General Officer Education and Generalship: Budget and Acquisition

Publication of the American Society of Military Comptrollers

Schmitt, Gary J. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2020).
“With the United States facing two major revisionist powers, Russia and China, as well as additional security threats from North Korea, Iran, and jihadist terrorism, a critical advantage for the United States is its global network of alliances and strategic partners. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy states, ‘Alliances and partnerships are crucial to our strategy, providing a durable asymmetric strategic advantage that no competitor or rival can match.’
The advantage of having military allies and partners is enhanced by the core capacity of the American military having remained largely the same over the past decade, though the global security environment grew more complex and difficult during that time. In short, the United States needs allies and security partners. But the United States needs allies and partners that can pull their weight militarily if the country is going to be able to maintain a favorable balance of power in critical regions of the world. The second edition of ‘A Hard Look at Hard Power’ provides an in-depth examination of the overall strategic perspective, defense plans, budgets, and capabilities of seven key European and Asian allies, three frontline strategic partners, and NATO.”

Townshend, Ashley, Brendan Thomas-Noone, and Matilda Steward. (Sydney, Australia: United States Studies Center at the University of Sydney, 2019).
“America no longer enjoys military primacy in the Indo-Pacific and its capacity to uphold a favourable balance of power is increasingly uncertain…Over the next decade, the US defence budget is unlikely to meet the needs of the National Defense Strategy owing to a combination of political, fiscal and internal pressures…America has an atrophying force that is not sufficiently ready, equipped or postured for great power competition in the Indo-Pacific — a challenge it is working hard to address…A strategy of collective defence is fast becoming necessary as a way of offsetting shortfalls in America’s regional military power and holding the line against rising Chinese strength.”

Belkin, Paul, and Hibbah Kaileh. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Updated June 16, 2020).
“The European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is a Department of Defense (DOD) effort to ‘enhance the U.S. deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of U.S. forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO allies, and bolster the security and capacity of U.S. allies and partners,’ according to the DOD European Deterrence Initiative Fact Sheet…Today, EDI is a key funding source for U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) posture adjustments in response to the evolving European security environment. EDI has enabled the first increase in U.S. military forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War. This includes the rotational deployment of an Armored Brigade Combat Team (BCT), mostly in Central and Eastern Europe. Two BCTs, one Stryker-equipped and one airborne infantry, are permanently stationed in Europe—in Germany and Italy, respectively. A prominent objective of EDI has been to enable rapid military mobilization to Central and Eastern Europe in order to respond quickly to military aggression in the region.”

Deni, John R. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US War College Press, 2020).
“In 2017, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, none of the capability targets identified in NATO’s quadrennial NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) were left on the negotiating table. Previously, capability targets were identified by the alliance’s secretariat, but they remained unfilled as allies failed to assume responsibility for them. This monograph examines the 2014–18 iteration of the NDPP, which represented a stunning turnaround in transatlantic burden sharing. The analysis reveals a combination of factors—the changed threat environment, political pressure from Washington, and the role of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ working within NATO—best explain the alliance’s success in achieving more equitable burden sharing.
To reach this conclusion, the monograph relies on an array of primary and secondary sources, including interviews with over two dozen officials directly involved in the 2014–18 NDPP. While incorporating available quantitative data on alliance defense spending, the monograph primarily focuses on process tracing as the most effective qualitative methodology for revealing the story behind the 2014–18 NDPP. Policy makers will find this monograph particularly useful because it draws key lessons from the 2014–18 NDPP to make several forward-leaning policy recommendations to strengthen and build upon NATO’s burden-sharing successes to date.”

Peters, Heidi M. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2014).

(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 30, 2020).

McGarry, Brendan W., and Heidi M. Peters. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 14, 2020).

McGarry, Brendan W. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, December 11, 2020).

Field, Elizabeth. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, November 2020).

Walsh, Kevin C., and Asif A. Khan. (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, September 2020).

DeVine, Michael E. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, April 24, 2019).

Byrd, Miemie Winn. (Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California, 2012).

Brockmann, Heidi Ann. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2011).

Martin, James F., and Steven R. Jones. Air Force Journal of Logistics 29, no. 2 (Summer, 2005): 30-41.

Analysis and Research Team. (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The main levers that Army leaders control to apply budget dollars to shape their force are organizational structure, modernization, and readiness. Obviously the size of the force has a major impact on its capabilities, but the greatest challenge for leaders has been to keep the force ready for all current threats while also incorporating new technology for the future. This is an ongoing process, but has become even more complex in the modern era with the increasing scope and impact of technological change. During the last century, the Army has experienced magnified transformational bursts of modernization about every 40 years. The first was during the mobilization for World War II in the1940s, and the second involved the fielding of the Big 5 and associated systems in the 1980s. Both were enabled by a significant amount of innovative thinking in times of tight budgets that could be funded by a later influx of money. These opportunities for mass modernization always put considerable strain on the development of corresponding training, doctrine, and organizations for their application, and in maintaining contemporary combat capability, especially in the 1940s when Army leaders were also trying to massively increase the size of the service.”

