General Officer Education and Generalship: Industrial Mobilization

Cecire, Michael H., and Heidi M. Peters. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Project, March 25, 2020).

Cecire, Michael H., and Heidi M. Peters. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Project, March 2, 2020).

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The Defense Production Act emerged from the need to rapidly accelerate industrial mobilization for the Korean War. Over the last 70 years, the DPA's prominence in the national consciousness declined and then only reentered the national dialogue with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, it has remained an important tool for the executive branch and helped to ensure national security, whether it was stockpiling needed metals and minerals, prioritizing the production of weapons systems, developing energy security, or providing emergency relief from natural disasters. In meeting all of these requirements, the DPA has evolved into a flexible piece of legislation that is able to aid in the development and acquisition of military weapons and technology as well as the procurement and distribution of emergency relief materials.”

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Irish, Kerry E. The Journal of Military History 70, no. 1 (2006): 31-61.

Cuff, Robert D. The Business History Review 43, no. 2 (1969): 115-133.

Cancian, Mark F., et al. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“With the shift of U.S. strategic focus to great power competition, interest in industrial mobilization for a long-term, high-intensity conflict has returned. However, the highly consolidated and fragile U.S. defense industrial base is not designed to meet this challenge. To gain insight into the ability of the defense industrial base to meet the demands of great power conflict, this project reviewed the history and literature on industrial mobilization and then analyzed the time needed to replace contemporary weapon systems’ inventory at peacetime and surge production rates. This analysis was based on an original database developed using production data found in the P-21 and P-40 exhibits in the Department of Defense (DOD) procurement justification books from 1999, 2008, and 2020. The study found that it would take many years to replace weapon inventories in the event of a long, high-intensity conflict, even at surge production rates. Further, the study found that the industrial base has become more brittle over time, as it takes longer to replace inventories at FY 2020 production rates than at FY 1999 production rates.”

Elhefnawy, Nader. Parameters: U.S. Army War College 34, no. 3 (2004): 122-133.

Berenson, Doug, Chris Higgins, and Jim Tinsley. War on the Rocks (January 13, 2021).