General Officer Education and Generalship: Historical Perspectives Including Oral Histories

"The Analysis and Research Team (ART) of the U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) provides historical products, analysis, and synthesis for senior leaders, planners, action officers, and decision makers in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, major commands, and other government agencies, within the limits of current resources. It also develops relationships with senior leaders and key staff at DA level and in the joint arena to better anticipate requirements for historical analysis. ART also supports the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) curriculum development and execution by providing history-based curricular advice and support. ART products rely primarily on the unique archival holdings at USAHEC."

Gentile, Gian, et al. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020).
“Tracing the evolution of the U.S. Army throughout American history, the authors show that there is no such thing as a 'traditional' U.S. military policy. Rather, the laws that authorize, empower, and govern the U.S. armed forces emerged from long-standing debates and a series of legislative compromises between 1903 and 1940. The authors document this in a series of four volumes, collected here in an easily searchable digital tool. Volume I traces the history of U.S. military policy from the colonial era through the Spanish-American War; this period is critical for understanding the genesis of the basic structure of today's Army and the various factors that informed that structure. Volume II focuses on the major laws enacted in the early 20th century that changed the federal government's relationship with the National Guard, established what would become today's Army Reserve, and improved the Army's ability to expand and develop trained specialists. Volume III covers the period from 1940 to 1970 and the development of Total Force Policy. Volume IV covers the period from 1970 to 2015, from changes to U.S. military policy that resulted from the Vietnam War through years of persistent conflict following the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks.”

Crane, Conrad C., et al. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“Task Force Smith at the beginning of the Korean War has often been used as a metaphor for military unreadiness. While the story of that first US action of the war provides a timeless cautionary tale for commanders, the story of unreadiness for war in June 1950 went much further than the tactical failures of one infantry battalion. The lack of readiness was caused by a very disruptive interwar period that saw drastic and often chaotic changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy (DOTMLPF-P). This case study examines the political, economic, military, and strategic environment in the years between 1945 and 1950 to illustrate the complexity of the readiness issue. Readiness in the strategic context concerned many more issues than simply personnel status or equipment availability.”

See USAHEC's Frequently Asked Questions. USAWC patrons can submit new questions here.

"The Center Of Military History (CMH), which reports to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), is responsible for the appropriate use of history throughout the United States Army. Traditionally, this mission has meant recording the official history of the Army in both peace and war, while advising the Army Staff on historical matters. In terms of this tradition, the Center traces its lineage back to those historians under the Secretary of War who compiled the Official Records of the Rebellion, a monumental history of the Civil War begun in 1874, and to a similar work on World War I prepared by the Historical Section of the Army War College."

Rayburn, Joel D., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).
“The Iraq War has been the costliest U.S. conflict since the Vietnam War. To date, few official studies have been conducted to review what happened, why it happened, and what lessons should be drawn. ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War’ is the Army’s initial operational level analysis of this conflict, written in narrative format, with assessments and lessons embedded throughout the work. This study reviews the conflict from a Landpower perspective and includes the contributions of coalition allies, the U.S. Marine Corps, and special operations forces. Presented principally from the point of view of the commanders in Baghdad, the narrative examines the interaction of the operational and strategic levels, as well as the creation of theater level strategy and its implementation at the tactical level. Volume 1 begins in the truce tent at Safwan Airfield in southern Iraq at the end of Operation DESERT STORM and briefly examines actions by U.S. and Iraqi forces during the interwar years. The narrative continues by examining the road to war, the initially successful invasion, and the rise of Iraqi insurgent groups before exploring the country’s slide toward civil war. This volume concludes with a review of the decision by the George W. Bush administration to ‘surge’ additional forces to Iraq, placing the conduct of the ‘surge’ and its aftermath in the second volume.
This study was constructed over a span of 4 years and relied on nearly 30,000 pages of hand-picked declassified documents, hundreds of hours of original interviews, and thousands of hours of previously unavailable interviews. Original interviews conducted by the team included President George W. Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretaries of Defense Leon Panetta and Robert Gates, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and every theater commander for the war, among many others. With its release, this publication, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,’ represents the U.S. Government’s longest and most detailed study of the Iraq conflict thus far.”

Rayburn, Joel D., et al. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2019).

Crane, Conrad C., Michael E Lynch, and Shane P. Reilly. (Carlisle, PA: US Army Heritage and Education Center, Historical Services Division, 2019).
“The history of the U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom is replete with tactical and operational studies, and the shifts in strategy are well documented. The Chief of Staff of the Army’s (CSA) official study, ‘The U.S. Army in the Iraq War,’ provides an excellent analysis of the operational level of war. ‘Riding the Hydra,’ however, examines the institutional Army, specifically the Army staff, and its efforts to prepare the Army for war. When President George W. Bush made the decision to launch the war in Iraq, the Army faced a two-front war for the first time since World War II. Though the Army in 2002 was much better trained, equipped, and ready than its predecessor sixty years before, it still showed the effects of declining budgets and lack of strategic focus. The modern, professional Army requires bureaucratic processes in order to coordinate a complex and highly sophisticated system. The defense budgets have declined over the years, but they remain as much as 14 percent of the total federal budget. Managing those funds properly and legally requires a system of firm controls.”