Blume, Susanna V., and Molly Parrish. (Center for a New American Security, 2020).
“This report asks whether the 2021 U.S. defense budget request is aligned with the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in selecting priority capability investments while taking risk in less urgent areas.1 We conclude that the Department of Defense (DoD) is making progress in NDS implementation in select sectors—for example, in pursuing new command and control and strike architectures. However, we also conclude that DoD continues to underinvest in some critical enablers that will make these emerging command and strike complexes work.”

Historical Services Division. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2020).
“The Defense Production Act emerged from the need to rapidly accelerate industrial mobilization for the Korean War. Over the last 70 years, the DPA's prominence in the national consciousness declined and then only reentered the national dialogue with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, it has remained an important tool for the executive branch and helped to ensure national security, whether it was stockpiling needed metals and minerals, prioritizing the production of weapons systems, developing energy security, or providing emergency relief from natural disasters. In meeting all of these requirements, the DPA has evolved into a flexible piece of legislation that is able to aid in the development and acquisition of military weapons and technology as well as the procurement and distribution of emergency relief materials.”

Farley, Robin Lee. (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2014).

Snider, Don M. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2012).
"The U.S. Army has been through three reductions in-force since the inception of the All-Volunteer Force. The first one, roughly 1972-78, actually birthed the All-Volunteer Force. The second one occurred in the late 1990s after the end of the Cold War when the U.S. Army was reduced by approximately one-third in both force structure and budget (Total Obligational Authority). The third one is just now beginning in 2011-12 as the Army returns from a decade of war in the Middle East. Critical to the future effectiveness of the Army, and thus its trust with the American people, is whether the Army will retain the essential characteristics of a military profession—each of the six carefully explicated in this monograph—as it transits this era of Department of Defense reductions. Unfortunately, that future effectiveness is often not really known until the ‘first battle of the next war,’ as the Army learned so painfully in the past, e.g., Task Force Smith in Korea. As noted in the Foreword, the Army’s campaign of learning about the Army profession has been ongoing for a year, a campaign led by a broad community of practice (CoP) drawn from many of the proponent Centers (Army schools or agencies for each Army branch or functional specialty) in dialogue with cohorts throughout the Army. For purposes of analytical capabilities, the CoP is organized by cohort within the profession, e.g., officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted Soldiers, Army civilians, etc. Throughout calendar year 2011, that CoP conducted multiple surveys, assessments, dialogues, forums, and exercises across the Army. This monograph highlights some of the outcomes to date, particularly those relating to the central research question—what does it mean now, after a decade of war, for the Army to be a military profession. This question is addressed by presenting four initial outcomes of the campaign:
1. The Background Realities of the Army as a Profession;
2. Including Army Civilians: A New Typology for the Army Profession;
3. The Process of Professionalization and the Criteria for Individual Certifications; and,
4. The Essential Characteristics of the Army as a Profession."

McGee, Jarrod, Deepak Mathew, and Jon Basham. The Armed Forces Comptroller 61, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 24-29.

Horlander, Thomas A. The Armed Forces Comptroller 56, no. 4 (Fall, 2011): 27-29.

Michel, Marshall L., III. (Denver, CO: Auburn University, 2006).

Spoehr, Thomas. War on the Rocks (January 14, 2021).

Gansler, Jacques S. Issues in Science and Technology 27, no. 4 (Summer 2011): 42-50.

Kiser, William, Quy Nguyen, and Edith (Dawnn) Coon. The Armed Forces Comptroller 63, no. 1 (Winter, 2018): 48-51.

Zawislak, Edward L. (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2000).

Interagency Task Force in Fulfillment of Executive Order 13806. (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018).
“America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base ('the industrial base') supports economic prosperity and global competitiveness, and arms the military with capabilities to defend the nation. Currently, the industrial base faces an unprecedented set of challenges: sequestration and uncertainty of government spending; the decline of critical markets and suppliers; unintended consequences of U.S. Government acquisition behavior; aggressive industrial policies of competitor nations; and the loss of vital skills in the domestic workforce. Combined, these challenges –or macro forces –erode the capabilities of the manufacturing and defense industrial base and threaten the Department of Defense’s (DoD) ability to be ready for the ‘fight tonight,’ and to retool for great power competition. The following report explains the macro forces impacting the industrial base, identifies primary categories of risk, illustrates impacts within sectors, and provides recommendations for mitigation.”

