’s trade transition team and how they’ll shape policy and personnel in the administration. And, they’ll take a look at a new ban on investment into certain Chinese companies.”

Kurlantzick, Joshua. (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 2020).
"Fifteen Asian states, including China, signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The deal, midwifed by China and promoted for years by Beijing, includes both close Chinese partners like Cambodia as well as countries with cold relations with Beijing, like Australia and Japan. Overall, RCEP will create the most populous trade area in the world, and it joins together several of the largest economies in the world, like China, Japan, and South Korea. It provides a major signal to investors that the region is still committed to multilateral trade integration."

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