Gerstel, Dylan, and Matthew P. Goodman. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“In response to today’s economic challenges—particularly managing the Covid-19 pandemic and the rise of China—prominent U.S. policymakers and political figures on both sides of the aisle, as well as business leaders, have called for more active government efforts to boost domestic production and innovation. However, there is significant disagreement about how to do so.
This report focuses on the role of government in supporting innovation in critical technologies, although there are other challenges—notably Covid-19—where greater federal intervention could be appropriate. To help further the discussion, we reviewed historical approaches to industrial policy in three advanced democracies: Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. Reflecting on those experiences, we present in this report a set of ten ‘first principles’ intended to guide a more active U.S. innovation strategy to reaffirm the country’s leadership in critical technologies.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
CSIS Senior Adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of papers on U.S. military forces, including composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. The first white paper in this year’s series analyzes the strategy and budget context for building forces in FY 2021, criticisms of the strategy, budget and resulting force plans, and risks for sustaining force levels in the future.
Key Takeaways
- From FY 2017 to FY 2020, the administration increased the defense budget to fund its national defense strategy. However, that growth ended in FY 2021, requiring some trade-offs. The FY 2021 budget maintains the readiness gains of the last several years and expands force size modestly but squeezes modernization.
- Active component end strength is projected to increase from 1,346,000 in FY 2020 to 1,351,500 in FY 2021 and 1,361,000 by FY 2025. Congress has been supportive.
- In the long term, force structure faces four challenges and a wild card. The challenges include:
A. The need to respond to heavy day-to-day demands for crisis response, allied engagement, gray zone competition, and ongoing regional conflicts. One observer called this “a bear trap of current commitments,” and it works against reducing force size.
B. The opening of a resources-strategy gap as budgets are flat or reduced, but the strategy does not change. This increases risk as actions may not be able to back words.
C. The desire to move more aggressively toward a structure designed for great power conflict, increasing modernization, and trading off force structure if necessary. A major uncertainty is how the concept of “legacy” systems will be applied—does that means old systems or old types of systems?
D. Disagreements about strategy, as many libertarians and progressives support a foreign policy of “restraint” that would have the United States less involved militarily with nations overseas. Such a strategy would make large segments of existing force structure unnecessary
- The wild card is the long-term effect of the pandemic, and whether this would change the nature or size of the defense effort.
- The public will be the ultimate arbiter. Polling indicates public support for a U.S. role in the world but not increased spending.”

Daniels, Seamus P., and Todd Harrison. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“This report from the CSIS Defense Budget Analysis program seeks to enhance understanding of the formulation and accuracy of Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) projected obligation rates in the defense acquisition sector. These projections are published annually for each appropriation account in the Financial Summary Tables released by the office of the DoD Comptroller. This paper compares the Comptroller projected obligation rates for procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts with actual obligation rates, as well as budget execution benchmarks compiled by the Comptroller’s office. This analysis assesses the reliability of the projections and their consistency with other DoD targets, identifies trends in the accuracy of obligation rates across different accounts, and attempts to isolate factors that may influence the formulation and accuracy of the projections.”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The President’s defense budget request for FY2021 does have some important virtues. It does contain a wide variety of important initiatives to improve the readiness and effectiveness of important elements pertaining to each military service, invest in force modernization, and support military personnel. At the same time, however, the Defense Budget Overview begins with the statement that the FY2021 request is a ‘Strategy Driven Budget’ – but few things could be further from the truth. The only ‘strategy’ that is clearly reflected in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) FY2021 request is an effort to provide a justification for the separate spending goals of each military service. The end result turns the budget request into little more than an ‘Oliver Twist Strategy,’ in which each military service asks for more money – a major component of the DoD’s defense-wide efforts – without meaningfully addressing the major strategic problems and challenges that the United States will face over the coming decade. The DoD’s FY2021 budget request abandons virtually all of the past efforts to create an effective planning, programming, and budgeting system. It has devolved into a classic ‘input’-driven budget that focuses on meeting the spending goals of each military service without addressing the net assessments of threats, the role of strategic partners and allies, or the resulting levels of deterrence and war fighting capability.”

Cancian, Mark F. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2021).
“Part of U.S. Military Forces in FY 2021. Beyond the traditional military services, military forces include the new Space Force as well as Special Operations Forces (SOF, which functions as a quasi-service), Department of Defense (DOD) civilians (which perform many functions that military personnel perform in other countries), and contractors (which form a permanent element of the national security establishment, not only in the United States proper but also on overseas battlefields).”

Cordesman, Anthony H. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020).
“The Congressional Budget Office regularly provides a touch of reality regarding the trends in the U.S. federal budget and its impact on the U.S. economy. Its September 21st report on the 2020 Long-Term Budget Outlook is no exception.
It provides a clear warning about the problems in civil spending, and it projects a major rise in mandatory spending after the current peak for COVID-19 related spending has passed. These are all critical issues, but so are the trends in discretionary spending, as well as in the areas like defense and foreign affairs.”

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